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I very much appreciate the comments made over the years by colleagues,
students, and others who prompted me to think from different perspec-
tives. It is as Benjamin Franklin said: “I have experienced many instances 
of being obliged by better information, or fuller consideration, to change 
opinions even on important subjects, which I once thought right, but found 
to be otherwise. It is therefore that the older I grow, the more apt I am to 
doubt my own judgment, and to pay more respect to the judgment of oth-
ers” (quoted in Madison 1966, 653). The helpful suggestions from UMP 
senior editor Elizabeth Demers and anonymous reviewers are equally 
appreciated, and made for a better argument. However, there is one thing I 
need to say before the reader dives into the chapters. One of the reviewers 
pointed out that I should explain better the content and purpose of each 
chapter up front. I have tried to do so, but by mixing an American writing 
style, which is to state up front the question and answer, address the ques-
tion and answer in the midsection of the text, and repeat the question and 
answer at the end, with a writing style I learned in the Netherlands, which 
starts with a topic or question, builds an argument element by element, and 
then offers the overall view and conclusion at the end. 
Finally, a word for my mentors and my family. As for my mentors, I 
have been very fortunate throughout K-12 and higher education. Limiting 
myself to the latter, Professor Aris van Braam gave me my frst job at the 
University of Leiden and encouraged me to pursue a PhD. Professor Theo 
Toonen prompted me to write for an international audience, trusted me 
to run a student exchange program, and sought my collaboration in devel-
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oping custom-made programs for elected and appointed public servants 
from various countries. Professor Richard Stillman was the frst visiting 
professor in the Leiden student exchange program (1991), and he asked me 
to serve as managing editor of Public Administration Review (2006–2011).
Professor Gary Wamsley was the journal editor who patiently listened,
probed, and prodded, and through discussions we learned that American 
and European scholars have somewhat different understandings of “sub-
ject of knowledge.” I can only assume that they saw potential where I had 
not even thought of venturing. It is their example of mentorship I hope to 
emulate. We all thrive when paying forward. 
My wife, Julie Bivin Raadschelders, PhD, is always supportive. That she 
took it upon herself to read and edit another one of my books is wonderful.
While she is an American, she gives her comments, questions, and sugges-
tions Dutch-style, that is, without any concern for my ego. My children 
continue to let me do my thing; perhaps one day, as citizens of the world,
they might actually read this book. 














What Is Government? 
I have gathered a posy of other men’s fowers, and nothing but the 
thread that binds them is my own. (Montaigne 1595) 
Since the late nineteenth century, governments across the globe have 
become a key social phenomenon. Elements of this social phenomenon 
are studied in all of the social sciences, but in the interdisciplinary study of 
public administration, the insights are connected into an overall perspec-
tive on the position and role of government in society. The main title of 
this book, The Three Ages of Government, may not be the most alluring, but it 
captures precisely what this book is about. People experience and perceive 
government in the context of social, economic, political, technological, and 
cultural changes of today that are more rapid than such changes in the past. 
Government has changed signifcantly since the late nineteenth cen-
tury in terms of increasing (a) the number of personnel, (b) organizational 
differentiation, both horizontal and vertical, (c) the amount of primary 
and secondary legislation, and (d) revenue and expenditure. And, indeed,
government has grown, but the more fundamental and dramatic changes 
occurred some 10,000–12,000 years ago; then again some 6,000 years ago; 
and then again about 200–250 years ago. 
The frst big change is the Neolithic Agricultural Revolution, with the 
transformation from a hunter-gatherer existence to a sedentary and agri-
cultural economy. From this point forward, people created governments.
For the frst four millennia, this was self-government in fairly egalitar-
ian, sedentary communities. The second major change occurred as people 






















increasingly began living in urban communities around 6,000 years ago.
During this time, government became a more formal institutional arrange-
ment, and city-states and empires began emerging in various parts of the 
world. With the emergence of pristine states, governments generally 
became instruments of exploitation of the many by the few. The third big 
change, not so long ago, is the establishment and growth of a democratic 
government in various parts of the world that serves the people at large.
We can and should probe what governing as a social phenomenon and 
institutional arrangement is and then seek understanding of its three main 
manifestations: 
(1) self-government among people, which lasted some 4,000 years, 
(2) government above a society with subjects, which lasted almost 6,000 
years, and in many countries in the world continues to exist, and 
(3) government in a society with citizens, which represents a type of 
government that emerged during the time of the Atlantic Revolu-
tions; this type of democratic government represents a set of insti-
tutional arrangements to which citizens and governments are still 
adjusting. 
We can answer the question “What is government?” in various ways.
The most common way is to identify major changes in our own time,
identifying how something has shifted considerably from one situation to 
another in one’s lifetime. With regard to government, one example is the 
emphasis placed in recent decades on the shift from government to gov-
ernance. There is a prophetic element to this idea of a transition since it 
suggests that an author has identifed something that many others have 
not yet noticed. The problem is that while such shifts are easily claimed,
they are not so easily empirically confrmed. A second common approach 
is the attempt to fnd some universal features in the comparative study of 
political-administrative systems. The problem with this approach is that it 
is impossible to avoid getting bogged down in comparing country-specifc 
features of government and governing. Both these approaches suffer from 
a rather short time perspective. A third approach considers “government”
in the context of the “state” as social phenomenon. Political scientists and 
anthropologists in particular have paid considerable attention to state-
making and to the coercive role of the state in society (see chapter 1), but in 
a public administration perspective, the state is nothing more, nothing less 
than a territorial expression of sovereignty. To be sure, the political science 
















   
 
   
 
Introduction 3 
emphasis marginalizes attention to the position and role of government.
Government is not merely that set of institutional arrangements which 
provides domestic services. Instead, it is the set of institutional arrange-
ments within the state through which those in and with political and eco-
nomic power take action. Thus, with this book I augment the literature 
focused on the state and state-making by focusing on government through 
the lens of a scholar of public administration. This public administration 
perspective is less common; it is a bird’s-eye view that considers the posi-
tion and role of government in society over time and across the globe, and 
it requires a defnition of government that travels easily across historical 
time and geographical contexts. 
Governments are constantly changing and growing over time but 
at varying speeds and intensities. It appears, however, that governments 
all over the world have grown more rapidly in the past 150 years than 
at any time before. Indeed, there is no historical precedent for the posi-
tion and role of governments today, especially in democratic political sys-
tems. Given that rapid growth of government, many social scientists have 
studied elements of this social phenomenon relevant to their disciplinary 
interest. Political scientists study power and its role in and around gov-
ernment. Anthropologists study the emergence of “pristine states.” Econ-
omists study scarcity in markets, how the market is regulated, and how 
resources are allocated in and by government. Sociologists study interac-
tion and government-citizen relations. Psychologists study processes of the 
mind and, for example, how individual worldviews, expectations, choices,
and habits infuence decisions made under pressure. Public administration 
scholars and practitioners have been focused on solving social problems 
through practical, operational approaches. In the early twentieth century,
they looked at organizational structure, leadership, decision-making, and 
the range of administrative skills in personnel and fnancial management 
that would improve government. After decades of searching for practical 
solutions and acknowledging the vastly increased role of government in 
society, some scholars suggested the need for a more contemplative per-
spective upon government. Thus, Marshall Dimock (1956), Christopher 
Hodgkinson (1982), and Edoardo Ongaro (2017) wrote a philosophy of 
public administration, but with an eye on the present only. 
Meanwhile, much of public administration scholarship continues to 
focus on operational-level challenges of personnel management, budget-
ing and fnance, performance management and measurement, cost-beneft 
analysis of policies, and so on. Make no mistake, these are critical research 
topics, but given governments’ vastly expanded role in societies today,











we should also address the question “What is government?” by drawing 
upon the various academic studies and disciplines that have explored self-
government and government in order to develop a comprehensive under-
standing of this social phenomenon. So this book is neither a philosophy 
of government nor a philosophy of the study of public administration. It is 
a study of the position and role of government in society and assumes that 
government is real in its consequences for our lives. However, this study is 
not an ontology that deals with the nature of being. It is, instead, a social 
ontology (see chapter 2) focused on how humans perceive the social events,
phenomena, and interactions that concern governing arrangements that 
are experienced as real in their consequences for the lives of people. That 
being said, this book is not written for the small community of scholars 
who developed social ontologies to probe and better understand the deep 
nature of the social and institutional arrangements that human beings have 
made to structure and govern society (Bhaskar 1978, 1986, 1998; Lawson 
2015, 2016; Searle 1995, 2003, 2006, 2010). It is a social ontology, written 
for both scholars of public administration and for other scholars whose 
work includes attention to government, as well as for the educated public 
and elected and appointed public offceholders. 
Colleagues and others familiar with my work will expect a strong his-
torical element in this book. They are correct, but this study does not 
augment or amend descriptive works such as those by political scientist 
Samuel Finer (1997) on the history of government and by political scientist 
Francis Fukuyama on the origins of political order (2011, 2014). Sociolo-
gist Michael Mann wrote an extensive study of the sources of social power 
(1986, 1993, 2012, 2013), and it is unusual in its masterly combination of 
descriptive detail and analytical power and will serve our understanding 
for decades to come. Indeed, Finer’s, Fukuyama’s, and Mann’s volumes do 
not need another similar attempt. The authors of these studies show that 
there is no single set of causes for the various trajectories that countries 
“followed” in their public institutional arrangements. I agree with Mann’s 
assertion that any event is intertwined with multiple causes and contingent 
factors. Hence, a global history of government and a global perspective 
on what government is are not possible based on a descriptive approach.
In addition, there are plenty of studies concerning the role of the state 
and government in specifc countries, such as those by Box (2018), Durant 
(2020), and Sparrow et al. (2015) on the United States. These need not be 
duplicated. Instead, I present an understanding of government that is rel-
evant to any governing system across the globe. I do so by taking observant 














genetic heritage and instincts, their sense of community and sociality, and 
how these two—instinct and community—come to terms with living in the 
multiethnic and multicultural global civil society of this age. 
This is important because people have little understanding of the posi-
tion and role of government in society. In many places across the globe 
government is perceived and experienced as a property of the elite, not as 
a vessel for meeting the needs that (groups of) individuals cannot satisfy on 
their own. When government is experienced as being above the people as 
subjects, few will think much about government beyond its oppressive or 
exploitative nature. Indeed, most will think as scholars did from antiquity 
up to the early modern age: government is something that concerns ruler-
ruled relations. It is only since the seventeenth century that practitioners 
and scholars in Western Europe have written about government as some-
thing that could and should provide services to people at large beyond the 
traditional regalian services of police, military, and justice. 
People in parts of the world where democracy is still a dream need to 
know what it involves and what it can do for them. People in parts of the 
world where pluralist democracy is established need to be informed about 
what it takes to be a citizen. In true democracies, citizens are expected to 
be active participants in the political process. Citizens need to understand 
what it means that in democracies government is the only actor that has 
the authority to make binding decisions on behalf of all living in the juris-
diction. That this is a fairly recent phenomenon in the history of governing 
is not widely appreciated. Understanding the position and role of govern-
ment, irrespective of whether one lives in a democratic political system, is 
important in a world that is globalizing. It is hugely important in democ-
racies that in the past 20 years or so have experienced increased political 
infuence from right-wing extremists. One scholar has even argued, and 
quite convincingly so, that democracy is devouring itself because the citi-
zenry is uninformed (Rosenberg 2019). Through this book I hope to offer 
people a way of understanding the position and role of (a) government in 
general, (b) government as the property of the happy few, and (c) govern-
ment in democratic political systems. 
I seek to reach out to colleagues in academe as well as to interested citi-
zens and public offceholders because all should be included in a conversa-
tion about what government is. This is especially important in an age when 
citizens increasingly distrust their governments and the truthfulness of 
information and when civic education has been marginalized. To make this 
book accessible to a wide-ranging audience, I avoid academic language, and 
I hope it will read like “a welcoming conversation . . . with relatives around 






















a kitchen table, with old stories mixing seamlessly with recent ones” (Cal-
lahan 2012, 243). 
This book is ambitious and audacious, for there is no way that I have 
read, let alone digested, everything that could be relevant to the matter 
of this study. My colleagues in public administration and other social sci-
ences may think it pretentious, for I dabble in a variety of disciplines and 
specializations as an amateur. In my defense, I write this not as an expert in 
any of these disciplines and specializations, but as a public administration 
and history scholar who, after almost forty years of studying the emergence 
and development of government, wants to write up his thoughts about the 
development of the governing capacity of human beings and of govern-
ments’ role in societies over time in their geographical contexts. 
Studying and making notes on this topic for decades has humbled me
in many ways. I have not developed new empirical knowledge in this book;
I have merely connected dots that have not been connected before in the
study of public administration. In this effort, I am reminded of the humility
of economist and political scientist Charles Lindblom, who observed that
all of his ideas were “refnements of already familiar hypotheses or beliefs”
(1997, 235; see also Lindblom 1993). Just like political scientist and anthro-
pologist James C. Scott, I canvassed many sources: “The creative aspect, if
there was any, was to make out this gestalt and to connect the dots” (Scott
2009, xi). About his most recent book Scott wrote that “it creates no new
knowledge of its own but aims, at its most ambitious to ‘connect the dots’ of
existing knowledge” (2017, xi). Historical sociologist W. G. Runciman said
that he relied on “the work of authors whose fndings and interpretations I
have no competence to discuss” (2001, 235). In the same vein, political sci-
entist Alexander Wendt noted that he could not speak with “any real author-
ity” about the various philosophical and scientifc discourses he accessed
when preparing to unify physical and social ontology (2015, 32, 36). 
Lindblom, Runciman, Scott and Wendt engaged in what Bell Tele-
phone CEO Chester Barnard in the 1930s called “patterned reasoning.”
I do the same. In this book, I am not a scholar-discoverer who contrib-
utes new knowledge through meticulous empirical work. Instead, I am 
scholar-teacher who presents a new perspective upon government, hoping 
to convince the audience that government can be conceptualized and thus 
understood in a more nuanced way. In the academy, scholars are focused on 
discovering something new and publishing in frst-tier journals. It becomes 
increasingly diffcult to, frst, keep up with all that is published (Ostrom and 
Hess 2011, 60), and, second, develop a view of the forest rather than the 















develop new and empirically confrmed knowledge, that is, evidence-based 
knowledge, but also make the effort to explore what all that knowledge 
amounts to, what meaning it has in and for our social lives, and to develop 
deep understanding and wide-ranging overviews. A wide-ranging overview 
is not one where a lot of disparate knowledge is regurgitated. Instead, it 
selects a point of departure from which to navigate available knowledge 
and chart a novel course. Accordingly, this study is what sociologist and 
political historian Charles Tilly called a macrohistorical analysis (1984, 61) 
focused on a specifc big structure (government) and its emergence and 
subsequent development in society. 
Since this study is not empirical by nature, it is not structured on the 
basis of the interplay between description and explanation; instead, it is 
exploratory. In fact, (causal) answers to a question such as “What is govern-
ment?” are not possible. Given the “plurality of causes and intermixture of 
effects,” we must be content with being a “science of tendencies”—never 
knowing how a particular cause will operate in a particular context (Mill 
1930 [1843]), 285, 585). In the early twentieth century, one can almost 
imagine Max Weber sighing when he wondered, “How can causal explana-
tions of an individual fact be possible? . . . The number and nature of causes 
that contributed to an individual event is always infnite” (1985, 177; author 
translation). Weber focused on a specifc event, yet the challenges of expla-
nation are compounded in comparative research. This was noted by the 
Swedish economist and sociologist Gunnar Myrdal, whose “circular and 
cumulative causation” points to the interplay and reinforcement of various 
economic, social, and cultural factors (1957). It was also noted by the Ger-
man public administration scholar Fritz Scharpf: “For comparative policy 
research, this means that the potential number of different constellations 
of situational and institutional factors will be extremely large—so large, in 
fact, that it is rather unlikely that exactly the same factor combination will 
appear in many empirical cases” (1997, 23; also quoted in Ostrom 2005,
10). And, as Elinor Ostrom reiterated: “The many relevant variables, the 
immense number of combinations of these variables that exist, and their 
organization into multiple levels of analysis make understanding organiza-
tional social life a complex endeavor” (2005, 11). 
We fnd the same reminder in a study on the impact of social science 
and social scientists: “Every social science must handle an inescapable ten-
sion between knowledge advanced by the reductionist research tactic of 
focusing down on simple processes while ‘controlling’ for more and more 
factors; and the recognition that all social processes operate in complex,
multicausal environments, where hundreds of thousands of infuences 














fux and interact with each other to shape any given social or behavioural 
outcome, and where the same outcome can eventuate through multiple 
diverse causal pathways” (Bastow et al. 2014, xvii). With regard to research 
that takes a wide-ranging historical perspective, Norwegian international 
relations scholars Iver Neumann and Einar Wigen observed that the num-
ber of variables at play is so large that it is very hard to establish that any 
one phenomenon is a causal effect of any one set of historical patterns 
(2015, 110). 
If anything, historical study that draws upon a great variety of academic 
disciplines and specializations cannot be but confgurational (Halperin 
and Palan 2015, 245). Sociologist Norbert Elias introduced the concept 
of fguration in the late 1930s and regarded it as capturing the nature of 
nonquantitative research that is more commonly referred to as qualitative 
research. He believed that social reality can only be understood in terms 
of the forces, whether planned or unplanned, emanating from how people 
interact with and infuence one another (Elias 1987, 166; Linklater and 
Mennell 2010, 388). 
Earlier I implicitly argued that scholars of public administration need to 
develop a deep understanding of government in human society. A scholar 
of public administration and history can do so because public administra-
tion is an interdisciplinary umbrella under which it is possible to develop 
an encompassing perspective on government in society. To reiterate, this 
effort is as relevant to colleagues in other academic pursuits as it is to citi-
zens and public offceholders. Having been born and raised in the Neth-
erlands, and living and working in the United States since 1998, I may 
be accused of having a Eurocentric or Western bias. However, for several 
reasons I think this book presents a global perspective. First, government 
has been a feature of human societies since they became sedentary. It is 
thus a global phenomenon. Second, for some 6,000 years government was 
the domain of political and economic elites, and they were war-makers 
that exploited the resources of the polity. This situation still exists in many 
parts of the globe. Third, it is only in the past 240–250 years that some 
governments have redirected their objectives to becoming peace-makers 
and welfare-makers, and the democracy that characterizes these political 
systems is still under development. 
My interest in this topic stems from two parallel lines of interest and 
study. From fourth grade on, I was fascinated with history and knew I 
wanted to study it. I was particularly enthralled with discoveries concern-
ing the evolution of the hominid genus. My BA thesis in history at the 




















Homo sapiens people transitioned from magic (i.e., the attempt to manipu-
late the supernatural) to religion (i.e., submission to the supernatural) as 
assessed on the basis of burial practices. One of my minors while pursuing 
a graduate degree in history at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands 
was public administration. That opened up conceptual lenses with which I 
felt better able to understand the past. I started making notes on the history 
of government after coming across a study by Leiden anthropologist Henri 
Claessen and his Czech colleague Peter Skalnik, The Early State (1978).
My early notes were handwritten since I had no typewriter, let alone a 
computer. I have been making notes on this subject ever since, including 
summaries of books, but also thoughts for further research and future writ-
ing, on state-making, nation-building, citizenship, and the development of 
government in general using whatever source I happened to stumble upon.
Several books (1990, 1996, 1998a, 1998b, 2002, 2005) and lots of articles 
and chapters on aspects of (Dutch) administrative history have come out 
of this line of study. 
The second line of study concerns my public administration’s so-called 
identity crisis, and this became an interest after I had completed my PhD in 
public administration and was teaching mainstream public administration 
classes. Cutting a long story short, one night I woke up having “dreamed” a 
“wheel of public administration.” As is my habit, I got up, made some quick 
notes, and went back to sleep. That wheel was eventually published (1999),
and several articles followed on the nature of the study of public adminis-
tration. These culminated in an epistemology of and for such study (2011).
It has a well-defned identity, in my view, albeit not of the nineteenth-
century type with topical and methodological boundaries clearly defned 
by the scholarly community that “owns” the discipline. At the same time,
I have been busy developing an interdisciplinary public administration 
perspective of government that does not present the study as a string of 
specializations. My 2003 book was an attempt to map the study of pub-
lic administration, and it targets a graduate student audience. The book 
coauthored with Eran Vigoda-Gadot (with Mirit Kisner) (2015) presents 
a global view and shows that all governments have adopted a specifc ter-
ritorial and hierarchical structuring of jurisdictions and organizations. In 
terms of function, how things are done (political-administrative processes) 
and what is done (policy), political-administrative systems vary with soci-
etal context. That book is useful to both graduate and upper-level under-
graduate students. The most recent book, coedited with Richard Stillman 
(2017), identifes major research questions in the various specializations of 
the study, and is of service to doctoral students. 
























Where does this book ft in my intellectual development? It seems I 
have been studying government and its study of public administration 
“backward,” from mapping the layered nature of the study’s content (2003),
to exploring how government can be known (2011a and 2011b), to calling 
for attention to social ontology (2012), to what questions we can answer 
(2017), to—in the book before you—what government actually is. Look-
ing back, I do not believe it could have been otherwise. This social ontol-
ogy about a specifc social phenomenon could only have been written after 
reading and assimilating a wide-ranging literature. Whether all this read-
ing, assimilating, and reporting has been done in a manner acceptable and 
interesting to colleagues, students, and citizens is for the reader to decide. 
This book pulls together my thinking and writing about the emergence
and development of government as a social phenomenon. When fnalizing
the text, and especially when putting together the author index, I noticed
how often I have referenced myself. If this comes across as vanity, so be it.
For me, this is merely tracing my lines of thought through past decades.This
book is certainly not any overview of any “discoveries” I have made.That is, I
can neither claim to have changed worldviews the way that Galileo, Newton,
Darwin, Einstein, and Hubble did, nor claim that I rediscovered something
hidden deep in humanity’s understanding and experience such as Herbert
Simon’s bounded rationality or Elinor Ostrom’s self-government capacity.
Apart from some original empirical and archival work on the development
of local government in the Netherlands (1990, 1994), on the emergence
and development of the Dutch Itinerary Merchants Association (1996), and
some empirical articles, my main work in the study of public administration
is nothing more, nothing less than tracing the history of government and
thinking about the study and its material object. 
The structure of this book is perhaps traditional even though its con-
tent is not so traditional for a public administration readership. In chapter 
1, I discuss ideas of twentieth-century social commentators and scholars 
about the role of government in society. It appears that change is perceived 
as being more intense in this day and age than at any time before, and so 
special attention is given to trends that various individuals identify with 
regard to state and government. In this chapter I also discuss recent claims 
and concerns of public administration scholars with regard to the relevance 
of the study’s research for society at large. I examine the concept of public 
administration, which I choose to understand in terms of the generalist and 
interdisciplinary pursuit that this book represents. 
As you can expect, there are different appreciations of the meaning of 

















lighted in chapter 1 is relevant to government and study of it: the glo-
rious decades of declining economic and political inequality during the 
1945–1975 period are behind us, a shift infuenced by government policies 
in a variety of Western countries. We have, however, the knowledge and 
understanding to turn that tide around. The theme of the glorious decades 
will return in the fnal chapter. This frst chapter serves as a descriptive 
map of how we think about government in our own time, and it is nec-
essary because it serves as point of departure for our question, “What is 
government?” 
Chapter 2 presents the overall conceptual frame of reference for this 
study and starts with a discussion of government as an artifce of human cre-
ation. This serves as the basis for a brief description of what a social ontology
is and why it is a useful approach for understanding public institutional 
arrangements. Next, I briefy revisit earlier comments about hierarchies of 
knowledge, that is, how knowledge in general is structured and how, more 
specifcally, we can approach the understanding of government (Raad-
schelders 2011, 47–61). This provides the rationale for what I regard as 
three drivers in the emergence and development of government: human 
instinct and intent, tribal community, and global society. The emergence and 
development of government is infuenced by instinctual as well as inten-
tional actions at the individual level, by group and community needs, and 
by environmental forces at the societal and global levels. Each of these 
three drivers (and there can be others) has left its mark in the institutional 
arrangements for governing, and they will be further explored in detail in 
chapters 3 to 5. 
Continuing to build the overall conceptual framework in chapter 2, I 
expand the time horizon to the past 250 years or so, with special attention 
to the decades preceding and following 1800. It is in those decades that the 
foundation was laid for large-scale democratic government: there is no his-
torical precedent for the kind of democratic political systems in which vari-
ous peoples of the world today are fortunate enough to live. The changes 
in public institutional arrangements in the past 250 years are described in 
terms of the levels of analysis distinguished by Kiser and Ostrom (1982).
The four elements of the overall framework for this book are (1) a view 
of government as an artifact of human creation, (2) a social ontological 
approach, (3) recognition of hierarchies of knowledge, and (4) use of varied 
levels of analysis. The concepts of human instinct and intent, tribal com-
munity, and global society are only briefy touched upon in chapter 2, and 
further conceptually developed in an ensuing chapter, one for each of the 
three concepts. 



















Chapters 3 to 5 examine the periods implied in the subtitle of this book 
and, together, move the time horizon further back, starting with the period 
in which government emerges for the frst time in human history (chap-
ter 3), how it developed (chapter 4), and what new challenges it has faced 
in recent decades (chapter 5). In chapter 3 I explore the extent to which 
human instinct and intent shape the role of government in society and 
how they continue to infuence governing. The activity of governing is not 
abstract and does not take place outside of ourselves. Governing is a human 
activity and is highly infuenced by balancing instinctual, prerational inclinations 
and intentional, rational actions. Proper appreciation of this requires atten-
tion to the major advances primatologists have made in understanding 
the behavior of primates, and to studies by evolutionary psychologists on 
human evolution. We see that a variety of features of government today are 
embedded in our genetic heritage. Again, one can claim that government 
represents a balancing act between the satisfaction of prerational and non-
rational needs and desires, on the one hand, and of rationalist-purposive 
objectives, on the other. This is why we need to be familiar with these areas 
of research, as they provide important conceptual elements (e.g., instinct 
and intent, nature-nurture, sociality). 
Chapter 4 explores our group or “tribal” inclinations, starting back in 
prehistory, when we lived in small communities. In these physical commu-
nities, the band was an in-group where members knew each other; it was 
a concrete community. In imagined communities, the in-group can be as 
large as a territorial state, and then one can argue that in an abstract sense 
there are, for instance, Argentinian, Australian, Chinese, Dutch, and South 
African “tribes.” Tribalism continues to defne the behavior and policies 
of people in territorial states and has not lost its deep roots in human-
ity’s genetic heritage, but to varying degrees it is embodied in institutional 
arrangements that emulate the dynamics of sharing, caring, confict reso-
lution, and so on, which ensure survival of the group. The psychology of 
human beings is still wired for a society of small-scale groups , even though 
we are increasingly living in a global society. Chapter 4 is lengthy since it 
concerns how government’s role in societies across the globe has changed 
over time. The literature on that subject is huge, and the chapter offers 
only the highlights, with examples from all parts of the globe. The refer-
ences, though, will provide the reader with the opportunity to follow up 
with in-depth studies concerning various countries and world regions. The 
conceptual element added in this chapter is the idea that there have been 
four major phases of socioeconomic development, three structuring con-







   
 
 




    
Introduction 13 
The largest community of people that has been emerging in recent 
years is the global community. Globalization in its various manifestations 
is highly infuential on (changes in) the role of government in society. It is 
most likely that the extent to which we act instinctually and on the basis 
of in-group and out-group thinking is still so great that we have not quite 
come to terms with what to do about living in an increasingly global soci-
ety on the one hand, and increasingly multiethnic and multicultural soci-
eties on the other. While chapters 3 and 4 are concerned with biological,
psychological, and social evolution, in chapter 5 I describe how our cultural 
and technological evolution has outpaced our biological and psychologi-
cal evolution. Indeed, cultural and technological evolution is propelling 
humanity toward a global society, even though people are not yet global 
citizens. The conceptual pieces added in this chapter are a discussion of 
what globalization and global society actually are. 
I pursue a very different line of inquiry in chapter 6, where I seek to 
identify what makes government in large-scale democracies different from 
its historical predecessors. Being a simplifer, like Herbert Simon,1 I pon-
der the question of what is different about government today and simply 
state that for millennia, governments were the property of the few who 
enjoyed political and economic power and were focused on structuring 
their territory, organizations, and activities. With regard to the latter, the 
structuring of activities was focused on organizing particular services with 
an eye on output and, to a lesser extent, outcome. Thus, the focus was on 
product. What makes government, at least in democracies, stand out is that 
in terms of political theory it is no longer the property of a privileged class 
and that much attention is given to governing as a process. I discuss two 
elements that are central to contemporary government in democracies,
namely the processes of negotiable authority and multisource decision-
making. In other words, government structures and processes are not set in 
stone, but are instead open to change. That is, democratic governments are 
not characterized by preservation of the status quo, but by willingness to 
adapt to changing environmental (political, cultural, economic, social, etc.) 
circumstances in order to serve better the population at large. 
In the fnal chapter, I return to the overall question of what government 
is by focusing again on our own day and age. In chapters 3 and 4 I discuss 
elements relevant to governments in all times and contexts, in chapter 5 
I identify the impact of a notion of global society upon governing, and in 
chapter 6 consider governing processes under democratic conditions. In 
chapter 7, I combine that past and present by reviewing the main argu-
ments of this book and pondering the vulnerabilities of democratic politi-








cal systems. I discuss challenges that confront governments and citizens as 
a result of their operating based upon instinctual and intellectual stimuli 
and a spirit of community, given that they face the daunting task of learning 
to live as global citizens. My recommendation of how to do this is almost as 
old as humankind. Whether that recommendation is religious or secular in 
expression makes no difference, for it amounts to the same thing: democracy 
can thrive only on the basis of individual and institutional self-restraint. Such 
self-restraint is the secret to a society where all boats, not just those of 
the powerful and wealthy, can rise, and it was during the glorious 30 years 
following the end of World War II that we had a glimpse of this possibil-
ity in large, urbanized communities in the Western world. While I write 
this book as a global perspective on, and a social ontology of, government 
in society, I also write it as a plea for policymakers to learn from the past 
and see that past experience can serve citizens in the twenty-frst century.
I have already mentioned that democracies are characterized by the abil-
ity to change in response to changing environmental circumstances, but 
this requirement of self-restraint adds an important caveat: adaptation will 
work only when those in political power are willing to serve and stand up 
for the population at large. As soon as political power is captured by eco-







     




Understanding Government in Society 
The Past 50 Years 
What is government itself but the greatest of all refections on 
human nature? (Federalist no. 51) 
One way of breaking the ice at a social gathering is to ask, “So, what do you 
study?” When you mention physics, psychology, history, dance, or theol-
ogy, people nod in understanding, since these are common subjects in high 
school or elsewhere. But when you answer, “Public administration,” eyes 
glaze over, because it is not a common subject. Civics has not been a man-
datory course for the past 30 or 40 years. But once you have made clear that 
public administration is about government, you are not the only expert in 
the room. Everyone has opinions about government: Government can-
not be trusted. Government is bureaucratic, riddled with red tape, slow 
and unresponsive. Government collects too much in taxes and should leave 
people alone. Government is too big. 
Let’s review some of these notions. People say government is a big 
bureaucracy, but big in comparison to what? Any organization of a certain 
size (say above 30 to 50 employees) cannot but be organized and operate as 
a bureaucracy. So Microsoft, Apple, Boeing, Girl Scouts of America, Hua-
wei, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, Amazon, Carrefour, Walmart,
Heineken, Shell, HSBC, and so on, are also bureaucracies. 
Government is perceived as ineffcient and full of red tape, but most 
people don’t consider that a paper trail might be useful. Kaufman’s thought,
“One person’s ‘red tape’ may be another person’s treasured safeguard,”
has not lost its relevance (2015, 1). In fact, people seldom consider that 












their lives are improved by what government does, and this has been the 
case in the world since the late nineteenth century. In the classroom I ask 
students to give examples of what is not infuenced by government: they 
might mention the color of your hair, the shoes you wear, or the num-
ber of times you kiss your partner on a given day. But apart from such 
personal matters, almost everything involves government, if not via direct 
service delivery, then via regulation. Governments provide a wide range of 
services, including fre protection, policing, parks and recreation, defense 
(protecting the citizenry from foreign aggression through the military),
water supply, elementary and secondary education, justice, road construc-
tion and maintenance, health care, elderly care, environmental protection,
and so on. Governments regulate many additional aspects of life: the dye 
used in clothing (cobalt blue cannot be used in dyeing jeans because it is 
a carcinogen), medication, the quality of produce in supermarkets, and so 
on. People do not realize that in today’s densely populated, urban societies,
they really cannot live without government. 
Contemporary governments, certainly in the democratic political sys-
tems, are very different from their historical predecessors. They actually 
provide a wide range of traditional and social services and operate based 
on a rationale of service to the public at large. That is, governments in 
democracies are intended to serve all citizens, and not only the ruling elite.
Indeed, for most of history, government was the property of those with 
political and economic power, and they used bureaucracy as an instrument 
that helped them stay in power. The bulk of the population was subject to 
those in power and had no voice in governing. So what government is and 
does varies by time and by context, but it is possible to give a defnition of 
government that is not bound by time and context: 
Government is an institutional arrangement that people develop once 
they start living under sedentary conditions and with growing popu-
lations, so that they can be assured that internal and external order and 
safety are maintained as best as possible despite the fact that they live 
in imagined communities (Raadschelders and Stillman 2017, 1) 
This defnition captures self-governing and governing institutional arrange-
ments established in sedentary and agricultural communities, historic and 
stratifed city-states, principalities, kingdoms, republics and empires, and 
the territorial states of today. It emphasizes three features of government: it 
is human-made, it seeks to safeguard a minimum level of security through 



















Understanding Government in Society 17 
[1932]) or imagined communities (Anderson 2005). These are communi-
ties where an individual knows only a small fraction of other people in the 
community, and they are very different from the physical, small communi-
ties of people of the prehistoric hunter-gatherer societies where everyone 
knew everyone else. With the exception of the small hunter-gatherer bands 
still in existence (e.g., the !Kung in the Kalahari Desert, the Yanomami 
in the Amazon River basin, the Aborigines in Northern Australia), most 
people no longer only live in the physical communities of old where an 
individual knows everyone else. As imagined communities grow larger 
in population size and density, so do their governments grow in terms of 
range and scope of public services. 
The defnition of government provided earlier covers the entire contin-
uum between self-governing sedentary local communities, on the one end,
compassionate government in the middle, and oppressive government, on 
the other end, since it is inclusive of the basic minimum features of all col-
lective and public institutional arrangements that can be described as “gov-
ernment.” No one disputes that government is an artifcial, human-made,
institutional arrangement. That people almost instinctually create a gov-
ernment once population size and density increase beyond the point where 
everyone knows everyone is a fact and will be further explored in chapter 
3. Where governments vary is in (a) how many people are involved in gov-
erning and (b) what these functionaries do to ensure internal and exter-
nal order and safety. At a minimum, all governments ensure internal order 
and safety through policing and through judicial services. In addition, all 
governments provide external order and safety via a military. Almost from 
the start of governing, these three regalian functions have been fnanced 
through taxation, and for millennia police, justice, and military have been 
the organizational expressions of order and safety. 
The functions of government changed in the early modern age, when 
the likes of Antonio Serra in early seventeenth-century Italy, Christiaan 
von Wolf in mid-eighteenth-century Germany, and Nicolas de Condorcet 
in late eighteenth-century France suggested that order and safety might 
also be advanced through the provision of welfare functions and services.
The expansion of government services into such areas as health, education,
elderly care, childcare, unemployment, and help following natural disasters 
(e.g., hurricanes) and human-made disasters (e.g., terrorism) is driven by 
the notion that we have basic human rights, that we all have equal oppor-
tunity to access them, and that we are all equal under the law. 
In this chapter I describe what characterizes government in democ-
racies today (section 1), what positions government in general, not only 












   
 
democracies, can occupy in society (section 2), what roles governments can 
occupy in society (section 3), and what trends various scholars identify with 
regard to government in society in the past 50 years or so (section 4). Thus 
in section 1, the position of governments concerns its relations with other 
social actors in the structure of society. What roles government can play 
basically concerns its functions, such as very small government, or a wel-
fare state government, etc. Next, I outline what has been done and could 
be done in the study of public administration to advance the understanding 
of government in society (section 5). The concluding section is devoted to 
why we need to contemplate what government is and can be. The content 
of that section will be revisited at length in the fnal chapter of this book. 
1. Government Today 
For the frst 4,000 years that people lived in sedentary communities, start-
ing some 10,000 years ago, governing arrangements are best characterized 
as self-government, and these arrangements are comparable to the com-
mon pool resource management systems (CPRs) studied by Elinor Ostrom 
and her many associates. These self-governing communities were mostly 
egalitarian and lacked hereditary leadership. Once people started living in 
urban communities, about 6,000 years ago, societies became stratifed, and 
government became the instrument through which ruler(s) and elites con-
trolled or tried to control society. Society and its resources were treated by 
rulers and elites as property, and were so perceived by their subjects. It is 
only in the past two to two and a half centuries that government’s role in 
some societies has changed, and it has done so signifcantly. That is to say,
in democratic political systems, government serves a stratifed society, but 
with elements of, and efforts to enhance, citizen participation and estab-
lish some degree of equity and equality (i.e., not egalitarian). This change 
happened so quickly that humans are still learning how to deal with this 
relatively new social phenomenon of government in society rather than 
government above society. Government as changed from the purview of 
the few into an abstraction that encompasses all. Government today is 
expected to meet challenges that collectives of people cannot, whether 
organized as interest groups, as nonprofts, or as private companies. There 
is no historical precedent for the range and scope of government activities 
and services today, which has been expanding almost continuously since 
the late nineteenth century. Government today is constantly adapting to a 

















Understanding Government in Society 19 
moving target for government, and government is a constantly moving 
target for society and its citizens. 
After some 6,000 years of government by and for elites, we now have in 
some parts of the world 200 or more years of experience with government 
under expanding democracy, where people are citizens with the opportu-
nity to participate, rather than subjects who simply do as they are told (see 
chapter 2). As such governments adapt to their new service role in a demo-
cratic polity, people must adapt to a historically new role as active citizens 
with rights as well as duties, rather than merely passive subject. In other 
words, people in democracies have to recognize that government is us, that 
the potential to self-govern is not only instinctual (see chapter 3) or limited 
to small and medium-size groups (see chapter 4), but may stretch to a ter-
ritorial state or even to a global society (see chapter 5). People living in less 
democratic or nondemocratic systems will have to assess for themselves 
how appealing the potential of democracy is. They must also recognize 
that a particular set of institutional arrangements cannot be transplanted 
from one country to the next. Instead, democracy has to be adapted to the 
national historical, political, economic, social, and cultural circumstances.
In other words, democratic government can be described in the abstract 
but must be indigenized in the concrete situation. 
Contemporary democratic government differs from its authoritarian 
historical predecessors in how it is understood, perceived, and defned.
Up to the middle or late eighteenth century, the concepts of government 
and governance referred to the multiple, complex, and overlapping ways 
of governing individuals and groups: army, church, family, university, trad-
ing company, free cities, alliances, colonies, the poor, consumers, pirates,
nations, states, and so on. By the generation of Thomas Paine, Immanuel 
Kant, and Georg Hegel, “government” came to be used primarily in refer-
ence to formal, public “practices of governance” in a representative, demo-
cratic, and constitutional state (Tully 2008a, 21). Intriguingly, despite that 
narrowing of the concepts of “government’ and “governance,” people still 
perceive themselves as “below” or “under” government. Government is an 
institution “above” the people, as has been the case for most of history,
rather than a commons, shared as is the case under true self-governance in,
for instance, CPRs or the formalized institutional arrangements in democ-
racy. Indeed, in political theory, under democratic institutional arrange-
ments, citizens are the sovereign and government is its servant. As indi-
viduals, people remain subject to the government they themselves have 
created. As government is, in the eyes of Alexander Hamilton, a refection 
of human nature, it must be its creation as well. 
20 The Three Ages of Government 
 
 
   
   
 







For millennia, thinking about government was focused on the relation 
between ruler and ruled, and more specifcally on politics and the use of 
power by a coercive state. State and politics were unavoidable concepts in 
any book about government. However, I will not dwell on a discussion of 
the various defnitions of state and politics but for a few elements. 
In Max Weber’s defnition, a state is characterized by (a) continuous 
territory, (b) relatively centralized administration, (c) organizations differ-
entiated from other societal organizations, and (d) a monopoly over the 
use of violence (Weber 1946a, 78;; Tilly 1975, 27). For most of history,
the state was “personal,” that is, identifed with and by a single sovereign 
whose authority was guaranteed by an apparatus of offcials (Dyson 1980,
28). The three types of state in Europe distinguished by Tilly (1990, 21),
that is, city-states (and later, urban federations of city-states), tribute-
taking empires, and national states, exist in the history of all other parts of 
the world. The state as we know it was born when patrimonialism ended 
(Badie and Birnbaum 1983, 21). That is, by the end of the Middle Ages 
and the early modern age in Europe, the state was less often regarded as 
the property of one individual and his ruling elite. The state then became 
impersonal and permanent (Badie and Birnbaum 1983, 40; Dyson 1980,
33). Since the early modern period, the state has been regarded as a geo-
graphic, territorial entity that is sovereign; government is what administers 
or rules this territory and its people through elected and appointed rep-
resentatives. The emergence of the state in various world regions, that is,
pristine states, has attracted much attention from political scientists and 
anthropologists (Tilly 1975, 1990; Skocpol 1979; Carneiro 1970; Clae-
sen and Skalnik 1978; Claesen 2016). This book augments that literature,
offering a public administration perspective by focusing on government. 
The contemporary state, politics, and government are very different 
from institutional arrangements of power before sixteenth century. A gen-
eral and timeless defnition of politics is Harold Lasswell’s “who gets what,
when, and how,” and this process is guided by the general rules that (some) 
people design and that all people are expected to live by. Robert Dahl’s 
politics as “any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to 
a signifcant extent, control, infuence, power, or authority” (1991, 4) is 
equally timeless but could apply to the state and its government as well as 
to other societal organizations, such as, for instance, the Roman Catholic 
Church, labor unions, and neighborhood associations. Rather than identi-
fed by a universal defnition, politics in democratic societies should be 










    
 










   
  
  
Understanding Government in Society 21 
For most of history, politics was about the naked (ab)use of power, and
what is different about politics under democratic rule is, as Sir Bernard Crick
notes (1992, 141), that it “is a way of ruling in divided societies without undue
violence” (see also Spicer 2010, 2; 2014, 67).Where in most historical societies
the use of violence is not limited to government only, Max Weber emphasizes
that the use of violence in the modern state is solely the purview of govern-
ment. He provides a broad defnition of politics as “any kind of independent
leadership in action,” but in the modern state (and thus its government), poli-
tics cannot be defned in terms of its ends, but “only in terms of its specifc
means peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely, the use of physi-
cal force.” In the same lecture he reiterates this: “A state is a human commu-
nity that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force
within a given territory” (Weber 1946a [1919], 77–78). Weber distinguishes
between power (Herrschaft; best translated as “domination”) and legitimate
power (legitime Herrschaft), and he calls the latter “authority.” The concept of
authority is also central to David Easton’s defnition of politics, which evolved
from “understanding how authoritative decisions are made and executed for
a society” (1968, 87 [1957]), via “those interactions through which values are
allocated authoritatively for a society (1965a, 2), to the elegantly brief “Politics
is the authoritative allocation of values” (1965b, 2). 
Politics, though, is just one element in that institutional arrangement 
which we know as government. Government’s role in contemporary soci-
ety can be described by 
(a) considering the position of the state, 
(b) considering what consequences that position has for the role of gov-
ernment, and 
(c) recognizing that politics can no longer operate without the expertise 
and support of bureaucratically organized administration. 
The preceding defnitions of politics are helpful in characterizing govern-
ment’s overall role and place in society, but they do not explicitly include 
any reference to 
(a) the authority under which contemporary government operates (i.e.,
citizens), 
(b) whom this authority extends to (i.e., citizens and all noncitizens 
[temporarily] residing in the jurisdiction), 
(c) why that authority is concentrated in government and not in other 
social actors, or 
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(d) what its role actually is amid various (groups of) societal stakehold-
ers. 
A more comprehensive defnition, admittedly less elegant than Easton’s,
starts with considering what possible positions the state and its govern-
ment can occupy in society. 
2. What Positions Can State and Government Occupy in Society? 
Since government is the sole repository of decision-making authority that 
includes and affects all those residing in its jurisdiction, it is the ultimate 
institutional structure in modern society (Searle 2003, 13). We cannot 
“see” government, just as we cannot “see” society, but we can see its mani-
festations in buildings, uniforms, behaviors, judgments, and effects (Bhas-
kar 1998, 45). It does not exist independently of us, so it is human made.
It is an artifcial appendage to the natural environment in which we live.
Government’s authority, whether in an authoritarian or a democratic pol-
ity, is nowadays critical to all other social institutions since it is invested 
with the ultimate deontic, that is, rulemaking, powers that regulate rela-
tions between people in terms of rights, responsibilities, obligations, duties,
privileges, entitlements, penalties, authorizations, permissions, and so on 
(Searle 1995, 100, 109). Paradoxically, as government holds the monopoly 
over the use of violence, in democratic governments the use of undue vio-
lence is constrained by a permanent threat of the possible use of armed 
violence. Hence, governmental (political) power cannot exist without the 
military and the police (Searle 2010, 163, 171). 
Often the position of government in a state and its society is character-
ized in terms of the prevailing political system, ranging from completely 
totalitarian or authoritarian to fully democratic. The extended literature 
on the state provides a laundry list of state concepts and how each of these 
characterizes or designates the state. In what follows, these possibilities are 
presented in no particular order and briefy explored in terms of how the 
role of government is perceived (see Table 1.1). 
This table shows the very different ways in which the state has been 
conceptualized and characterized, and we can see what a particular state 
conception means for the role of government. From a purely legal/juridical 
perspective, one could simply refer to Article 1 of the Montevideo Con-
vention on Rights and Duties of States (1933) and defne the state as an 












    







Understanding Government in Society 23 
ritory, a government, and the capacity to engage in relations with other 
states. We should add Max Weber’s monopoly on the use of coercion or 
violence. The state concepts in Table 1.1 refect a sociological perspective 
in that each characterizes an actual or desired role and position of govern-
ment in a state. “Predatory state” is the appropriate designation for most 
states and governments perceived as being “above” the people. All other 
state concepts in Table 1.1 refer to designations that emerged in the past 
two centuries and refect the large range of opinions about the existing or 
desired role of the state and its government. The concepts used may vary,
but the content is similar, as is, for instance, the case with various designa-
tions of “no state” and various characterizations of the “bold state.” 
States designated as “no state” or “hollow state” are weak either by cir-
cumstance (no state) or by design (hollow state). The latter deserves par-
ticular attention since deregulation, contracting out, and privatization have 
resulted in a thinning of administrative institutions in democratic systems 
since the 1970s. This thinning was motivated by “liberating” the entre-
preneurial civil servant from debilitating rules and regulations on the one 
hand, and allowing market forces to improve government accountability 
and performance on the other (Terry 2007, 114). As far as deregulation is 
concerned, Kaufman pointed out that “red tape” is often benefcial. We 
also have evidence that accountability mechanisms may actually reduce 
performance (Bouwman et al. 2017). And, as Terry pointed out, both liber-
ation management and market-driven management. “if swallowed whole,
do not serve constitutional government well” ( 2007, 122). 
The pre-state is the intermediate situation between a weak and a strong 
state. The bold or active state is a strong state and is more often referred to 
as the welfare state. It peaked in Western democracies during the frst three 
decades after World War II. The French speak of the “provident state”; the 
Swiss of the “social state.” Landis Dauber’s concept of the “sympathetic 
state” describes a government that offers disaster relief following major 
natural or economic upheavals (2013), and I regard it here as one mani-
festation of the welfare state. In the wake of efforts to reform and reduce 
the welfare state, Schuppert’s concept of the “ensuring state” represents 
the continental European vision of a government that will monitor private 
or contracted-out collective service providers. The British government’s 
vision of an enabling state befts an Anglo-American belief that govern-
ment’s role is to defne the parameters of the public realm where society is 
to be “governed” as much as possible by the invisible, and presumed neutral 
and blind, machinations of the market. Illustrative of this Anglo-American 



















   
  
 
TABLE 1.1. State concepts and characteristics and what they mean for the role of 
government 
State concept State characteristics Government’s role in society 
Weberian state (Weber 1946a,
78 [1919]); neo-Weberian state
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; 
Randma-Liiv 2011) 
No state (Stillman 1999, 175–
185); hollow state (Milward 
and Provan 2000, 359); 
minimal and ultraminimal 
state (Nozick 2013, 26); 
market state (Bobbitt 2002,
229); night-watch state or 
social contract state (Lassalle 
1862, 195-196; see also 
Sawer 1996); garrison state
(Lasswell 1997, 43) 
Submerged state (Mettler 2011); 
compensatory state (Durant 
2020); delegated welfare state
(Jacobs et al. 2019, 454) 
Distributive or patronage state
(Lowi 1969, 1988) 
Bold state (Stillman 1999,
185–197); active state (Jann 
and Wegrich 2004, 193);
provident state (Beck 1986); 
l’état providence (Rosanvallon 
1981; Ewald 1986); l’état 
social (Bonoli 1999); 
sympathetic state (Landis 
Dauber 2013); ethical state
(Sawer 2003). In pejorative 
sense also referred to as 
nanny state (McLeod 1965) 
or command-and-control state
(Ridley 2015). 
Policy state (Orren and 
Skowronek 2017) 
Pre-state (Stillman 1999, 197–
205) 
A human community that 
(successfully) claims the 
monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force within 
a given territory; refers 
to modernized Weberian 
administrative systems with 
more emphasis on citizen 
needs, and reduced attention 
to rules 
Minimal state intervention 
in society; role limited to 
maintaining public order and 
safety; state where economic 
and social life is subordinate 
to the armed forces. In the 
police state (e.g., Orwell,
1984) or the surveillance state
(Bregman 2016, 130) the 
focus is on monitoring the 
public. 
State that desires to come 
across as minimal, but in 
practice provides ample 
services and benefts 
Relations between state and 
people in terms of patron-
client 
Broad state intervention in 
society 
Extensive state intervention in 
society through policy 
Evolutionary state concept 
between minimal state and 
interventionist state 
Can range from very limited to 
very expansive 
Sharply limited; outsourcing 
of public services to private 
actors; government primarily 
focused on regalian functions 
of protecting society from 
internal and external 
disorder 
Making role of government 
less visible, exaggerating role 
of market 
Policies pursued on basis of 
patronage 
Broadly expanded bureaucracy 
providing a wide range 
of public protective and 





Government as one actor next 
to gamesmanship of multiple 
policy entrepreneurs in the 
private and nonproft sectors 


















State concept State characteristics Government’s role in society 
Pro-state (Stillman 1999, 205–
213) 
Clerical state (Carpenter 2011,
38, 56) 
Enabling state (H. M.
Government 2007; Page and 
Wright 2007, 3) 
Catalytic state (Held et al. 1999,
9) 
Ensuring state (Schuppert 2003,
54) 
Network state (Breivik 2016,
507); associative state (Hawley 
1974, 118); associational state
(Balogh 2015) 
Fragmented or disarticulated state
(Frederickson 1999, 702) 
Entrepreneurial state
(Mazzucato 2015) 
Competition state (Cerny 1997,
259) 
Consolidation state (Streeck 
2015) 
State as a professional 
technocracy by experts 
State with an autonomous 
bureaucracy 
Empowering citizens to take 
joint responsibility with the 
state for their own well-
being 
Government as facilitator of 
coordinated collective action 
State obligation to guarantee 
the delivery of public 
services if private service 
providers fail 
An actor among many involved 
in establishment of networks; 
includes actors from public,
private, and nonproft 
sectors functioning through 
promotional conferences,




The state as bold innovator 
Minimized government 
spending so as to not crowd 
out private investment 
State that embraces fscal 
consolidation and austerity,
relies on market for the 
pursuit of environmental and 
social policies 
Global, encompassing role of 
public administration with 
blurred boundaries between 
public and private sectors 
Decisions made by clerks in a 
bureaucracy “run neither by 
planning nor by expertise,
but by rote administration 
and clerical supervision” 
Public administration is limited 
to the role of helping citizens 
to help themselves; customer 
orientation in new public 
management 
Bureaucracy has a mediating 
role. 
Reserve competence of public 
administration for delivering 
all public services; regulating 
rather than providing these 
services 
Ensuring improved political 
management, representation 
and domination in network 
society; one actor among 
private, nonproft, and 
voluntary actors 
Eroded capacity to deal with 
complex social and economic 
issues, unclear boundaries 
between public and private 
sectors 
Ensuring attention to 
innovations that beneft 

















State concept State characteristics Government’s role in society 
Predatory state (Moselle and 
Boas 2001) 
Predator state (Galbraith 2008,
143) 
Unsustainable state (Jacobs and 
King 2009) 
Deep state (Lofgren 2014) 
Primitive state where rulers 
extort taxes for their own 
ends 
Modern state where “entire 
sectors are built upon public 
systems built originally for 
public purposes” 
State that does not regulate 
the market, with a politics 
committed to free market 
ideology 
A state governed by 
antidemocratic coalition of 
military, industry, and high 
fnance; in United States 
cf. Eisenhower’s military-
industrial complex, collusion 
of military, intelligence,
and government offcials 
to manipulate the state; in 
other countries a collusion 
of military, intelligence,
judiciary, and organized 
crime 
Bureaucracy supports those in 
power 
Socializing risk and privatizing 
proft; government’s role 
stereotyped as not as 
dynamic, innovative, and 
competitive as private sector 
Role of government severely 
limited by multiple, cross-
cutting lines of authority 
Government as a compound of 
multiple actors in an arena 
with many other actors who 
are often at odds with each 
other 
Source: Expanded from Stillman 1999, 226; and from Bohne, Graham, and Raadschelders 2015, 4. 
Robinson (2019), in which they advance the argument that a strong state 
must be ‘shackled’ by a strong society. The strong state controls violence,
enforces law, provides important public service, and the strong society is 
needed to control that strong state (ibid., xv). It is only in democracies that 
the centralizing bureaucratic and legal traditions of the Roman Empire 
were matched with the bottom-up, participatory institutions and norms of 
German tribes (ibid., 19). Indeed, state and society must grow together and 
in response to one another (ibid., 466). 
These various state designations can be used to characterize a state at 
a particular moment in time; in the Western world, countries appear to be 
moving from welfare states (i.e., bold or active) to ensuring or enabling 
states. In other parts of the world, we have seen that states can “move” from 
being strong to being weak. Some states can be characterized as failed or 
failing. States can also move from weak to strong (Chomsky 2006; Hanlon 
2011; Rotberg 2003). Clearly, a government’s role in the society of a weak 
state is very different than in that of a strong state. 
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We can now turn to government’s possible roles in society and combine 
them with these conceptions of states, developing a more comprehensive 
characterization of the state and its government. 
3. What Roles Can Government Play in Society? 
Government’s Political Revolution 
Government’s role in society is related to the concentration of political and 
economic power. Governments always extract resources in labor, kind, or 
money from the population and with them can fnance consumptive needs 
of government as well as reactive and proactive services for the people.
For millennia government was a property of the few, and its activity was 
mainly that of consuming resources and reacting to internal and exter-
nal threats to its domination. In its consumptive role, government does 
not contribute to the well-being of society, and merely serves the interests 
of those in government. In its reactive role, government prosecutes those 
who have violated the law. It also mediates and, when necessary, adjudi-
cates in conficts between people, between people and societal organiza-
tions other than itself, and between people and itself. Another reactive role 
is that of defending the territory against outside aggression. For most of 
history, these consumptive needs and reactive roles dominate the business 
of government. 
Government is more proactive when it uses extracted resources for the
beneft of all people rather than for the beneft of those in power exclu-
sively. Food storage, irrigation works, and water supply are examples in
ancient times of such proactive services. Government is more proactive
when it actively seeks to plow extracted resources into services and goods
that beneft the population at large. Government is most proactive when
it circumscribes the rules within which economy and society must oper-
ate. This is possible, however, only when government (a) is an institution
clearly separated from other social institutions, and (b) actively protects,
and even advances, life, liberty, and property through due process of law.
This self-restraint on the part of government is rooted in the thought of
English political theorist John Locke and is found, inter alia, in Federalist
10. It becomes reality for the frst time in human history toward the end of
the eighteenth century in Western Europe and the United States. The most
basic development is to perceive “public” and “private” as distinct spheres
of life, and this becomes the case both in a tangible and in a more abstract
manner. It is tangible when political, economic, and religious positions are





















no longer solely controlled by a ruler and ruling elite. One concrete mani-
festation of this is the separation of church and state. As for the separation
of politics and the economy, keep in mind that for most of history, political
and economic power are in the same hands, that is, those in political posi-
tions also held leading positions in craft, trade, and—since the middle of the
eighteenth century—industrial organizations. Some even held infuential
positions in the church (e.g., Cardinals Mazarin and Richelieu). In an eco-
nomic perspective, the separation of public from private is one of state from
market. To be sure, government always regulates society, but between the
sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, it becomes an actor that could regulate
the economy beyond mere taxation. Thus, it is not only the separation of
public and private, of church and state, and of politics and administration
that characterizes the momentous changes in the late eighteenth century
(Raadschelders 2015), but also the separation of state and market (see also
chapter 2, section 6 for more detail on these developments). 
For thousands of years, a strong polity is one embodied by and invested 
in its ruler. Refecting upon the origins of and the havoc created by the 
civil war in England (1642–1649), Thomas Hobbes believed a strong state 
is necessary to restrain human selfshness and advised that all authority 
should be invested and concentrated in the hands of a, hopefully benevo-
lent, ruler. The change in perspective on government’s role in society that 
emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century is revolutionary. The 
ideas of some writers about the desired role for government (e.g., Locke,
Serra, Von Seckendorff, Von Wolf, Condorcet) and the actions of those 
who lived through the thick of the Atlantic Revolutions coincide, and those 
ideas create the foundations upon which, a century later, a welfare govern-
ment is built the likes of which has not been seen before. The means of 
human economic subsistence went from hunting, gathering, and foraging 
to producing for surplus through the agricultural and industrial revolutions, 
but the means of a somewhat peaceful human coexistence through politics 
and administration was possible through a political or governmental revolu-
tion). It is nothing short of a revolution when people come to regard gov-
ernment as an abstraction, when they no longer perceive it as the property 
(legitimate or not) of a ruler or ruling elite. In modern, democratically 
ruled societies, government is still controlled by the few—how could it be 
otherwise?—but strives, ideally, to serve the many and provide for those 
who cannot provide for themselves. In the words of Hubert Humphrey,
spoken on November 4, 1977, in Washington, DC, at the dedication of a 
building named after him: “The moral test of government is how it treats 
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of life, the aged; and those in the shadows of life, the sick, the needy and 
the handicapped.” The government implied by Humphrey’s words is one 
that provides a range of welfare services that have existed mainly since the 
second half of the twentieth century. Historically, political, economic, and 
religious power and offce are in the hands of the elite; the population at 
large has little or no infuence upon the distribution of power. In contrast 
to the prehistorical self-governing agricultural communities, that which 
can be called “historical government” (see Table 1.2) is really an amalgam 
TABLE 1.2. Major features of historical, night-watch, and welfare government 
Historical  Night-watch Welfare  
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(cf. corporatism) 
















of all sorts of polities ranging from city-states to empires, from loosely 
confederated entities to unitary systems, and from systems with multiple 
centers of power to highly centralized systems. They are lumped together 
in order to sharpen the contrast with night-watch and welfare government.
This is not the place to discuss in detail the development of governments 
over time (see Finer 1997; Raadschelders 1998; Raadschelders and Vigoda-
Gadot 2015, 17–40), but there is one aspect that needs to be mentioned 
and that concerns the relationship between politics and the economy in 
Western Europe in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. 
For most of history, governments simply extracted resources from the 
population at large, the bulk of whom were exploited. Political and eco-
nomic power (and often religious power as well) is in the hands of the 
elites; other than taxes, policing, and justice, the economy is basically left to 
its own devices. This changes in sixteenth-century Western Europe, when 
states start to regulate the economy with an eye on strengthening their 
position vis-à-vis other states by (a) controlling the balance of trade (i.e.,
more exports than imports) and (b) acquiring colonies (Mann 1993, 2012).
This state policy is known as mercantilism and dominates economic activ-
ity until the late eighteenth century. In the second half of the eighteenth 
century, various thinkers, among them Adam Smith, critiqued this mer-
cantile system and advocated for a more limited government. This night-
watch (or night-watchman) state is one where government merely ensures 
public order and safety, but it exists only between the 1820s and 1860s. The 
industrial Revolution that spread throughout Europe and North America 
from the 1860s on, combined with the distress caused by crises in agri-
culture, resulted in massive urbanization, as people left the impoverished 
countryside for jobs in the cities. In the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, organizational management became a practical and academic concern.
This period also generated increasing calls for government intervention,
and the early steps between the 1900s and 1930s in developing health care,
education, housing, zoning, and workplace policies culminated in the wel-
fare state of the post–World War II decades. This growth of government 
as a result of moving into social policies broadly defned was legitimized by 
John Maynard Keynes’s economic philosophy of government investment 
in labor and work. 
It is especially in the twentieth century that governments’ role in politi-
cal systems became central to society; no other institutional arrangement 
could hold society together. 
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(1) with the authority to make binding decisions on behalf of all citi-
zens, legal residents, nonlegal residents, and transients (e.g., visiting 
tourists, athletes, artists, students, professors, etc., from abroad), 
(2) that can marshal the resources to address society-wide concerns, 
(3) that can address issues that private or nonproft actors will not deal 
with because 
(a) they are not proftable or 
(b) they cannot be addressed for lack of decision-making author-
ity and resources (points 1–3 from Raadschelders and Whetsell 
2018), 
4) that has the capacity to serve as neutral arbiter in conficts between 
citizens as well as between citizens and private (including nonproft) 
companies and organizations, and 
5) that has the capacity, at least in a democracy, to restrain its use of 
power and violence vis-à-vis individuals, groups of citizens, and pri-
vate and nonproft companies and organizations. 
This characterization of government holds in any democracy, irrespec-
tive of recent trends (see the next section). It holds because of two constant 
features of democratic governments, that is, negotiable authority and mul-
tisource decision-making (see chapter 6). 
4. Trends in the Role of Government in Society 
People across the globe now experience the time they live in as one of rapid 
change. The economic crisis of 2008–2009 in the United States spilled 
across the entire globe as a function of a highly intertwined global econ-
omy. In the 1990s, people experienced the sudden political change from a 
world dominated by two major powers to one that has only one hegemon 
(Mann 2013). Culturally, clashes between peoples of different religious 
background intensifed, as the emergence of international terrorism sug-
gests, and clashes between people of different ethnic origin in one country 
intensifed, as is clear from the emergence of right-wing, populist politi-
cal parties and opinions. Socially, people hear of events around the world 
almost instantaneously as a function of enormously expanded communi-
cation capabilities (Twitter, Facebook, FaceTime, internet, email, etc.).
Within a few decades, people have moved from living in societies where 
the actions of individuals could not be constantly monitored or reported.
to one where they are under almost continuous surveillance (for instance,
32 The Three Ages of Government 

















street cameras, cameras on police uniforms, cameras in shopping malls) 
and where people share their day-to-day activities through social media.
Perhaps we do live under a “steel web of surveillance” (Lipschutz 2015,
235) but, make no mistake, it is a web created by individuals themselves, by 
governments, and by businesses. It is not only government that watches us. 
Social, political, economic, and cultural developments are perceived 
as intensifying since World War II (Caiden 1969). Consequently, govern-
ments are challenged to reform their structure and functioning by those 
working within government (elected offceholders, career civil servants) as 
well as by interest groups, individual citizens, and representatives of non-
proft and private organizations. Both this intensifying social change and 
this increased urge for government reform are expected to continue (Baker 
2002; Barzelay 2011; Nolan 2001; Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2014; Peters 
and Pierre 2001, 2016; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). A variety of authors 
have attempted to capture the nature of this change, often with an eye to 
the role of the state (and by extension the government) in society. 
There are two groups of such authors. First are the “big picture theo-
rists” (Martinez 2010, 589), who provide a long historical view; second are 
those who focus on changes in government’s role in the past half century. 
As far as this book is concerned, three of the big-picture theorists 
stand out: Francis Fukuyama, Christopher Bobbitt, and Michael Mann.
Fukuyama gained notoriety when he suggested that liberal democracy had 
triumphed over communism, as illustrated by the fall of the Berlin Wall,
and that history had thus ended (1992). Whether Fukuyama’s faith in the 
triumph of democracy lulled the Western world into hubris and impaired 
Western understanding of global trends since then (Mahbubani 2018, 21,
40) remains to be seen. It is still too early to assess the impact of events in 
the 1980s and 1990s. In all fairness, Fukuyama has moved away from his 
youthful prediction and now embraces the idea that the state is in decay 
because its authority is increasingly captured by powerful elites, a process 
he refers to as one of “repatrimonialization” (2014, 28). One of the causes 
of this political decay is the worship of procedure over substance (2014,
543), a claim he does not elaborate. More importantly, he does not ques-
tion whether the extent of repatrimonialization is similar across the globe.
Could it be that this is happening in a country such as the United States,
where government is expected to embrace liberalization and market-based 
management, while in many other democratic polities this embrace is more 
limited? To what extent is repatrimonialization both a national, domestic 
issue, as well as something that manifests itself at a global level? After all,
multinational corporations and businesses infuence public policymaking,
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Bobbitt believes that the state is losing ground. In his view, the nation-
state is giving way to a market state because the former cannot protect 
people from weapons of mass destruction, cannot avoid the reach of inter-
national law, cannot protect its economy and culture from external infu-
ences, and cannot shield its people from global problems of the commons 
(2002, 229). Whereas the nation-state’s authority rests upon the promise 
to improve citizens’ material well-being, the market state merely seeks to 
maximize citizens’ opportunities. The clearest example of a market state 
is the United States (consider, for instance, the exchanges in President 
Obama’s health care reform), but even there one must acknowledge that 
the state is still a powerful, and even authoritative, player. Indeed, if we 
recall the fve features of the role of democratic government in society, gov-
ernment remains the only actor that can authoritatively address nationwide 
domestic and global challenges. It is true that in some states, government 
seems to be hollowing out (Milward and Provan 2000) through deregula-
tion, contracting out, and privatization. However, that government is farm-
ing out some services does not necessarily erode its legal responsibilities 
and certainly not its stature as the societal actor in which ultimate col-
lective sovereignty is invested. Furthermore, there are scholars who point 
out that contracting out and privatization may well threaten democracy 
(Freeman and Minow 2009; Verkuil 2007, 2017), and so we may actually 
simply wait a few years, possibly a decade or two, and the pendulum could 
swing back from the market state to a more interventionist state. Indeed,
the economic crisis of 2008 prompted governments to take a more active 
role in safeguarding the economy. And, of course, who else but states can 
fnd solutions to global problems? 
The notion that the state suffers under repatrimonialization and is hol-
lowing out is somewhat simplistic. It provides a singular, directional expla-
nation for a complex phenomenon: the development of the state and its 
government in society. This is also an unspecifed phenomenon. Is the state 
hollowing out itself? Is the state being hollowed out by other domestic and 
international actors? Is the hollowing out a function of internal and external 
trends in government? Mann offers a more nuanced analysis in his superb 
four-volume study on the sources of social power. In his descriptions of 
how the interplay of political, economic, military, and ideological sources 
of power have played out in various societies and regimes, he never fails to 
point out that any event can only be understood as a function of multiple 
causes and contingent factors (2013, 11). As a result, Mann can write about 
globalizations, that, multiple processes resulting in global intertwinement,
instead of zooming in on one particular trend, let alone claiming the pri-
macy of one causal explanation. The concept of “circular and cumulative 





   
 
 















causation,” the interplay and reinforcement of various economic, social,
and cultural factors, frst developed by Gunnar Myrdal (1944; 1957, 13; see 
also O’Hara 2008), captures best what we are dealing with when trying to 
understand the development of social phenomena. 
Bobbitt’s idea that that the welfare state may have had its day is not with-
out merit, and it provides a nice segue into authors who have focused on
trends in the past 50 years or so. Many authors view the welfare state as it
existed in those glorious 30 post–World War II years as unsustainable. The
question is what may come in its place. Is it Bobbitt’s market state or the
competition state that various authors see as overtaking the Keynesian wel-
fare state (Brenner 2004; Cerny 1997; Reinert 2007; Stiglitz 2016)? Michael
Mann speaks of the neo-Keynesian welfare state and calls the 1945–1975
period the golden age for democratic capitalism (2013, 400). In a similar
frame of mind, Edward Page and Vincent Wright suggest that the active
state, as they call the welfare state (see Table 1.1), will be replaced by an
enabling state “in which services and regulation are provided by a mix of dif-
ferent kinds of organizations with a range of supervisory and control regimes
and mechanisms” (2007, 4). Who knows, they may well be correct, and their
description shows that in its legal responsibility of exercising oversight, the
state and its government are not hollowed out. Given that shift to an enabling
state, where government is not the sole or predominant provider of collec-
tive services, various authors see governance replacing government (Chhotray
and Stoker 2010; Hill and Hill 2005; Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1997). 
Indeed, the voluminous literature on coproduction in the 1980s, on 
public-private partnerships in the 1990s, and on collaborative manage-
ment in the early 2000s is evidence enough that government is not the 
only actor providing collective services. However, what we need is actually 
a cross-time comparison: did governments before the 1970s collaborate 
less with nonproft or private actors? Has government in the modern age,
that is, since the early 1800s, been increasingly “a world of multiple actors 
and overlapping discourses,” as Colebatch observes (2010, 73)? I argue that 
we do not need a state-centric perspective on government so much as a 
polycentric perspective, recognizing that in many policy felds, all levels of 
government, as well nonproft and private actors, are involved in comple-
mentary and overlapping roles. It is in this spirit that the term “hybrid-
ized government” has been used to refer to the mix of public and private 
resources and practices in the effort to securitize the economy and econo-
mize security (Lipschutz 2015, 236). 
States and their governments are not only intertwined with nonproft 
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ernment. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, national 
governments were the face of a country on the international stage. Some 
scholars argue that we may be heading toward a world that is run by cities 
and city-states because political and economic power is concentrated there 
(e.g., Brenner 2004; Khanna 2009b; Halperin 2015). Given that various 
societal actors and governmental levels are intertwined in so many policy 
areas, it is no wonder that a host of scholars since the early 1990s have iden-
tifed a shift from governments operating in an organizational and societal 
hierarchy where they occupied the central role, to governments that oper-
ate in a network (Kickert et al. 1997; Klijn and Koppenjan 2004). That 
intricate network of actors includes international organizations that serve 
as forum for global issues and challenges. And there is also a trend where 
national regulation is complemented by international agreements if not 
regulation (Mann 1997, 494). There is little doubt that many components 
in the world of government are globalizing, but we have to remember that 
globalization has a differential impact in states, that it can strengthen as 
well as weaken states, and that there are globalizations rather than one 
single globalizing trend (Mann 2013). 
Most of the trends I have briefy touched upon are phenomena of recent 
times, say the past 30–50 years, with the bulk of commentators contrast-
ing a stereotyped past with the present. The emphasis is thus on change,
and various authors identify that change in different ways. However, the 
historian’s task is not only to look at change but also to stress continu-
ity and diversity. There is change, but there is also continuity. Imagining 
a trend from one “state” to another—, for example, from government to 
governance—suggests an inexorable and similar move everywhere toward 
that newly emerged state. However, diversity is as much a feature of devel-
opment over time as are continuity and change. 
That diversity, continuity, and change occur simultaneously is implicit 
in Guy Peters’s alternative trajectories for reforming government. Each 
of these possible trajectories of governing and governance is based upon a 
specifc critique of so-called traditional government (see Table 1.3). While 
Peters’s analysis is more elaborate than the table shows, the four alterna-
tives he presents operate on what he calls a principal diagnosis of the prob-
lem with “traditional government.” For instance, from the perspective of 
a market government, the main problem with traditional government is 
the monopoly of bureaucracies. We are now in a position to see that mar-
ket government and deregulated government have been most preferred 
in countries that emphasize contracting out, privatization. and deregula-
tion, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. Both market and 








   
deregulated government, though, have met with serious criticism, espe-
cially with regard to the extent that market principles are applied to public 
services. 
This is especially visible in the push for rankings and dollar amounts 
when assessing public sector performance. Performance management 
and measurement in the public sector, that is, in market government and 
deregulated government, focuses on short-term outputs at the expense of 
longer-term outcomes, which are harder to measure. Even short-term out-
comes can tell only part of the story: is it not better to know how much 
crime was prevented by police than how many criminals were caught? Par-
ticipative government is much more common in so-called corporatist gov-
erning systems, where government is one party in addition to other social 
actors (partners) in developing social and economic policies. Finally, of the 
four types that Peters lists, fexible government is the least common option. 
TABLE 1.3. Major alternatives to reforming governance 
Market Participative Flexible Deregulated 









Financial and HR 
management 
Role of civil 
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The preceding comment about the domination of performance mea-
sures in assessing outputs also applies to contemporary public administra-
tion scholarship. That is, just like any other social endeavor, public admin-
istration scholarship suffers under the ever-increasing commodifcation of 
activities. Whether it is the use of quantitative-statistical analytical meth-
ods to address ever smaller questions or the measures by which scholarship 
is assessed, it is all about numbers, and that moves to the shadows attention 
to the big questions (Durant 2016; Kettl 2016a, 328). Durant and Rosen-
bloom believe that scholarship is “hollowing out” by narrowing its focus 
more and more on empirical, evidence-based research that is more or less 
separate from the environmental context in which the issue or problem at 
hand unfolds (2017, 330). Big questions of government can be tackled (not 
necessarily answered) by more normative and conceptualizing approaches 
that cannot but include attention to the macrodynamics of societal trends 
(Neuman 1996; Durant and Rosenbloom 2017, 330). The kind of macro-
dynamics discussed above basically concern descriptions and characteriza-
tions of developments and changes in the role of government in society 
at large. Clearly these changes at the bird’s-eye level may seem to happen 
everywhere (in the Western world), but when moving down into specifc 
countries, we can see various degrees of divergence. Several big questions 
have been suggested for the study of public administration: three big public 
management questions (Behn 1995), seven big questions regarding govern-
ing in a democracy (Kirlin 1996, 2001), and four big questions on how to 
teach public administration (Denhardt 2001). The biggest question that con-
nects all these is that of how, when, how much, and why government’s role in society 
has changed, and how the study of public administration can aid in the understand-
ing of this phenomenon of change. The above sketch of trends may seem to 
suggest a critique on my part of scholars who advance them, but that is not 
my intention. We need scholars and practitioners to try to identify trends 
because this is one way to get to big questions and see whether these trends 
indeed represent verifable changes or are/were “merely” wishful thinking.
We cannot ignore the importance of the latter since what people perceive 
to be real may well become real in its consequences (cf. Thomas theorem: 
When people defne situations as real, they are real in their consequences).
Similarly, the comment about empirical, evidence-based research should 
not be interpreted as a critique because that type of research will always be 
needed.1 Researchers and university leadership, however, must recognize 
the potential—if not the fact—of gaming the performance measurement 
system in academe that rewards quick and frequent output (e.g., multiple 
articles out of one data set) over slow and less frequent output (e.g., one 


















book in fve years). Meanwhile, attention to empirical research should not 
drown out thinking about issues that cannot be tackled with quantitative-
statistical methods, which can only be retrospective and, when extrapolat-
ing into the future, speculative. Empirical work should be concluded with 
a perusal of the implications of fndings for much broader, macro ques-
tions, as is done, for instance, in the study by German political scientist Jan 
Vogler (2019). In other words, we need focus not only on the facts but also 
on what these facts mean for the social world we continuously create. The 
study of public administration teaches not only skills but also educates us in 
understanding the meaning of government in society. Asking broad ques-
tions constitutes a second way to approach big questions. A third way to 
deal with big questions cannot but start with what they are about, and that 
requires attention to our approach to science in general and, in our case,
how we can approach public administration specifcally. 
5. How the Study of Public Administration Contributes 
to Understanding Government 
In the past two centuries, government in democratic systems has come 
to occupy a more central position in society than ever before, certainly in 
terms of the scope and range of services. So it is no wonder that study of 
this human-made, artifcial phenomenon emerges from the second half of 
the nineteenth century on. While this is not the place to elaborate how the 
modern study of public administration emerged (see Raadschelders 2011a,
12–19; Rutgers 2004, 57–85), much of its initial focus was on answering 
instrumental questions of city managers and other public administrators.
At the same time, efforts were made to develop the theoretical foundation 
of the new subject, especially through the search for principles of organiza-
tion, management, and leadership.Those efforts were shot down by Simon,
who, in his characteristic charging manner, called such principles nothing 
but proverbs (1946) and advocated for a clear separation of studying facts 
(with an eye on developing public administration as a science, which is the 
responsibility of the scholar) from applying values (which he believed to be 
the realm of the decision-maker). In response, Waldo (1984 [1948]) argued 
that facts and values could not be separated. The two scholars squared off 
in an exchange in the American Political Science Review (Simon 1952; Waldo 
1952a and 1952b). Simon embraced a narrow view of science, while Waldo 
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Box 1.1: Narrow and Broad Conceptions of Science 
Narrow 
A branch of study that is concerned with observation and classification of 
facts and esp. with the establishment or strictly with the quantitative for-
mulation of verifiable laws chiefly by induction and hypotheses. (Web-
ster’s Third New International Dictionary 1993, 2032) 
Knowledge founded in strict experimental method and rigorous logical 
reasoning. (Hood 2007, 19) 
Broad 
The systematically organized whole of knowledge and of the rules, regu-
larities, theories, hypotheses, and systems through which further knowl-
edge can be acquired. (Van Dale 1984, 3402) 
A body of organized knowledge. (Waldo 1984, 182) 
Any kind of systematic study. (Read 2012, 11) 
I addressed the distinction between narrow and broad defnitions of 
science in an earlier book (Raadschelders 2011a, 40–42), so it suffces here 
to say that a broad defnition of science identifes it as an organized body 
of knowledge, nothing more, nothing less, that includes facts as well as 
ideas and normative judgments (see, e.g., the Van Dale defnition in Box 
1.1). A narrow approach emphasizes knowledge of facts that is organized 
on the basis of certain procedures, that is, methods, for acquiring it (see,
e.g., the Webster’s defnition in Box 1.1). This narrow approach to science 
emerged in the natural sciences in the Middle East between the ninth and 
eleventh centuries and in Western Europe from the ffteenth century on,
with scholars emphasizing knowledge development based on observation 
and experiment. Armchair contemplations about and conceptualizations of 
the natural world were no longer considered acceptable. So monumental 
were the discoveries and theories in astronomy, physics, chemistry, and—
later—biology, that scholars studying the social world have tried since the 
middle to late nineteenth century to develop and use methods in the social 
sciences similar to those used for the study of the natural world. The hope 
was that this would generate at least lawlike generalizations, but thus far 
there are very few, if any, of those; in the social sciences it is very diffcult 
to describe, let alone explain, how causes interact when leading to a spe-
cifc effect (Elster 2015, 2, 35). Hence, in the social sciences it is pretty 











much impossible to predict a phenomenon in a manner comparable to, for 
example, physics (think of the prediction of the Higgs boson in 1964 and 
its confrmation in 2012) or chemistry (think of the prediction and subse-
quent discovery of various new elements in the periodic table). 
In the effort to develop a more “sciency” social science, including 
political science, several scholars in the United States, from the 1920s on 
(Somit and Tanenhaus 1967, 110), emphasized the importance of using 
quantitative-statistical methods. In the study of public administration, the 
emphasis was initially on discovering principles of management, such as 
Luther Gulick’s POSDCORB (Planning, Organizing, Staffng, Directing,
Co-Ordinating, Reporting and Budgeting) and his notion of span of con-
trol. This quantitative focus spread to Europe in the 1970s. In the second 
half of the twentieth century, social scientists in various disciplines also 
tried their hand at capturing social reality in mathematical-type formulas.
There was strong belief in the development of a scientifc method or wheel 
of science for empirical research that moves from observation, via theory 
development and formulating new hypotheses. to confrmation of hypoth-
eses (Franklin and Ebdon 2005, 631, 636). This inductive approach works 
well for the natural sciences, even though one of its scholars argues that 
physicists “do not have a fxed scientifc method” and that “most scientists 
have very little idea of what the scientifc method is” (Weinberg 2001, 85; 
see also Pinker 2017, 392). 
This development toward better science in social science was lamented 
early on. Consider the following two commentaries: 
[The] materialistic basis [of science] has directed attention to things 
as opposed to values. (Whitehead 1925, 202) 
The social sciences had been monopolized by those more interested 
in the discovery of laws than in the welfare of society. (Commager 
1950, 205) 
Alfred Whitehead was among the early critics of the separation of fact 
and value, while Henry Commager denigrated science for science’s sake.
Considering journals in political science and, perhaps to somewhat lesser 
extent, public administration, it is clear that these are in a stage where 
“quants” and “math” are valued more than qualitative research, including 
normative, conceptual, and polemic pieces. Don Kettl recently noted that 
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meable to those outside the research community” and that delving into big 
questions is “simply too risky for junior scholars, who need to publish to 
get tenure and who have the best opportunities to publish if they do work-
manlike studies on existing questions using existing data sets” (2016a, 329).
In a similar vein, Bob Durant and David Rosenbloom wrote that academic 
incentive structures put up barriers against pursuing big questions. These 
incentives include (2016, 330–332) 
(a) methodological requirements for studying most big questions in 
public administration, 
(b) ticking tenure, promotion, and post-tenure review clocks, 
(c) overwhelming focus on adding statistics methods courses to PhD 
coursework at the cost of more big-picture-oriented classes, 
(d) stiffening competition for journal space, 
(e) commodifcation of scholarly work (citations, impact factors, accep-
tance rate, percentage of authorship), and 
(f) an emphasis in research universities on getting major grants from 
foundations and other funding sources, which generally do not focus 
on the macrodynamics of government but on microadministrative 
issues. 
Christopher Pollitt (2017), Alan Rosenbaum (2018), and this author 
(2019a) have argued the same. What will it take to shake PA scholars out of 
a “misguided desire for absolute certainty and a collective lack of imagina-
tion”? (Rosenbaum 2018, 51). The predominant appreciation for quants 
and math and the focus on management challenges threatens to drown 
out the generalist perspective that one should expect generalist scholars 
of public administration could provide. Indeed, at least since the 1930s,
various scholars have stressed the importance of a generalist understand-
ing of government (see Box 1.2). Paraphrasing Bertrand Russell (see Box 
1.2), public administration scholars (whether faculty or student) should not 
only be Spartans who focus on training in methods and skills, but also be 
Athenians who form the mind. Even Charles Merriam, the great politi-
cal scientist of the 1920s and 1930s, who championed a narrow approach 
to science for research, recognized that at least in the classroom the gaze 
should be much wider. To be sure, teaching skills used only in methods 
and math do not prepare any future scholar for a career that includes more 
philosophical and contemplative methods of reasoning. 
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Box 1.2: The Interdisciplinary Study of Public Administration Educates 
and Trains Specialists in Generalist Perspectives 
Education has two purposes: on the one hand to form the mind, on the 
other to train the citizen. The Athenians concentrated on the former, 
the Spartans on the latter. The Spartans won, but the Athenians were 
remembered. (Russell [1931] 1962, 243) 
It is to be presumed and desired that students of government will play a 
larger role in the future than in the past in shaping of the types of civic 
education; but this will not be possible unless a broader view is taken of 
the relation of government to the other social sciences, and the function 
of the political in the social setting. (Merriam 1934, 97) 
One of the chief practical obstacles to the development of social inquiry 
is the existing division of social phenomena into a number of compart-
mentalized and supposedly independent non-interacting fields, as in the 
different provinces assigned, for example to economics, politics, juris-
prudence, morals, anthropology, etc. . . . It is legitimate to suggest that 
there is an urgent need for breaking down these conceptual barriers so 
as to promote cross-fertilization of ideas. (Dewey 1938, 508) 
[Scholarship in our field must] grow out of actual social tensions, needs, 
“troubles.” . . . Any problem of scientific inquiry that does not grow out 
of actual (or “practical”) social conditions is fictitious. (Dewey 1938, 499) 
The proper training of “administrators” lies not in the narrow field of 
administrative theory, but in the broader field of the social sciences gen-
erally. (Simon 1957, 247 [1947]) 
Administrative thought must establish a working relationship with every 
major province in the realm of human learning. (Waldo 1984, 203 [1948]) 
Administration is, or at least ought to be, wedded to subjects such as 
philosophy, literature, history, and art, and not merely to engineering, 
finance and structure. (Dimock 1958, 5) 
A disciplinary field can hardly attain the sophisticated level of scholar-
ship which is worthy of graduate education if it is not capable of critically 
developing from within itself its epistemological foundations. (Ramos 
1981, 102) 
From the organizational standpoint [the administrator] is a specialist in 
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Profession-bent students should be helped to understand that in the 
twenty-first century the world will not be run by those who possess mere 
information alone. [Knowledge] is destined to become global and demo-
cratic. . . . We are drowning in information, while starving for wisdom. 
The world henceforth will be run by synthesizers. (Wilson 1998, 269) 
Especially at the upper tiers, generalists provide an invaluable contribu-
tion. (Ongaro 2017, 16) 
Clearly, the various quotations in Box 1.2 not only concern public 
administration research, but also imply that a narrow science approach 
inhibits the interdisciplinary and generalist perspective upon government 
that the study of public administration can and ought to provide. 
6. Why Study This? 
This book represents an effort to answer the big question of what govern-
ment is by considering how it emerged and how its role developed over time 
and across cultures. The manner of understanding government offered in 
this book is relevant to any governing system across the globe because it 
takes the observing human being as the key element of the analysis. Our 
genetic heritage and instincts. on the one hand, and our sociality and sense 
of community, on the other, are refected in how we structure government 
and how it functions. Human instinct and sense of community struggle to 
come to terms with living in multiethnic and multicultural territorial states 
and societies, and even more with living in a global society. 
There are various threats to the role of government in society. First,
governments can clearly be manipulated by specifc interests and individu-
als (political and business elites, interest groups, populists), and an example 
of this is the American Supreme Court decision Citizens United (2010),
which overturned the McCain-Feingold campaign fnance legislation. Sec-
ond, there is increasing distrust of government (and especially of political 
offceholders). Third, there is doubt as to whether government can pro-
vide adequate protection against cyberthreats and domestic and interna-
tional terrorism. Fourth, in societies where many things are commodifed 
according to monetary value or some kind of ranking, it is increasingly 
diffcult for governments to make the case that they are providing value for 
money. Fifth, and discussed in more detail in chapters 3 and 4, is the fact 
that human beings are wired for living in small groups. Our psychological 
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makeup has not begun to catch up with the kind of imagined community 
created as a function of living in densely populated urban environments 
and as a function of rapid and increased information fows that connect 
people from anywhere within minutes, even seconds. 
First, it is important for people as individuals, as community members,
as citizens of the imagined community of their country, and as citizens in 
a global society, to understand how different government’s roles in soci-
ety can be, and certainly how different democratic government is when 
compared to historical governments. There is no historical precedent for 
what democratic governments do and offer today. In a democratic political 
system, government is no longer the property of the happy few. Instead, it 
is expected to serve the people by meeting the challenges that collectives 
of people (as private citizens, or in private corporations) cannot address. In 
the light of the 10,000-year existence of (self-)government, its experience 
with an enormously expanded package of services and functions stretches 
back only some 150 years. Furthermore, government is not only constantly 
reacting and adapting to changing economic, social, political, and cultural 
conditions, it is also, and increasingly, expected to be proactive in its social 
engineering for a better future. 
Second, it is also important to move away from stereotypical shortcuts 
to understanding government. Hearing the word “government,” people 
too often associate it with “red tape,” “bureaucracy,” “slowness,” and so on.
People are so primed to associate government with pejorative images and 
characterizations, that they only remember that “government is the prob-
lem, not the solution.” The complete statement by former US president 
Ronald Reagan was that “in this present crisis, government is not the solu-
tion to our problem; government is the problem.” He referred to the idea 
that more taxes and regulation would not do much for the early 1980s 
recession and stagfation. Not to be nitpicky, but he regarded high taxes 
and too much regulation as a problem, not government as such. 
Third, it is also worthwhile to remember that it is not only government 
that operates as a bureaucracy. Any large organization cannot be but orga-
nized and operate as a bureaucracy. As I mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, can anyone believe that Shell, BP, IBM, JPMorgan/Chase, Mon-
santo, Dupont, Eli Lilly, Elsevier, the University of Michigan Press, the 
Red Cross, Greenpeace, Transparency International, Facebook, Google,
and so on, can do a good job without being organized and functioning as 
a bureaucracy? 
Fourth, this book on government is perhaps most important because we 
must remember that in terms of contemporary political theory of democ-
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racy, it is the people who are sovereign, and government that serves the 
people. Hence, democratic governments do not stand above the people.
Of course, this is political theory, and in practice money and power tend to 
concentrate in the hands of the few. That has always been the case, but in 
modern democracies, it is the division of power in branches of government,
the checks and balances between these branches, and the fragmentation of 
public authority and tasks across thousands of public organizations that 
prevent a despotic concentration of power in the hands of the few. 
In this chapter, I describe government’s contemporary role as well as 
the two main approaches (science narrow and broad) to how we can know 
it. The broad approach to science that characterizes this book will serve 
well in the effort of tying together knowledge from a great variety of dis-
ciplinary sources concerning the three elements—human instinct, tribal 
community, and global society—that enhance our understanding of gov-
ernment in society. However, before we get to the crux of the argument 
in chapters 3 to 7, an outline of the conceptual framework for this book is 
needed, going beyond what we can see and experience in our own lifetime 










Government in Society 
The Conceptual and Historical Context  
for Understanding Government 
If you were to import the geometrical method into practical life 
you would do nothing more than if you set yourself to work at going mad 
by means of reason and you would march straight ahead as though 
desire, temerity, occasion, fortune did not rule in human affairs.
(Vico 2010, 113 [1710]) 
The dignifed burial of the dualistic Descartes forces us to address 
the formidable explanatory challenge for a physicalistic theory of 
human agency and a nondualistic cognitivism. (Bandura 2011, 4) 
Public administration’s object of study has been part of human commu-
nities for about 10,000 years when we include self-governing sedentary 
communities. This is only a brief period of time compared to the 300,000 
years or so that Homo sapiens have roamed the earth. It is the blink of an eye 
in comparison to the time that the ancestors of Homo and the great apes 
appeared, some 6 million years ago. Biologists study the life that started 
with single-cell organisms some 3 to 4.1 billion years ago (the earth is 
about 4.5 billion years old), and physicists and astronomers study the forces 
in the universe going back to the Big Bang, 13.8 billion years ago. Indeed,
in comparison, the study of public administration concerns a minute 
period of time. While public administration’s object of study, government 
as a social phenomenon, has only existed for some 6,000 years, we better 
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munities and societies because it has become central to human survival,
especially so in the past 200 to 250 years in democratic societies. 
The question “What is government?” has often been answered as if 
the observer were independent of the object of study. However, only the 
natural world exists independently from human agency, at least in clas-
sical physics. By contrast, the social world is a human creation, as Italian 
philosopher Giambattista Vico noted back in 1710. Can we understand 
government independent of human beings? Most people accept Aristotle’s 
and Kant’s claims that what we can perceive and register is determined by 
the fve senses in combination with our rationality. Since government is a 
human creation that can only be known through the senses and through 
thought, the complementary question is “What produces government?”
That question immediately makes it a more dynamic object of study. The 
dynamic is then one that results from the artifact of human creation and 
concerns institutional arrangements that circumscribe the interaction 
between individuals, between an individual and her environment, between 
a group of individuals and the environment, and between different groups 
of individuals in the same or in different environments. 
In chapter 1, I examined scholars’ perceptions of the changes in state 
and government in the past 40–50 years with some comments about 
changes in earlier centuries and millennia. In this chapter, and as part of the 
overall conceptual framework for this book, the time horizon expands to 
the past 250 years or so, for in that period a democratic society and govern-
ment are established for which there is no historical precedent. However,
in this chapter, I will frst outline the overall conceptual framework of this 
study, which includes the notions (a) that government is ultimately an act 
of human creation, (b) that it can be understood through social ontology,
and (c) that three main factors allow us to understand the role of this rather 
new social phenomenon of government in society: human instinct and intent,
tribal community, and global society. The next section provides the histori-
cal context for government and society under democracy, and conceptual-
izes the monumental changes in the institutional superstructure during the 
1800s that provided the foundation for modern democratic government.
It is upon that foundation that, a century later, governments were able to 
respond to massive social and economic changes. To be sure, this book is 
about government in human societies at large, but the institutional changes 
that emerged around the 1800s and the policy and service changes that 
occurred around the 1900s established a very different kind of government 
in some parts of the world, and the impact of those changes has reverber-
ated around the world. 
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1. Opening Salvo: On the Torture of Holistic Scholarship 
Public administration is a feld of inquiry that cannot be demarcated by 
any specifc paradigm or set of interrelated theories. Instead, it concerns 
government and its interactions with society in the broadest sense of that 
concept. Public administration scholars are often focused on a specifc 
problem element, such as a specifc policy area, concerning the structure 
and functioning of (a specifc set of) organizations, on decision-making, on 
leadership, on public ethics and values, on citizenship, and the like. They 
collect information from any knowledge source relevant to understand-
ing and solving that specifc problem. Indeed, humans design institutional 
arrangements in the effort to solve real-world problems. In most cases,
these designs are partial since they only address one problem or set of 
related problems within that social-institutional arrangement of govern-
ment in society. In fact, in democratic systems, government has become the 
ultimate human-made institutional arrangement for two reasons. First, it is 
the social institution that circumscribes and defnes the rules and boundar-
ies of all other social institutions. Second, it is the social institution with 
mechanisms designed to limit the potential for rent-seeking and manipula-
tive behavior on the part of powerful political and economic actors at the 
expense of the (large) majority of people. 
In the preceding paragraph, the word “design” refers to an activity that 
aims to solve a specifc problem or problems and to the creation of a social 
institution that governs our behavior in a manner acceptable to most and 
thus regarded as legitimate. Hence, the human activity of designing can be 
assumed to occur at two levels: that of feshing out institutional arrange-
ments for society as a whole, and that of responding to emerging problems 
with new institutional arrangements within the existing overall governing 
system. All social institutions are artifcial, human-made, and thus have,
as Herbert Simon observed, an “air of contingency” that allows people to 
adapt their institutions to changes in the environment (Simon 1981, ix–x).
These changes often involve responses to changes in human-made ele-
ments of the living environment, that is, social, economic, cultural, and 
political changes. They may also involve responses to changes in the natu-
ral environment, such as, for instance, policies that seek to protect people 
from fooding, earthquakes, hurricanes, and some of the consequences of 
climate change. All natural phenomena have an “air of necessity,” as they 
are subject to natural laws. 
Natural phenomena concern forces that are mostly independent of
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Social phenomena concern forces that are of human origin, namely behav-
iors and the institutional arrangements created by these behaviors. Scholars
can study these empirically but not as forces independent of the observer.
The central concern of social scientists is thus meaningful, rule-following
behavior (Winch 1958; Bhaskar 1998, 133). You will notice that I regard
both individual behavior and institutional arrangements as forces, but I must
emphasize that I do so under the assumption that the “individual” and the
“social” cannot be separated and must be considered in relation and constant
interaction with one another. Thus, when we seek to understand the com-
plexities of social life, we must do so in a holistic manner. 
Any effort to analytically separate individual from environment will 
result in partial understanding. For instance, a methodological individual-
ist approach assumes that all social action originates in individual agency,
while (neo)institutional theory assumes that individual action is a function 
of the social-institutional context. Real social life can only be understood 
as a continuously emergent interplay between individuals on the one hand 
and the natural and social environment they create and respond to on the 
other. Social life is always emergent, and people will always fail to deter-
mine the ultimate cause of social events. Any attempt to determine whether 
an individual, or group of individuals, or an existing institutional arrange-
ment is responsible for some specifc event is nonsensical, because what-
ever happens is a function of the continuously emergent unconscious and 
conscious interplay between individuals and institutions (McIntosh 1995,
120, 129). 
Some social scientists may fnd this diffcult to accept. They seek a start-
ing point for analysis and structure their fndings in an either-or manner: 
events must originate in either the individual or the social context. Can we 
make sense of anything when there is no clear starting point or cause? The 
best that social scientists have developed is the power of correlation in the 
hope of approximating causality. I view that type of research to be a dead 
end when it is disconnected from considerations about how we can under-
stand something (i.e., epistemology) and what that something actually is 
(i.e., ontology) (Raadschelders 2011b, 920). We are not studying natural 
causes beyond our control but behaviors and contexts created by people 
in artful interaction with each other and with the environment in which 
they live. Human beings deal with situations that have meaning, and their 
actions are based on their understanding of that meaning. The challenge is 
one of attempting to capture a holistic or three-dimensional understanding 
in the confnes of a two-dimensional space, that is, a page. One can think 
of this in the following way. 







                 
 
 
    
 
  
I will start with what Max Weber called “torture.” In a letter, Weber 
stated that what occupies his attention at a given moment makes com-
plete sense because he can see the object of his attention from all angles 
and approaches simultaneously, and therefore, holistically or three-
dimensionally. The torture begins when he has to make the effort of trans-
lating that holistic image into the two-dimensional confnes of sequential 
and thus linear logic imposed by the page (Radkau 2009, 98). In a some-
what comparable manner, I suggest that we can see social reality in its 
three-dimensional appearance in our mind’s eye, but as soon as we seek to 
express and present our understanding to fellow humans, we either assume 
that social reality can be captured as an aggregate of individual behaviors 
or argue that the institutional environment constrains human behavior. It 
is as if we have to make a choice. But is there a choice? The social scientist’s 
problem of presenting social reality in a holistic manner is exacerbated by 
the lack of a truly universal language such as mathematicians have devel-
oped and is used in the natural sciences, and the lack of agreement about 
what constitutes the best theoretical representation of reality. In the fol-
lowing three sections, I elaborate various elements of this opening salvo. 
2. Government as Artifice of Bounded Rationality: Simon and Vico 
As far as I know, Herbert Simon was the frst scholar in our time to write 
about institutions as artifcial. He expressed the desire to construct an 
empirical theory of administration that would rise above environmental 
contingencies and consequent behaviors and be grounded in the inabilities 
of human beings to perfectly adapt to the environment. That inability to 
adapt was a function of the limits of rationality (Simon 1981, x). He argued 
that many scholarly felds are not concerned with the necessary but with 
the contingent, not with how things are but how they might be (1981, xi).
His examples include engineering, medicine, business, architecture, paint-
ing, education, and law (1981, xi, 129), and one can easily add public admin-
istration, nursing, social work and counseling, and any of the fne expres-
sive and performing arts. Human beings live partly in a natural world and 
partly in an artifcial social world, with “social” denoting all human-made 
institutions (i.e., economic, cultural, political). Boundaries for the sciences of 
the artifcial, as Simon titled his book, are determined by what distinguishes 
it from the natural. In his words, artifcial things 
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(b) may imitate appearances in natural things while missing, in one 
or many respects, the reality of the latter; 
(c) can be characterized in terms of function, goal, and adaptation; 
and 
(d) are often discussed, especially when being designed, in terms of 
imperatives and descriptives (1981, 4). 
Design is at the core of all professional training, so it is nothing short of 
astounding that many people do not see it as a key element of professional 
education. As Simon observed: “In view of the key role of design in pro-
fessional activity, it is ironic that in this century the natural sciences have 
almost driven the sciences of the artifcial from professional school cur-
ricula” (1981, 129). Indeed, Simon makes a good case that design is a very 
important part of human social life, but one can wonder about the mean-
ing of the second part of his observation. Natural scientists study natural 
phenomena, and these are subject to causal forces, which are generally not 
subject to forces of design. Hence, I assume that natural scientists really 
have little or no interest in how social phenomena are understood by social 
scientists. 
If that conclusion is accepted, I can only assume that the natural sciences 
have not driven out the sciences of the artifcial but that instead, social 
scientists have tried too hard to emulate the presumed scientifc method 
of the natural sciences and in the process simply overlooked the artifcial 
design element of the social environment. Simon mentioned that the social 
sciences looked too quickly “for models in the most spectacular successes 
of the natural sciences,” that “human behavior . . . is not to be accounted for 
by a handful of invariants,” and that human beings operate “in interaction 
with extremely complex boundary conditions imposed by the environment 
and by the very facts of human long-term memory and of the capacity of 
human beings, individually and collectively, to learn” (Simon 1979, 510; see 
also Simon 1991, 292). He then suggested that social scientists may fnd 
more guidance in biology than in physics, and that is why I have looked to 
primatological research (chapter 3) to understand the role of government 
in society. Finally, and already mentioned in chapter 1, natural scientists 
know of no scientifc method other than trial and error, and with that and 
with a good bit of luck have produced breathtaking discoveries since the 
ffteenth century (Weinberg 2000, 85). This understanding of the limita-
tions of the natural sciences seems lost to many social scientists. 
As understood in the Western world, scientifc thought has its roots in 
ancient Greek (natural) philosophy, which assumes the universe to be ratio-
nal and orderly, and this eternal and unchangeable nature of the universe 

















   
cannot be but refected in human rationality (Luft 2003, 16). One might 
be tempted to believe that nineteenth-century Western social scientists 
were convinced that just as laws of nature had been discovered, indepen-
dent, objective, and comparative observations of social phenomena would 
ultimately and irrevocably result in the discovery of social laws, as Eng-
lish historian Edward Freeman (1823–1892) argued in a series of lectures 
delivered in 1873 (as mentioned in Richter 1969, 134). That this expecta-
tion did not come to pass has resulted in the humbler pursuit of so-called 
middle-range theories since the mid-twentieth century. But the underlying 
assumption of that effort was and still is that research will culminate in the 
identifcation of social regularities akin to natural laws. 
So dominant is the belief in the rationality of natural and social phe-
nomena that Simon may not have completely grasped the implications of 
his own observation that the constitutional convention, the American Con-
stitution, and the Federalist Papers amply demonstrate that the Founding 
Fathers understood the limits of foresight about human affairs and that 
they accepted the psychological characteristics, the selfshness, distrust,
and restricted common sense of women and men as constraints upon their 
design of the government (Simon 1981, 163). This awareness may not have 
been as surprising to the Founding Fathers since they lived in an age in 
which at least one scholar had moved away from the Greek belief in a ratio-
nal order, in society as a machine: Giambattista Vico (1668–1745). 
Simon’s insistence upon the importance of sciences of the artifcial, that 
is, design science, for understanding the social world, and his frm belief 
in bounded rationality can be traced back to Vico. At least as early as 1710 
Vico wrote that 
science involves composing the elements of things: whence think-
ing is proper to the human mind, understanding to the divine mind,
for God gathers all the elements of things, both external and inter-
nal, because He contains and disposes them, but the human mind,
because it is bounded and outside everything else which is not itself,
goes along gathering up only the extremities of things, but never 
gathers everything together. So, the human mind can think about 
things, but it cannot understand them, and consequently, it par-
ticipates in reason, but does not fully possess it. (2010, 17 [1710]; 
emphasis added) 
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man  .  .  . follows the traces of the nature of things and eventually 
upon refection realizes that he cannot arrive at the nature of things 
on this basis because he does not have within himself the elements in 
accordance with which composite things exist; in addition, he real-
izes that this is the result of the limited scope of his mind, for all things 
are outside that mind; subsequently, man turns this vice of his mind 
to good use. (2010, 23, 25 [1710]; emphasis added) 
Again, as far as I am aware, these two quotations contain the earliest refer-
ences to bounded rationality.1 
Much later in his analysis but in the same spirit, Vico noted that “just 
as nature begets physical things, so human ingenuity produces mechanical 
things, such that God is the artifcer of nature, man is the god of artifacts” 
(2010, 111 [1710]; emphasis added). Finally, in a deadpan observation, he 
wrote the comment quoted as the frst epigraph of this chapter, and it is 
worth quoting again: 
If you were to import the geometrical method into practical life 
you would do nothing more than if you set yourself to work at going mad 
by means of reason and you would march straight ahead as though 
desire, temerity, occasion, fortune did not rule in human affairs.
(2010, 113 [1710]) 
In these few sentences, Vico distanced himself frmly from Descartes’s 
position that the natural and social world can be observed and known 
objectively, that is, independent of mind, and captured in a mathemati-
cal way. Descartes believed in a mind-body dualism where the mind is 
able to observe material facts in the distant manner of the scholar. Vico 
pointed out that science is knowledge from causes (just as Peter Winch 
later noted [1958, 8]; see also Bhaskar 1998, 133) and that human thinking 
simply could not be the cause of their being (Miner 2010, xi). They do not 
make the actual nature of the things they investigate, and therefore cannot 
move from awareness or consciousness of their own thinking to scientifc 
knowledge. Ergo, Descartes’s “I think, therefore I exist” is erroneous as 
far as understanding the social world is concerned. What makes Vico so 
interesting is that he is the frst, as far as I know, to state that the social 
world is artifcial and that we are limited in our ability to understand it. His 
full understanding of this is expressed in the remark that “the artifcer of 
the world of nations is human will” (Pompa 2002, 39, par. 47). He “knows”
















the causes of all human institutions to be acts of originary making that 
take place in and through language. He showed this in his 1710 explora-
tion of ancient wisdom as expressed in the Latin language. Vico’s refexive 
knowing is similar to hermeneutic understanding and is comparable to 
Max Weber’s approach to scholarship; it is not knowledge in the limited 
epistemic sense (Luft 2003, 3). To Vico, a science of the civil world could 
only be understood through the mind that created the civil world (Verene 
2003, 110, 146). So, Descartes’s approach is relevant, but only for the study 
of the natural world; its application cannot be extended to the world of 
civics and civil society. I am not convinced that burying the dualistic Des-
cartes requires scholars to develop an explanatory and physicalistic theory 
of human agency (see the second epigraph to this chapter). However, they 
should include biological and physical characteristics of the human spe-
cies, on the one hand, and the social, cultural, and historical experiences,
on the other hand, in order to arrive at a more encompassing framework 
of understanding. The connection between physical and social elements of 
human life and society will be further explored at the beginning of chapter 
3. At this point, I will continue to further outline a nondualistic cognitiv-
ism that is satisfed with understanding of meaning. This is what Vico tried 
to do, and it makes him a social ontologist avant la lettre. Social ontology is 
the theme of the next section. 
3. Social Ontology for Understanding Institutional Arrangements 
Ontology is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature of reality,
that is, of becoming and of being or existence. This includes the rela-
tions between various categories of being and how these relations can be 
grouped. Entities or things that exist are often grouped in a hierarchical 
manner, but for the purposes of this study, this hierarchical layering is com-
bined with a horizontal perspective on the relations between things that 
exist. The content of this and the following paragraphs will clarify why this 
is the most productive approach to conceptualizing government in general 
and the government in society that is characteristic of democracies. 
Descartes claimed epistemological certainty about the existence of the 
“self.” He and many contemporaries believed it possible to observe the 
world in an objective manner based on the assumption that all things exist 
independently from the observer. We have also seen that Vico was a very 
early critic of this epistemology, and this provides the stepping stone for 
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has not found widespread acceptance but is indispensable to understanding 
what a social phenomenon, such as government, actually is. 
Generally speaking, forces of nature are observer independent; they 
include gravity, electromagnetism, the strong and weak nuclear forces, and,
possibly, the Higgs force. Social forces are generally observer dependent 
(but not necessarily so; see below); they include the act of their creation 
(cf. Vico). Examples of social forces and phenomena are money, marriage,
language, property, religion, market, and . . . government. Western philo-
sophical thought and scholarship since the ancient Greeks has been enam-
ored with the notion that “what is” can be observed independent of the 
mind by, as White calls it, a “Tefon subject,” a human being whose “asser-
tive, disengaged self . . . generates distance from its background (tradition,
embodiment) and foreground (external nature, other subjects) in the name 
of an accelerating mastery of them” (2000, 4). This assumption gained sub-
stantial traction between the ninth and eleventh centuries when Middle 
Eastern scholarship emphasized the importance of observation as the basis 
of science. European scholarship followed along similar lines from the 
ffteenth century on. These scholarly observations concerned phenom-
ena of the physical world, and the discoveries made since then about the 
microscopic world of particles and cells and of the macroscopic universe 
are mind-boggling. In some cases, they resulted in a better understanding 
of natural phenomena such as the role of DNA in heritability of physical 
traits, and of chemical interactions in the brain. In some cases, they even 
resulted in complete changes of worldview, such as from an earth- to sun-
centered galaxy, and from a creation by divine intent to a blind watchmak-
er’s biological evolution. The foundation of the objective or realist ontol-
ogy of the natural sciences rests in the unchanging and universal scope of 
their objects of research, that is, a strong ontology (White 2000, 6). 
Desiring to achieve similarly astonishing discoveries, from the second 
half of the eighteenth century on, European scholars increasingly came to 
believe that the collection of observations, that is, statistics, about social 
phenomena would lead to public policy informed by data rather than 
impulse and instinct. Among the early believers was Condorcet, who fully 
expected that quantifcation and verifcation of numerically stated hypoth-
eses would improve social policy and planning (Berlin 1993, 126). Adopted 
from medicine, social scientists nowadays speak of evidence-based knowl-
edge and are still in search of strong ontology. What is important about 
the claim that knowledge of social phenomena is and ought to be evidence-
based is that it is implicitly assumed to be objective. But is it? 
We have seen how Vico challenged this assumption, and this train of 
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thought was further developed by Oxford-educated British philosopher 
Roy Bhaskar. His doctoral dissertation became his frst book, in which 
he claimed that knowledge is a social product (Bhaskar 1978, 16). Social 
reality cannot be studied as an aggregate of individual behaviors but as 
the product of continuous relations between individuals (1978, 195). He 
strongly objected to methodological individualism, that is, the notion that 
social scientists could empirically observe society by studying and aggre-
gating individual behaviors. Like Bhaskar, Sober and Wilson noted that 
methodological individualists claim that all human social processes can be 
explained by laws of individual behavior and that groups and social organi-
zations have no ontological reality (1998, 133). I am not sure—lacking the 
expertise natural scientists have about the laws of nature—whether laws of 
individual behavior exist the way that laws of nature do, but human behav-
ior does have instinctual and intentional components that are explored in 
the next chapter. Meanwhile, and for the purposes of this book, it is not 
important to determine whether groups and social organizations are real 
in a strong ontological sense, but it is important to make their very real 
impact on human behavior intelligible. In terms of the topic of this book,
government has an ontological status because of its infuence upon human 
behavior (Tuomela 2013). 
American philosopher Daniel Little seeks to bridge the methodological-
individualist and (neo)institutional approaches with his methodological 
localism. This approach holds that individual behavior is formed by locally 
embodied social facts constituted by the characteristics of the people who 
make these social facts (Little 2009, 163; 2016, 75). This is comparable to 
Bhaskar’s suggestion that social reality is a product of interaction between 
individuals. In a similar vein, South African public administration scholars 
Christelle Auriacombe and Natasja Holtzhausen emphasize that “the social 
world is constructed through human meanings and signifcation, is inher-
ently context-specifc, historical, and comprises various social systems that 
are complex and indeterminate” (2014, 9). Social science will not progress 
under methodological individualism: “It is this couple (empiricism/indi-
vidualism) that I think must be held largely responsible . . . for the social 
scientifc malaise” (Bhaskar 1998, 20). Bhaskar believes that social scientists 
do not appreciate that they study something that only manifests itself in 
open systems (1998, 21) where the various elements, that is, human beings 
and their interactions, are continuously in fux. Indeed, “Society . . . is an 
articulated ensemble of tendencies and powers which, unlike natural ones,
exist only as they . . . are being exercised; are exercised in the last instance 
via the intentional activity of human beings; and are not necessarily space-
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time invariant (1998, 39; emphasis added). Little echoes this when noting 
that an ontology of the social world includes attention to entities such as 
structures, organizations, and institutions and for the categories that refect 
the fuid reality of social processes, practices, rules, relations, and activities 
(2016, 85). Clearly, the element of “emergence” is important: things can 
and do happen over and above any individual, and local-level interactions 
produce emergent properties that are not easily understood by reference to 
individual behavior only. Think about the movement patterns in focks of 
birds and schools of fsh in the animal kingdom (Kerth 2010, 242). Similar 
emergent behavior is also visible in the handclapping and standing ovations 
of human beings at the end of a theater or symphony performance. That is,
we not only applaud the quality of the performance, we also clap because 
others clap. This is known as preferential attachment, which indicates that 
how anything in large networks unfolds is governed by self-organizing (cf.
autopoietic) capabilities that cannot be explained by individual behaviors 
(Barabási and Albert 1999). 
Accepting Little’s claim that all social entities, forces, and processes 
are ultimately constituted by actions and interactions of individuals (2016,
78, 82), and adding this notion of preferential treatment, it is important 
that we add “instinct” to the entities Little mentions, since people are as 
much infuenced by their biological/genetic and psychological makeup as 
they are by the social structures that surround them. Indeed, as British 
evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins argues: “Our own values are pre-
sumably infuenced by natural selection under conditions that prevailed in 
the Pleistocene epoch” (2018, 50). That is, our values developed far before 
cultural evolution outpaced biological evolution. Like Vico, Bhaskar and 
Little emphasize the intentionality of social creations, and they observe 
that the effects of intentional actions can vary with time and context. As 
far as we know, natural phenomena are space-time invariant: an object of a 
certain weight, shape, and size will drop at the same speed in ancient Egypt,
in the United Kingdom in 2018, and in China in 5018. Natural phenomena 
can be studied as observer independent because they operate as a closed 
system where it is possible to observe and isolate cause and effect. Irrespec-
tive of time and place, the same conjunction of events will occur (Bhaskar 
1978, 14). 
Social scientists have tried to approximate the causality of natural 
phenomena by means of correlating social events. And often causality is 
implied and sometimes even explicitly claimed when only correlation can 
be proven. However, correlation does not emulate causality because it is 
a very big step from identifying simultaneous occurrence to proving a 
















causal relation between two events. Following Mill and Weber, although 
not explicitly, Bhaskar also notes that open systems are characterized by a 
plurality and multiplicity of causes (1998, 87), and we have seen this view 
articulated by Gunnar Myrdal, Fritz Scharpf, and Elinor Ostrom. 
Bhaskar argues for a clear distinction between ontology as concern-
ing the intransitive and generally knowledge-independent, real objects of 
scientifc knowledge, and epistemology of transitive, social-historical pro-
cesses of the production of knowledge of such objects (1986, 24). Phrased 
in this way, it may appear that ontology is objective while epistemology is 
subjective, but that would be too hasty a conclusion. As American philoso-
pher John Searle pointed out, both ontology and epistemology have an 
objective and a subjective element (2003, 3–4). The natural sciences study 
objects that are ontologically objective, but they can only be accessed via 
epistemologically subjective means. Observations are made with sensory-
extending and sensory-expanding instruments that allow the study of the 
micro- and macrocosmos in the universe and in the laboratory. Social 
ontology concerns all features of the world that are relative to the inten-
tionality of the observer or user (Searle 1995, 9) and, more specifcally,
to the collectively understood intentionality (Searle 2006, 16). It seems to 
me that this is related to what Isaiah Berlin called intersubjectivity (2000,
11–12) and to Stephen White’s concept of weak ontology, which considers 
human beings in terms of the existential realities of language, knowledge of 
their own mortality, natality, and articulation of “sources of self” (2000, 9).
Social ontology includes “ideas about, including the self-conscious study 
of[,] the nature, character, or basic features, structures, or elements [that 
are] constituents of social life” (Schatzke 2008, 1). For British economist 
Tony Lawson, social ontology includes “all phenomena, existents, proper-
ties, etc. . . . whose formation / coming into existence and/or continuing 
existence necessarily depends at least in part upon human beings and their 
interactions” (2015, 21). Like Bhaskar, he notes that “social reality is an 
emergent, open-ended, structured, transformational process in motion, in 
which the parts are constituted in and through their (changing) conditions 
and their interactions” (2015, 43). 
We live in a world that is made of physical particles that interact in 
force felds. Some of these have combined into systems, and some of these 
systems have developed consciousness and intentional behavior (Searle 
1995, 7). In human beings, intentionality is a multilevel phenomenon, but 
human behavior is motivated by instinctual responses to internal and exter-
nal stimuli as well as by intentional actions. In Weissman’s words, “Persons 
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tures) and a complementary, self-created outside, one of families, friend-
ships, workplaces, and government” (2000, 141; emphasis added). The social 
ontology employed in this study requires that, in order to understand gov-
ernment, we consider the interplay of human instinct and intent in rela-
tion to the material world in which people live (Gosden 2009, 105). Some 
human behaviors have their origin in biological traits, such as the prefer-
ence of most primates to congregate in groups and form status hierarchies,
to accept leadership, and to use physical force when deemed necessary 
(Gosden 2009, 86). Other behaviors are exemplifed in and by artifacts as 
well as circumscribed by institutional arrangements. In fact, human beings 
are the only species that have developed elaborate social institutions,
including government. Again, for the purposes of this study, it is important 
to emphasize that the genetic and social traits that originated millions of 
years ago are as relevant to understanding government in society as any-
thing that can be subsumed under the term “social contract,” which refers 
to intentional agreements made between people. These agreements can 
be of instinctual or intentional origin. Either way, the social contract is a 
powerful organizing force in society. 
The central concept or underlying principle in Searle’s social ontology 
is that of status function, a collectively recognized status to which a func-
tion is attached (Searle 1995, 41). In his view, status function is a unifying 
principle for understanding the domain of social reality, analogous to the 
atom in physics, the elements and their chemical bond in chemistry, the 
cell in biology, the DNA molecule in genetics, and the tectonic plate in 
geology (Searle 2010, 7). Initially, he distinguished four categories of sta-
tus functions, namely symbolic, deontic, honorifc, and procedural powers 
(1995, 99–102), but later came to regard all status functions as expressions 
of deontic powers (2003, 11). All status functions carry deontic powers; 
examples include rights, responsibilities, obligations, duties, privileges,
entitlements, penalties, authorizations, certifcations, and permissions 
(Searle 2010, 8). Government is the ultimate institutional structure and 
repository of deontic powers. Its legitimacy is crucial to society in a way 
that other social institutions, such as churches and labor unions or abstract 
systems such as markets and language, are not. The power of government 
is expressed from totalitarian to democratic political systems, and in all 
cases, it is government that has the power to regulate other institutional 
structures: family, education, economy, private property, church, money,
market, and so on (Searle 2010, 161, 164; 2003, 13). But it is only in demo-
cratic polities that equality (at least before the law) and social justice are 
expected by and for all citizens and thus permeate society as a whole. This 
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expectation has been institutionalized through elaborate checks and bal-
ances. I take up this theme again in chapter 7, and must now return to the 
conceptual framework for this study. 
4. Hierarchies of Knowledge: From Simple to Complex Phenomena 
Searle was referenced above stating that we live in a world of particles. He 
also wrote that the higher levels of mind and society depend upon lower 
levels of existence as made visible through, inter alia, physics, biology, and 
neurobiology (Searle 2010, 25). At every point, he argued, we should con-
sider the biological basis of our object of knowledge (2010, 192). But what 
does this mean, and how can we do this? Status function can be seen as 
an organizing or unifying concept for social ontology in a manner that is 
similar to the atom for physics, the cell for biology, and the elements for 
chemistry. However, the social sciences (and the humanities) lack a para-
digm: a coherent and consistent framework of concepts and theories that 
describe, explain, and predict a clearly demarcated and interrelated set of 
natural phenomena. Why do the social sciences and humanities not have 
a paradigm? 
There are only three paradigms in all of science broadly defned (Raad-
schelders 2011a, 40–42): the standard model and relativity theory in phys-
ics, the periodic table of elements in chemistry, and evolution theory in 
biology. These three paradigms have in common that they describe, causally 
explain, and predict the natural forces or phenomena under consideration.
A paradigm is thus a unifying conceptual and theoretical umbrella that 
help scholars determine what counts as high-quality research. Some schol-
ars suggest that we should develop and agree upon a unifying paradigm 
for the social sciences. Among them, physical chemist and novelist C.P.
Snow called for a third culture, where ideas of science, applied science,
history, culture, would be applied to improve human welfare in general 
across the globe (1971, 58). Entomologist E. O. Wilson promotes gene-
culture coevolution, where the natural science “model” takes the lead and 
the social sciences are expected to follow (1998, Carroll et al., 2016). Evo-
lutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby advance the idea 
that the modular and computational architecture of the brain can serve as 
that unifying vehicle for understanding social reality (1992, 1994, 2008,
2013). The problem with the proposals of Wilson and of Cosmides and 
Tooby is, frst, that they take the individual as the starting point of the 
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that this is the way to go. After all, just like any social institution, science is 
a human artifact subject to agreement (Latour and Woolgar 1986). 
The way forward in the effort to advance understanding of society is 
not to try to model social science after the example of natural science, as 
Wilson proposes, but to accept that social science explanation is found in 
interpretation (Elster 2015, 40). This is comparable to Max Weber’s con-
cept of understanding. The social sciences have no paradigm and will not 
develop a paradigm because their object of study, human beings, behaves 
according to instinctual and intentional responses to internal (e.g., hunger,
thirst, sexual desire) and external (e.g., seeking protection from extreme 
weather and from one another) stimuli. Human beings choose certain 
behaviors, and they can opt to decline or follow their initial response. Reg-
ularities in human behavior include the handshake and the kiss, but these 
behaviors do not rise to the level of regularity observed with the four or 
fve fundamental forces of nature, the forces of chemical bonding, and the 
force of natural selection. 
The social sciences may lack a paradigm, but its scholars do have frame-
works, theories, and models (Ostrom et al. 1994, 23–25). A framework is 
an outline of various elements; the relation between them is relevant for 
understanding the object of knowledge. A model is a formalized representa-
tion of reality that can be tested. Theory is a metalanguage for formulating,
postulating, predicting, and evaluating models. This chapter outlines the 
framework for this study about what government is, and this framework 
combines conceptual elements with historical context. In this study, I do 
not select a particular theory because most theories in the social sciences 
must be second-order formal objects, that is, a set of interrelated concepts 
and theories within a specialization of a social science study or discipline 
(Raadschelders 2011a, 11). A frst-order formal object guides research and 
unifes a study or discipline as a whole, and we know it better as “para-
digm.” As for models, these are few and far between in the social sciences,
and none I have come across appear useful for the purposes of this book. 
For this study, I use theories and concepts as they appear relevant to 
understanding what government is. I structure available knowledge around 
the specifc problem of understanding what government is. I confess to 
having no other ordering principle, and cannot claim to have read every-
thing relevant to my object of interest. My way of acquiring knowledge 
about this is nothing more than the “snowball method.”2 
That being the case, I need to consider how the biological basis of 
humans infuences government as a social phenomenon and then how that 
information can be included in the analysis. Searle provides the key to this 




















challenge, stating that mind and society are embedded in lower, physical 
levels of existence. The fndings of biological, developmental, and behav-
ioral research suggest that human behavior is nested, that it results from 
complex interactions between genes and the physical-experiential environ-
ment. These interactions operate from the molecular up to the cultural,
social, and historical dimensions (Coll et al. 2004, 225). This is not the 
same as saying that it is possible to reduce some aspect and some level of 
reality to its component parts, that is, that the social sciences reduce to 
biology, biology to chemistry, and chemistry to physics, or that the human 
being is composed of molecules that obey the laws of chemistry, which, in 
turn, are subject to the regularities of the underlying physics. This rep-
resents what philosopher Daniel Dennett calls “greedy reductionism,” in 
contrast to “good reductionism,” where anything can be explained without 
resorting to some kind of frst force, power, or process (1995, 81–82). 
To my knowledge, the most complete representation of the layered 
nature of the natural and social worlds was offered by Austrian zoologist 
Rupert Riedl (1979, 1984). What makes Riedl’s framework of this layered 
natural-social system so appealing is that he thinks in terms of a two-way 
interaction up and down the levels of reality. By contrast, what Dennett 
calls “greedy reductionism” is a one-way causal directional to ever smaller 
units of analysis. I have discussed Riedl’s framework in some detail before 
(Raadschelders 2011, 50–53) and have since come to realize that his strati-
fed structure of the real world could be modifed to ft the object of inter-
est in this study.3 
Riedl distinguishes between twelve levels of knowledge in a single hier-
archy, from the smallest level of the quantum, via atom, molecule, biomol-
ecule, ultra-structure, cell, tissue, organ, individual, group, and society, to 
civilization. The individual is the linchpin between the physical-biological 
and social realms, and so, from the individual level on, we should distin-
guish between a subsequent series of physical-natural levels and a series of 
social levels. Thus, beyond the individual, the natural levels include con-
tinent, earth, solar system, galaxy, and universe. The social levels include 
group/tribe, territorial state, and global society (i.e., world civilization). In 
this study, all social levels are included. Of the physical-natural levels, only 
those that are relevant to understanding individual behavior are included,
thus genetics at the cell level and genotypical and phenotypical behaviors 
as imprinted at the cell up to individual organism levels. I will make the 
effort to not treat the relationship between individual and its biology as a 
black box (Williams 2000, 122–124, 134). I could be out of my depth as far 
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stop me from trying to understand government as a human-made institu-
tion that is as much infuenced by inherited biological and psychological 
traits as it is by inherited social customs and mechanisms. 
Riedl’s schema of organizing knowledge is structured around the 
notion of complexity. Once again, it is Vico who frst argued that the social 
world is far more complex than the natural world, and studying the social 
is to be labeled “hard science,” while the natural is “weak science” (Ongaro 
2017, 83). Auguste Comte argued along the same lines (see, e.g., Benton 
and Craib (2001, 126–127), as do American psychologist Gregg Henriques 
(2003) and American public administration scholar Ken Meier (2005). One 
would be hard-pressed to disagree; the social world is more complex to 
study because it does not answer to the timeless regularities that govern 
natural phenomena. I do not write this with glee, for in terms of science 
narrowly defned, that is, with clear epistemological boundaries and almost 
universally agreed standards of research, the natural sciences do sit at the 
top of the knowledge pyramid as conceived in the Western world in the 
past three centuries or so (Yankelovich 1991, 49–50). My approach is one 
of science broadly defned, where I seek to bring to bear anything I have 
come across that appears to contribute to elucidating government’s posi-
tion and role in society. 
5. Government as Function of Instinct, Community, and Society 
The reader will have noticed that my understanding is focused on gov-
ernment above society and government in society. I regard the two as related 
concepts, for government is the ultimate expression of society (Weissman 
2000, 172; Searle 2010, 161). We cannot understand government without 
the society in which it is embedded. If we want to understand government,
we cannot isolate it for analytical reasons from that larger society. That also 
means that we cannot isolate the understanding and meaning of govern-
ment from the human beings who made it. To study government without 
attention to the human origins of its expressions is to pretend it is some-
thing other than . . . what exactly? No, government is a function of human 
instinct, of tribal community, and of global society, and I elaborate each 
of these briefy below—briefy at this point is suffcient, because I discuss 
them in much more detail in chapters 3 to 5. 
Among the frst scholars to use the term “instinct” were the Ameri-
can educator and naturalist P. A. Chadbourne and the German physician 
and philosopher Wilhelm Wundt in the 1870s (Chadbourne 1872; Mur-
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phy and Kovach 1972, 160–167; Hofman 2016, 36–39). Chadbourne was 
referenced by American psychologist and pragmatist philosopher William 
James, who opened an article with the following defnition: “Instinct is 
usually defned as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain 
ends, without foresight of the ends, and without previous education in the 
performance” (1887, 355; see also James 1890, ch. 24). James next writes: 
“Man has a far greater variety of impulses than any lower animal; and any 
one of these impulses, taken in itself, is as ‘blind’ as the lowest instinct can 
be; but, owing to man’s memory, power of refection, and power or infer-
ence, they come each one to be felt by him, after he has once yielded to 
them and experienced their results, in connection with a foresight of those 
results” (1887, 359). In this observation James distinguishes instinct from 
learned behaviors, and the distinction quickly became standard. In the early 
twentieth century the English political scientist and social psychologist 
Graham Wallas wrote: “The prerational character of many of our impulses,
is, however, disguised by the fact that during the lifetime of each individual 
they are increasingly modifed by memory and habit and thought (1962, 50 
[1908]). Konrad Lorenz and Nikolaas Tinbergen used the same distinction 
in the research they did in the 1930s and 1940s (Tinbergen 1951). 
Lorenz suggested that instinctual behavior must include several fea-
tures, among them “ft,” as this behavior occurs at a defnite and often very 
short period of individual life and is irreversible (1961, 54). It is automatic,
irresistible, triggered by an event in the environment, occurs in every mem-
ber of the species, and governs the behavior of the organism without train-
ing or education. Pure instinct is any behavior that is not based on experi-
ence through social learning and training (Spink 2010). The more complex 
the neural system of a species is, the more its behaviors can be understood 
as a function of social learning. Thus, mammal behavior is much more 
dependent upon social learning than the behavior of reptiles. Instinct is 
concerned with repetitive behavior and should not be confused with refex,
which is merely a physical response to an external stimulus, such as the 
narrowing of the pupil when exposed to light, or yawning when one is 
hungry, sleepy, bored, in need of oxygen, responding to someone else who 
is yawning. Human beings display a larger range of learned behaviors than 
any other mammal. Some of these are genetically encoded, while others 
are psychologically imprinted (Coll et al. 2003; Ebstein et al. 2010). These 
learned behaviors include cooperation, retaliation, acceptance of social 
stratifcation, and child-rearing. The extent to which such behaviors are 
displayed can vary with social environment, so some instinctual behaviors 
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harmed in some way, human beings can choose to “turn the other cheek”
instead of acting on an “eye for an eye” basis, depending on the preferred 
choice in the community of which they are part. 
The fact that human behavior is a function of instinctual impulses and 
of environmental infuences makes belonging to a community another key 
element in any analysis of social institutions. Lawson argues that commu-
nity is an emergent and relationally organized entity that comes into being 
via a process where preexisting elements are combined to form a new sys-
tem. What is important about his line of reasoning is that the system or 
totality cannot be reduced to its components for analysis (as suggested by 
Simon 1962), and Lawson illustrates this point with the analogy of tak-
ing apart a house. When you put the various elements together again in a 
random manner, the end result won’t look like a house (2016, 4–5). We can 
only understand social institutions as a function of the interplay between 
individual behaviors and environmental circumstances. I do not regard 
either as primary, and that is what I mean with my reference to a—still for 
lack of that better word—horizontal conceptual framework that recognizes 
how the various physical and social elements can be related to one another 
without assuming preeminence for each of those elements beyond what is 
outlined in Riedl’s levels of knowledge. 
Community is indispensable for the survival of human beings. For most 
of their existence, Homo sapiens lived in physical communities, communities of 
people whose face-to-face interaction ensured that all members knew one 
another, and thus knew whom to turn to for protection, food, comfort, and 
mediation in case of interpersonal confict. Once living under sedentary 
circumstances, people increasingly lived in imagined communities, where the 
members no longer knew one another. The time- and context-free defni-
tion of government offered in chapter 1 refects the fact that government 
as a consciously developed institutional arrangement emerged only once 
people started living in imagined communities where less personal ways 
of interaction needed to be developed (Johnson 2017, 16). To be sure, in 
the past 10,000 years or so, human beings have lived in both physical and 
imagined communities. Their physical community is the extended family 
as well any small in-group to which they belong, such as a sports club or a 
church. The in-group may also be far larger, such as a tribe or nation. In 
the latter case, the in-group is an imagined community, since people can-
not possibly know all members of the same community. In a small band,
people may know all, in a tribe they may know many, but in a nation, mem-
bers cannot possibly know all other members. Under sedentary conditions,
informal and unwritten behaviors and expectations have to be codifed to 














           
some extent. Some instinctual responses may be restrained by formal rules; 
new formal rules are established as need arises. 
This set of formal and informal rules is indispensable to any society,
whether it is a small city-state with a few thousand people or a large state 
with hundreds of millions of people. In this study, I am not focused on soci-
ety as such but on government above society and government in society. I 
think this can be understood based on the hierarchical-horizontal frame-
work outlined above, but only in combination with a historical perspective 
(see the next section). With Bhaskar, I hold that social structures are always 
geohistorically earthed, complex, interconnected, and changing, and thus 
social science and theory depend upon an understanding of world history 
(1986, 216). In his words: “Society can only be known, not shown, to exist.
It exists only in virtue of the intentional activity of men but it is not the 
result (or the cause) of their intentional activity” (1978, 195). Two decades 
later, he continued to defne society along similar lines: “Society . . . is an 
articulated ensemble of tendencies and powers which, unlike natural ones,
exist only as they . . . . are being exercised; are exercised in the last instance 
via the intentional activity of human beings; and are not necessarily space-
time invariant” (Bhaskar 1998, 39). Just as the community cannot be under-
stood as an aggregate of its component parts, that is, the individual human 
beings, society cannot be reduced to the various communities within it. In 
the past two centuries, people have come to equate society with a homo-
geneous territorial state, but in recent decades, we have come to realize 
that the territorial state is increasingly heterogeneous in terms of cultural 
and ethnic identities, and that we are actually also part of a global soci-
ety. While human beings have been dependent on circumstances bound 
by time and context to live with and constrain their instinctual inclinations 
and their community needs, they are challenged when it comes to living in 
a global society where, ideally, behavior and interaction are defned by the 
fundamental humanity that all people share. 
6. Institutional Changes and the Triple Whammy 
Vico’s New Science is not concerned with natural forces, but is focused on 
understanding civil society in its social and historical context. In this sec-
tion, I outline one more element of this book’s conceptual framework: 
the ideational changes in the structure of government in the decades sur-
rounding  the 1800s and the internal and external functional changes in the 
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society to its core. To organize the description of the changes around the 
1800s, I use the distinction between three levels of analysis made by Larry 
Kiser and Elinor Ostrom (1982). 
Kiser and Ostrom distinguish between three levels of rules that can 
easily be seen as three levels of analysis: constitutional, collective, and 
operational. In a previous book, I have shown that these levels, translated 
as abstract, somewhat visible, and tangible features of administrative phe-
nomena, are often used by scholars of public administration to character-
ize features of the specialization or topic they study (Raadschelders 2003,
386–387). The constitutional level is concerned with the institutional 
superstructure that provides the foundation and legitimation of govern-
ment and defnes in abstracto the role of government in society. Within 
that context, the collective level is the one where people establish decision-
making arrangements that identify who is allowed to participate in policy 
and decision-making, who has voting powers, who has veto powers, and 
so on. The operational level is where the day-to-day operations of gov-
ernment are determined. These include internal arrangements concerning 
intra- and interorganizational coordination, fnancial and personnel man-
agement, as well as external arrangements for planning and implementing 
public policy and the direct or indirect delivery of collective services. 
For much of history, the institutional superstructure simply emerged 
and was generally accepted as is. Elements of this superstructure could be 
codifed, especially the nature of relations between those who govern and 
the governed. The large majority of the population had nothing to say 
about their position in relation to government and could do little about 
their station in society. The people were treated as subjects who lived in 
the territory that was governed. To be even more specifc: rulers governed 
a territory, not a people. Population-rich societies were generally governed 
by a social, economic, religious, and political elite with a more or less strong 
leader. This leader, whether titled chief, lugal, pharaoh, queen, emperor, or 
president, generally had to share power with the societal elites. Govern-
ment was centralized to varying degree, and its authority was frequently 
contested between various elites. Indeed, up to late eighteenth century,
government was one among various social actors that exercised power,
such as a powerful nobility with armies, leaders of religious organizations,
and leaders in trade and craft guilds. Regardless of who “controlled” gov-
ernment, however, it was an actor whose role and position were perceived 
as being above society at large, that is, government above society. 
This changed from the sixteenth century on when political trea-
tises started to appear that were no longer in the Fürstenspiegel (Mirror 
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of Princes) tradition, concerned with advising the ruler how to rule, but 
focused instead on the anti-Machiavellian “art of government” itself (Fou-
cault 1991, 87, 90). This, in part, inspired the fundamental changes dur-
ing what American historian Robert R. Palmer (1959, 1964) dubbed the 
period of the Atlantic Revolutions, when the dominance of monarchs, aris-
tocrats, clergy, and merchants in the trade and craft guilds was successfully 
challenged with a call for equality, liberty, and brotherhood. The regime 
changes that followed revolutions in colonial America and in France 
resulted in a type of government not seen before, one where sovereignty 
is invested in the people—at least in terms of political theory—and where 
government is populated by top leaders elected by the adult population,
and by career civil servants appointed on the basis of merit and accountable 
to the elected offceholders. In the light of history, this change unfolded 
very fast, in the span of a human lifetime. 
Changes at the Constitutional Level 
At the constitutional level, that is, the institutional superstructure of the 
foundation for and context within which government operates, there were 
at least four major changes: the separation of the public and private sectors,
the separation of church and state, the creation of constitutions, and the 
separation of politics from administration. 
Separation of public and private spheres. Until the late eighteenth 
century, positions in the upper strata in all societies were held by people 
who belonged to a single social, economic, and political elite. Thus, local,
regional, and national government administrators (political offceholders) 
also held major offce and positions in, for instance, the British East India 
Company or in one of the guilds. Also, high-ranking clerics could hold 
major offce in government (e.g., Cardinals Mazarin and Richelieu at the 
seventeenth-century French courts of Louis XIII and Louis XIV). Further-
more, positions in what nowadays would be defned as career civil service 
or policy bureaucracy were also held by members of the same elite, and 
then as preparation for the higher type of offce that would nowadays be 
labeled as political. In other words, there was no distinction between a 
public and private sphere of organization.4 
For most of history, elites controlled government and thus territory and 
its produce as property and the people in it as subjects (Olson 1993). It only 
became possible to separate a public from a private sphere when the idea 
took root that government existed not as the property and instrument of 
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its people against violence from foreign aggressors and from injustice and 
oppression from within, to provide people with public works and education 
so as to advance the interests of all, and to protect people from the power 
of government (Kennedy 2010, 164–167). Indeed, the private sphere came 
to be synonymous with economy and society (Foucault 1991, 92). The 
contemporary understanding of “society” emerged in the late eighteenth 
century and was consolidated in the nineteenth century (Rose 1996, 67–69) 
through persistent—and government driven—national identity formation 
(Fisch 2008). The contemporary understanding of public (government) 
and private (predominantly the economy, but also other societal organiza-
tions) spheres was frst voiced by John Locke and became fully developed 
in the works of Adam Smith. 
Separation of church and state. In the slipstream of separating public 
from private, church and state, de facto separating since the twelfth cen-
tury in Europe, became de iure separated in the national constitutions that 
were rapidly adopted everywhere (the American 1787; the French 1791; 
the Dutch 1798) (Raadschelders 2002, 6). This was a monumental develop-
ment because hitherto the state had often been intertwined with organized 
religion and other societal organizations. From this moment on, the state 
would dominate the public realm, and organized religion was relegated to 
the private realm. 
Establishing a constitutional foundation to the state and its public 
sphere. Capturing the foundation of society in a legal document, such as 
a constitution, is another major innovation in the history of government.
Its origins can be traced back to Aristotle’s ideas about the good constitu-
tion as a mix of oligarchy and polis, to Roman natural law that connected 
law to natural principles of justice and equity, and to Germanic law and 
feudalism, where ruler and nobles were bound by mutual obligations and 
reciprocities. These three fed into the contemporary understanding of 
constitutionalism, which includes limiting state power vis-à-vis society and 
a separation of powers within the state (Lane 1996, 20–25). These powers 
were initially identifed as legislative, executive, and federative (i.e., foreign 
affairs [Locke]) but the most common is that between legislative, executive,
and judiciary branches (Montesquieu). At no time was administrative staff 
considered a political power in and of itself. Constitutionalism provided 
not only a new context for the relation between rulers and people, but also 
for the interaction between rulers and administrative staff. 
Separation of politics from administration. One can argue that the 
separation of public and private (i.e., state and market), the separation of 
state and church, and the creation of constitutions defne the role and posi-















tion of government in society in relation to other societal institutions and 
organizations. Hence, these three are external to government itself. The 
fourth separation, between politics and administration, is internal to the 
political-administrative system. Until the late eighteenth century, those 
who served in a political position at the local level (e.g., mayor, alderman,
council member) conducted many administrative duties, such as keeping 
the minutes of meetings. There were very few purely administrative posi-
tions where incumbents actually had policy-developing responsibilities.
Public sector positions below the leadership positions were merely clerical 
and more often involved manual activity. Those in leadership positions had 
the discretion to appoint anyone in a subordinate position. In practice, this 
led to widespread nepotism and cooptation. Following the Atlantic Revo-
lutions, and in a manner of a few decades, it became accepted practice that 
those in the highest positions ought to be elected as representatives of the 
people, while those in all other positions should be appointed on the basis 
of relevant education, experience, and skills. The lack of universal suffrage 
(i.e., many citizens had no voting rights) does not diminish the importance 
of this principle. And, in the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the right to vote was slowly expanded to ultimately include all 
citizens (female and male) above a certain age. 
The frst three changes at the constitutional level concern the institu-
tional context in which the “new” civil servant would be working, namely 
as subordinate to one (in the case of the executive, i.e., head of state, or 
head offcer of an administrative department or agency) or several (in the 
case of a collegial body, i.e., legislature or judiciary) political offcehold-
ers. Those in higher “public” offce should be elected as representatives 
of the people, that is, political offceholders, while those at subordinate 
levels should be selected on the basis of specifcally defned administrative 
skills, education, training, and experience. It is especially this separation of 
politics from administration that had direct consequences at the collective 
and operational levels. 
Changes at the Collective Level 
At the collective or organizational level, there were two major develop-
ments, and they concern the organizational structure and the “owner-
ship” of public offce: departmentalization and separation of offce from 
offceholder. 
Departmentalization. There had been government departments before 
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12), but the idea of structuring the bulk of the public sector in clearly 
identifable units that are organized as a bureaucracy (i.e., with unity of 
command, clear lines of structure, etc.) that is subjected to the primacy of 
politics is yet another product of the eighteenth century. Collegial organi-
zation, where one offce was held by a group of people—and this was the 
normal situation at middle and higher managerial levels (e.g., at local level: 
the regents of the orphanage, church masters, market masters)—was lim-
ited from here on to elective offce (e.g., legislative bodies) and sometimes 
also to judicial offce (e.g., a high court). 
Separation of offce and offceholder. The second development at the 
collective level was the separation of offce from offceholder. Throughout 
history, it had been quite common to acquire a position on the basis of kin-
ship or friendship. Offces could be inherited, even sold, and it was possible 
to hold multiple offces at the same time. First urged by Popes Celestine I 
and Leo I (ffth century) (Miller 1983, 84), and reiterated by Martin Luther 
(Hattenhauer 1978, 15), the separation of offce and offceholder was not 
common practice until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
ries. This started in 1780 with the creation of a number of committees by 
George III, king of England, that were charged with looking into the sale 
of public offce and into sinecure offces (Cohen 1941, 20). This resulted in 
a series of civil service reforms, such as Act 23 GEO III, c.82 (1783), which 
abolished sinecure offces in the Exchequer upon the demise of the offce-
holder, who was then—if necessary—replaced by a salaried offcial. Other 
departments followed quickly (Chester 1981, 138). 
Changes at the Operational Level 
Developments at constitutional and organizational levels naturally had 
consequences at the level of individual offceholders. The separation of 
politics and administration happened with an eye on two important issues: 
making administrators less dependent upon their “political bosses” yet sub-
ordinate to the latter to ensure they were not beholden to other external 
infuences, and increasing their substantive qualifcations for holding a 
career civil service position. 
Adequate salary and monetary pension. Government jobs below the top 
ranks often required one to two days a week at most. Except for the elites,
anyone working in a government job had to augment that income with 
employment elsewhere. Since salary was paid in money and in kind (e.g.,
a house, food, frewood, clothes), and since there was no formal pension 
system, those working in a government job were highly dependent upon 










patronage. The fact that they worked other jobs opened the door for cor-
ruption. It was in the early nineteenth century in Europe that administra-
tive positions in government became full-time jobs, compensated with a 
salary that was suffcient to sustain a family. Equally important, government 
employees were no longer required to work until very old age because of 
the establishment of a retirement age and pension system. Starting in the 
seventeenth century with military pensions, by the 1820s several German 
states had established retirement (with a maximum age between 65 and 70) 
and pensions (Wunder 2000, 28; Chester 1981, 129). To have a suffcient 
salary and monetary pension was one of the features of Max Weber’s ideal 
typical bureaucracy: at one brilliant stroke career civil servants were made 
somewhat autonomous from political offceholders and were no longer 
being beholden to other employers. In return, career civil servants were 
expected to serve the elected administration to the best of their abilities. 
Appropriate educational background and relevant experience. These 
qualifcations were necessary to serve the administration properly. 
The development of the career civil service is summarized in Table 2.1. 
Considered together, the changes described above affected mostly 
those who worked in government but created the foundation for a gov-
ernment “owned” by the people as a collective. In fact, it was from then 
on that people were no longer considered subjects and became citizens.
Obviously, this did not happen overnight, but based on the foundation laid 
in the decades between 1780 and 1820 and building in the course of the 
nineteenth century, people expressed their newfound right of association 
in the creation of political parties and labor unions. In the same century,
they would be turned into citizens of a nation (Weber 1976; Fisch 2008),
no longer identifying only with the geographical region where they were 
born but also with the country whose fag came to symbolize a unity never 
before experienced. 
Enter the Triple Whammy: Industrialization, Urbanization, and 
Rapid Population Growth 
For centuries, governments provided very few services to the citizenry at 
large. Most of those services concerned the maintenance of order and safety 
by means of a military, a judicial system, and some policing. It is true that 
historical governments offered other services, such as food supply in times 
of bad harvests (the granaries of ancient Egypt), irrigation works (agricul-
ture in the Fertile Crescent of Mesopotamia), water supply for urban areas 
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governments in the Low Countries from the ffteenth century on). But, all 
in all, governments at all levels were quite small. 
The ideational and structural changes described above did not imme-
diately affect the citizenry at large, but it did provide the foundation that 
enabled governments to respond quite quickly to the rapid changes in the 
social, political, and economic environment from the second half of the 
nineteenth century on. What happened? Years of disappointing harvests 
resulted in a serious and prolonged agricultural crisis in Europe and North 
America. As a consequence, many left the countryside in search of jobs 
in the new industries that emerged in and around the cities. The agri-
cultural crisis and industrialization prompted rapid urbanization. At the 
same time, populations started growing rapidly. This massive urbanization 
and population growth caused a whole host of new collective problems,
which people could no longer solve among themselves on the basis of self-
governance. Furthermore, where people in rural areas could and did turn 
to one another for help in times of hardship (e.g., bringing food to a fam-
ily who had a birth or a death), in the new urban settlements they could 
only turn to local government since they now lived in communities where 
they hardly knew others. On both sides of the Atlantic, new industries 
and urban areas needed all sorts of explicit regulations and attention to 
standards of living, which included housing, garbage collection and street 
cleaning, snow removal, water supply, sewage systems, health care, labor 
laws (especially protecting children), playgrounds, publicly owned utilities,
public baths, and education (Griffth 1974; Raadschelders 1990, 1994).
Local governments were called upon to deliver a whole range of services,
and from this time on, governments started growing in terms of person-
nel size, horizontal and vertical organizational differentiation, revenue and 
expenditure, and regulation. By the 1920s, government was very different 
from its historical predecessors in structure and in functions. It is on this 
basis that a welfare state emerged in the decades following World War II,
the likes of which had not been seen or experienced before. 
7. The Stage Is Set for the Remainder of This Book 
This chapter should have made clear that the question “What is govern-
ment?” requires a conceptual rather than an empirical answer. A social 
ontology of government is concerned with presenting an intelligible pic-
ture of government as a social phenomenon, without striving to present 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































should I bother to read this book? Given that this is a short treatise, I do 
hope that the reader will give it a shot, because it will help one acquire a 
more nuanced understanding of the role of government in society. This 
book will not contribute to an improvement of the material standard of 
living. It will, however, contribute to better understanding of the general 
nature of human society and the role that people as citizens and their gov-
ernments play in that. The most important contribution of this book is to 
demonstrate that government is not only human-made but something we 
can observe intersubjectively. In the words of John Stuart Mill: “The laws 
of the phenomena of society are, and can be, nothing but the laws of the 
actions and passions of human beings united together in the social state.
Men, however, in a state of society, are still men; their actions and passions 
are obedient to the laws of individual human nature” (1930, 573 [1843]).
Human social relations and the institutions they create to nourish, chan-
nel, constrain, and—I’m afraid—exploit those relations very much depend 
on instinct, on our ability to live in (tribal) communities, and, presently, on 
learning how to live in a global society where we recognize each other’s 
fundamental humanity rather than physiological and cultural differences.
That triad—human instinct, tribal community, and global society—is the 











Instinct and Intent 
Origins and Elements of Human Governing Behaviors 
[Lord Acton] seems to have thought that the power problem could 
be solved by good social arrangements, supplemented . . . by sound 
morality and a spot of revealed religion. Power has to be curbed on 
the legal and on political levels. . . . But it is also obvious that there 
must be prevention on the individual level, on the level of instinct 
and emotion. (Huxley 2009, 189 [1962]) 
The origins and development of governing in the human species can be 
described on two timescales (Richerson et al. 2003, 383). The frst is the 
long period during the Pleistocene when our social instincts were honed 
by living in small and mobile hunter-gatherer groups. During this time,
many genetic changes occurred as a function of humans living in groups 
with social institutions that were heavily infuenced by culture. At this tim-
escale of hundreds of thousands of years, genes and culture coevolved. The 
second is the short period of the past 10,000 years, the Holocene, when 
people replaced a nomadic life with a sedentary existence. At this timescale,
genetic changes were fairly insignifcant, while the cultural changes turned 
out to be ever larger and faster. 
In order to study the institutional arrangements of human govern-
ing, we have to consider the components, elements, and features of those 
governing systems that can be attributed to instinct and those that can 
be attributed to intent. This is important because, as I mentioned in the 
introduction to this book, governing faces the challenge of balancing non-
rational and prerational impulses with rationalist-purposive objectives.
Instinct is a pattern of fxed action or behavior, and some of the governing 













arrangements among the human species originated quite early in our fam-
ily tree. They date back to a time before the earliest Homo emerged. Intent 
refers to conscious actions or behaviors that people learn from others by 
way of imitation and formal education. Instinctual behavior is automatic 
and more genetically determined, while intentional behavior is culturally 
based. In this chapter, I focus on instincts and early-learned behaviors.
The human primate instincts have developed over a span of millions of 
years, while Homo sapiens’ early-learned behaviors have unfolded during 
the course of the Pleistocene and, somehow, found a more solidifed and 
codifed expression in our institutional arrangements for governing. How 
is this mix of instinctual and intentional elements in our species’ makeup 
visible in our governing arrangements? This question is central to this and 
the next chapter. In this chapter, I look at that long period of the Pleisto-
cene when early humans lived in small, nomadic, forager-hunter-fsher-
gatherer groups of 30 to 50, perhaps sometimes 150, individuals. In the 
next chapter, I target the short period of the Holocene when human beings 
became increasingly sedentary. From an evolutionary point of view, the 
latter development has been quite rapid. Until some 10,000 years ago, all 
humans lived a nomadic life. By 1500 CE only 1 percent of the world pop-
ulation lived a nomadic life, while by the year 1900 CE, this had declined 
to only 0.001 percent (Barnard 2011, 64). 
The distinction between instinctual reaction and intentional action is 
visible in McIntosh’s observation that the concept of self-control implies 
there may be more than one energy system in the human psyche (1969,
122). It is also visible in Kahneman’s system 1 and system 2 thinking (2011,
20). The former is activated in an almost automatic way, especially when 
people are under pressure or threat. It produces quick responses with 
little or no thought. System 2 thinking is conscious thought and takes 
time, sometimes much more time, and is thus harder (2011, 21). System 1 
thinkers are doers; system 2 thinkers are planners (Thaler 2015, 109). Our 
instinctual behaviors are an excellent example of pre-system 1 thinking,
and pure instinct is genetically encoded (e.g., blushing, yawning) (Salazar 
2019, 17). 
Some system 1 thinking among human beings includes the behaviors 
that ensure survival, and these include inclusive ftness, raising the young 
by the entire group, pair bonding and sharing of food resources, as well 
as the many heuristics and biases that are part of our social makeup and a 
function of experiences in interaction with one another. Those could be 
called learned instinctual or psychologically imprinted behaviors because they 
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respond to a commonly recognized greeting style (handshake, hug, kiss).
However, as much as they may have become second nature (Gamble 2007,
33), humans can override them. While people cannot control their pure 
instincts, they are becoming increasingly aware of the heuristics and biases 
that play a role in day-to-day interactions and in decision-making, and they 
can restrain them. No human being is free from these heuristics and biases.
The training opportunities for employees regarding sensitivity to diversity 
and (in)appropriate behaviors testifes to that growing awareness. 
These early-learned instinctual behaviors can be distinguished from 
learned calculating behaviors that involve a choice about whether to con-
sciously use one’s biases and heuristics to infuence the behavior of oth-
ers. System 2 thinking is ideally the kind where decisions are made on the 
basis of pure rational thought, but, unlike some characters in science fction 
such as Mr. Spock in Star Trek or the Econs in Richard Thaler’s discus-
sion of behavioral economics (2015, 7), no human being has ever achieved 
this feat. The system 2 thinking of human beings is boundedly rational,
because the capacity to process and store information in and retrieve it 
from the brain is simply limited. People are aware of the challenges that 
system 2 thinking poses, especially when accepting that they are boundedly 
rational. It may be more challenging to accept the fact that people also 
act upon pure instinctual, early-learned instinctual and learned calculat-
ing behaviors. Looking back at tumultuous political and military upheavals 
of the Russian Revolution and the Great War, Graham Wallas wrote in 
the preface to the third edition of his book in 1920 that the assumption 
that human beings are guided by “enlightened self-interest” is an “intel-
lectualist fallacy”: “Impulse . . . has an evolutionary history of its own ear-
lier than the history of those intellectual processes by which it is often 
directed and modifed. Our inherited organization inclines us to re-act in 
certain ways to certain stimuli because such reactions have been useful in 
the past in preserving our species. Some of the reactions are what we call 
specifcally ‘instincts,’ that is to say, impulses towards defnite acts, inde-
pendent of any conscious anticipation of their proftable effects” (1962, 48 
[1908]). He directly challenges the “economic man” assumption of clas-
sical economics (61) and observes that in human beings and other social 
and semisocial animals “the simpler impulses—especially those of fear and 
anger—when they are consciously shared by many physically associated 
individuals, may become enormously exalted, and may give rise to violent 
nervous disturbances” (76). Reading this, one cannot but think about how 
right-wing populism in democratic political systems seems to take overtake 
the rational side of humanity (Rosenberg 2019). Echoing Wallas’s senti-




















ments (though not referencing him), American journalist Rick Shenkman 
observes through various narratives how diffcult it is to overcome impulses 
with rationality (2016). 
At least in part, human decision-making is the “result of animal spir-
its—a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the out-
come of a weighted average of quantitative benefts multiplied by quanti-
tative probabilities” (Keynes 1936, 162; emphasis added). In the wake of 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud, many in the Bloomsbury group,
which John Maynard Keynes frequently attended, believed that these ani-
mal sides of human nature dominated most human action (Maurini 2017).
Still today, some authors point out that instincts and intuitions seem to 
come frst (Haidt 2012, xx), and that public administration scholars need 
to pay attention to intuitive, automatic, and cue-driven behaviors (Nør-
gaard 2018, 3). That belief in the dominance of humanity’s animal side 
and irrationality can be understood as a counterpoint to the overwhelming 
notion in the early twentieth century that the machine was the new meta-
phor characterizing the time. However, while infuenced by his acquain-
tance with members of the Bloomsbury group, Aldous Huxley pointed to 
a middle course. In his words: “The only philosophy of life which has any 
prospect of being permanently valuable is a philosophy which takes all the 
facts—the facts of mind and the facts of matter, of instinct and intellect, of 
individualism and of sociableness. The wise man will avoid both extremes 
of romanticism and choose the realistic golden mean” (as quoted in Web-
ster 1934, 208). What Huxley called the extremes of romanticism are the 
soul and the individual versus the machine. 
Enlightenment’s belief in human rationality, which assumes human 
observers to be superior to animals in their ability to independently 
and therefore objectively observe the world, is still going strong in the 
social sciences, and—at least as far as the study of public administration is 
concerned—may blind its scholars to prerational motives and experiences 
that characterize governing in human societies. Given the pervasiveness of 
this instinct versus intent, or nature-nurture, thinking, we have to examine 
it more closely (section 1). 
The nature-nurture debate is an example of dichotomous thinking and 
is relevant to the current chapter as it addresses the extent to which nature 
and nurture account for the evolution of humanity and, specifcally for the 
objective of this book, for this balancing of instinct and intent in the emer-
gence and development of human governing behavior. Thus, I examine the 
common elements in the behavior of the great apes and humans (section 
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to become distinct from other primates (section 3), human instinct and 
intent (section 4), how we differ from primates (section 5), and the fact that 
humans must balance conficting impulses at the individual, group, and 
societal levels (section 6). In the concluding section, I summarize the most 
important elements of this chapter and lay the foundation for chapter 4. 
The individual and group levels are especially important since the 
larger-scale society we live in nowadays did not come into existence 
until some 10,000 years ago. The society of the Pleistocene was that of a 
hunting-gathering group, a term coined frst by the Scottish baronet and 
lawyer John Dalrymple (1726–1810) when he wrote in 1757 that the “frst 
state of society” was that of hunters and fshers (Potts 2014, 435). It was a 
characterization picked up by Adam Smith. Until that time, people simply 
believed in the Hobbesian distinction between humans existing in a natural 
state (cf. Rousseau’s “noble barbarian”) versus those living in a state-society 
(Barnard 2004, 32–33). The notion of a hunting-gathering society is thus 
to be seen as an intermediate phase between that of the “noble savage” and 
the settled agriculturalist. 
1. The Nature-Nurture Issue: From Dichotomy to Balanced Complex 
People are primates and share a common ancestry with the great apes.
Italian philosopher Lucillio Vanini was executed in 1619 for saying that 
people descended from apes (Barnard 2011, 4), but there are still plenty of 
people who believe that human beings hold a special place in creation and 
thus deny that the great apes are our cousins. While there cannot be any 
scientifc basis to engage in the argument about the existence of a divine 
creator, there is ample scientifc evidence that we share instinctual and 
early-learned behaviors with the great apes. That people share instinctual 
and early-learned behaviors leads us to ask how much of our governing 
arrangements are based on instinctual and prerational behaviors and how 
much on learned behaviors. 
This goes directly to the nature-nurture debate, which dates back to 
antiquity, sparked interest in late medieval and early modern England and 
France, and gained popularity when discussed by the nineteenth-century 
British statistician Francis Galton. Those who believe that nature deter-
mines most of our physical and mental being point to the infuence of 
DNA and genotype, that is, heredity, upon human behavior. Thus, in the 
early twentieth century, Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto 
argued that the basic forces in human society and the motives for human 
























action are instinctual (as discussed in Collins and Makowsky 1972, 171).
Those who point to nurture argue that we are born as a “blank slate,” a 
term frst used by John Locke, and that all our behaviors are thus a product 
of learning, that is, nurture. This position is refected in the observation of 
English-Canadian anthropologist Christopher Hallpike, that the human 
inclination for “cooperation, mutual assistance . . . , parental care, . . . shar-
ing and reciprocity, controlling violence within the group, treating others 
with respect, and the appropriate forms of behavior towards men, women,
old people, children” comes to us through living in society (2017, 20). Both 
positions are understandable: nature is manifest in instinct or fxed action 
patterns, and culture is visible in learned behaviors (Brown 1991, 147).
They are both hereditary, but heredity is genetic in the case of nature,
while in the case of nurture, heredity is established through learning from 
the knowledge and experience of parents (vertical learning), of peers (hori-
zontal learning), of the elder to the younger (oblique learning, teaching),
and of higher- to lower-status individuals (Gintis 2009, 224; 2011, 878).
Genetic changes in any species evolve over long periods of time, and sev-
eral human behaviors originated millions of years ago (Bjorklund and Pel-
legrini 2002, 11). Cultural changes take time too, but they are generally 
measured in thousands and tens or hundreds of thousands of years. 
In the past 30 years, the stark nature-nurture dichotomy has been rel-
egated to the trash heap of scholarship. There is widespread agreement 
among scholars from different disciplines that the distinction obscures 
more than it reveals. Individual development of human beings is consid-
ered highly infuenced by genetic activity, neural activity, various ranges of 
behavior, and the physical, social, and cultural environment (Bjorklund and 
Pellegrini 2002, 34; Buss 1999, 279; Coll et al. 2004, 225; Salazar 2019).
Indeed, the neural architecture of our brain allows for high plasticity. That 
is, there is a built-in structure where each cell has instructions (the genes),
and these instructions regulate how a particular cell will be expressed (e.g.,
a cell in the brain, or a cell in the stomach lining, or a bone cell, etc.).
Nature provides the instruction of a process of gene expression, and how 
that is expressed is in part determined by nurture, that is, the environment 
(Marcus 2004, 34, 40). Furthermore, careful ethological research has shown 
that learned behavior, as well as elements of language, consciousness, and 
culture, is visible in other species and especially among primates (reference 
to Churchland, 2014; Mithen 1990, 10). As a consequence, biologists can 
no longer assume that human behavior is a function of the genetic makeup 
only, while social scientists can no longer assume that behavior is mostly 
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research and how it informs understanding of (early) human society has in 
recent years been discovered by anthropologists (Johnson 2017; Storey and 
Storey 2017). However, some biologists and social scientists still stereotype 
one another on the basis of that obsolete nature-nurture dichotomy, rather 
than actually learning from each other’s insights (as described nicely by 
Harcourt and De Waal 1992, 493–494). 
As far as understanding this balancing act between genetic and social 
heredity, the dichotomy does not help to describe or help understand human 
behaviors very well. I prefer to use the word “understanding” rather than 
“explanation” since we have little clue about how human behavior can be 
explained by the intertwinement of genetic and social heredity. Indeed, all 
primate behavior is a function of evolved tendencies, environmental modi-
fcation, development, and learning (De Waal 2001b, 2). But, again, how 
genes and (early) learning are actually linked will be an important part of 
the research agenda of geneticists, evolutionary biologists, primatologists,
evolutionary psychologists, and anthropologists in the years to come. 
Part of the problem of understanding in general, and specifcally the 
understanding of gene-culture interaction, is that Western scholars often 
search for prime or suffcient causes. It is considered unsatisfying to con-
clude that something might have happened continuously in a complex,
always emergent, almost chaotic, even unpredictable manner (see the ref-
erences to multicausal events in the introduction). People fnd little guid-
ance or assurance, and certainly no intellectual satisfaction, in the observa-
tion that human behavior results from a mix of conscious and unconscious 
actions and choices that defy unraveling, and that these actions and choices 
have intended and recognized but also unintended, overlooked, and 
unknown consequences (Lumsden 1989; Mithen 1990, 263). 
On the basis of existing knowledge and for the purposes of this book,
it is simply suffcient to agree with the following observation: “Genes are 
part of the developmental system in the same sense as other components 
(cells, tissue, organism), so genes must be susceptible to infuence from 
other levels during the process of individual development” (Gottlieb 1991,
9; cf. Wahlsten and Gottlieb 1997, 167). The same line of reasoning is fol-
lowed by the American professor of psychology Gary Marcus, who notes 
that different parts of the brain have different functions, but those func-
tions are likely to be shared subcomponents for information processing.
That is, there are no complete systems or modules in the brain that single-
handedly solve a complex cognitive task (Marcus 2004, 133–134). Thus,
I am less inclined to regard human behavior as a function of a modularly 
wired brain and as a purely physical function, as is suggested by evolu-



















tionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (1992, 1993, 2008,
2013), and more persuaded by theories about human behavior infuenced 
by both genetic and cultural evolution. The latter emphasizes the role of 
extragenetic transmission and adaptation of behaviors as well as embodied 
cognition, which stresses the reciprocity between individual and environ-
ment (Smith et al. 2008, 3473). Furthermore, and lacking evidence to the 
contrary, I also hold to the notion that human life is underdetermined by 
heredity and environment—at least in the past 10,000 years or so—since 
people have the capacity to think and act independently of biological and 
environmental constraints and infuences (McIntosh 1995, 26). 
The reader recognizes that these theories of interlaced genetic and cul-
tural development refect the understanding of human nature as a layered 
and interconnected phenomenon both up and down levels of complexity.
Perhaps the various theories about what determines human nature can be 
combined in a gene-culture coevolution theory that describes how genes 
and culture infuence each other. The evidence that genes infuence human 
behavior and thus culture is strong; the evidence that culture actually infu-
ences genetic development is growing stronger (Laland et al. 2010; Ross 
and Richerson 2014). 
As far as genetic heritability is concerned, the human genome of any 
two individuals is 99.9 percent identical. However, one cannot then con-
clude, as Venter et al. remind us, that many human characteristics and 
behaviors are “hard-wired” in the genome and that it will only be a matter 
of time before the understanding of gene functions and interactions will 
provide a complete causal description of human variability (2001, 1348).
Indeed, the importance of that 0.1 percent difference between individuals 
is perhaps best illustrated with research that shows how identical twins 
with completely similar genes have developed very different phenotypes 
when raised under different ontogenetic conditions. The photographic 
evidence of two brothers is merely a visual reminder of the extent to which 
nonvisible environmental conditions made them grow up very differently 
(photos in Gottlieb 2004, 95). With 7.6 billion people on this earth at the 
time of this writing (2018), it is nothing short of amazing to realize that the 
0.1 percent difference is suffcient to make us all unique. 
What Lerner has called a split between the nature-reductionist and the
relational-developmental approaches (2004, 7) is clearly visible in ideas about
human beings as rational and self-regarding maximizers that serve as the
basis for research of many political scientists, biologists, and economists, on
the one hand, and the sociologists’ notion of humans as passive internalizers
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et al. 2015, 327). In the same spirit, Overton distinguishes between split and
relational metatheory (2004, 203). Split metatheory regards the social world
as aggregates of the smallest pieces and requires some kind of principle or
mechanism upon which the whole can be reconstructed. Public choice and
principal-agent theory in economics, political science, and public adminis-
tration are excellent examples because they assume that social reality is the
product of individual behavior and interactions with the principle or mech-
anism being the self-interested and maximizing behavior of individuals.
Relational metatheory describes the social world as a range of interlocked sys-
tems of dynamic, ever-changing relations between parts and the whole. It is
holistic and builds upon the assumption of organized complexity where the
one part is defned by its opposite. Overton mentions Dutch graphic artist
Escher’s Drawing Hands as a visual example of this type of approach (2004,
205). In the study of public administration and in political science, relational
metatheory is partially visible in the variety of neoinstitutional approaches
(Peters 2012) that assume that individual behavior and interactions are a
function of the larger physical and social (cultural, economic, political, his-
torical, religious) environment. There is, though, in the social sciences a
relational metatheory where individual and environment defne each other:
Elinor Ostrom’s multilayered framework for analyzing social institutions,
which includes the Institutional Analysis and Development framework for
analysis of microsituations and the Social-Ecological Systems framework
for the broad context, with the learning and norm-adopting individual
nested in both (Ostrom 2005, 2010; Schlager and Cox 2018). 
Just as with the nature-nurture conundrum, the methodological dif-
ferences between reductionist and relational approaches are artifcial, and 
it is likely that we can describe human governing arrangements in terms 
of an undeterminable mix between maximizing, individualist behavior 
on the one hand and conformist, contextualist behavior on the other. In 
other words, making a choice between these approaches will not elucidate 
the understanding of human behavior and their artifcial creations. Let us 
explore that understanding by looking at what is shared with other pri-
mates and, within that category, with the great apes. 
2. Sociality among the Great Apes and Humans: 
Similarities and Differences 
Following the Linnaean taxonomy of the primate order, the great apes and 
humans are part of the superfamily of Hominiodea, which split at some 





















point in two families, the Hylobatidae (lesser apes, such as the gibbon) and 
the Hominidae (great apes and humans). The latter split in the subfamily 
of the Ponginae (orangutans) and the Gorillinae on the one hand and the 
Homininae (chimpanzee, bonobos, and humans) on the other. Some 6 to 7 
million years ago, the Homininae then split into the panini (chimpanzees 
and bonobos) and the hominini, which includes, among others, Homo erec-
tus, Homo neanderthalensis, and Homo sapiens (Larsen 2014, 175). 
All living primates are characterized by sociality (Dunbar 2001, 175–
179; Müller et al. 2007, 678). This is also known as prosociality and xeno-
philia (Tan et al. 2017), which is defned as the association in social groups 
that develop cooperative behaviors such as protection from predators and 
ensuring access to food by means of sharing and caring as survival responses 
to evolutionary pressures. Three types of sociality have been distinguished 
(Fiske 1992; Kerth 2010, 242). First, aggregation is merely the anonymous 
assembly of individuals, such as a swarm of fsh or a fock of migrating birds.
Second, a society is a group of individuals showing social bonds, displaying 
cooperative behaviors, and recognizing each other as members, while at the 
same time being heterogeneous in terms of age, dominance, relatedness,
sex, and reproductive status. Examples include colonies of some bat spe-
cies, troops of social carnivores, and primates. Third, the fssion-fusion society
includes the features of society but in addition shows frequent splits into 
subunits (fssion) that re-form in the larger group again later (fusion). This 
is found among dolphins, elephants, some primates, and human beings.
An important shift to sociality occurred when multimale and multifemale 
social aggregations were established between 74 and 32 million years ago.
Single-male harems and pair-living appeared some 16 million years ago as 
a function of the shift from nocturnal to diurnal lifestyles. Once the transi-
tion from a solitary to a social lifestyle is made, it is irreversible (Shultz et 
al. 2011, 219–220). 
Human beings live in a highly developed fssion-fusion society. They 
are members of a society, a term nowadays often used as coterminous with 
“state” and “nation,” but are also members of multiple and very different 
types of associations and groups, such as religious organizations, sports 
clubs, homeowner’s associations, and interest groups. Being a fssion-fusion 
species allows human beings to pick and choose whom to associate with,
enables them to acquire the territory that will sustain a growing popula-
tion, makes for much more complex interactions, and reduces competi-
tion between individuals (Moffett 2019, 38–39, 42). Fission and fusion are 
also visible at the nuclear family level, where individual members go their 
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eating and sleeping in late afternoon and early evening. As for govern-
ment, it can be seen as a fssion-fusion system at the organizational and 
the societal levels. At the organizational level the many subunits (fssion) 
contribute to the overall objectives of the organization. At the societal 
level, the various public departments and agencies (fssion) are all part of 
government (fusion), which, in turn, safeguards the order, safety, and well-
being of society (fusion). In various ways, human behavior in general, and 
more specifcally in relation to governing and government, is similar to 
that of other (higher) primates. At the same time, some behaviors may be 
more pronounced among human beings, while others may be less different 
from those of our primate cousins. Therefore, in the subsections below on 
similarities and differences, you will fnd observations that could have been 
placed in either subsection. Also, while I devote much more space to simi-
larities, the differences are substantial, and we need to keep in mind that 
quantifying differences and similarities is a pretty useless exercise. 
Similarities 
Humans are similar to many primates in that they seek to dominate others 
and are able to form coalitions. With bonobos and chimpanzees, the clos-
est relatives, humans share the ability to engage in warlike raids and have 
the cognitive potential to develop lethal weapons (Gintis et al. 2015, 330,
334). Humans have behavioral elements found in both bonobos and chim-
panzees. Bonobo groups are more female-centered and coalesce around 
empathy, caring, cooperation, and sexuality, but in the wild they have been 
observed to display pretty aggressive behavior as well (Wrangham and 
Peterson 1996). Bonobos have also been observed to display highly proso-
cial behavior by sharing food with complete strangers. It thus appears that 
it is not cultural evolution only that make humans share (Binmore 2001,
156). The human sense of fairness, sharing, and caring is biologically hard-
wired and shared with our cousins. The bonobo’s xenophilia stands in clear 
contrast to the chimpanzee’s xenophobia (Tan et al. 2017, 6). In De Waal’s 
playful characterization, bonobos are the hippies of the primate world: 
make love, not war (2005, 30). By contrast, chimpanzees are male-centered 
societies with strong checks and balances. In both, social organization con-
sists of two layers. The most visible is the rank order among dominant 
individuals, but the second layer, that of networks of positions of infuence,
may well be more important, prompting De Waal to observe that politics 
precedes humanity (1998 [1982], 207; see also Di Fiori and Rendall 1994; 
Tuschman 2013). Specifc to chimpanzees is that their alliances are of two 
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types. In a rank-changing alliance a male relies on supporters to get and 
keep dominance, while in the leveling alliance, several lower-ranking males 
form coalitions to ensure that the top males do not take too large a share 
of resources (Gintis et al. 2015, 331). The latter type is also known as the 
reverse dominance hierarchy (Boehm 1993; 1999, 66). In human communi-
ties, we fnd both types of alliances; especially so because, unlike chimpan-
zees, humans are very careful to hide their personal aspiration for power 
(De Waal 1998, 208). Democratic institutional arrangements in particular 
are designed to balance the inherent need for hierarchy with the equally 
important desire for reverse dominance hierarchy. After all, the checks and 
balances between branches of power and authority in democratic political 
systems serve to avoid the possibility that any one individual usurps legisla-
tive, executive, judicial, and military authority in the manner that was com-
mon for rulers in most historical polities and contemporary dictatorships. 
This reverse dominance hierarchy mechanism is also visible in group 
decision-making since subordinates are likely to resist despotic decisions 
when they are perceived as unfavorable to the group (Kerth 2010, 253).
Research into animal decision-making has accelerated, especially in the past 
twenty years, and it appears that various human decision-making behaviors 
are also observed among animals. For instance, it is noted that democratic 
decisions are more benefcial to the group because they are less extreme 
than despotic decisions, and that includes decisions by a qualifed or modi-
fed majority. For instance, a group of red deer will move when about 62 
percent of them stands up, gorillas will move when 65 percent of them call,
and whooper swans will fy when the majority of them indicate so by head 
movements (Conradt and Roper 2003, 156). The qualifed majority works 
better for decisions of which the consequences can be costly. 
Human decision-making also includes considering the trade-off 
between accuracy and speed of decision; when there are serious time-
constraints, the uniformity of preferences increases and the number of 
individuals participating in the decision declines (e.g., group-think). This 
is similar to behavior observed in—remarkably—ant colonies (Kerth 2010,
259). Ants are considered a eusocial species where individual members 
have no choice regarding their behavior and are highly cooperative. Thus,
there is little or no confict about how decisions are made. Human beings,
like many other vertebrates, live in heterogeneous groups with variable 
degrees of relatedness, and so their decision-making has higher potential 
for confict (Kerth 2010, 252). 
Decision-making by humans and other primates is also infuenced by 
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Fission-fusion dynamics appear to increase when environmental variability 
and uncertainty are low (Sueur et al. 2011, 1619, 1624). Individuals in such 
stable societies thus show trust in the strength of existing social relations.
Also, when behaviors and customs are transmitted as part of a collective 
learning effort, that is, learning in a social context rather than in isolation,
it appears that individuals are better able to interpret what happens in the 
environment in which they live and can thus arrive at more optimal deci-
sions when responses to environmental changes are considered. Again, this 
is found among various animal species (Kao et al. 2014, 8) and is relevant 
to how humans govern and learn about governing. Certain elements of 
knowledge can be learned in an online environment, but it is still in face-
to-face interaction that humans actually learn better. 
Establishing coalitions is an important indicator of the ability to engage 
in complex social strategies, and that apes can do this is because of two 
prominent skills. First, they display causal understanding of complex 
behavior that allows an individual to imitate the behavior of others or use 
that behavior as a source of ideas for structuring a novel type of action.
Second, the capacity for coalition and complex strategies shows that indi-
viduals have some degree of understanding the intention of others, that is,
of what they think, might want, know, and feel as possibly different from 
their own thought, feeling, and so on. This is commonly referred as theory 
of mind, that is the ability to recognize mental states behind certain behav-
iors (Byrne 2011, 171–172; Salazar 2019, 26). On the basis of these skills,
apes can and do form coalitions, but they also engage in tactical decep-
tion where one individual deceives another in the pursuit of personal gain 
(Dunbar 2001, 179). Generally, apes pay careful attention to symmetrical 
or fair interactions. Cheating is considered unfair and comes at a price 
when it happens repeatedly. The cheating individual may be excluded from 
the community, so that the community can continue to operate on the 
basis of inclusive ftness, where young members of the group are raised by 
the adults irrespective of their genetic (kin) relationship (Hamilton 1964a,
1964b). What is more commonly referred to as Hamilton’s Rule, r B > C, is 
that an individual is altruistic toward another to whom she or he is related 
(r) as long as the cost (C) of doing so is less than the beneft (B) to the 
recipient (see also Shenkman 2016, 166). 
Among apes and humans, both inclusive ftness and kin selection play 
a role in group cohesiveness. Nonhuman primates display clear aversion 
to inequity (Trivers 2006, 77); humans, though, accept some degree of 
inequity, but fnd egregious examples of cheating, excessive self-serving 
behavior, and excessive inequality unacceptable. In the case of confict or 
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tension, most primates show the ability to reconcile and establish a friendly 
collaboration with a former opponent (Aureli and Schaffner 2006, 121).
Humans do so as well, and especially at the small-group level. 
The instincts for dominance, reciprocity, and kinship, as briefy 
described above, are ancient and in place well before Homo enters the evo-
lutionary stage (Chudek and Henrich 2011, 222–223). From these three 
basic instincts it is clear that primate behavior is infuenced by the con-
ficting tendencies of individualism (i.e., the instinct for dominance) and 
collectivism (instinct for reciprocity and kinship). Thus, primates are not 
a eusocial (nota bene: eu is Greek for “good”) species with a clear repro-
ductive division of labor and without any choice regarding each member’s 
behavior. Instead, they maintain high levels of cooperation between geneti-
cally distant individuals, even though “selfshness beats altruism within 
groups. Altruistic groups beat selfsh groups” (Wilson and Wilson 2007,
348). Intriguingly, E. O. Wilson claims that humans are a eusocial species 
(see section 4) (2012), without distinguishing between a group’s behavior 
toward its own members as compared to its behavior towards members of 
other groups. Furthermore, we can fnd both selfsh and altruistic behavior 
within a group. 
Within a group, however, selfsh behavior is generally limited; hence the 
concept of bounded rationality is increasingly paired with that of bounded 
selfshness (Rodrik 2015, 203); the group generally bands together and 
behaves as one, that is, altruistically, when interacting with (members of) 
another group. This is in line with Darwin’s suggestion that the most cohe-
sive and cooperative groups will triumph over groups of selfsh individuals 
(Haidt 2012, xxii). E. O. Wilson’s claim that humans are a eusocial species 
has been met with much resistance, especially because he rejected Ham-
ilton’s inclusive ftness theory outright. There is another reason why Wil-
son’s claim can be questioned: is there less cooperative behavior within 
groups (cf. “Selfshness beats altruism within groups”)? I do not think so.
That humans’ ability to maximize their own inclusive ftness at the expense 
of the in-group is limited was already mentioned, and a spectrum of social,
(in)formal rather than genetic sanctions can be accessed in the case that 
group norms are violated by one or more individuals (Gintis 2012b, 990). 
While all primates have the capacity to deceive and cheat, none is more 
sophisticated at it than human beings. This is, indeed, one of the reasons 
that people have such diffculty assessing politicians and their politics (see,
for many examples, Shenkman 2016). In addition, human beings are much 
more inclined than other primates to display learned, calculating behav-
ior with an eye on longer-term outcomes, rather than focusing on short-
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term returns. That mix of short-term and long-term gains and games may 
well infuence the time it takes before the manipulative behavior of a few 
human beings seeking advantages at the expense of the multitude becomes 
unacceptable. The bonobo in humans strives for collaboration, getting 
along, conciliation, even when faced with some who game the “community 
system” by playing upon the heuristics and biases that all have. However,
those humans who behave more like chimpanzees, aggressive and cheat-
ing, will at some point be confronted with the reverse dominance tendency 
of the many subordinates. The best example is uprisings and revolutions 
against authoritarian and exploitative rulers and regimes. Reverse domina-
tion hierarchy is one of the early-learned instinctual behaviors. 
To some extent, all primates are aware of their own existence and their 
own environment. Their cognitive abilities are substantially larger than 
those of many other mammals, and their behavior is clearly a function of 
both individual and environment. The earliest expression of this was Kurt 
Lewin’s equation: B = f (P, E), where B is behavior, f is function, P is person 
and E is environment (1936, 12). This environment can be the social envi-
ronment as well as the physical environment. In light of the many observa-
tions by primatologists in zoos (e.g., De Waal 1998 [1982]) and in the wild 
(e.g., Goodall 1986), it has become clear that primate social interaction is 
complex in the sense that upsets to the social order can only be repaired on 
the basis of limited resources, bodies, social skills, and strategies. Humans,
however, operate much more on the basis of complicated social interaction,
by using a range of material resources for personal use and for trade as well 
as symbols in a succession of simple operations to enforce or reinforce a 
particular type of social life. Archaeological and anthropological research 
in recent years is pushing back the date that complicated behavior and 
interaction emerged in human societies and came to dominate the older 
complex behaviors (Brooks et al. 2018; Gibbons 2018). Hunter-gatherer 
groups have a large degree of social complexity and medium ability to 
organize on a large scale; people in agricultural societies have a medium 
degree of social complexity, but greater ability in large-scale organization; 
and people in modern industrial and knowledge societies have a low degree 
of social complexity but a high capacity for social organization (Strum and 
Latour 1987, 790–791). 
For many years, social complexity (or complicatedness) has been attrib-
uted to social intelligence as a function of living in relatively large groups,
cooperative breeding, social learning, and political gaming. However, a case
has been made that ecological intelligence is just as important for the evolu-
tion of primate cognition. This would include a focus on extractive foraging

























     
  
techniques, diet, and distribution of foods. Rosati focused on three elements
of ecological intelligence: executive control, spatial memory, and value-
based decision-making. Executive functions include the ability to restrain
undesirable behavior and to seek out new elements in the environment and
new social partners (McGrew 2003; Rosati 2017, 6). With regard to spatial
memory, there is great variation among primates in the ability to recall the
location of food sources and visit them in an effcient manner. Striking is
the observation that chimpanzees, more than bonobos, can defer immedi-
ate gratifcation for a larger payout in the longer term. They, again more so
than bonobos, will choose a “risky” option if it may provide a higher value,
risking a smaller payoff rather than opting for the intermediate-value payoff
that comes with selecting a “safe” option (Rosati 2017, 5). 
Yet, again, it appears that humans are not so different from chimpan-
zees. Distinguishing between immediate-return and delayed-return systems, 
anthropologist James Woodburn noted that people in the latter type exer-
cise rights over valued assets such as technical means of production (boats,
nets, beehives), processed and stored food or materials in fxed dwellings,
wild products that have been improved by human labor, and assets in the 
form of rights of individuals over other individuals (e.g., women, slaves,
children) (Woodburn 1982, 432–433). Hunter-gatherer societies survive 
because they mainly operate as an immediate-return economy, while farm-
ing communities cannot but rely on more formally defned and embedded 
commitments and dependencies between people, and hence survive as a 
delayed-return economy. 
Differences 
The focus on human sociality prevented scholars from recognizing that 
the human species is well suited to and specialized in the hunter-gatherer 
lifestyle, and that its sociality is different from that of other primates in a 
number of important ways. First, humans seek out high-value foods that 
are diffcult to get (meats, nuts, honey) and require time-consuming pro-
cessing techniques (e.g., cracking nuts, extracting honey, cooking). Second,
their food resources stretch across space and time, and human foragers 
range substantially farther on a daily basis than their primate cousins.
Humans live in fssion-fusion communities, where individuals disperse 
during the day for foraging and get back together at night (Rodseth et al.
1991, 238; Sueur et al. 2011, 1614). Third, humans are unique in that they 
engage in central-place foraging. They go out (fssion) and gather game 
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case with, for instance, chimpanzees. Instead, it is brought back (fusion) 
to a camp where the food is distributed among all members of the group.
Thus, fourth, many of these foraging behaviors are facilitated by learned,
calculated behaviors such as food sharing and making tools (Rosati 2017,
8–9). Finally, ffth, our closest kin, Pan, learn by emulation, that is, sim-
ply copying behaviors and actions without taking the time to understand 
the various steps involved, while humans learn by imitation while seeking 
to understand the actions of others (Barham 2013, 78). It is that capabil-
ity that, at least in part, helps us understand human accumulative culture.
The shift early Homo made from foraging-gathering to hunting-gathering 
almost 2 million years ago made them even more likely to operate in tight-
knit groups and share food resources (Pontzer 2017, 20). 
As noted in the previous subsection, human behaviors are learned in 
a social context (Kao et al. 2014, 8) and applied when making aggregate 
(e.g., elections) and interactive (e.g., the workings of the market) decisions.
Human decision-making is highly based in sharing information as well 
as highly biased in favor of group consensus (Tindale and Kameda 2017,
674, 676). Despotic decisions have much less likelihood of acceptance in 
a democratic political context. What fundamentally differentiates human 
decision-making from animal decision-making behavior is that language 
enables the former to convey extremely complex arguments about very 
complex social issues and arrangements. Humans also seek to maximize 
group-level payoffs (Conradt and List 2009, 735–736). These behav-
iors were made possible by signifcant changes in the physical and social 
makeup of Homo. 
3. Physical and Social Features of the Hominin Tribe 
Three physical and one social feature distinguishes the hominin tribe from 
primates: bipedalism, brain size, and digestive tract as major physical char-
acteristics and group size as a major social feature. Based on analysis of the 
remains of Ardipithecus ramidus, a proto-hominin living some 4.4 million 
years ago (proto-hominins are dated 7 to 4 million years ago, coinciding 
with the split from the panini) in a woodland environment, bipedalism 
emerged early in the hominin evolution (Crompton et al. 2010). All great 
apes have the ability to walk upright, but only humans do so exclusively 
starting at around nine to 12 months old. Why walking on two feet became 
dominant is debated, although it appears that energy effciency and carry-
ing capacity are the most favored explanations at the moment. Comparing 




















   
  
chimpanzees and humans, it appears that the latter need 40 to 80 percent 
less energy (measured as cost of transport per meter) when walking on 
two legs (Pontzer et al. 2009, 51). Walking upright also frees up the hands 
so that foodstuffs can be carried. It has been shown that chimpanzees are 
inclined to walk on two legs when carrying foods (Carvalho et al. 2012,
R180). And, clearly, bipedalism allows humans to develop the ability to 
carry tools (including lethal weapons) (Gintis et al. 2015, 332). One early 
theory explaining the emergence of bipedalism is the thermoregulatory 
theory. This suggests that an upright posture allows humans to absorb up 
to 60 percent less heat during the hottest time of the day and thus need 
less water, allowing longer-range foraging (as, e.g., Barnard 2011, 37, sug-
gests). Another early theory, the threat theory, claims that standing upright 
allowed humans to see potential predators across the grasses of the savan-
nah. Neither theory has held up to scrutiny because the earliest hominins 
lived a mixed arboreal-terrestrial life (for overview of theories, see Ko 2015 
and Maslin et al. 2015). 
The second major physical feature that distinguishes human beings 
from other great apes is brain size (Wrangham 2001, 122–123). Increasing 
brain size, or encephalization, was slow up to some 35 million years ago 
and sped up from then on. A. ramidus, mentioned above, had a brain size 
of about 300 to 350 cubic centimeters, which is a little smaller than that of 
chimpanzees. Its predecessor A. kadabba, living between 5.8 and 5.2 million 
years ago, had a brain size similar to that of chimpanzees (282–500 cubic 
centimeters). Something of a jump occurred with the appearance of Aus-
tralopithecus some 4 million years ago with a brain size varying between 400 
and 550 cubic centimeters. A third phase in brain size development started 
with the appearance of the genus Homo between 2.5 and 1.8 million years 
ago. Homo habilis (living between 2.5 and 1.5 million years ago) had a brain 
size of 550–680 cubic centimeters and Homo erectus (living between 1.9 
million and 143,000 years ago) of 1,000 cubic centimeters. Homo neander-
thalensis (living between 250,000 and 20,000 years ago) had a brain size on 
average larger than that of modern human beings, namely between 1,200 
and 1,900 cubic centimeters. Archaic humans living in Middle Pleistocene 
China (300,000 BCE) had an endocranial capacity of 1,150 cubic centime-
ters (Wu et al. 2019). The brain size of the anatomically modern Homo sapi-
ens is about 1,250 to 1,400 cubic centimeters, and the earliest fossils date 
back to some 300,000 years ago and were found in contemporary Morocco 
(Hublin et al. 2017; Richter et al. 2017). Having a large brain is useful (as 
far as we know) but costly. The human brain weighs about three pounds,
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ries. In the course of evolution, the female birth canal had to be restruc-
tured to accommodate the passage of a large head, and, more importantly,
babies had to be born before the brain was fully matured. This led to col-
lective and prolonged child-rearing and to the development of institutional 
arrangements for learning outside the nuclear family. 
Striking in the physical appearance of humans is also that from H. 
erectus on, females and males are roughly the same height, while among 
the great apes males are substantially larger. As far as skull appearance is 
concerned, human beings have smaller teeth, and that relates to the third 
physical feature concerning the digestive tract, which has much to do with 
dietary habits (Kaplan et al. 2000, 175–182). During the very early evo-
lution of primates, between 60 and 35 million years ago, the major food 
sources were insects and leaves. From 35 million years ago, they shifted 
to plant foods, and brain size increased more rapidly when compared to 
body size increases. The third big change was the adoption of a diet of ripe 
fruits and the use of complex techniques for extracting food, such as crack-
ing nuts with stones and using sticks to “fsh” for termites and ants. With 
the fourth major shift, that of bipedalism, Homo consumed a nutrient-rich 
diet that includes meats. Meat eating is evidenced at least 2.6 million years 
ago, and it is likely H. erectus who mastered the use of fre for cooking pos-
sibly some 1.5 million years ago. The implications of this will be further 
addressed below when discussing human group size in comparison to that 
of primates, but it is important to point out that cooking allowed for much 
easier digestion of food, especially meats, and thus reduced the amount of 
time spent chewing food from four to seven hours to only one hour a day.
Meat-eating also provided for much higher protein intake, thus provid-
ing much-needed energy for the enlarging brain. Cooking also resulted in 
a shrunken stomach size and signifcantly shorter colon length (Henrich 
2016, 316). Some scholars recently argued that diet explains relative brain 
size among primates and that food processing by Homo made more energy 
available for brain development (DeCasien et al. 2017; Stanford 2001). 
The suggestion that diet is the better predictor of brain size challenges 
the social brain hypothesis advanced by British anthropologist Robin Dunbar 
(1992, 1993, 1998), who holds that brain size is a function of social living 
in large groups (see also Ebstein et al. 2010, 831). Our larger neocortex is 
then explained by the need to keep track of and interpret the ever-changing 
social relations in a group (Dunbar 2001, 180–184). Clearly, living in a 
group opens the potential for food sharing and protection against preda-
tors, but it comes at a price. For one, the larger a group, the more travel 
time is needed to fnd a suffcient amount of food. Another cost is that the 


















larger a group, the more time social bonding takes. Panini establishes social 
bonding through grooming (e.g., picking feas from each other’s skin). This 
works with group sizes up to 30 to 50 individuals. When a group becomes 
too big, it splits in two. Humans “groom” as well, that is, they spend about 
30 to 60 percent of their time talking about others (i.e., not just gossip-
ing, but also acquiring information about others such as, “What is that 
professor like?”). In fact, human group size is such, Dunbar argues, that 
it prompted the development of language, a far more effcient means of 
social bonding than grooming. Most hunter-gatherer primate groups had 
about 30 to 50 individuals (known as a band or overnight camp). With 
the appearance of Australophithecus, group size jumped to 60–80 individuals 
and with H. erectus, it jumped to 100 to 120 individuals. The average group 
size of H. sapiens was about 150 (Dunbar 2001, 180–184; see also Shenk-
man 2016, 25). This is nowadays known as the Dunbar number. For the 
purposes of this book, we need not choose between the dietary or social 
brain hypothesis. While a recent behavioral and fMRI experiment affrmed 
a key assumption of the social brain hypothesis (Lewis et al. 2017, 1070; 
Dunbar is one of the coauthors), there is actually ample reason to suggest 
that both theories contribute to the understanding (not the explanation) of 
human group size. 
Dunbar claims that 150 is the group size at which we recognize kin-
ship, and that many primates lived in nested social layers of distinct size.
Five is the layer of “intimate friends,” 15 that of “best friends,” 50 rep-
resents “good friends,” 150 represents “friends,” while 500 is the number 
of “acquaintances.” Finally, 1,500 represents the number of people whom 
we can put a name to. Human beings interact predominantly in these six 
layers; chimpanzees and baboons only up to three (i.e., 50), and colobus 
monkeys in only one or at most two layers (Dunbar 2016, 78, 81). When 
humans interact, they do so in awareness of the existence and intentions of 
others, and do so to an extent that stretches well beyond the intentionality 
of chimpanzees and bonobos. 
4. Human Instinct and Intent 
Living in social groups is hard work because the individual has to pay con-
stant attention to what drives the other individuals in the group. The indi-
vidual is aware of self and of others and acts accordingly (McIntosh 1995).
If human beings existed as a eusocial species, as some claim (e.g., Wilson
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viduals in a eusocial species cannot choose their behaviors. By contrast,
primates operate upon a few levels of intentionality, with humans acting
at all levels. These levels of intentionality need to be briefy described,
because it will illustrate and characterize how instinctual and intentional
behaviors are enshrined in the formal institutional arrangements people
are familiar with. 
Philosopher Daniel Dennett distinguished initially between four levels 
of intentionality: the frst level being that of beliefs and desires without hav-
ing beliefs and desires about beliefs and desires (i.e., understanding there is 
a world outside oneself), the second level of beliefs and desires about beliefs 
and desires (i.e., understanding that others have a mental state), a third 
level about what one individual wants another to believe about the indi-
vidual’s state (i.e., concerning a preference for and about the mental state of 
others), and a fourth about wanting another to think that one understands 
that the other wishes one to do something (1987, 243–244). In another 
study he describes fve foors of awareness (1995, 374–380). The frst foor 
is that of Darwinian creatures with zero intentionality, where whatever hap-
pens is blindly generated by more or less arbitrary processes. One can think 
of single-cell organisms, but also of computers and machines. The second 
foor is that of Skinnerian creatures that survive by being lucky and on the 
basis of trial and error. This seems to me somewhat similar to his frst-
order intentionality. Popperian creatures, the third foor, exist by preselecting 
possible behaviors and actions on the basis of understanding the regulari-
ties of the environment outside the individual. Reptiles, birds, and mam-
mals, humans included, operate at this foor. Whether this is reminiscent of 
second-order intentionality is not clear to me, since that requires a theory 
of mind, and one can assume that reptiles and birds do not have that. Apes 
and four-year-old children operate at a second-order level of intentionality.
The fourth foor is that of Gregorian creatures, whose inner environment is 
informed by the designed elements of the outer environment. They can 
learn how to improve their thinking about what they can think about next.
The fnal, unnamed, foor is that where language is used for structuring 
deliberate and foresightful action. Humans are the only species that oper-
ates at all levels of intentionality or foors of awareness. 
As will be clear, levels of intentionality can easily be related to identity 
(Cole 2014; Gamble 2010, 29). First-level intentionality is then evidence 
of consciousness of self, while second-order intentionality is the under-
standing that others have a self as well. The latter is suggested to have 
emerged among the frst humans to make hand axes some 1.6 million years 
ago (Oldowan period). Adult humans operate upon third, fourth, and ffth 













levels of intentionality, where the self desires that other(s) buy into the rep-
resentation of self (third level; emerging some 600,000 years ago), where 
the self understands and acts upon the group (fourth level), and where the 
identity of self is conceptualized in an ideological construction that is rep-
resented in the real world (ffth level). It is at the ffth level of intentionality 
that political and religious ideology (a fully abstract concept) can be for-
mulated. The fourth and ffth levels are characteristic of modern humans 
and are illustrated by the use of symbolic ornamentation of artifacts (Cole 
2014, 97–100; 2016; Tomasello 2014). 
There are several reasons why this is relevant to the understanding of 
government. First, we must recognize that government is an artifce of 
human creation and thus infuenced as much by our psychological makeup 
as by the human inclination to seek control over and protection from the 
natural and social environment. Second, government is an instrument that,
while quite different from a hand ax or a computer, has been used for per-
sonal gain for most of its existence in human societies. And many politi-
cians and political offceholders still today seek to convince the electorate 
of their best intentions, which is illustrative of a third level of intention-
ality. In the past two and a half centuries, though, humanity—at least in 
democratic political systems—has seen a dramatic shift from government 
perceived as an instrument of power to one that provides the framework 
of action in which individuals operate and that they, in their role as citi-
zens, “own” as sovereign. This is government as an abstract representation 
of the whole community of people, which is a symbolic role. Citizens in 
Western democracies have seen glimpses of how that symbolic role can be 
translated into actual consequences (consider Fourastié’s 30 glorious years 
following World War II). 
How government is structured, how it functions, and what it provides in 
democratic polities illustrates that symbolic role becoming tangible. Ear-
lier, dominance, reciprocity, and kinship were mentioned as instincts deeply 
rooted in the human primate heritage. The human deference to domi-
nance hierarchies is visible in how physical symbols are used to emphasize 
authority. These can be wigs of judges in Britain, the academic “regalia”
of professors, or the foor plans and facades of public buildings (Goodsell 
of city council chambers [1988], of bureaucracy’s architecture [1997], and 
of state capitols [2001]). Human respect for authority is also expressed in 
reactions such as shame (for instance, when being sanctioned by someone 
in authority for unacceptable behavior) or pride (for instance, when elected 
to positions of authority, when receiving academic recognition). Reciproc-
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and deceit, and in guilt when caught and exposed in an act of greed or gen-
erally unacceptable behavior. Governments operate with accepted means 
of graduated sanctions to correct unsocial behaviors, and incarceration is 
usually the strongest expression. Finally, kinship is expressed in empathy 
and compassion, that is, in the collective sharing with and caring for not 
only offspring but also for those who cannot take care of themselves. 
The ancient instincts of reciprocity (and thus, bounded selfshness) and 
kinship are preserved in the welfare state, which is not so much a system 
offering handouts to the undeserving as one that elevates humans above 
frst- and second-level intentionality. Indeed, dominance, reciprocity, and 
kinship are moral instincts of very ancient origin (Norenzayan 2014, 241–
244) that developed as a practical answer to the challenges of living in 
social groups. They worked in physical communities of people and needed 
to be enshrined in more formal, institutional governing arrangements once 
people started living in imagined communities. Of these three, reciproc-
ity receives little, if any, attention in the public administration literature 
even though it is as important as dominance (for hierarchy) and kinship 
(for nepotism, favoritism) (Oliver 2018). The two most obvious formal 
institutional arrangements are those constructed around political and reli-
gious beliefs, which can be regarded as systems where instinct is translated 
into intent. For most of the hundreds of thousands of years that humans 
walked the earth, such formal institutional arrangements were not neces-
sary because early human-gatherer communities were, as far as we know,
quite egalitarian, unlike their primate cousins and ancestors. To be sure,
we should not exaggerate the presumed egalitarianism among prehistoric 
hunter-gatherers. Not only does Boehm’s reverse dominance hierarchy 
logically imply the dominance of subordinates (Runciman 2005, 132), but 
we can also assume that egalitarianism may have circumscribed interaction 
between males (Sober and Wilson 1998, 185), while children and females 
may not have been treated as equals. Finally, it may well be that egalitari-
anism is not so much motivated by a desire for equality as such, but by a 
strong dislike of domination (Haidt 2012, 209). 
5. How We Differ from Primates: 
Governing among and of Hunter-Gatherers 
Where humans truly differ from primates is that they exhibit not only the 
ability but also the inclination to participate in organized collective action 
with an eye on reaping the long-term benefts of such behavior (Gintis 
























et al. 2015, 330, 334). They are also very different in that they combine,
and usually balance, the instinctual acceptance of hierarchy with the early-
learned instinctual need for egalitarian relations. The latter dominated in 
the physical communities of hunter-gatherer groups, and was characteris-
tic of sociality for most of humanity’s existence (Whiten and Erdall 2012).
It is only in the past 6,000 years or so that hierarchy has returned to the 
governance of human society. 
Of all social species, humans have achieved an unmatched capacity of 
sociality, as evidenced by the cooperation and division of labor between 
genetically unrelated individuals in the pursuit of goods and services that 
cannot be obtained, developed, or provided alone. At a small scale, that of 
a few hundred up to a few thousand individuals, people have managed to 
engage in productive collective action by not exploiting natural resources,
and thus ensuring the regenerative capacity of the resource. The research 
of Elinor Ostrom and her associates provides ample empirical evidence of 
this cooperation (for overview, see Schlager and Cox 2018). Common pool 
resource management systems (CPRs) have existed all over the world and 
continue to be important, especially at the local level. Thus, the suggestion 
that humans are primarily self-interested is inconsistent with the degree 
of group-level cooperation often visible (Gächter and Herrmann 2006,
279). At the fairly small scale of the early agricultural governing communi-
ties and of CPR systems, cheating and deceit are diffcult since individuals 
monitor each other’s commitment to the collective rules designed to avoid 
depletion of the natural resource that is the prime source of living. At the 
even smaller scale of the prehistoric hunter-gatherer group of some 50 
to 150 individuals, we can assume that cheating and deceit were virtually 
impossible since individuals were in each other’s presence for signifcant 
parts of every day. Furthermore, since all adult individuals in such small 
groups were needed for the survival of the band, any inclination to social 
stratifcation was met with resistance and controlled through reverse domi-
nation. In other words, hunter-gatherer groups and the early agricultural 
communities were egalitarian. In the large-scale, urban, and highly strati-
fed societies of today, there is more opportunity for cheating and deceit 
(Van Schaik and Kappeler 2006, 13–16), but even now the learned instinct 
to cooperate is still strong (Tuomela 2007).
Cooperation and egalitarianism hold the secret to human sociality.
They reinforce each other (Whiten and Erdall 2012, 2122), and encourage 
learned behavior that is strengthened by various mechanisms and insti-
tutional means. In the physical communities of hunter-gatherer bands,
cooperation ensured protection against predators as well as the sharing 
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of foodstuffs, both vital to survival. Cooperative behavior is thus altruistic 
and conformist because protecting and sharing behaviors may come at an 
individual cost that is outweighed by the group beneft. Biological altruism
is genetically determined and is characteristic of eusocial species such as 
ants. Humans and, up to a point, other social species operate more upon 
moral altruism (Ayala 2010, 9016), the sense that one is obliged to serve 
the group’s interest rather than self-interest. In the hunter-gatherer band,
humans engaged in two types of relationships: reciprocal altruism (do ut des, I
give so that you will give, or “I scratch your back, you scratch mine”) (Triv-
ers 2006, 67–68) and mutualistic sharing. In larger-scale groups, humans 
have revived a third type of relationship, namely deference to dominant indi-
viduals (Pinker 2010, 8994). What is intriguing about large-scale, imagined 
communities is that humans still cooperate even when the beneft of their 
action extends to perfect strangers. Humans cooperate with nonkin and 
do so much more than any other primate. This could be explained by the 
role that prestige and reputation play in human societies (Henrich 2011,
3). Humans are very much aware that their behavior is observed by others,
so acting cooperatively and altruistically occurs simply upon the expecta-
tion of indirect reciprocity (Gächter and Herrmann 2006, 287), which is the 
expectation that strangers will act cooperatively and altruistically in return.
Direct and indirect reciprocity are more technical, sociological terms for 
the Golden Rule, which is found in the political and religious ideologies of 
most human communities. 
Where and how is cooperative behavior learned? In the small band 
it was simply learned through observing others and through rewards for 
cooperative and conformist behaviors and sanctions for cheating, deceit,
and manipulation. Outside the nuclear family, moralistic group sanction-
ing is the most basic type of cooperation, and the most common sanctions 
are shaming and ostracism. Killing is less common since it does not allow 
for reforming behavior to improve self-control (Boehm 2014, 41–43), and 
because all individuals are needed to ensure survival. The sanctioning is 
different in large-scale societies, where individuals can be incarcerated for 
long stretches of time or even executed simply because there are so many 
others who can ensure the survival of the imagined community. In large-
scale societies, cooperative and altruistic behavior is frst learned in the 
nuclear family, and reinforced through extrafamilial relations and friend-
ships and through more formal mechanisms such as organized education 
and religion, which are both exaptations (i.e., when evolution puts a trait to 
new use; for instance, feathers were an evolutionary adaptation for insu-
lation but exapted for fight) that happened in response to the evolution 
















of high intelligence (Ayala 2010, 1919). It is no coincidence that schools 
and religious organizations emerged in large-scale and sedentary societ-
ies because the imitative learning behavior possible in and the immediate 
social control exercised by a physical community of people is not effective 
in imagined communities and certainly not at the level of contemporary 
society as a whole. Educational and religious organizations thus fortify the 
human moral instinct for sharing, shaming, and sociality. Human learning 
is instrumental in and vital to the development of altruistic behavior, and 
altruism succeeds because of humanity’s docility, the capacity to learn from 
and build upon others (Simon 1990, 1665). 
In larger-scale societies, sociality and altruism are further enshrined and 
structured in institutions of which organizations are the tangible expres-
sion. Institutions “are the rules of the game in a society . . . the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990, 3) and 
“the set of rules actually used (the working rules or rules-in-use) by a set of 
individuals to organize repetitive activities that produce outcomes affect-
ing those individuals and potentially affecting others” (Ostrom 1992, 19).
The North and Ostrom emphases upon rules defne institutions in the 
broadest sense, and they can then be regarded as conventions for, for exam-
ple, temporary leadership positions. A narrower defnition of institutions 
would focus on formal arrangements of authority invested in an organiza-
tion (e.g., a government department or agency; a local police department 
or an individual/group of individuals—e.g., a police offcer; legislators in a 
parliament or Congress) (Runciman 2005, 130). 
It is important to understand that rules in democratic political systems 
are not ossifed, but subject to change when circumstances require (chapter 
6). While institutions can be regarded as ossifed at a very abstract level,
such as marriage as the public statement of a pair of individuals wishing 
to live together and share their resources, how that institution is ritualized 
and upheld varies between societies as well as over time. In other words,
any collection of behaviors or practices and rules constitute a “living”
institution (Olsen 1997). Examples of important rules include (a) labor is 
divided and people cooperate for actions and services that require multiple 
individuals (chapter 4), (b) beyond the mom-and-pop store, people orga-
nize their actions in nested hierarchies (chapters 4 and 5), and (c) people 
practice multisource decision-making and negotiable authority (chapter 6). 
Human cooperation has been so successful that it has allowed us to 
inhabit the widest possible range of environments, from the harshness of 
the polar areas and the deserts, to the humid denseness of the jungle, to the 
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of the globe. This is testimony to the impact of an aptitude for individual 
learning and for cumulative cultural evolution. Somewhere in the past 2 
million years, humans crossed from noncumulative social learning (as vis-
ible in the higher primates) to cumulative social learning, which, together 
with norm psychology (i.e., the written and unwritten rules for society that 
determine what behavior is acceptable), differentiates humans from other 
primates. Keep in mind, though, that both these uniquely human features 
complement the more ancient instincts of dominance, reciprocity, and kin-
ship (Chudek and Henrich 2011, 222). These ancient instincts are free of 
culture; the instinct for cumulative learning is not (Chudek and Henrich 
2011, 223). 
There is one feature of human sociality that is puzzling, and that is the 
propensity to engage in high-risk cooperation, even the extremely high-
risk cooperation characteristic of war (Keeley 1996; 2014; see also Bowles 
2003, 145). War is not unique to humans. A study of aggression among 
mammals found that many species not only kill their own kind in other 
groups, but also kill individuals in the group to which they belong (e.g.,
infanticide). Deaths caused by interpersonal violence among primates are 
about 2 percent of all deaths, a rate similar to that among prehistoric bands 
and tribes. The authors of the study conclude that the state’s monopoly 
over the use of violence signifcantly decreases violence, and that the high 
population densities of today are the consequence of successful pacifca-
tion rather than war (Gómez et al. 2016, 235). The same argument has 
been made by Steven Pinker (2011; 2017). This fnding is contested by 
Rahul Oka and coauthors, who argue that states with large populations 
actually “generate more casualties per combatant than in ethnographically 
observed small-scale societies or in historical states” (Oka et al. 2017, 1).
However, keep in mind that Oka’s et al. remark simply shows that modern 
states have more lethal weapons; the evidence that violence has actually 
declined is substantial. The human inventiveness for developing weapons 
of mass destruction does support the latter conclusion, and constitutes one 
big difference between human war-making and war-making by other pri-
mates. A second big difference is that among primates, both males and 
females can be violent against individuals in out-groups in general but can 
also be violent against their own gender. Human males are no different, but 
human females generally refrain from attacking other females (Rodseth et 
al. 1991, 231). 
More information is needed about the infuences of ecology, technol-
ogy, and social norms, and much more information is needed about the 
increase of ideologically inspired violence and confict. This would include 
















the increase of international terrorism for which legitimacy is found in 
political and/or religious convictions. War is cooperative behavior gener-
ally directed at an out-group, nowadays mostly another country, but it can 
target out-groups within one country as well. It was not until the nine-
teenth century that governments attempted to devise international plat-
forms to introduce the kinds of norms and mechanisms that are in place 
domestically and keep societies mostly quite peaceful. I turn to these mech-
anisms now since they illustrate how the ancient instincts and norms of 
deference for hierarchy, reciprocity, and kinship are nowadays embodied in 
formal rules and explicated actions. 
The imagined communities of today could not function without an 
intricate network of governmentally imposed norms combined with social 
and personal norms. Governmentally imposed norms are codifcations of 
behaviors that are benefcial to both the individual and the group. These 
regulations signal that certain behaviors are important to the survival of 
society and therefore encourage repetition of them. Having grown up in 
the Netherlands, where traffc at intersections in urban areas is regulated 
by traffc lights, I was apprehensive about the effectiveness of the octagonal 
stop sign in the United States. But after a few months I found that people 
generally do what is expected: they stop and wait their turn to cross the 
intersection. I fully expect all people to do so and rely upon indirect reci-
procity and conformist behavior. Social norms are enforced and sanctioned 
by actors other than the state and followed because we care about what 
others think of us (most people will wash their hands in the bathroom,
especially when others are present) (third-level intentionality), and personal 
norms are those rules that govern individual behavior and are followed irre-
spective of what others think (Ellickson 2001). The social norms especially 
affect collective action and public policy. While descriptive norms guide and 
judge actual behavior (do not drive when intoxicated) (second-level inten-
tionality), injunctive norms concern beliefs about what other people think 
ought to be done (be careful with verbal comments or tactile gestures that 
can be interpreted as sexual harassment) (third-level intentionality) (Lap-
inski and Rimal 2005). It is these social and injunctive norms that are fairly 
easy to sanction, especially when government establishes the conditions for 
enforcing them. 
Governments have ways other than formal regulation to advance social 
and injunctive norms (Kinzig et al. 2013).Through moral suasion by means 
of advertising, information, and appeal they seek to alter people’s behav-
ior. The antismoking campaigns since the 1960s and the wellness policies 
in various public, nonproft and private organizations in this century are 
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and wellness campaigns play upon the instinctual behavior of individuals 
to avoid standing out among others. Into the second part of the twentieth 
century, smoking was socially accepted, even considered “stylish.” In recent 
decades, those who smoke have been increasingly treated as pariahs. The 
same is the case with obesity. The desire not to distinguish oneself from 
the group is simply a manifestation of reverse dominance. What worked 
in the prehistoric bands still works in large-scale societies. Governments 
can also change the conditions and nudge people to make certain behav-
iors more convenient (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Recycling is a good 
example. Finally, taxes, fnes, allowances, and subsidies are fnancial policy 
instruments that encourage socially desirable behaviors. In all these cases,
norms and rules rely upon reciprocity and cooperation, but also upon def-
erence to the authority of government and its legitimate efforts to main-
tain, and where possible advance, the basic need for order and safety as 
well as the more advanced concern for the well-being of all living in the 
territory. Shaming is the sanction applied when people violate these social 
and injunctive norms. This can range from informal intervention (correc-
tive intervention between family members, friends, group members, col-
leagues), to more formal coaching to alter certain behaviors (for instance 
to increase sensitivity to and awareness of what constitutes inappropriate 
behavior), to the formal and graduated sanctions of a fne, a conditional 
sentence (e.g., community service), incarceration, and the ultimate sanc-
tion of execution. 
There are other features of Neanderthal and H. sapiens society that dif-
ferentiate it from primate groups such as the use of fre (Gowlett 2016),
intentional burials (Pettitt 2011; Berger et al. 2017, 10), symbolic, artistic 
expression (Knappett 2006; Hoffmann, Angelucci, et al. 2018; Hoffmann,
García-Diez, et al. 2018), and language (Seyfarth et al. 2005). These will 
not be discussed in any detail even though each of these four is indirectly 
illustrative of governing arrangements. Each of them helps in the success-
ful control of the physical and social environment, and each is constrained 
nowadays by formal regulation issued by governments. However, the focus 
of this book is not what makes us human and at what point in time we can 
identify humanness (for a nice discussion of this, see Proctor 2003), but 
what government is in and for human societies. 
6. Conflicting Impulses Underlying Governing Arrangements 
Human beings no longer live in the complex social world of face-to-face,
local interactions with others as their primate cousins do. Instead, they live 






   
 
 
in a complex world where the many individuals are members of one large 
imagined community known as society and where all members share one 
role, that of being a citizen. The overall distinctive feature of the human 
species is that the main elements of their sociocognitive niche, that is,
cooperation, egalitarianism, mind reading, culture, and language reinforce 
each other (Whiten and Erdall 2012) and in their combination allow for 
accumulation of behaviors and experiences. There are several factors that 
make human sociality complex in a manner different from that of primate 
group sociality (Rodseth and Novak 2005). 
One is that humans are members of a variety of different subgroups 
within the same society as well as subgroups of different societies. All 
people are members of a nuclear family and of an extended family; they 
work with colleagues; they form more (political parties; choirs; religious 
denominations) or less permanent coalitions (issue networks) and often 
socialize in cliques (for instance, the popular, the nerds, the goths, the jocks 
in secondary school) (Arrow 2010). Beyond national societies or territorial 
states, people can be part of international groups such as the Red Cross and 
the Red Crescent, Doctors without Borders, Greenpeace, and Transpar-
ency International. Scholars of public administration can be members of 
the European Group of Public Administration, active in the International 
Institute of Administrative Sciences, and serve as members of editorial 
boards of various journals across the globe. 
Second, people engage in virtual interaction with others; they do things 
that affect others without having any face-to-face contact with the affected.
As far as governing and government are concerned, this is especially visible 
in the infuence that policy bureaucrats have upon target populations. In 
the private sphere, virtual interaction is, for instance, visible in the infu-
ence of ministers of megachurches who reach their fock via the television 
(televangelists) and of marketers of large corporations who seek to manip-
ulate the consumptive behaviors of their target audience (think of pop-ups 
when one is googling information or playing games). 
Third, in the past 10 years or so, technology has enabled people to 
interact with one another via Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, FaceTime, and 
other similar means of rapid communication. In fact, people are increas-
ingly wrapping themselves in a virtual cage of constant visibility (Raad-
schelders 2019). 
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, human beings are torn between 
overlapping and conficting instincts and intentions, as has become clear in 
the course of this chapter. Each of these conficting instinctual and inten-
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become more pronounced in human societies given the possibility of lin-
guistic and symbolic expression. A little digression will be illuminating.
The common ancestor of the panini and Homo “may in fact have possessed 
a mosaic of features, including now those seen in bonobo, chimpanzee and 
human” (Prüfer et al. 2012, 527). As we know, bonobo and chimpanzee 
speciated quite suddenly somewhere between 2.1 and 0.9 million years ago,
with the former settling south and the latter north of the Congo River 
(Takemoto et al. 2015; Reich 2019, 46). Anthropologists Richard Wrang-
ham and Dale Peterson note that chimpanzees lived in a habitat occupied 
by gorillas, forcing them to compete for food resources, while bonobos 
lived in a habitat without gorillas (1997). Could it be that this geographi-
cal separation explains chimpanzees’ more aggressive nature and bonobos’ 
more consensual inclinations? The latter’s gray matter, which holds the 
capacity to recognize distress in others, is signifcantly larger than that of 
chimpanzees (Rilling et al. 2012). In humans we can see a combination of 
strong prosocial behavior, pronounced in bonobos, and strong aggression,
characteristic of chimpanzees. Human features are still the mosaic of the 
common ancestor with Pan. 
As observed by St. Augustine (cf. Manent 2013, 279–280), all human 
societies are subject to various conficting elements of sociality: collec-
tivism/individualism, egalitarianism/hierarchy, submission/domination,
cooperation/aggression (confict), conformity/uniqueness, community/ 
competition, altruism (honorability) / selfshness (manipulation: deceit,
under cover, covert, cheating); compassion/cruelty. We can add to these the 
conficts between impulsive (emotional) / rational (deliberative) behavior 
(the latter from Ariely 2012, 98) and between revenge (Daly and Wilson 
1989) and forgiveness (McCullough 2008). This ability to balance confict-
ing desires in ourselves is, according to psychologist Steven Pinker, what 
people generally call ‘wisdom’ (2017, 414). Just as people are aware of these 
conficting tendencies in their psychological makeup, they are also inclined 
to perceive the world as less well off than is really the case. Swedish physi-
cian Hans Rosling showed how much people’s perceptions of the world 
are still infuenced by instincts that helped our hunter-gatherer ancestors 
survive (2018). 
People are part of a larger group, but they do like individual acknowl-
edgment. We want to conform and are herdlike creatures, but we do 
enjoy it when others recognize (and sometimes, celebrate) our unique-
ness. Indeed, our humanity is defned by interaction. Until Friday came,
Robinson Crusoe was only biologically human because from a sociological 
point of view, living on an uninhabited island misses a defning element of 
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humanity, that is, interaction between human beings. People have strong 
and ancient egalitarian tendencies in small groups, but they can live in 
large-scale imagined communities only through hierarchical structuring of 
social relations. They cooperate to an extent not seen among other social 
species, yet they have also shown an unparalleled ability to invent bodily 
extensions that are lethal to fellow members, and they have an uncanny 
drive for war. People share not only with kin but also with people beyond 
the immediate kin and friendship group, while at the same time they are 
selfsh and engage in free-rider behavior. 
The balancing of these conficting impulses is done in primate groups 
and small-scale human societies on the basis of face-to-face interaction 
and informal yet prescriptive rules (McIntosh 1995, 131). In large-scale 
human societies, this balancing act is performed and successful when, and 
only when, government is no longer an instrument of manipulation and 
exploitation of the few by the many, but has become the abstract unifer 
of all people and legitimized by a democratic political ideology. This is a 
very important point to make and will be further elaborated in chapter 4: 
for most of history, government was used as an instrument for maintaining 
control over an imagined community of people. From a historical point 
of view, it is only very recently—the past 200 years, approximately—that 
government in democracies has become a container of and for all people,
including those who are in political leadership positions. In nondemocratic 
political regimes, government continues to serve as an instrument in the 
hands of the few to oppress the many. Those living in a democratic polity 
cannot afford to be complacent about their political regime. If anything,
democracy not only requires constant gardening by all citizens (Liu and 
Hanauer 2011), but also quite vigilant attention to the dangers of repatri-
monialization, a process where powerful elites capture the impersonal state 
institutions for the pursuit of their individual or group interests (Fuku-
yama 2014, 28). Political elites seek to monopolize power in their favor 
(for instance, through redistricting in the United States), and economic 
elites seek to acquire more wealth via bending public policy (e.g., through 
deregulation) to facilitate their interest in less oversight and more control 
over the market. These conficting instincts and intentions come to full 
expression in the container that a democratic political system strives to be.
Indeed, our humanity’s major challenge is to recognize the conficting ten-
dencies St. Augustine wrote about, and to create time between instinctual 
reaction and thoughtful response (Dalai Lama and Tutu 2016, 179). In any 
other type of political regime, government operates merely as an instru-
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ment of the few aimed at constraining the more negative human inclina-
tions and usurping the fruit of the more positive inclinations. 
7. Concluding Comments: 
Relevance to Understanding What Government Is 
In chapter 1, I provided a defnition of government that is universal for all 
sedentary societies. At the conclusion of this chapter, the structural features 
implied by that defnition have not changed and will be further discussed in 
the next chapter, but they must be fne-tuned with how these features func-
tion in practice. For most of history, government was the instrument in the 
hands of the few, and only recently has government been perceived as a 
possible container of all people: that is, a government where no individual 
is above the law; an impersonal government where bureaucracy serves the 
people. In chapter 7, I return to the various dangers that impersonal gov-
ernment faces. At this point, it is suffcient to emphasize that the ways in 
which social norms are enshrined in formal, public institutions have very 
ancient roots. Several early-learned behaviors are enshrined in institutions: 
pair bonding in marriage and raising children in a community has to some 
extent become raising children in a partially government-controlled envi-
ronment (kindergarten, elementary and secondary education as subject 
to government regulation, whether public or private schools), and shar-
ing through a community has become sharing through government (the 
welfare state). In this perspective, government is the institutional arrange-
ments that intentionally channel the deeply rooted instinctual behaviors of 
caring and sharing. Inclusive ftness is attempted through various mecha-
nisms that constrain the human inclination to dominate, deceive, and cheat 
and encourage those learned calculating behaviors that are benefcial to the 
group and society at large. 
From the great apes, humans inherited a rank-order social system that 
works with networks of positions of infuence. Hunter-gatherers switched 
to a society operating upon reverse dominance hierarchy, conformity, kin-
ship, egalitarianism, and reciprocity, all possible because they lived in a 
physical community of people. Humans in the past and at present engage 
in small-scale cooperation that can be characterized by nepotism, cronyism,
deference to authority, dominance hierarchy and prestige, intergroup com-
petition, and alliances on the one hand, and reverse dominance hierarchy,
polite consensus, sharing, conformity, kinship, and face-to-face reciprocity 










on the other. All of these behaviors are visible in physical as well as in imag-
ined communities of people. But only in the latter do we fnd large-scale 
cooperation characterized by coercive leadership on the basis of experience 
and merit (education), negotiable authority at multiple decision-making 
levels (chapter 6), reverse orthodox dominance hierarchy, nonegalitarian 
social interactions, conformity, citizenship, hierarchical and prestige domi-
nance, alliances, and reciprocity (Henrich and Henrich 2007). 
We see each of these elements in the large-scale societies of today.
For a long time, scholars believed that population growth accelerated as 
a function of sedentarization and domestication of plants and animals, but 
as early as 40,000 years ago, the human population increased 10-fold as a 
consequence of technological and sociocultural changes (Cox et al. 2009; 
Barnard 2011, 509; Nishida 2001), hence well before the agricultural revo-
lution. Norms for individual behaviors about living in social groups, physi-
cal communities, were developed over millions of years. We have already 
seen how these norms are assured through the more formal arrange-
ments necessary for living in large-scale sedentary, imagined communities.
Hence, one can argue that what is expected of individual functioning in 
social groups is ancient; how people structure this expectation in space and 
through formal organization is of much more recent origin, and it is to that 














Governing Humans in Ever Larger, Sedentary Groups 
For most of their existence on this earth, human beings lived in small,
nomadic, and relatively egalitarian groups, whose livelihood and economy 
was based on fshing, hunting, gathering, and foraging. That period, the 
Paleolithic, was discussed in the previous chapter, especially with atten-
tion to the extent to which in human communities both instinct and intent 
play a role in how people organize themselves. It is only in the past 10,000 
years or so that humans settled down. A little over 6,000 years ago they 
developed formal institutional arrangements for governing large stratifed 
communities and managed surplus economies organized around contract 
and property. Hierarchical society with unidirectional relations between 
leader and subjects did not start 13,000 years ago (as suggested by Van Vugt 
et al. 2008, 187). The transition to an agricultural economy took thousands 
of years, and the emergence of an elite-governed political system took a 
few thousand years more. While this is a fundamental change, it is only 
revolutionary in terms of how different the political and economic insti-
tutional arrangements accommodating sedentary life are from those for 
most of prehistory’s nomadic existence. The so-called Neolithic Revolu-
tion was anything but rapid. In comparison, the transition to a democratic 
political system and an industrialized economy started about 250 years ago,
and while not happening everywhere at the same time, this political and 
economic revolution unfolded a lot faster than the agricultural revolution 
did. The shift to more democratic government slowly gained ground in the 
second half of the twentieth century and has been far from global, but the 



















transformation into a service and knowledge economy has been very swift 
and global indeed. 
Some suggest that the human mind is exceptionally well developed for 
living in a tribal community: “Our modern skulls house a Stone Age mind”
(Cosmides and Tooby 1997; also quoted in Bolhuis et al. 2001, 1). It is 
relevant to know that our tribal instinct, that is, the strong inclination to 
live in groups, rests on top of the more ancient social instincts rooted in 
kin selection and reciprocal altruism (Richerson and Boyd 2001, 205; Boyd 
and Richerson 2009, 3287). Our tribal instinct is no longer one of a Stone 
Age mind because of cumulative cultural evolution. Human cultural evo-
lution has progressed increasingly faster and still seems to be gathering 
speed. For hundreds of thousands—and even millions of years, the bio-
logical evolution of our species dominated humanity’s cultural evolution.
Most scholars agree that this has reversed in the past 40,000 years or so,
with cultural evolution becoming far more dominant. While many animal 
species acquire behavior through social learning, humans do so through 
cumulative cultural evolution (Boyd and Richerson 1996, 78). Genetic evo-
lution in the past 10,000 years has been limited, and only two changes were 
prompted by the shift to an agricultural economy: (a) lactose tolerance 
among some populations across the globe (Richerson and Boyd 2001, 219) 
and (b) lighter skin pigmentation among populations in temperate climates 
that shifted from the high vitamin D diet of hunter-gatherers to the much 
lower vitamin D, grain-based diet of agriculturalists (Wilde et al. 2014; 
Jablonski and Chaplin 2017). 
The human tribal instincts have proven able, even though by trial and 
error, to deal with this ever faster cultural evolution. It is because of tribal 
instincts that humans look for membership in groups where they can iden-
tify with and relate to others, often like-minded or like-interested and/or 
similar in appearance. Unlike the nomadic ancestor who lived in one small 
group, a physical community of people today is characterized by individu-
als who live their lives as members of multiple smaller and larger groups,
with the largest groups being that of imagined communities of people.
They are stratifed along lines of authority, income, educational attain-
ment, fame, and so forth. They are fragmented societies in the sense that in 
addition to being members of a family and band, as they have always been,
people are also members of work environments, religious organizations,
sports clubs, labor unions, political parties, and so on. The deep, enduring 
ties of old among all members have been replaced by more superfcial, fuid 
ties. In the late nineteenth century, German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies 
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(community) to people living in Gesellschaft (society), but that dichotomous 
representation of social development is too simplistic. In reality, we live in 
multiple, physical communities that are embedded in a larger, imagined 
community called society where most of its members share one role: that 
of being citizens. It is also too simple to claim that humanity developed 
four basic forms of organization: tribes in prehistory, followed by institu-
tions in the early Holocene, then by markets (especially since the nine-
teenth century), and since the late twentieth century by networks (Ronfeldt 
2006, 1). Bands and tribes were, indeed, frst, but formal institutions, physi-
cal markets, and networks emerged in Mesopotamia and Egypt at least 
5,000 years ago. 
An individual with a Stone Age mind would not survive in modern soci-
ety, but one with a tribal mind could because tribal instinct makes people 
seek out and thrive in groups. We may reside in a society of 17 million 
Dutchmen, 54 million Englishmen, 60 million South Africans, 320 million 
Americans, 1.2 billion Indians, and 1.3 billion Chinese, but we “live,” inter-
act, and thrive in smaller groups. There are two reasons that human beings 
have been able to deal with the ever-increasing speed of cultural develop-
ment. First, there is the tribal or group instinct that anchors individuals 
to identifable units of people they belong to and identify with. It is hard 
to comprehend everything that happens in the world, and it is certainly 
impossible to respond to everything that happens, but societal life becomes 
somewhat manageable by participating in smaller-scale group life. The 
human self-governing capacity, expressed through the creation of associa-
tions, was acknowledged as important to society (in addition to state and 
market) as early as Althusius (early seventeenth century) and Tocqueville 
(1830s) (Buijs 2018, 190–191, 196). The human ability and willingness to 
create and participate in groups that profess a shared interest, purpose,
or desire is substantial and helps them to survive and thrive (cf. Ostrom’s 
work on CPRs). Second, perhaps less obvious, are the more formal gov-
erning institutional arrangements that structure our daily lives and that 
identify us as “one.” Humans have their biological humanness in common,
and almost all of them are also citizens of a country. Indeed, the largest 
group of humans in any society is that of all citizens. In a legal sense, that 
would include those who have citizenship, but in a sociological sense it also 
includes resident aliens, transients (students, tourists), illegal aliens, and 
refugees, that is, all those who live in a territory and are given some degree 
of support by the governing system. 
In this chapter, I explore how humans have governed these ever-larger 
communities of people. First, I consider population growth and general 

















settlement patterns (section 1). Population started growing some 40,000 
years ago but intensifed in the slipstream of the Neolithic, or agricul-
tural, Revolution (section 2). The shift from nomadic to sedentary life was 
enormous, but it unfolded over many thousands of years, and it took more 
thousands of years of experimenting with structuring governing arrange-
ments to fnd those that work best in and for imagined communities (sec-
tion 3). Some scholars describe that experimentation in terms of rise and 
fall of political regimes or civilizations (section 4), but we know that human 
societies seldom totally collapse, let alone disappear. They merely disag-
gregate into the small groups wherein people survive. While the agricul-
tural revolution represents a major social-economic change with signif-
cant political consequences, it is the fundamental change in thinking about 
and practicing governing arrangements starting in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries that lay the foundations for contemporary 
governing arrangements in democratic societies (section 5).1 It is on this 
foundation of massive political-administrative change that unprecedented 
economic, technological, and social evolution has been possible since the 
second half of the nineteenth century (section 6). In the course of these 
cultural changes, government’s position and role in society has changed 
fundamentally, from one where it was used and exploited as an instrument
to one where it serves as a container for the largest group in any society: 
citizens in a sociological sense (section 7). People are still adjusting to that 
role of government as a container, but that topic is for the next chapter. 
1. The Growth, Dispersion, and Concentration of the Human Species 
It might be too simplistic to write that government is a function of popula-
tion size and density, but when we look at the growth of human popula-
tions since prehistory, there is reason to believe that there is some truth to 
the claim. American biologist and ecologist Edward Deevey estimated that 
1 million years ago, the human population stood at about 125,000 people,
increasing to about 1 million individuals by 300,000 BCE (Deevey 1960; as 
referenced in Kremer 1993, 683, 715). That number still stands, given the 
estimate of French demographer Jean-Noël Biraben that between 300,000 
and 200,000 years ago Homo sapiens numbered about 800,000 individuals in 
Africa and South Asia, Neanderthal man in Europe was at about 250,000,
and Java man in Indonesia counted some 100,000 individuals (2003, 1).
There has been much research in the past twenty years into the size and 
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is quite technical but it appears that population size waxes and wanes over 
time, varying with environmental circumstances, more specifcally with the 
alternating cooling and warming climates. At various points in its existence,
the human race experienced sharply declining population size because 
of environmental events. The last time may have been around 70,000 to 
60,000 years ago, but whether this is the consequence of a massive volcanic 
eruption in present-day Indonesia or some other reason is debated (Lane 
et al. 2013; Dawkins 2018, 53). It has been said that at that time, perhaps 
only some 15,000 human beings survived. 
For the purposes of this book, it is not necessary to engage deeply 
with studies on population size in prehistory, but it is important to note 
that environmental circumstances are highly infuential. For a long time,
scholars believed that human populations start growing exponentially as a 
function of the agricultural, or Neolithic, Revolution, but recent research 
indicates that human populations were growing well before that time. One 
growth spurt occurred at around 40,000–50,000 years ago (Behar et al.
2008, 1130; Huff et al. 2010, 2149). At least one scholar writes that it is 
unclear why this happened (Mellars 1996, 185). Another suggests this was 
possibly a function of the use of new technology at the time such as the 
throwing spear, the harpoon, and the bow and arrow (Biraben 2003, 2) 
(nota bene: the oldest spears date back to some 300,000 years ago; see 
Coolidge and Wynn 2018, 169). This growth was followed by a decline 
because of cooling temperatures across the globe (Gazave et al. 2014, 761).
Populations started growing again from some 15,000–20,000 years ago. In 
Western Europe, for instance, the population around 11,000–16,000 years 
ago jumped from about 9,000 to 40,000 individuals (Gamble et al. 2005,
195; Tenesa et al. 2007, 525; Wei-Wei et al. 2013, 392; Zheng et al. 2012, 5). 
At year 1 CE, Deevey estimated the human population to be about 
133 million, while several years later economist John Durand estimated 
the world population in 14 CE at between 275 and 330 million (1977,
259). From then on, the human population slowly and steadily increased to 
about 1 billion people in the year 1800, after which growth accelerated to 
arrive at 2.6 billion in 1950 and 7 billion in 2015. It is expected that by 2050 
the world population will be around 9 billion, and some United Nations 
projections suggest it may reach as much as 11.8 billion people in 2100.
This does appear as signifcant population growth, but, by way of contrast,
had population growth been steady at 4 per 1,000 people since roughly 
6,000 years ago, and thus not limited by natural (famine, disease) and arti-
fcial events (war), it has been estimated that we would now have about 7 to 
8 trillion people (Wenke and Olszewski 2007, 301). 









   
 
 
It is generally accepted that modern human beings migrated out of 
Africa somewhere between 125,000 and 50,000 years ago (Behar et al. 2009,
1130; López et al. 2015). Since then, they are the only species that inhabits 
all corners of the earth. For most of that time humans lived a nomadic 
existence, and settled down in big numbers only in the past 10,000–12,000 
years, with their livelihood provided through the cultivation and produc-
tion of edible plants and animals. Most people lived in fairly small settle-
ments, dispersed across the land masses of the globe with enormous tracts 
of land unclaimed. Over time, some hamlets became towns, and some of 
these, in turn, became cities. The earliest such settlements are found in 
the Fertile Crescent. We have the population size estimates of three cit-
ies in the ancient Near East around 7,000 BCE: Jericho, in modern-day 
northern Israel, had about 1,000 inhabitants; in the same time period Abu 
Hureyra, in contemporary northern Syria, had a population of about 5,000 
to 6,000 people (Moore et al. 2000, 494); and also around 7,000 BCE, Çat-
alhöyük, in present south-central Turkey, had a population between 5,000 
and 10,000 individuals. 
These towns and cities existed in an agricultural economy. It has been 
estimated that around the year 1800 CE, about 4 to 5 percent of the world 
population lived in cities, that is, 50 million people in urban areas as com-
pared to another 930 million in rural parts (United Nations 1980, 7). Since 
then, urbanization has spread rapidly to include 30 percent of the world 
population in 1950, 54 percent in 2014, and 66 percent, it is expected, by 
2050. There is signifcant regional variation, however. In 2014 about 40 
percent of the African population lived in cities; in Europe this is 73 per-
cent (with the UK and the Netherlands around 83 percent), and in the 
United States it is around 82 percent. 
Urbanization accelerated rapidly in Western countries from the second 
half of the nineteenth century onward. In China and South Korea, the 
same acceleration occurred in the past 40–50 years. When visiting in 2009,
I was told that the city of Hangzhou in China had 300,000 people in the 
1970s and grew to 6 million in 2009 (an intriguing aside: in the year 1200 
CE Hangzhou had a population of about 1 million because it was the capi-
tal of the Song dynasty). In South Korea, 60 percent of the population in 
1960 lived in rural areas; by the early twenty-frst century this fgure had 
declined to 35 percent (Jung 2014, 170). 
Sedentarization and urbanization both had signifcant effects on human 
governing arrangements. In connection with the domestication of some 
plants and animals, sedentary life led to the emergence of formal governing 
institutions created to fulfll basic functions and services. The structural 
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territorial and organizational arrangements that developed in antiquity are 
still part and parcel of any governing arrangement on the globe. Urban-
ization since the second half of the nineteenth century had little impact 
on structural governing arrangements, but it signifcantly infuenced the 
expansion of government into a wider range of functions and services than 
it has had ever before. Furthermore, urbanization in the past 150 years 
or so also has tied local and national levels of government more frmly 
together than has been previously the case. How all this unfolds is the sub-
ject of the remainder of this chapter. 
2. The Agricultural Revolution: Fraud or Inevitable? 
It appears that hunter-gatherer populations showed the same kind of 
growth levels as sedentary agriculturalists, so it is not clear what can help 
us understand the shift to agriculture (Bettinger 2016, 813). In fact, sed-
entary life and a livelihood dependent upon domesticated foodstuffs has 
demonstrably increased human beings’ vulnerability to infectious diseases 
as a result of living in close proximity, and it has reduced human’s hardi-
ness, as evidenced by weakened bone and teeth structures (Scott 2017, 84,
97). Domesticated cereals lack suffcient iron, are short on essential amino 
acids, and lack certain vitamins. Furthermore, they are carbohydrates that 
promote dental caries and, later in life, enhance the possibility of diabetes 
(Larsen 2015, 425). Also, the Neolithic shift to agriculture entailed some 
degree of “deskilling” as we became more dexterous with our hands but less 
industrious (Scott 2017, 92). As American anthropologist Marshall Sahlins 
argued almost 50 years ago, the agricultural revolution had contradictory 
consequences: it was appropriating in relation to nature, but expropriating 
in relation to humans (Sahlins 2017, 35 [1972]). On the upside, overall life 
expectancy in the Paleolithic was somewhere between 15 and 20 years of 
age, which increased to 25 years in agricultural society (Gurven and Kaplan 
2007, 344). 
Israeli archaeologist Ofer Bar-Yosef provides two suggestions for why 
people decided to stick around in the same area: frst, because of the attrac-
tion of spatially restricted and rich resources that could be accessed easily; 
second, because abrupt climate change and increasing population densi-
ties reduced mobility and resulted in social and technological changes 
(2001, 5). In addition to climate change, increasing population densities 
since about 100,000 years ago and improving technology have also been 
suggested as possible reasons for domestication (Wenke and Olszewski 
















   
  
2007, 236). Rapid environmental changes may well have prompted a trend 
toward subsistence intensifcation (Boyd and Richerson 2005, 362). For 
instance, during a rapid drying period some 2.6 million years ago, people 
started manufacturing the earliest Oldowan stone tools. At the time of a 
second major climatic change between 1.8 and 1.6 million years ago, people 
started producing the more sophisticated Acheulian stone tools; and a third 
major cooling and drying period during the Younger Dryass (10,800–9,500 
BCE) preceded the warming up and wetter centuries leading into the agri-
cultural revolution (Bar-Yosef 1998, 174; Kuijt and Finlayson 2009, 10966).
Gibraltarian zoologist, paleoanthropologist, and paleontologist Clive Fin-
layson believes that these drying periods forced humans to seek out places 
where they could easily access water; indeed, they selected environments 
in an intermediate range of rainfall regimes, between the hyper-humidity 
of the rainforest and the hyper-arid desert (2014, xvii and 125). The earli-
est settlements, such as Jericho in northern Israel, Teotihuacán in central 
Mexico, and Hangzhou in China are wetland-based and only marginally 
dependent upon grains (Scott 2017, 56). Furthermore, there appears to be 
a gap of about 4,000 years between the frst domestication of grains and 
livestock and the emergence of the frst fully agrarian economies (Scott 
2017, 46; Fuller et al. 2010). 
It is long believed that domestication of plants and animals led to sed-
entarization, but Finlayson and various others point out that there is ample 
evidence of sedentary life well before the onset of agriculture (Finlayson 
2014, 147; Gamble 2007, 259–263; Scott 2017, 10; Foley and Gamble 2009).
There is also evidence of the construction of monumental architecture for 
mass rituals before the emergence of sizable villages and towns (Richer-
son et al. 2003, 391). The structures excavated since the 1990s by German 
archaeologist Klaus Schmidt and his team at Göbekli Tepe in south-central 
Turkey illustrate this. The earliest human activity in this, possibly, oldest 
temple complex in the world dates back to the late Epipalaeolithic period 
(eleventh millennium BCE). It was during this same period that beer brew-
ing emerged, that is, well before widespread sedentarization, and testifying 
to signifcant social and ritual complexity in the Natufan culture (Liu et al.
2018). The Natufans are the frst peoples to live in permanent dwellings,
but they were hunter-gatherers (Reich 2019, 86). 
The concept of a Neolithic agricultural Rperahevolution was introduced 
by Australian archaeologist Vere Gordon Childe in the 1930s (Childe 1958,
35; Liverani 2006, 5), but it was not a rapid transition from a nomadic life 
with a hunter-gathering-foraging-scavenging economy to a sedentary life 
with an agricultural economy. Furthermore, it was not initially a worldwide 
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event but limited to Europe, Southwest Asia, and—almost as early—North 
China (Richerson et al. 2001, 388). Richard Dawkins describes the emer-
gence of agriculture as unnatural (2018, 69), and I agree with him when 
“unnatural” is understood as “artifcial.” That the human diet became less 
varied, as Dawkins implies when noting that wheat is not a natural food 
for Homo sapiens, is true, but that does not mean that the domestication of 
grains and animals was unnatural. If anything, it was the large human brain 
that allowed people to go well beyond behaviors determined by natural 
selection alone. After all, it is natural for human beings to try new things 
and pursue new ways of doing things. Israeli historian Yuval Noah Harari 
describes the agricultural revolution as history’s biggest fraud (2014, ch. 5) 
because it made life more diffcult for human beings. People had to take 
care of planted foods and domesticated animals, they worked longer and 
harder, their diet became more limited, and their leisure time was severely 
reduced. At the same time, while requiring working harder, farming gradu-
ally resulted in a general decline of robustness and mobility (Larsen 2015,
240 and 255). The hyperbole of fraud suggests an intentionality that sim-
ply was nonexistent back then. The transformation to agriculture was 
slow, took thousands of years, and was never comprehensive, since forag-
ing continued to be a way to augment the diet (Rosen and Rivera-Collazo 
2012). Furthermore, there is increasing evidence that the transformations 
included intentional forest fres to promote certain vegetation and create 
open landscapes for farming, food storage, houses, the domestication of 
dogs, and intensifying plant-use. These developments occurred during the 
Epipalaeolithic period of between 21,000 and 9,500 BCE (Gamble 2007,
260; Maher et al. 2011; Sevink et al. 2018, 296; Wenke and Olszewski 2007,
177). Indeed, the concept of an agricultural revolution may be conveniently 
simple, but it should be put to rest since it obfuscates the complexity and 
pace of the social and economic changes that unfolded in the millennia 
leading up to widespread agricultural cultivation (Gamble et al. 2005, 210). 
How this progress toward a sedentary and agricultural way of living 
unfolded is nicely illustrated by the various settlement periods of Abu 
Hureyra in the Euphrates valley of northern Syria (the following based on 
Moore et al. 2000, 476–525). The earliest settlement dates back to 9,500 to 
9,000 BCE with a population of a 100 to 300 individuals living in pit dwell-
ings and surviving on the basis of gathering plants and hunting gazelles.
Between 9,000 and 8,000 BCE they started living in timber and reed huts,
still gathering plants and hunting gazelles but now also cultivating some 
cereals. From 8,000 BCE on, plant gathering and gazelle hunting declined,
while from between 7,400 and 6,000 BCE they started living in mudbrick 


















houses and operated an economy of cereal and pulse agriculture and sheep 
and goat husbandry. At its largest, Abu Hureyra occupied about 16 hectares 
of mudbrick houses with some 5,000 to 6,000 people. It did not have (a) 
sizable public buildings, (b) a clear social hierarchy, or (c) large-scale trade,
which was characteristic of towns and cities of the early historic times.
It is generally believed that these early communities were egalitarian in 
nature, that is, without formalized leadership (Mithen 2004, 95; 2012, 49).
Institutionalized inequality emerges some 10,000–12,000 years ago (Mat-
tison et al. 2016, 195) and intensifed quickly in southern Mesopotamia,
and perhaps even within a few hundred years around 3900 BCE, with the 
emergence of urban communities during the Uruk period of Sumer (Mat-
tison et al. 2016, 50). 
The early Southwest Asian settlements before 3900 BCE shared densely 
populated villages with residential units of the one-room type, tightly 
packed, in what appears as almost a single structure. An example would be 
the settlement of Džejtun in the ffth millennium BCE near Ashkhabad 
in present-day Turkmenistan. It has been suggested that these early stan-
dardized, one-room house plans refected a desire to preserve a degree of 
equality in the community (Bernbeck and Pollock 2016, 76). In the fourth 
millennium BCE, we see multiroom dwellings as well as different burial 
practices for the elite that suggest increasing social stratifcation (Tosi 
1973, 430, 434; Mithen 2012, 52). To be sure, the sequence of sedentariza-
tion followed by domestication of plants and animals was not universal. It 
happened like that in western Asia, Japan, and the Ganges plain in India.
In Mexico and New Guinea, however, plant domestication and farming 
preceded permanent settlement. In North Africa and the Andes, domesti-
cation of cattle and vicuña, respectively, came before the domestication of 
crops and quinoa (Mithen 2004, 505). In the Tibetan high plateau, people 
started living seasonally some 11,000 years ago, and settled permanently 
with the shift to agriculture about 3,600 years ago (Reich 2019, 65). These 
processes not only happened within societies, but could come from with-
out. Thus, the British Mesolithic hunter-gatherers were replaced by the 
migration of continental farmers who introduced agriculture some 6,000 
years ago (Brace et al. 2019). 
The Neolithic “Revolution” stretched over at least ten millennia and 
included both the development of agriculture and sedentarization. It is 
impossible to determine whether dwelling in towns preceded agriculture 
or vice versa. This, however, is not important for the purposes of this book.
What is important is that this slow change toward a more stationary way 
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lishment of more formal institutional arrangements for governing people.
Once people started living in these “artifcially created” (Russell 1962) or 
imagined communities (Anderson 2006), government became inevitable.
From the two preceding sections we can discern that this social and eco-
nomic change was neither unnatural (in the physical sense) nor a fraud,
even though it did have negative consequences for the quality of life in 
some respects. Instead, it was inevitable as a function of growing popula-
tions since roughly 40,000 years ago and of increasing numbers of people 
living in close proximity to one another starting some 20,000 years ago. 
3. Small- and Large-Scale Governing Arrangements: Four Main 
Phases of Socioeconomic Development, Three Structuring 
Constants, and Two Governing Revolutions 
The social and economic changes described in the previous two sections 
unfolded over a period of some 15,000 years. It was around 20,000 BCE 
that people started living in the frst stationary dwellings and domesti-
cated dogs, thus well before and independent of the agricultural revolution 
(Weisdorf 2005, 582). People started living in towns and cities at around 
5,000 BCE, and it may be surprising to know that there were parts of Mes-
opotamia where 80 percent of the population lived in towns (Wenke 1997,
44). In southern Mesopotamia around 3,200 BCE, about 70 percent of 
the population, that is, some 200,000 people, lived in cities (Mithen 2012,
52). In Teotihuacán in the Valley of Mexico, by 150 CE some 90 percent 
of the population lived in the city (Millon 1988, 136). This is a degree of 
urbanization not matched in the modern Western world until the early 
twenty-frst century CE. 
Living together in cities requires governing arrangements well beyond 
the face-to-face interactions that were suffcient to ameliorate any confict 
in the hunter-gatherer communities of old. These governing arrangements 
were social arrangements that helped establish loyalty to groups far larger 
than just extended family and friends. As noted above, people participated 
in many groups, but they also identifed with a region and identifed a state 
with its government. Government was inevitable and a necessity in imag-
ined communities of people for at least three reasons. First, in such large 
communities confict could no longer be resolved by an elder in the band 
or tribe on a “we know each other” basis. People needed a neutral arbi-
ter to help settle conficts (Johnson 2017, 16). Second, in small, physical 
communities of people, it would be very diffcult to engage in predatory 




















behaviors because they harmed the survival of the group. Such behaviors 
ranged from not sharing food and other resources to theft, rape, and mur-
der. In small, nomadic communities, the survival of the group was assured 
by sanctions against predatory behavior. By contrast, rent-seeking behav-
iors are a feature of large-scale imagined communities where criminals can 
prey upon public goods and where economic and political elites can take 
advantage of their wealth and of their specifc role and position in society.
Both criminals and elites can take advantage of living in an imagined com-
munity by disappearing in the crowd, the urban jungle, and extracting dis-
proportionate rewards from their work (Boyd and Richerson 2009, 3287).
Third, in such fast-growing, sedentary communities, collective challenges 
emerged that could not be handled on the self-governing basis character-
istic of small communities all over the world. This has especially been the 
case since the second half of the nineteenth century (see section 6). 
As people are simplifers and pattern-seekers by nature, the question is,
how can these political and social-economic developments be conceptual-
ized? The most common conceptualization is that of a linear development 
over time from a small and simple to a larger and more complex type of 
political and social-economic system. The ancient Greek poet Hesiod’s 
portrayed a deterioration of the human condition, a shrinking from the 
gold, to the silver, the bronze, the heroic, and the iron ages. By contrast,
conceptualizations in the Western world since the eighteenth century are 
predisposed to emphasize progress in terms of improvement (Nisbet 1980) 
in stages. Consider, for instance, three scholars in the nineteenth century.
French sociologist Auguste Comte focused on the change from a society 
“governed” by the supernatural to one that was dominated by science.
Danish archaeologist C. J. Thomsen was impressed by the human ability 
to make tools and weapons, and thus distinguished between the Stone, the 
Bronze, and the Iron ages. American anthropologist Lewis Morgan labeled 
three phases: “savagery,” lasting until about 60,000 BCE, “barbarism,” with 
some cultivation and domestication starting around 35,000 BCE, and “civ-
ilization,” with agriculture emerging from 5,000 BCE. 
The frst person to focus on the development of governing arrange-
ments was, as far as I know, North African scholar and civil servant Ibn 
Khaldûn (born in what is today Tunisia), who, in the late fourteenth cen-
tury, wrote about bands, tribes, chieftainships, cities, and empires (the latter,
in his words, “far-fung dynasties”) (1989, 96, 108, 152, 292; see also Irwin 
2018). His stage model is still visible in the most dominant stage model 
in the twentieth century, proposed by American cultural anthropologist 
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from band, via tribe and chiefdom, to culminate in the state (1962). Ser-
vice’s sequence suggests a growing population size and, with that, a grow-
ing territorial size. Indeed, human beings instinct toward cooperation is so 
strong that they are not only able to work together on a fairly small scale,
but have been able to expand cooperation to the much larger scale of the 
imagined communities in and of a country by means of formalized insti-
tutional arrangements. Other examples of such cooperative arrangements 
encompass only portions of the population and include religious organiza-
tions, universities, labor unions, and political parties that operate within 
a society at large, and numerous associational arrangements that connect 
like-minded and like-interested individuals at a more regional or even local 
scale, such as Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts, sports clubs, and so on, but none 
of these encompass all people. 
With regard to stages in the evolution of institutional arrangements, it 
is tempting to explore the possibility of specifc moments when one stage 
gives way to another. American anthropologist Steadman Upham identi-
fed such thresholds. He suggested that with a population density of 150 
people per square mile, intensive agriculture becomes necessary. A pop-
ulation of 300 to 500 people requires some coordinated leadership, and 
administrative units larger than about 1,500 individuals (comprising fve 
village or kinship units of 300 each) would necessitate more centralized 
political control. Six of these administrative units would call for vertically 
specialized political integration, and regions with more than 10,000 people 
need both centralized political control and vertical political integration 
(Upham 1990, 12). 
Presently, the effort to identify clear stages and thresholds, where one 
stage is a prerequisite for the next, has been abandoned, as it has become 
clear that the variety of political-administrative and social-economic devel-
opmental paths eludes any simple stage model (Maisels 1987). In fact,
some city-states became empires, skipping the “state” stage. Some chief-
doms were acephalous; others had some type of leadership. Some societies 
operated pretty much without a state but with governing arrangements 
for confict resolution (e.g., Viking Scandinavia; see Wallette 2010, 136,
145). There is no evidence that some kind of population threshold must 
be passed in order for a chiefdom to come into existence. After all, the 
vast majority of African chiefdoms had population densities between 40 
and 1,000 people per square kilometer (Netting 1990, 55–56). In addition,
bands and tribes continued to exist even when they lived in a territory 
temporarily governed by a supra-local governing arrangement, and we still 
fnd this arrangement in various parts of the world. 




















In addition to these stage theories, the anthropological literature on the 
emergence of the state can be organized in two main groups (the following 
based on Service 1978, 21–30; Haas 1982, 20, 80, 151). On the one hand,
confict theories focus on individual confict, intersocietal confict (e.g.,
conquest theories), and intrasocietal confict arising out of political differ-
ences and economic stratifcation (e.g., civil war, class struggle) (e.g., Car-
neiro 1970; Claessen and Skalnik 1978). Integrative theories, on the other 
hand, consider how territories have been circumscribed and protected, and 
consider the organizational benefts of redistribution of wealth via long-
distance trade and distribution of surplus among the population, of orga-
nizing for war (to fnd booty, and serve as a source of national pride), and 
of public works (religious buildings such as the pyramids, secular structures 
such as palaces and irrigation works) (e.g., Yoffee 2005). 
As indicated in the title of this section, it is useful to organize the 
description of the development of political and social-economic institu-
tional arrangements around three features. First, and focusing on social-
economic development, I simply adopt the notion of a somewhat linear 
development from a nomadic, via an agricultural, then industrial, to a ser-
vice- and knowledge-oriented economy. Second, I suggest there are three 
constants in how humans structure themselves and organize: throughout 
their existence, they have shown self-governing capabilities, especially at the 
local level. These have been augmented, when human populations became 
sedentary, with territorial layering of administrative units in the state on 
the one hand and with organizational differentiation of the administrative 
apparatus of the state on the other. Finally, as I mentioned in the introduc-
tion and in chapter 1, there have been two main political-administrative 
revolutions. The frst centered around the emergence of formal govern-
ment institutions some 6,000 years ago. The second involved the change 
of government as property and instrument of the few to government as 
enabler and container for the many since the late eighteenth century. In 
the remainder of this section, I use the distinction between four types of 
socioeconomic systems to organize the discussion. 
As noted in several places in this book, during the bulk of their existence 
Homo sapiens lived in small, nomadic groups. Economically they functioned 
as what English anthropologist James Woodburn calls immediate-return 
systems (1982) where hoarding and self-aggrandizement were not toler-
ated (Tainter 1988, 36). Politically these groups were more or less egali-
tarian, acephalous societies. They lacked formal leadership positions, and 
leaders might emerge when the situation arose (e.g., for coordinating the 




















Tribal Community 125 
lish anthropologist, described this Mesolithic arrangement of social inter-
actions as one where accumulation is considered antisocial and equated 
with not sharing. Immediate sharing and consumption were considered 
acceptable social behaviors. By contrast, the Neolithic living arrangements 
emphasized accumulation as appropriate social behavior, and this was then 
considered saving for self and for dependents. Immediate consumption was 
not considered social, and was regarded as not saving (Barnard 2010, 256). 
Nowadays, the !Kung/San in the Kalahari Desert in southern Africa,
Australian Aboriginals, the Inuit in northern Canada, and Laps in the north 
of Scandinavia link the residential units of a few dozen people in larger 
groups, and such a multilevel “tribal” organization is not found among 
other primates (Richerson and Boyd 1999; Service 1967, 11–113).Whether 
something similar was the case during human prehistory is not known,
but it is conceivable that there were many fewer such pan-tribal sodalities 
simply because there were fewer people. While a lot of ideas about hunter-
gatherer societies in prehistory are based on ethnographic research among 
contemporary hunter-gatherer groups, it is important to keep in mind that 
the hunter-gatherers of today differ from their prehistoric counterparts 
in that the former interact with multinational corporations and colonial 
governments (Kelly 1995, 339). 
Collective challenges in hunter-gatherer societies are met bottom-up,
through the group, and this continues to operate quite well in relatively 
small-scale economic systems such as those investigated by Elinor Ostrom 
(1990; see also Richerson and Boyd 2003, 393; Richerson and Henrich 
2012, 54). In hunter-gatherer economies, the social network of reciprocal 
exchange is the key mechanism (Cohen 1981, 116). They are frst and fore-
most gift-giving and gift-sharing socioeconomic systems where exchange 
as trade is not dominant. In fact, some small and nomadic groups have 
until quite recently been able to escape the “reach” of the state (Scott 2009) 
even if they cannot avoid the harmful infuences of living close to sed-
entary populations (Woodburn 2016). This nomadic and egalitarian type 
of society declined in scope and geographical range as population density 
increased and sedentism emerged (Cohen 1981, 118). Governments then 
emerged because of the need to organize redistributive exchange systems 
in response to irregular distribution of goods and subsistence resources 
(food storage). 
When bands turned into tribes is unclear; that is, it is likely that it hap-
pened at different moments in the various world regions. We can assume 
that tribes were governed on a basis more or less similar to the governance 
of bands. It is equally unclear when tribes turned into chiefdoms. Again,





















in the course of human history, the emergence of chiefdoms varied from 
region to region. Carneiro argues that they were established as a function 
of war-making with other groups and emerge in the Near East around 
5,500 BCE, in Britain around 4,000 CE, in central Europe around 3,000 
CE, and in Peru somewhere between 2,000 and 1,800 CE. The Olmec 
became a chiefdom in the 1,500–1,200 CE period; chiefdoms in the Valley 
of Mexico emerged around 900 CE, in the Valley of Oaxaca around 850 
CE, in highland Guatemala between 800 and 500 CE. The lowland Maya 
acquired chiefdoms around 350 CE, and in the southeastern United States 
they emerged around 1200 CE (Carneiro 1981, 49, 63). 
In addition to warfare, it has been argued that chiefdoms and states 
emerged to make irrigation possible (Wittfogel 1957), but—conversely—it 
has also been suggested that irrigation prompted the emergence of central-
ized authority (Mithen 2012, 58). Other explanations include the proxim-
ity to waterways for easy transport (Algaze 2006, 147), population growth 
(Boserup 1965), trade (Mithen 2012, 65), and the secondary products revolu-
tion. The latter term was coined by archeologist Andrew Sherratt (1981) 
to refer to the period when people started using domesticated animals not 
only as a food source, but also for dairy production, for clothing (wool),
and for pulling carts and plows (Greenfeld 2010, 46). It was also when the 
horse was domesticated, when the wheel was invented (Anthony 2007),
and when the discovery was made that copper and tin could be used for 
making bronze—hence the Bronze Age. Intriguingly, at the same time that 
this secondary products revolution was unfolding, Y-chromosome patterns 
showed increasing inequality, with some males concentrating much power 
and resources (Reich 2019, 237). The latter includes access to women, and 
Lithuanian-American archaeologist Marija Gimbutas has suggested that 
this is when male-centered societies replaced those where females were 
considered central to social life (Gimbutas 1991; Reich 2019, 238, 241).
However, the archaeological evidence is too limited to support the hypoth-
esis of such a shift from a matriarchal to a patriarchal society (Goodison 
and Morris 1999, 11–12; Tringham and Conkey 1999). 
Whatever the reasons for the emergence of chiefdoms and states, it 
is important to distinguish between processes such as centralization,
mechanisms by which these processes happen, and socioenvironmental 
circumstances that select these mechanisms, such as climate change, popu-
lation growth, and density (Flannery 1972, 404–409). Of all the reasons 
advanced for the emergence of chiefdoms and, later, (city-)states, social-
environmental stressors appear to be the ultimate reasons (Flannery 1972,
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(Algaze 2006, 152; Civolla-Revilla 2001, 217). Some say it is social hubris,
that is, a lack of an appropriate response to changing natural and economic 
circumstances, that accounts for most if not all decline of civilizations 
(Johnson 2017). With regard to elites, Civolla-Revilla emphasizes that 
collective action in the process of government formation is caused by the 
emergence of leaders and followers. Keep in mind, though, that collective 
action can be successful without social distinctions between elites and com-
moners. This is shown by the prestate, sedentary agricultural communities 
that organized irrigation (see below) and the many common pool resource 
management systems found across the globe throughout history. 
Bands and tribal communities are assumed to have mostly informal 
institutional mechanisms for settling interpersonal conficts and for mak-
ing collective decisions (Richerson et al. 2002, 413). They were also likely 
to be mainly redistributive systems where the chief or “big man” is not so 
much the top decision-maker but rather the prime gift-giver and adjudica-
tor. An example of this is the An-Ri (king or queen) in the Irish rundale 
system, which existed well into the nineteenth century. This “king” was 
selected by and from among the local population on the basis of wisdom,
knowledge, and sense of justice. His or her responsibility included “the 
regulation, division, and apportioning of fshing and shore rights and the 
allotment of tillage and pasture land . . . and in some case, [the appointment] 
of subsidiary offcers” (Slater and Flaherty 2009, 14). The rundale agrarian 
community is an excellent example of local self-governing capacity. 
The chief in a chiefdom or big-man society may have a retinue of fol-
lowers and assistants, and these are precursors to the more formal bureau-
cracies that appear later (Flannery 1972, 403; Gibson and Geselowitz 1988,
25–26). Chiefdoms are believed to have perhaps two up to three settlement 
levels with a central town and one or more smaller towns. City-states and 
states have four or more settlement levels (Flannery 1998, 16–17). As with 
tribes turning into chiefdoms, it is not clear at what point chiefdoms turn 
into city-states and states. Some scholars place the threshold at 2,000 to 
3,000 people, while others fnd 10,000 a more reasonable estimate. Yet oth-
ers suggest that chiefdoms become unstable when they reach a population 
of about 48,000 people; but some of the chiefdoms in Hawaii had as many 
as 100,000 people (Feinman 1998, 97, 112). 
Whatever the case, once people started living a sedentary lifestyle and 
developing an agricultural economy, some degree of government became 
unavoidable. And slowly but surely the population and territorial size of 
the governed community increased, from hamlet, to village, town, small 
city, city, city-state, state, and even empire. This is a universal process and 
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it started in at least six different regions of the world: Mesopotamia, Egypt,
India, China, Mesoamerica, and South America. With the emergence of 
sedentary communities and small villages, humanity entered a transitional 
period, starting at least 10,000 years ago, in which it quite successfully 
experimented with self-government, as is clear from the ability to organize 
irrigation without centralized authority (Mithen 2012, 287), and from the 
existence of various types of popular assemblies next to royal institutions in 
the Mesopotamian world (Van de Mieroop 1997; Seri 2005; Keane 2009).
This was a global event, but unfolding at different moments in time and 
at different speeds (Bandy 2008; Fort 2015). With the emergence of cities 
between 5,500 and 2,500 BCE people experimented with formalizing a 
political system, and the so-called stateless era came to an end (Scott 2009,
324; Van de Mieroop 1997, 23). 
With regard to the expansion of a political system, people organized 
the territory in local, regional, and upper-regional jurisdictions; when con-
tracting, people “fell back” to their local level and community. Many rea-
sons have been advanced for the emergence of the city-state, and they often 
are environmental, that is, referring to climate changes, economic devel-
opments, and competition for resources. In the end, though, city-states 
emerged because of human agency, that is, the action of some individuals 
as accepted by the many. We will likely never know what exactly allowed 
some individuals to be accepted as permanent leaders in their communities.
The archaeological record does not allow archaeologists and anthropolo-
gists to determine why social elites emerged (Algaze 2008, 7, 153). Was 
it the ambitious lust for power of some individuals? Was it the extraordi-
nary management and leadership skills that some individuals developed 
or had (Mithen 2012, 66)? Was it successful appeal to and emphasis upon 
some kind of divine selection? Of course, all societies, including hunter-
gatherers and early self-governing agricultural communities, have people 
with natural leadership abilities, but that leadership has to be earned, time 
and again, and those positions did not become hereditary until the emer-
gence of the city-state (Mithen 2012, 214, 220). And when that happened,
it was experimentation that resulted in political and social stratifcation.
Humans built on their understanding of the past and were thus more goal-
oriented than when working on a mere trial-and-error basis (Wright 2006,
316). In the process, labor became a commodity that could be exploited.
That it happened is clear; when it happened and how is much less clear 
(Algaze 2006, 128–129, 131). 
Sometimes the local level was sovereign and then called a city-state. A 
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of government that serves as the sovereign. Functionally, these jurisdic-
tions often operated as general-purpose systems that performed a range 
of tasks and services. Specifc-purpose organizations, however, were estab-
lished alongside these general-purpose systems. The intensity of relations 
between local and upper-local jurisdictions varied from being merely a 
confederation of loosely coupled local governments to being highly verti-
cally centralized systems. 
The sequence from hamlet to state and empire with increasing popula-
tion size suggests that society and political-administrative arrangements 
had become more complex, and, indeed, that is how many scholars have 
described this development: from a small and simple society with no divi-
sion of labor, to a large, complex, and differentiated society (e.g., Service 
1967, 143). By way of contrast, Tilly notes that, if anything, it is decreas-
ing complexity and de-differentiation that characterizes social change, as is 
illustrated by the convergence of governing structures, the standardization 
of language, the development of mass production and consumption, and 
the agglomeration of thousands of sovereignties (principalities, duchies,
counties, kingdoms, bishoprics, chiefdoms, city-states, empires, etc.) into 
the roughly 200 territorial states of today (Tilly 1984, 12, 48; see also Mor-
ris 2013, 18; Yoffee 2005, 92, who writes that a general trend in the evolu-
tion of states is the development of simplicity). 
When focusing on government, the truth lies somewhere in the middle.
In terms of organizational size and structure and function, governments 
have become much more complex in the past 150 years; but in terms of the 
institutional arrangement for structuring political power, there is one dom-
inant system today: the territorial state. The seven exceptions I am aware 
of include fve city-states (Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino,
and Singapore) and two theocracies (Vatican City, Tibet). Around the year 
1800 CE, there were about 25 territorial states, with much of the rest of the 
world governed by chiefdoms, tribes, kingdoms, and colonial governments.
Since then, the territorial state has become dominant (Herz 1957). Take 
the United Nations membership as the cue: in 2017 there were 193 terri-
torial states, with another two that have observer status (Palestine, Vatican 
City), and another 11 states that are recognized by some but not by the 
majority of UN member states and whose territory is contested (includ-
ing Kosovo and Taiwan). Finally, there are fve nonsovereign city-states: 
Hong Kong and Macao (China), Ceuta and Melilla on the Moroccan coast 
(Spain), and Gibraltar (UK). 
In such large-scale societies, the human instinct of cooperation can only 
to be satisfed through a combination of coercive and prosocial institutions.
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The appearance of monumental architecture as residences for the ruling 
class and as places for worship is a marker of increasing formalization of 
governing arrangements and of mass rituals (Richerson et al. 2002, 417,
420). Both coercive and prosocial institutions are needed to make large-
scale societies work; they balance each other. Coercion alone may work for 
a while but only when the population at large accepts the societal structural 
arrangements and perceives there are no major social arrangements that 
encourage increasing inequality (Richerson and Boyd 2001, 209). 
What characterizes these city-states and states? The city-state is the 
oldest type of formal governing arrangement for sedentary society. They 
grow from important pilgrimage sites, market sites, defensive locations 
where people would go to in time of danger, places with access to water 
or with prime agricultural land, trade routes, or a combination of these 
(Yoffee 1997, 261). They have been defned as a capital city or town with 
small integrated hinterland and a small overall population, as politically 
independent, with relative economic self-suffciency, and perceived ethnic 
distinctiveness (Griffth and Thomas 1981; Charlton and Nichols 1997,
65). Yoffee points out that many states do not ft the Griffth-Thomas 
trait list. For instance, Teotihuacán had an estimated population of around 
125,000 people living in a 20-square-kilometer area; Mesopotamian city-
states were multiethnic; the city-state of Chuzan on the island of Okinawa 
was not economically self-suffcient (Yoffee 1997, 257–258; Pearson 1997,
133). 
Based on a comparative study of 35 ancient and modern city-states, per-
haps the best defnition of a city-state thus far is the following, and because 
of its detail it deserves to be quoted in full: 
A city state is a highly institutionalised and highly centralized 
micro-state consisting of one town (often walled) with its imme-
diate hinterland and settled with a stratifed population, of whom 
some are citizens, some foreigners and, sometimes, slaves. Its ter-
ritory is mostly so small that the urban centre can be reached in a 
day’s walk or less, and the politically privileged part of its population 
is so small that it does in fact constitute a face-to-face society. The 
population is ethnically affliated with the population of neighbour-
ing city-states, but political identity is focused on the city-state itself 
and based on differentiation from other city-states. A signifcantly 
large fraction of the population is settled in the town, the others are 
settled in the hinterland, either dispersed in farmsteads or nucleated 
in villages or both. The urban economy implies specialisation of 
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function and division of labour to such an extent that the population 
has to satisfy a signifcant part of their daily needs by purchase in the 
city’s market. The city-state is a self-governing but not necessarily 
independent political unit. (Hansen 2000a, 19) 
In the past 40 years, ample evidence has been collected testifying to the 
great diversity in city-states. In ancient India, the city-state of Harappa 
occupied about 150 hectares with a hinterland of 128,000 square kilome-
ters; some 500 miles south, the city-state of Mohenjo-daro had a hinter-
land of almost 170,000 square kilometers inhabited by 30,000 to 40,000 
people (Kenyor 1997, 54). Political centralization was minimal in the Indus 
Valley, and multiple city centers existed in an area of about 1 million square 
miles (Possehl 1998). 
By the late third millennium BCE, most Mesopotamian settlements 
were governed by individuals with inherited status and had central control 
of stored resources, monumental architecture, armies, physical markets,
and extravagant death rituals expressive of an ideology of personal and 
divinely sanctioned power. This was very different in prehistoric temper-
ate Europe. Until the middle of the second millennium BCE, European 
communities actively resisted city-state development and the commodi-
fcation (see below) that came with it (Whittle 2001, 39, 42; Cochran and 
Harpending 2009, 113). Generally, in nonagricultural societies people 
are less submissive to a government, and until shortly after World War 
II, some communities in the mountainous regions of southeast Asia were 
still able to escape the long arm of the state (Scott 2009; 2017, 8). North 
of the Alps, larger communities did not emerge until the eighth century 
BCE, and almost all settlements were on the scale of farmsteads and small 
villages with 200 to 500 people. Not until 150 BCE did they grow beyond 
1,000 people (Wells 1984, 7). 
In west central Africa, villages, chiefdoms, and states emerged even 
later. Around 680 CE sedentary villages and domesticated bovine cattle 
suddenly emerged. By the tenth century stable sedentary villages with 
solid food system production were found. Chiefdoms appeared shortly 
after the introduction of large cattle herds. As for population size, in 1564 
CE, Kabasa, capital of the kingdom of Ndongo (Angola), had a population 
somewhere between 12,500 and 24,000, and the whole kingdom had some 
100,000 people. The kingdom of Ndongo grew to some 200,000 people 
with hundreds of villages. However, just as in Northern Europe and in 
Southeast Asia, small chiefdoms could escape incorporation into larger 
kingdoms (cf. Scott 2009; Vansina 2004, 69, 98, 137, 189, 202, 265). 





















Apart from their relatively small territorial size, city-states—and sed-
entary communities in general—had economies based on property (e.g.,
stored foodstuff, houses, domesticated animals) (Renfrew 2001, 101).
Products hitherto shared and gifted were increasingly exchanged on the 
basis of measured value. This was a new kind of exchange in social engage-
ment, and it was one where material products became a commodity (Ren-
frew 2001, 97, 106). Another feature was that, as time passed, it became 
clear that settlements were not just defned by their population size as a 
hamlet, village, town or city. In fact, a great variety of towns emerged: a 
second-tier political center may have been a frst-tier religious center, a 
fourth-tier political center may have been a frst-tier craft production cen-
ter, and a frst-tier political center may well have been much less important 
as a religious or economic center (Marcus and Feinman 1998, 11). Indeed,
in southern Mesopotamia, Nippur was the primary religious center, while 
Uruk (also known as Warka) was the foremost political center (Algaze 
2006, 115). 
For the purposes of this book, it is important to consider the position 
and role of government in these ancient city-states in relation to other 
societal associations and to consider the structuring of government itself.
Danish classical philologist and demographer Mogens Hansen observed 
that much of the urban studies literature pays too little attention to the 
political aspect of urbanization (2000b, 606). We have seen that earlier 
conceptions of social and political developments are usually linear, and that 
they are also hierarchical by nature. This is not quite in sync with the real-
ity presented by the archaeological record. Mentioned above is that cities 
may have had different functions, and not all of these were concentrated in 
one and the same place. Thus, instead of hierarchy the concept of heterarchy
denotes that multiple centers and functions exist within one governing sys-
tem (Crumley 1995, 3). 
To be sure, in coercive and centralized political systems, all sorts of 
governing and societal functions may be bundled in the hands of the ruler 
or ruling elite. In consensual societies, it is more common to have politi-
cal and religious institutions physically separated, and that is common not 
only among the Mesopotamian cities, but also in medieval European cit-
ies, in medieval Islam, and in the preindustrial city-state of nineteenth-
century Yoruba in parts of modern Nigeria. In these consensual polities,
elite and royal power were restricted because a key feature is not ownership 
of land but control of labor needed to cultivate the land (Stone 1997, 16,
20). Most city offcials in Mesopotamian city-states such as Eridu (Wright 
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ter 1982a, 1982b), Ur (Wright 1969), and Uruk (Liverani 2006) served as 
personal servants to the king, as administrative personnel (e.g., comptroller 
expenditures, overseer of irrigation, of land cultivation, of storage, of fsh-
ing, and of harvesting), or as temple personnel. 
The history of city-states as political entities is one of a repetitive cycle 
of consolidation, expansion, and dissolution, and this is mostly prompted 
by elite (king, priests, military) pressure to focus on intensive, short-term 
farming without regard for longer-term sustainability (Marcus 1998; Han-
sen 2000b, 611; 2002, 8; Mithen 2012, 73). Sometimes these city-states 
were united, as happened for the frst time when King Sargon conquered 
southern Mesopotamia. This effort at regional unifcation ultimately 
crumbled because Sargon failed to include the traditional city-state leaders 
(Yoffee 1988b, 46). 
Sargon’s Akkad was the frst empire in history, and with it we have the 
frst state of which the size is larger than that of a city-state. The so-called 
pristine states (Uruk in Mesopotamia; Egypt; Tikal, Monte Alban, Teo-
tihuacán, and Moche in North, Central, and South America; Erlitou in 
China; ancient Ghana) were created out of the subjugation of chiefdoms by 
one superior chiefdom (Marcus 1998, 92; Claesen 2016). In the past 6,000 
years or so, there has been great variation in the structuring of states. Some 
were highly centralized but much less urbanized, such as pharaonic Egypt 
(Blanton 1998, 135–140, 147; Baines and Yoffee 1998, 204; Yoffee 2005,
5) and the Aztec and Mayan states (Wilson 1997, 244). Egypt had a clear 
bureaucratic administrative structure, while other states allowed for more 
delegation of authority. In Mesopotamian states, for instance, kings and 
government offcials encouraged self-governance in legal matters at the 
local and family levels as well as self-governance through craft guilds and 
other local associations (Trigger 2003, 209, 222, 342). Indeed, in the late 
Assyrian Advice to a Prince (seventh century BCE), the king was reminded 
that his rule should be fair and in line with the laws of the land (Lambert 
1960, 110–116). Craft and trade guilds played a similar role in medieval 
and early modern Europe (Olson 1982, 124–129). Markets in the Yoruba 
kingdom (West Africa, eighth to nineteenth centuries CE) were policed by 
local traders’ associations (Olson 1982, 346). The Andean states operated 
upon patrimonial principles of authority that was nonbureaucratic, with 
fairly small capital cities. Chan-Chan, capital of the kingdom of Chimor 
(900–1470 CE) (West 1970) in northern Peru, and Tiwanaku, of the empire 
of the same name (330–1150 CE) in contemporary Bolivia and northern 
Peru, did not get beyond a population of 25,000 to 30,000, and Cuzco’s 
central core had no more than about 15,000 to 20,000 people (with a total 























                
 
 
of about 50,000 in the entire metropolitan area) (Kolata 1997, 253). It was 
under the Incas that the jump was made from a noncentralized polity to an 
empire governed through indirect rule (Morris 1998, 302). Similar to the 
states in the Andes, the Maya were not very centralized or bureaucratized 
(Culbert 1988, 73). It would not ft the objective of this book to describe in 
detail the various states and what happened with them throughout history.
(Of the studies mentioned in chapter 1, especially Finer 1997, Fukuyama 
2014, and Mann 1986 are useful. For a focus on the past 500 years or so,
see Kennedy 1987 and Mann 1993, 2012, and 2013) 
By way of summary of this section, we can say that nomadic society is
generally egalitarian and thus without government. It is in agricultural soci-
ety that governments emerge, but their range of services is fairly limited.
Until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the political and
economic elites basically experimented with the size of territorial govern-
ment and with what it can do for people. During the history of government,
there have been thousands upon thousands more or less autonomous sover-
eignties. Only in the past 200 or so years has government spread throughout
the globe and become structured as the territorial state. These can be small,
such as small states on the continents and island states, they can be medium
sized, and they can be huge. Although these sovereignties come and go (see
the next section), it seems they are now consolidated into some 200 ter-
ritorial states, and there are three constants in how these territorial states
are structured. First, they allow for the existence of multiple self-governing
associations. Second, they organize the territory in layered jurisdictions
from the local up to the national level. Third, all governments work with
bureaucratic organizations because the scope and range of services offered
is beyond the capabilities of the self-governing instincts humans have had
since they began walking the globe. And it is only in the past 10,000 years or
so that social, economic, and political changes have been so rapid that they
have not been accompanied by signifcant changes in human social instincts.
It has led, though, to some signifcant changes in the relationship between
society and government, especially with regard to access to information and
as a result of speed of communication (Richerson and Boyd 1999). 
4. The Rise and Fall of Governing Arrangements: 
Self-Governing Capacity as the Default 
For 99 percent of human existence, the common political unit has been 
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by the seasons. They have a cyclical conception of time where there is 
no beginning or end, with a simple an ever-repeating cycle of life, of ebb 
and food, of day and night, and of the four seasons. There are still many 
societies where people think in terms of cyclical time, and this is impor-
tant because in such societies, time is predetermined and people are not 
expected to escape their social station. This is quite different in societ-
ies that are organized on the basis of a linear conception of time because 
in these societies it is considered possible to improve one’s living circum-
stances (Raadschelders 2017, 42–44). 
The frst to write about civilizations emerging and collapsing are Plato,
Polybius, and Ibn Khaldûn (Whitrow 1988, 46–47). Of these three, it was
Ibn Khaldûn who described the developed of human polities in terms
of increasing scale. He lived (1332–1406) during a volatile period in the
world of Islam and saw polities come and go, and he had to change bene-
factors with some frequency (Irwin 2018). Another scholar writing about
the decline of a civilization from a cyclical temporal point of view was
British historian Edward Gibbon, noted for his work on the decline and
fall of the Roman Empire (published between 1776 and 1788). The theme
of rise and fall of civilizations dominated most historical perspectives well
into the twentieth century; the best known is that offered by the German
historian Oswald Spengler about the decline of the West (1970 [1926]).
Looking back, it does appear as if the political-administrative past can be
described in terms of “rise and fall,” from the ancient world in the Middle
East, to the various civilizations in the Americas, to southern and south-
east Asia, to Africa (Tainter 1988, 6–18). In the year that Tainter’s study
was published, Yoffee and Cowgill published an edited volume observ-
ing that there was little attention to collapse (Yoffee 1988a, 1). Intrigu-
ingly, Norman Yoffee noted that Herbert Simon wrote about how lower
and intermediate levels of governing can cause a breakdown of the higher
level, but argued instead that governments collapse when they are overex-
tended at the top and when the center can no longer secure resources and
services (1988a, 13). Tainter is more in line with Simon when writing that
collapse is a process of declining complexity or “decomposability” (the
term from Simon 1962). 
Reviewing the literature, Tainter explored a list of possible themes for 
declining complexity and collapse. One is depletion or cessation of the 
vital resource(s) on which society depends, which is basically the economic 
weakness argument (Tainter 1988, 50) A second reason is that of establish-
ing a new resource base and is mainly relevant to simple societies (52). A 
third reason could be the occurrence of insurmountable catastrophe such 























as a volcanic eruption or a massive earthquake, and a fourth the intrusion of 
invaders, but he regards these two as among the weakest explanations (53,
63). Appealing to Marxist theorists, he also mentions class confict, societal 
contradictions, elite mismanagement and misbehavior, and social dysfunc-
tion (71, 73). And then there are explanations that consider the limited 
adaptive capacities of existing political-administrative institutions (54–55).
There are also mystical explanations by Spengler and Toynbee (83) and 
explanations pointing to a chance concatenation of events, but these pro-
vide no basis for generalizations (86; remember Mill, Weber, Scharpf, and 
Ostrom on multicausality, mentioned in the introduction to this book).
Tainter fnds the more interesting question to be, what structural, politi-
cal, ideological, and economic factors in society prevented an appropriate 
response to a tragedy of the commons? (1988, 50) He divides the failure-
to-adapt-literature, that is, that of insuffcient institutional response, into 
three groups. The Dinosaur group hypothesizes a complex society that is 
such a lumbering colossus that it is incapable of rapid change. In the Run-
away Train group, the existing institutional arrangements operate like a 
dinosaur; in the face of obstacles the society can only continue in direction 
it is headed. Finally, in the House of Cards group, complex societies are 
inherently fragile (59). Whichever it is, it is not as important as recogniz-
ing that collapse is not a matter of choice, as American geographer and 
biologist Jared Diamond suggests (2005; see also Johnson 2017). The elites 
who seek to acquire societal resources for their own needs and ends do not 
choose collapse; they simply keep taking until the overarching structure is 
overextended and the political-administrative system crumbles under the 
weight of an exploitative bureaucratic instrument (Scott 2017, 205). What 
the political and economic elites experience as collapse or catastrophe may,
in the eyes of the population, not be a problem in terms of productivity.
Local groups merely sever ties with a regional and upper-regional polity 
(Tainter 1988, 198). 
This now seems the dominant viewpoint: the human story is one of 
regeneration and survival at the local level; it is not one of collapse at the 
(upper) regional level (McAnany and Yoffee 2009, 5; Storey and Storey 
2017). At root of the collapse thesis is the Western neoliberal theory of self-
interested motivation and assumption of unconstrained rational choice 
(McAnany and Yoffee 2009, 8), and we have learned from Simon and 
from behavioral economists and psychologists that rationality is bounded.
Whether causes of “collapse” are extrinsic (drought, climate change, inva-
sion) or intrinsic (disease, deforestation, soil salinization; succession, civil 
war, insurrection, or hubris), the archaeological record suggest it is nothing 
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but a breaking up of a polity into smaller units (Scott 2017, 31–32), noth-
ing but decentralization or localization (Wenke and Olszewki 2007, 291).
If anything, history’s “pattern” of foundation, abandonment, expansion and 
contraction, dispersal into smaller settlements and villages, and the disap-
pearance of higher-order elites is bewildering (Wenke and Olszewki 2007,
185). 
5. The Political-Administrative Revolution since the 1780s: 
A Very Brief Recap 
In almost all historical societies, government is an institution or set of 
institutions controlled by a small social, economic, and political elite that 
mainly extracted resources (in labor and in kind) from the larger popula-
tion, which had no political or citizen rights. A ruling elite could stay in 
power because of the support of bureaucratic organizations, the origins 
of which may well be in prehistory (Nystrom and Nystrom 1998). His-
torical bureaucracies were parasitic by nature (Paynter 1989), extracting 
resources and providing few services to people at large. As Yoffee described 
it, bureaucracies served as a “loyal and personally ascribed cadre of sup-
porters” of the ruler or the ruling class, not as servants of the people (2005,
140). It was advantageous to work in bureaucracy because it enabled its 
cadre to create selective benefts for themselves (Masters 1986, 156). When 
bureaucracies made impossible demands upon society (Butzer 1980), the 
population would rise in revolt. Many popular revolts against politi-
cal regimes were fueled by unreasonable tax burdens. The American and 
French Revolutions started as tax revolts but had totally unexpected and 
worldwide consequences. 
With regard to the consequences of these two democratic or Atlantic 
revolutions (Palmer 1959, 1964), the focus will be on those outcomes that 
concern hitherto nonexistent features of institutional arrangements. The 
changes wrought by this upheaval have already been discussed as occurring 
at three different levels (see chapter 2). The constitutional level concerns 
the societal context within and foundation upon which government oper-
ates. The collective (or organizational) level is that of the decision-making 
arenas, that is, the organizations that make up the public sector and all 
those who seek or have access to these arenas (e.g., interest groups, lobby-
ists). Finally, there is the operational level, that of day-to-day activities. The 
monumental changes wrought by the democratic revolutions manifested 
themselves at the constitutional, organizational, and individual levels. 


















Obviously, as momentous as these changes were for those working in 
government at the time, the population at large could not have appreci-
ated their long-term impacts. But with the virtue of hindsight we now 
know that these changes in the political-administrative system facilitated 
the move from an exclusionary to an inclusive political and economic sys-
tem (cf. Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) and would be the foundation upon 
which expansion of government services became possible. 
6. The Triple Whammy Plus High-Speed Communication Technology 
For millennia, governments mainly extracted resources in labor, kind, or 
money from subjects. This changed from the late eighteenth century on,
when Western Europe and North America industrialized, and with that 
came rapid urbanization and unprecedented population growth. With so 
many people moving to cities, the nature of society changed signifcantly.
People left an agricultural society where everybody knew everybody else 
and where they could rely on one another in hard times. In the new urban 
environment, people were no longer acquainted with their neighbors and 
turned to local government for help with water supply, energy supply (gas,
electricity), sewage, garbage disposal, road pavement, housing standards,
health care, poverty relief, and many, many more issues. In late eighteenth-
century France (Markoff 1975) and in nineteenth-century Amsterdam 
(Van Dalen 1987), citizens wrote their (local) government offcials with 
requests for specifc services. While people often believe that governments 
grow because of budget maximizing civil servants, as Brutus (on October 
18 and November 29, 1787, in The Anti-Federalist Papers; Ketcham 1986,
275, 279, 328) and Downs suggested (1994, 2, 7), the reality is that govern-
ments grow in response to public needs that cannot or should not be han-
dled by collective action within the private or corporate spheres (Downs 
1994, 263). The government that emerged in the decades between 1870 
and 1930 is very different from any of its historical predecessors given the 
much larger range of tasks, functions, and services. Consequentially, the 
organizational structure of governments became much more horizontally 
and vertically differentiated (Raadschelders 1997), revenue and expendi-
ture increased, the public personnel workforce increased, and pieces of pri-
mary (as enacted by elected legislators) and especially secondary legislation 
(as issued by administrative agencies upon delegation) increased as well 
(see on the latter Raadschelders 2017a, 461). 
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dation and expressed their concern in scholarship, such as Max Weber’s 
fear that bureaucracy could overpower democracy; in social commentary,
as illustrated by the scorn that German-born American journalist H. L.
Mencken (sometimes called the American Nietzsche; see Pinker 2017, 446) 
showered upon bureaucracy; and in the arts, as Erik Satie’s Sonatine Bureau-
cratique and Franz Kafka’s The Castle and The Trial. With the advantage 
of hindsight, we know that bureaucracy has not overpowered democracy.
Indeed, it is the governing structure that determines the nature of bureau-
cracy. In democracy, bureaucracy serves the people; in all other political 
systems, it serves the elite and those in power. 
Meanwhile, this concern in the early twentieth century with the rapid 
growth of bureaucracy is understandable, for there was no precedent for 
this rate of government growth, and (especially local) administrators had to 
“learn on the fy” how to deal with vastly increased public demand for pub-
lic services, just as scholars and artists pondered what this growing govern-
ment meant for society. Not surprisingly, this was the period in which the 
public sector workforce became one where people were primarily selected 
on the basis of relevant educational background and experience, that is,
merit. This environmental infuence on government growth and the inter-
nal process of professionalization continues to the present day. 
One of the responses to this urbanized society and its “new govern-
ment” was to pursue specialized, disciplinary knowledge and training.
The universities responded with the establishment of new disciplines and 
studies such as psychology, political science, and economics. A variety of 
professional degrees emerged as well, either in higher vocational schools 
or in universities, such as public administration, business administration,
accounting, nursing, forest management, agriculture, engineering, social 
work, and so on. Where the educated workforce in the public sector had 
previously studied law, bureaucrats now come into government with other 
professional degrees as well. In the developed world, you will fnd almost 
all possible advanced degrees among those working in government. 
Presently, we are in the midst of considerable changes in the relation-
ship between citizenry and government, and they are prompted by contin-
ued rapid population growth and diversity, scientization, and informatiza-
tion. Are we experiencing the same kind of momentous change today that 
people experienced more than two centuries ago with the creation of a new 
political-administrative superstructure and more than a century ago when 
shifting from living in a predominantly agricultural to a mostly industrial-
ized and urbanized society? It is probably too early to tell, although three 
developments are clearly discernible. 
















First, population growth has increased since the 1870s, but may be lev-
eling off at some point in this century (Lee 2011). One important element 
in demographic developments is the rapidly increasing population diver-
sity, especially in Western societies, confronting public policy and decision-
makers with the challenge of fnding common ground for religiously, polit-
ically, ethnically, and culturally heterogeneous populations. Second, we live 
in an age of scientization, that is, one where government increasingly relies 
upon experts for policy advice, which tends to exclude the common citizen 
from providing input into the policymaking process. The rise of experts 
began in the 1920s and reached a point where scientifc knowledge came 
to be regarded as knowledge superior to any other type. In the early twen-
tieth century public intellectuals such as John Dewey, Woodrow Wilson,
and Justice Louis Brandeis believed that “modern industrial society had 
grown too complex for the common citizen or the average elected offcial”
(Piereson and Riley 2013). The consequence, in the words of President 
John F. Kennedy, is that 
most of the problems . . . that we now face are technical problems,
are administrative problems. They are very sophisticated judgments,
which do not lend themselves easily to the great sort of passion-
ate movements which have stirred this country so often in the past.
[They] deal with questions which are now beyond the comprehension of 
most men. (quoted in Lasch 1978, 77; emphasis added) 
However, problems are not just technical or administrative by nature, as 
Dewey pointed out: the shoemaker (read policymaker) may make the shoe,
but the client (i.e., citizen) judges whether the shoe fts (Dewey 1927, 207).
As far back as the 1920s, Mary Parker Follett emphasized the importance 
of citizen participation at large. In the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury, Charles Lindblom pointed out that we need more “lay probing,” as he 
called it (1990; Lindblom and Cohen 1979). Experts still hold center stage 
in the policy- and decision-making process, but there is plenty of scientifc 
evidence that suggests that experts cannot be relied upon exclusively when 
making decisions because, frst, they want to be clever, think outside the 
box, and consider complex combinations rather than be focused solely on 
the policy content, and second, “Humans are incorrigibly inconsistent in 
making summary judgments of complex information” (Kahneman 2011,
224). It may take some time for this to be widely accepted since we are 
socialized into regarding a specialist’s expertise as superior to any other 
type of knowledge. But the problem remains—how will decisions be made? 
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The third big change is that technological development has given peo-
ple instant electronic interaction, even about trivial events (Twitter, Face-
book) and access to vast amounts of information (big data). The effects of 
these technological developments are not at all clear, but at least two can 
be mentioned. First, there is some indication that the internet and other 
communication media are rapidly changing how people’s brains absorb 
information, that is, literally rewiring the brain. The online environment 
is one that encourages superfcial reading. People zap through or scan 
pages of a text rather than carefully reading and digesting their content.
As a consequence, the ability to transfer information from short-term to 
long-term memory is declining quickly. This is problematic because the 
long-term memory is where the ability to understand complex concepts or 
“schema’s” resides (Carr 2010, 124). While a computer absorbs and stores 
information, the human brain continues to process it long after informa-
tion has been received: the brain lives, a computer does not (Carr 2010,
191). The information revolution is a threat to the consolidation of long-
term memory and thus to the development and conceiving and probing 
of complex schema’s (Carr 2010, 193). A second effect of technological 
development mentioned is the huge amounts of information available 
as “open data” and “big data” (for the difference between open and big 
data, see Margetts 2013a). Open and big data may provide opportunities 
for innovation, greater transparency, or conversely, for consumer profl-
ing, insurance discrimination, or total surveillance. Data gathering and 
the extent to which we make data available ourselves (e.g., Twitter, Fitbit,
Facebook, etc.), create a virtual cage in addition to the iron cage of regula-
tions and bureaucracy that Max Weber wrote about (Raadschelders 2019).
Open and big data may enhance government, but only when citizens actu-
ally access and use information and when government agencies employ 
feedback loops to discover errors, service weaknesses, and even failures.
Policymakers face several challenges in this regard. First, they must acquire 
the technical skills to analyze big data, and even in the corporate world 
this is a huge challenge (Margetts 2013b). Second, policymakers should 
be wary of probabilistic policymaking, which happens when they act upon 
what could happen, targeting specifc populations, rather than upon what 
happened (Margetts 2013b). Third, as Margetts argues (2013c), policymak-
ers should not only draw upon the inputs of social scientists, but also learn 
from scholars in the life sciences, the natural sciences, and engineering, as 
well as bring in normative political scientists and philosophers of informa-
tion. Related to this is, fourth, the challenge for policymakers to evaluate 
scientifc evidence and make decisions when the science is inconclusive or 
contradictory (Raadschelders and Whetsell 2018). 

















Meanwhile, informatization has made people even more aware of the 
fact that they live in a highly interconnected world. It has also made people 
aware of the fact that a variety of problems exist that cannot be addressed 
by private individuals or actors. These are often “wicked” problems. 
In the previous section, I argued that government is the key actor, and 
disciplinary knowledge often considered the deciding factor, for dealing 
with domestic and global public problems. This has changed in the past 40 
years or so. The concept of collaborative governance, or governance net-
works, suggests that government is one among a variety of actors that col-
laborate to solve collective problems (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Dona-
hue and Zeckhauser 2011; Milward and Provan 2000). However, amid all 
of these private individuals, private businesses, think tanks, interest groups,
and nonproft organizations, government still remains the only actor that has 
the authority to make binding decisions on behalf of an entire citizenry. The man-
ner in which solutions or resolutions2 to global and public problems is 
sought is increasingly interdisciplinary by nature, but is that enough? Are 
most public problems really only administrative and technical in nature, as 
President Kennedy claimed? 
Today, we live in a service-and-knowledge society, characterized by 
increased importance of services since the 1950s (e.g., fnancial services,
hospitality, retail, tourism, health and human services, education) and of 
information since the 1980s. Knowledge-intensive sectors of the economy 
are growing fast (education, information and communication technology).
The production of goods and services is increasingly dependent upon 
knowledge-intensive activities. In that societal and economic environment,
governments are expected to be transparent, to provide access to decision-
making (citizen participation, interactive websites), and to provide oppor-
tunities for easy electronic submission and processing of permits and tax 
returns. Governments now work in a society where citizens, if they choose 
to, can be highly informed and participative, but they can also pick and 
choose which information they wish to access, which to include, and which 
to believe (Galloway 2018). As a consequence of increased citizen partici-
pation, governments will continue to grow, and what that growth actually 
looks like when presented in graph form is strikingly similar no matter 
what indicator is chosen. 
We can look at indicators of government growth itself. In terms of per-
sonnel size, governments grow slowly but steadily, with a slightly upward 
curve, from antiquity up to the second half of the nineteenth century. The 
impact of the “triple whammy” is visible in rapid growth of the public 
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position for four Dutch municipalities for the years 1600 to 1980 (Raad-
schelders 1994) are likely to be representative for any other public organi-
zation operating in an agricultural environment at frst and then shifting to 
an industrializing and urbanizing environment. The same sharply upward 
trend is visible in vertical and horizontal organizational differentiation 
(Raadschelders 1997), in the growth of revenue and expenditure, and in 
the growth of primary and (especially) secondary legislation (Raadschel-
ders 2017a). Is a similar trend visible in social and economic development? 
Social development has been defned as “the bundle of technological,
subsistence, organizational and cultural accomplishments through which 
people feed, clothe, house, and reproduce themselves, explain the world 
around them, resolve disputes within their communities, extend their 
power at the expense of other communities, and defend themselves against 
others’ attempts to extend power” (Morris 2013, 5). British archaeologist 
and historian Ian Morris has made a convincing effort to measure social 
development using four indicators: energy capture, social organization/ 
urbanization, information technology, and war-making capacity. Of these 
four, he argues, energy capture is the most important since it is the foun-
dation of social development. Without energy, nothing is possible. People 
need to capture at least 2,000 kilocalories per day in order to survive, and 
this is provided in the form of food. We also know (chapter 3 and above 
in this chapter) that a group of people may seek to extend their power 
and resources by conquering other groups and settlements, but to do so 
requires a much higher energy capture through nonfoods (e.g., burning 
wood for heat, for casting bronze and iron weapons; nowadays using of 
fossil fuels). Following an earlier estimate by geoscientist Earl Cook (1971,
135), Morris suggests that in the year 2,000 Americans needed to capture 
about 230,000 calories per capita per day (2013, 25). This is the energy 
needed for heat, for transport, for industry, for agriculture, for construc-
tion, for space travel, and so on, for all the things that make our lives com-
fortable and appealing. He emphasizes that none of the measures known 
(his or those of the United Nations) add up to a comprehensive overview 
of social development in the world. He makes a reasonable argument that 
his measure provides a usable snapshot that reveals the overall pattern. So 
the graphs in his study of Eastern and Western social development at large 
between 14,000 BCE and 2,000 CE show for all four indicators the same 
trend: a very slow upward trend from the last Ice Age up to the nineteenth 
century, and a sharply upward trend since the late nineteenth century 
(2013, 48–49, 167, 181, 225). Emphasizing the rapidness of social change 
since the late nineteenth century, he concludes that there are a series of 














“hard ceilings” that limit social development. On his scale, in which 250 
points is the maximum for each of his four indicators, no foraging society 
develops much beyond 6–7 points. No agricultural village can get beyond 
10–12 points; no agrarian empire can reach beyond the low 40s. No society 
could leap from a foraging or agricultural economy to an industrialized 
one without going through the stage of agrarian empire (2013, 258). 
With regard to economic development the evidence is more mixed as to 
whether there is a sharp upward trend. First, evidence suggests that there 
is no linear relationship between urbanization and economic development,
and that the latter is as much, if not more, infuenced by an enabling insti-
tutional context and by investments in public infrastructure (Turok and 
McGranahan 2013, 478). The fast urbanization and unprecedented eco-
nomic growth in China and South Korea since the 1970s may suggest a 
link, but economic developments there may well be a function of insti-
tutional reforms and opening up of the economy, institutional transition,
and education (Chen et al. 2014, 14). Among economic growth theorists,
Oded Galor stands out for his claim that for much of history the develop-
ment process was characterized by Malthusian stagnation, which is a func-
tion of the fact that the resources produced by technological progress and 
land expansion were primarily channeled to increase population size (2011,
1, 17, 65, 67). Departure from this long period, which he calls the post-
Malthusian regime, is associated with industrialization and urbanization 
(2011, 25) and prompts increased demand for skilled labor, thus encourag-
ing educational reforms. This, in turn, results in the period of sustained 
economic growth that we have enjoyed in the past 150 years or so. His 
analysis builds upon Jared Diamond’s hypothesis that the timing of the 
Neolithic transition serves as a proximate determinant of institutional and 
economic development. That is, the earlier the transition was made, the 
larger the developmental head start (Galor 2011, 75, 208). Galor provides 
a retrospective and hypothesizes a sharp break with the past. He does not 
address how poor countries can get out of the Malthusian trap. By contrast,
the Australian nuclear physicist Ron Nielsen, who has been working in the 
area of environmental science, questions Galor’s selective use of data and 
points out that population growth and economic development are much 
more hyperbolical, and that poor countries can get out of the trap via edu-
cation, employment opportunities, and improving gender equality (2016,
410, 427). 
More problematic in Galor’s analysis is the suggestion that genetics and 
genetic diversity may predispose some populations to make the transition 
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that whereas “the low degree of diversity among Native American popu-
lations and the high degree of diversity among African populations have 
been detrimental forces in the development of these regions, the interme-
diate levels of genetic diversity prevalent among European and Asian pop-
ulations have been conducive for development” (Ashraf and Galor 2013,
43). A few pages earlier they observe that countries with greater genetic 
diversity enjoy lower prevalence of trust and higher intensity of scientifc 
knowledge creation (40). Their analysis limits itself to large ethnic groups.
Are they referring to the United States today? Are they suggesting that 
lower genetic diversity is desirable? Are some individuals more prone to 
learning and thus invest more in the education of their (fewer) children 
(i.e., quality), while some others are simply focused on the number of chil-
dren as long as there is no reason to invest in education (Foldvari and 
Van Leeuwen 2012, 1587)? The extent to which human traits and incli-
nations are biogeographically and genetically determined remains to be 
determined, but we have seen in the past one and a half to two centuries 
that education can help people get out of the vicious cycle captured in this 
so-called Malthusian trap. 
In two pieces Galor cites, it is noted that it was the non-food-producing 
elites (kings, warriors, bureaucrats, priests, and specialized craftsmen) whose 
activities were a prerequisite for the gradual evolution of civilization (Ols-
son and Hibbs 2005, 923; Weisdorf 2005, 563). Galor’s analysis is “purely 
positive” (i.e., fact/number-based) (Dinopoulos 2012, 215) and does not 
include people (and when Galor does include them, they are hypothesized 
to have only one parent; Galor 2011, 69). The two studies by Olsson and 
Hibbs and by Weisdorf, respectively, are examples of elite theory, refect-
ing a society that has become stratifed. It is in this intensely intercon-
nected environment that people as citizens and governments operate and 
that their roles and positions in society fundamentally change. The issues 
of economic development in the underdeveloped world and of elites as 
necessary for civilization will be picked up again in the concluding chapter. 
7. From Government as Instrument to Government as Container: 
The Role and Position of the Individual 
We now have a somewhat complete picture of the emergence and devel-
opment of governments over time in relation to their social-economic 
environment. In sections 3 and 6, I described four major social-economic 
systems and their infuence upon governing arrangements. In sections 3 














and 4, I also suggested three structural constants in the history of human 
governing (self-governing capacity; territorial layering; vertical and hori-
zontal organizational differentiation). And in sections 3 and 5, I touched 
upon the two major political-administrative revolutions in the history of 
humankind: the frst is the emergence of government in response to the 
agricultural “revolution,” the second is the rapid growth of government 
functions and tasks in services in response to the “triple whammy” from the 
late nineteenth century on. What remains in this chapter is to characterize 
the change in the citizens’ and governments’ position and role in society in 
the terms that Anthony Giddens and Clive Gamble presented. 
Reminiscent of Weber’s defnition of the state having a monopoly over 
the use of violence, Giddens emphasizes the concentration of political 
power in the state and refers to the state’s storage capacity (1981, 5) and to 
the state as a “bordered power container” (1987, 120). Where states could 
have started as a political container for a war machine that ensures and 
protects independence from other polities, they have become a container 
of the economy since the seventeenth century (see also chapter 5 on politi-
cal economy), of national culture and identity since the late eighteenth 
century, and of social well-being in the twentieth century (Taylor 1994).
Whether the central role of the state in domestic and global affairs is under 
siege, as some claim, will be further discussed in chapter 5. 
Gamble also analyzes technological, social, economic, and political-
administrative developments over time in terms of two concept-pairs: 
instruments and containers, and accumulation and enchainment. Human-
kind’s frst instrument is the body, because the body is the source of social 
agency (Gamble 2007, 89, 91). Humans also construct containers for fuids 
and food (e.g., bowls) and for their bodies (e.g., clothes, housing). The body 
itself has some parts that are instruments (arms and legs) and others that 
are containers (trunk, skull) (Gamble 2007, 103). Sometimes a container 
can also be used as an instrument, such as in soccer when a player heads a 
football into the goal (Gamble 2007, 109). Human beings construct iden-
tity via accumulation and thus establish social relations on the basis of pro-
duction and reproduction, and via enchainment, where a network of social 
relations is established through exchange (Gamble 2007, 116). These are 
universal features of human beings, but only up to a point. Variation starts 
with how the individual is perceived in relation to the larger community.
To illustrate this, Gamble lists some of the differences between Western 
and Melanesian conceptions of personhood, and I highlight those that are 
directly relevant to the content of this book. 
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the relations that unite them and bring them together, while Melanesians 
regard people as the compound and plural set of the relations by which 
they are defned. In the West, an individual’s power lies in her or his control 
over others, and power is a property, a possession. In Melanesia a person’s 
power rests in the ability to do and act; it is a relation. Finally, the West-
ern individual experiences society as an external force that imposes norms,
rules, and constraining conventions. The Melanesian individual experi-
ences society as something that is parallel to the individual (Gamble 2007,
125; based on LiPuma 1998). From this, one can assume that Western indi-
viduals will perceive government also as an external force, as something 
that is above them. Non-Western people may have the same perception,
dependent upon the type of political-administrative system that governs 
them, but they might see government as their own creation.3 
What the Atlantic revolutions established in the Western world, and 
what has been expanding since then, is a complete reversal of the relation-
ship between people as citizens and their government.As mentioned above,
for most of government’s existence, it was the property and instrument in 
the hands of the few, and the people were mere subjects. Since the late 
nineteenth century, people have become citizens in democracies, and gov-
ernments have developed into a serving role. It might be that this historical 
experience of an overbearing government still clouds people’s understand-
ing of government in general. In the Western world, however, that new 
servant position and role of government is parallel to an individualist con-
ception of personhood, preventing people as citizens from recognizing the 
nuances in governments’ contemporary role and position. Gamble empha-
sizes that over time, technological development has shifted from attention 
to instruments (spear, bow, and arrow) to the development of containers 
(ceramic bowls, houses) (2007, 205). I can use the same terms to describe 
the development of government. For most of history, government was an 
instrument, and it has increasingly become a container. Government is the 
fence around the garden of democracy, and the garden and the fence are 
maintained by the citizenry: people are not only the farmers but also the 
seeds and the fertilizer. The defnition of government provided in chapter 
1, I claim, travels over time, because it emphasizes only the basic functions 
and tasks of government and can be found in pretty much all historical and 
contemporary governments. The understanding of government in today’s 
democracies is not adequately captured in that defnition. Government in 
a democratic political-administrative system is an institutional arrange-
ment that citizens develop and maintain in and for the entire jurisdiction (i.e.,
urban and rural), so that they are assured not only that internal and exter-




nal order and safety are guaranteed by means of police, justice and military 
functions but also that their well-being is advanced through the provision,
production, and governance of so-called welfare functions. As noted, this 
is only true of the past 200–250 years and is not yet a global phenomenon.
However, the role of government in society is increasingly infuenced by 
the globalization of social, political, economic, and cultural life. 
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Citizen and Government in a Global Society 
Globalization and the Deep Current of Rationalization 
We know that humanoids have roamed the earth for a few million years 
now, and for most of that time they lived in small bands of 30 to 50 mem-
bers. They are social beings and their sociality is expressed through kin-
ship, dominance, alliances, and reciprocity. Rules of modern institutions 
do not come naturally to people. When left to their own devices, humans 
tend to apply the mindset of living in a small band to modern organiza-
tions, and that can result in nepotism, cronyism, deference to authority,
and polite consensus. These are features beftting the traditional small-
scale society but may be corrosive in modern societies (Pinker 2010, 8998).
Of course, it is only in the past 10,000 years that temporary leadership 
positions have emerged in some communities, and only in the past 6,000 
years that humans developed formal institutions to govern their increas-
ingly imagined communities. Most, and perhaps all, evolutionary biologists 
agree that the speed of cultural evolution in the past 10,000 years has by far 
outpaced the speed of biological (i.e., genetic) evolution. 
As people live in ever larger and more densely populated areas and ever 
more complex societies, they will have to navigate this societal complex-
ity with a psychology that is still designed for small-scale life in bands and 
tribes (Richerson et al. 2003, 388). They can usually do this with substan-
tial success because they have designed very complex and extremely vari-
able forms of cooperation and social organization, legal codes, and political 
institutions (Ayala 2010, 9015). Perhaps we are in the middle of a process 














where a new kind of human is in the making, as anthropologist Joseph 
Henrich suggests (2016, 318), or where we are heading toward a true 
global citizenship where wars, capitalism, and nation-states have ceased to 
drive the world, as suggested by archaeologist Robert Kelly (2016, 6). Hen-
rich leaves unanswered, though, what that new kind of human is like, and 
Kelly does not provide a road map of how we can get to his utopia. I cannot 
pretend to do better than they since no one can see what happens in the 
future. However, looking back, it can be argued that our biological makeup 
has not changed much (except for lactose tolerance for some peoples). Our 
psychological makeup has changed, not so much in how we instinctually 
respond to changes in the environment but in how we intentionally deal 
with those changes. Imagine that we could travel back in time; the further 
back we are transported, the shorter our survival rate. We would literally 
be unable to speak the same language, we would lack the learned instinc-
tual behaviors that help us read the reactions of others and know how to 
respond to them, and we would simply lack the various specialized skills 
needed to live (how to recognize what fora is edible, making fre with fint 
stones, etc.). 
I cannot say for sure that social evolution has resulted in a different 
human being; I also cannot say that globalization leads to a fundamentally 
different society, as some scholars suggest. Michael Mann calls that belief 
“globaloney” (2013, 3). Stating that globalization leads to a new type of 
human and to a new type of society has a prophetic ring to it. Of course, it 
is fne to write such words, but then one needs a convincing argument as 
to what these new types look like, and that is generally much more diffcult 
than simply being prophetic. 
What are the consequences of globalization for our physical, social,
economic, and political-administrative environment? How can and do we 
“see” globalization? And what is it that we believe to “see”? We can see 
food products from all over the world on the shelves of our supermarkets.
Africans, Asians, Australians, Latin Americans, and Europeans can watch 
American television programs (and get a skewed image of America when 
watching them). McDonald’s can be found all over the world, with some of 
its products adapted to the local taste. Customer services may well be phys-
ically located in a call center somewhere else on the globe. We can commu-
nicate with one another across the globe in a matter of seconds, and it is not 
just via email, but also through Facebook and FaceTime. Apple provides 
the mobile phones with which we access Facebook. With the same iPhone 
we can Google enormous amounts of information at little to no visible 
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very infuential through fast communication of snippets of thoughts, and 
allowing people to select what to read. These Four, as Scott Galloway calls 
them (2018), are not platforms—as they like to call themselves—they are 
social media, but without the journalistic responsibility expected of main-
stream news outlets. We should not, however, overestimate the infuence of 
social media. People may be in touch with one another a lot, but it remains 
rather superfcial interaction. It appears that online social media cannot 
substitute for the quality of face-to-face interaction, and online interac-
tion does not increase an individual’s social network size in a meaningful 
way (Dunbar 2012, 2198; 2016, 7). Whether that matters in the long run 
remains to be seen. 
Globalization is also, and unfortunately, visible in various challenges 
that governments are expected to deal with but are beyond their individual 
sovereign authorities and capabilities. These include climate change and 
global warming, migration, human (sex) traffcking, the garbage patches 
in the world’s oceans, the huge amount of space debris circling our planet,
cybercrime, terrorism, the drug trade, the extinction of species, epidemics,
efforts in manipulating social and political movements in foreign countries,
and the effects of an increasingly international economy where multina-
tional corporations are diffcult to constrain. 
Globalization is also visible in how we capture and express various 
phenomena and developments in numbers and present them as trends 
and as rankings. And globalization has consequences for our political-
administrative institutions and for the relationship between society and 
government (and its state). It has consequences for the position and role of 
the citizen, of public offceholders, and of government. 
In this chapter, I discuss what globalization is and what a global society 
is (section 1). Next, I provide examples of what impacts globalization has 
upon people as citizens and as public offceholders (section 2). In section 
3, I explore the impact(s) of globalization on the functioning of govern-
ment, that is, the operational and collective levels of analysis, with specifc 
attention to how we assess its activities. What globalization actually means 
for the position and role of government and the state, that is, the consti-
tutional level of analysis, is the subject of section 4. In section 5 I seek to 
provide understanding of globalization by suggesting that we are deeply 
infuenced by what Max Weber called the rationalization process and its 
manifestations. Finally, in section 6, I briefy ponder how we can deal with 
globalization from a citizen-government perspective, thus setting the stage 
for chapter 6. 
Two fnal remarks are important before stepping into this chapter. First,









chapters 1 and 2 provide a conceptual and historical framework for this 
study, and chapters 3 and 4 are basically about the historical experience 
with how human instinct and tribal community play a role in shaping gov-
ernment, in our understanding of government, and how government func-
tions. But with global society we may be actually entering a new stage in 
the development of government in society, so this chapter draws on conjec-
tural ideas and is thus more speculative than the previous chapters. Second,
I reference literature but do not present in any detail empirical evidence of 
what is discussed. The references must suffce because the sheer volume of 
studies on globalization alone prohibits any acceptable analysis; again the 
focus is on what government is. 
What Is Globalization? What Is a Global Society? 
In chapters 3 and 4, we have seen that humans slowly but surely spread 
across the globe from Africa. In this sense, globalization dates back sev-
eral hundred thousand years. From archaeological and anthropological 
research, we know that people in prehistory traded products from their 
own environment with products from elsewhere. Thus, economic global-
ization is not of our time only. As the various pockets of human settlement 
grew in terms of population and incorporated territory, they “touched” one 
another, at frst from across the common, unincorporated lands, seeking to 
acquire resources through conquest. As these pockets of settlement con-
tinued to grow, the territory became defned as a jurisdiction with a border 
that is adjacent to another jurisdiction. Hence, the territorial expressions 
of governing institutions have globalized as well. Thus seen, globalization 
is an almost physical process bringing people and their polities (city-state,
empire, or territorial state) in closer proximity to one another. 
Globalization is also a process of increased virtual connectivity made 
possible by technology unimaginable even 40 years ago. In fact, it is around 
this connectivity that globalization is initially defned as “the widening,
deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects 
of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the fnancial 
to the spiritual” (Held et al. 1999, 2). Clearly, though, the examples men-
tioned above point to something more encompassing, namely as “a process 
(or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organi-
zation of social relations and transactions, expressed in transcontinental or 
interregional fows and networks of activity, interaction and power” (Held 
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(a) a stretching of social, political, and economic activities across the 
globe 
(b) an intensifcation of interconnectedness and fows of trade, invest-
ment, fnance, migration, culture, and so on, 
(c) a speeding up of global interactions and processes, which increase 
the velocity of the diffusion of ideas, goods, information, capital,
and people, and 
(d) the growing extensity, intensity, and velocity of global interactions 
so that local events may have considerable impact far away and 
vice versa (Held and McGrew 2001, 1). 
As can be expected, people, as well the scholars among them, respond 
differently to this globalization, and Held et al. (1999) distinguish between 
three main lines of thought. The hyperglobalizers believe that a new global 
era is emerging with free and unlimited global interactions leading into a 
global civilization and—possibly—a global government. The skeptics point 
to increased regionalism and localism, where the international economic 
world is still led by the territorial states of old. Finally, the transformation-
alists, occupying something of a middle ground, emphasize the unprece-
dented interconnectedness, changing government processes, and domestic 
policies being infuenced by international forum organizations of which 
the territorial states are the most important members. The authors sum-
marize these three viewpoints and in Table 5.1 those relevant to the topic 
of this book are listed. 
Each of the frst four elements in the left column will get further atten-
TABLE 5.1. Features of globalization regarding government role and position 
Hyperglobalists Skeptics Transformationalists 
Dominant feature Global capitalism, World as less “Thick” (intensive 
global governance, interdependent and extensive) 
global civil society than in 1890s globalization 
Power of national Declining or eroding Reinforced or Reconstituted,
government state enhanced restructured 
Driving force of Capitalism and States and markets Combined forces of 
globalization technology modernity 
Pattern of Erosion of old Increased New architecture of 
stratifcation hierarchies marginalization of world order 
the South 
Dominant Rankings and Rankings and Rankings and 
expression of currency values currency values currency values 
globalization 
Source: Revised from Held et al. 1999, 10. 


















tion in what follows, but I must state up front that it would be ludicrous 
to determine which of the three “camps” is most or least correct because 
(a) we do not have suffcient distance in time to determine what the effects 
of globalization are upon government, and we may never have suffcient 
distance in time, and (b) each of the three camps picks and chooses from 
among the various knowledge sources and available datasets. Hence, I can 
only question the ideas presented by the hyperglobalists, the skeptics, and 
the transformationalists. 
The frst to suggest that a period of global governance and global soci-
ety could be on the horizon was the sociologist Norbert Elias (1982 [1939]).
He regarded it as the fnal step in the stages of development of the state.
For the moment, we are far removed from a world government system as 
portrayed in the dystopias of George Orwell’s 1984, Aldous Huxley’s Brave 
New World, or Max Barry’s Jennifer Government, which portrays a world 
where government is severely clipped in its governing capacity. But we also 
cannot really say that the world is regionalizing (i.e., less interdependent 
than in, e.g., the 1890s). It does appear that interconnectivity between vari-
ous components of social life is increasing, as the transformationalist’s use 
of the word “thick” seems to imply. As far as a global society is concerned,
and in light of what has been described in chapters 3 and 4, we are far from 
living in a truly global society where people recognize and respect each 
other’s fundamental humanity and citizenship. We still think in terms of 
tribes, be they the tribes of the territorial states with their citizens, “tribes”
of white supremacists, tribes of indigenous peoples, tribes of academics, of 
religions, of worldviews, of politics, of sports clubs, tribes of Caucasians,
Asians, Africans, and so on. For the moment we probably cannot expect 
anything else, unless the gene is discovered that will rewire the humanity 
of the future into members who identify with and feel a belonging to the 
global society. 
Second, whether the state’s position and role in society changes under 
the force(s) of globalization will be addressed in sections 3 and 4 with spe-
cifc attention to the continued role of hierarchy in organizations. Whether 
globalization restructures, unbundles, or otherwise shakes up and changes 
the nineteenth- and twentieth-century division of the world into a North 
and South and into a First, Second, and Third World remains to be seen,
but there is something to be said for Hoogvelt’s notion of a three-tiered 
concentric structure that cuts across borders and consists of the elites, the 
contented, and the marginalized, with the former being mostly concen-
trated in the world’s major urban areas (2001). As for driving force(s) of 
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climatological, geographical, historical, and cultural (including political,
economic, institutional) factors that infuence globalization. One element 
must be added to those Held et al. describe, and that is the dominant way 
in which globalization is expressed or visualized. Public, private, and non-
proft organizations increasingly look for numbers in rankings or in cur-
rency value, and this manifestation of the deep undercurrent in our global 
society will get extensive attention in Section 5. Held et al.’s characteriza-
tion of the globalization process(es) has gained quite some traction but has 
not been without its critics. These critics especially question the infuence 
of changing relations between territorial states, regional trading blocks,
intergovernmental organizations (such as the Group of E7 countries, the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organiza-
tion), and multinational enterprises that hold or infuence political power.
At stake is the distribution of that power in favor of liberalizing interna-
tional trade regimes via international fscal competition at the expense of 
welfare services (Michael 2004, 5–6). Since the book before you is a social 
ontology concerning government (and the state), the nature and impact of 
globalization must be addressed even when only impressionistically. 
2. The Impact of Globalization on People as Citizens 
and as Public Officeholders 
People experience and perceive the changes in their own day and age as 
rapid and, in fact, assume that these changes and reforms are occurring 
at a faster pace in their own time more quickly than ever before (see sev-
eral references in Raadschelders and Bemelmans-Videc 2015, 334–335).
Is this really the case? The massive changes in the political-administrative 
systems of Western European countries unfolded in a span of decades,
roughly between the 1780s and 1820s. The emerging industrialization at 
that time was followed by rapid industrialization from the second half of 
the nineteenth century on and resulted in an unprecedented diversifcation 
of the economy and in equally rapid urbanization. In each of these two 
periods, the changes were experienced as extremely intense by the ruling 
elites as well as by the people. Remembering the Luddites in the 1810s,
we can assume that workers in the weaving trade back then experienced 
changes in the production system of woolen cloth to be extremely swift and 
threatening. The phenomenal speed of industrialization on the European 
continent from the 1860s on alienated the workforce at large from the 
production process; the concurrent urbanization estranged people from 












   
 
 
one another when they moved from the physical, rural communities of old 
and into the imagined, urban communities of the present. 
Large-scale social, economic, and political changes are always experi-
enced and perceived as intense because they uproot the predictability of 
life. The contemporary assessment of the size and intensity of change is 
very much infuenced by the rapidly declining “width of the social present,”
and by the unbelievable capability of high-speed information exchange.
Comparative scholars in public administration focus—often mainly—on 
diversity and change but should also consider the extent to which these 
changes and this diversity are accompanied by continuity. In any time and 
context, continuity, diversity, and change “exist” simultaneously, although 
in mixes that vary between countries and periods. Change and diversity 
are experienced and perceived much more intensely than continuity (cf.
Rosling’s negativity instinct, 2018, ch. 2). However, changes are never so 
encompassing that they leave no trace of continuity and obliterate any evi-
dence of diversity. In addition, diversity is never so total that it conceals 
similarities between peoples. And if we are to recognize and appreciate 
that continuity, diversity, and change always occur together in some kind of 
mix peculiar to environmental circumstances, we must employ a historical 
perspective, especially a long view of time that focuses on more than the 
past three, four, or fve decades only. 
There are three important observations regarding comparative and 
global public administration that can only be made when taking this type 
of long view. First, looking back at 10,000 years of sedentary life, it is clear 
that there is convergence across the globe in how humans have structured 
(a) the lands that they (self-)govern and, though later in time, (b) the for-
mal institutions and organizations with which they govern. Slowly but 
surely, the landmasses of the globe have been incorporated into territorial 
states that have increased in size and decreased in number. These territo-
rial states are carved into layered jurisdictions (local, regional, national).
With regard to organization, people have increasingly used hierarchy and 
division of labor to organize for needs and outcomes they could not indi-
vidually achieve. Both territorially layered and defned jurisdictions as well 
as horizontally and vertically differentiated bureaucratic organizations are 
converging trends in the history of governing. 
Second, at the same time, it is clear that there is substantial divergence 
in how various communities of people deal with the challenges of trans-
portation, health care, water management, education, trade, zoning, crime,
migration, and so on. Whether in urban or rural environments, these chal-
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though people live in close geographic proximity to one another, or at least 
in the same territorial state, it is unlikely that they will become like their 
neighbors in other territorial states. Will the Dutch become like the Ger-
mans, the Japanese like Koreans, and Americans like Canadians? This is 
clearly a rhetorical question. There always has been, and there always will 
be, divergence in what and who people identify with and how they orga-
nize to provide for their public functions and collective needs. 
Third, have this global interdependence and diversity given rise to a 
new global citizen? Global citizenship refers to an orientation of engage-
ment with, and a sense of belonging to, a broader community than the 
territorial state and to a common, shared humanity. It is not a legal but an 
associational relationship with the transformative aim of working toward 
a more inclusive, sustainable, and just global order. To that end, it rests on 
knowledge of (a) political and social structures that interact and interpen-
etrate across scales from the local up to the global, (b) critical skills to assess 
the operation and effects of those structures, and (c) commitment to social 
and political engagement. 
When living in small, physical communities of 30 to 50 people, formal 
institutional arrangements are not necessary to help solve conficts and 
to ensure collaboration for achieving collective objectives. But, as soon as 
people start living in ever larger imagined communities and in ever closer 
proximity to one another, they do need formal institutional arrangements 
to shield societal stability from internal and external shocks and threats.
The challenge of living in ever larger, urban communities has been met 
so far by creating territorial and organizational structures, but throughout 
the past ten millennia, people have continued to act with a psychological 
makeup more ftting to living in a physical community. 
The past 250 years are very unusual in the history of humankind with 
regard to citizenship and government. Recent changes in the political-
administrative system (i.e., structure), in the formal position (structure),
and in the possible role (functions) of people as citizens in that system have 
been substantial. For most of the time that people have lived in sedentary,
urban environments, that is, for some 6,000 years, government has been 
an oppressive force controlled by a ruler and a small economic, political,
and social elite. Most people were mere subjects. In the slipstream of the 
momentous changes in political-administrative superstructure around the 
1800s, people slowly transformed from peasants and subjects into citizens 
(cf. Weber 1976; Fisch 2008). From a longue durée perspective, it can be 
argued that in the past 250 years, both people in general and those work-
ing in government have been learning to deal with a very different posi-









   
  
 






tion and role of government, especially in democratic political systems.
Government has had to adapt to and adopt a service-oriented and social-
engineering perspective; people have had to learn that as citizens they have 
rights and duties, including the duty to participate in a community much 
larger than the physical communities of bygone days. 
From the vantage point of the lifespan of a human being, 250 years feels 
like a long time, but in the light of history and cultural development, it is 
not, and it may well be that citizens and governments are still fnding their 
way in their new respective positions and roles and thus in a new type of 
relationship between citizen and government. That this is a challenge is 
clear from populist movements in various countries across the globe, which 
is particularly notable in the response to international migration in the 
United States and in various Western European countries (Raadschelders 
et al. 2019; Larrison and Raadschelders 2020). Populism thrives by appeal-
ing to in-group, tribal instincts that developed long ago. When building or 
reforming institutions, the elements in our psychology that were formed 
when living in small, egalitarian bands are not often considered, if at all.
That human psychological makeup includes kinship, reciprocity, nega-
tive reciprocity against norm violators, reputation, and signaling (humans 
are concerned with what others think of them), leadership (dominance) 
and status (prestige), identifcation with marked groups, and preferential 
imitation of in-group members (Richerson and Henrich 2012, 62–64). At 
the same time, people have been able to create institutions to help govern 
large-scale, imagined communities. Humankind may be slowly—and with 
much diffculty—moving away from a society that operates and collabo-
rates upon simple and primal in-group versus out-group distinctions, to a 
society where these cultural distinctions are surpassed by recognizing that 
biologically, frst and foremost, we belong to one species, Homo sapiens, 
and that, sociologically, we are all (at least most of us) citizens from a few 
days after we are born to a few days after we have passed on. That human 
beings are challenged to balance (a) a genetically programmed inclina-
tion toward hierarchy with a social inclination to equitable sharing among 
hunter-gatherers with (b) efforts at dividing and balancing powers, as De 
Waal (2005, 83, 236) notes, is a process that only started some 250 years 
ago. The psychological challenge is one of people coming to grips with 
the new reality of being global citizens with rights and duties and with a 
service-providing government. 
There is no doubt that peoples’ lifestyles have changed signifcantly 
since the 1980s, and it is not only the interconnectedness possible because 
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because of increased college attendance and advances in medical knowl-
edge and technology. These changes have been felt across the globe to 
different degrees. The communication possible because of the cell phone 
has reached many corners of the globe, but access to higher education and 
health care is still not a worldwide achievement. One major change that is 
felt worldwide, between individuals within a country, and between coun-
tries, is that of an increased income inequality since the 1970s. The data are 
unambiguous. In most Western European countries, the richest 10 percent 
of the population own 62 percent of the total wealth, while in the United 
States the top decile owns 72 percent and the bottom half only 2 per-
cent. Between 1997 and 2007, the richest 10 percent in the United States 
absorbed 75 percent of economic growth and the top 1 percent some 60 
percent of growth (Piketty 2014, 257 and 297). One of the main explana-
tions for the decline of the middle class, created as a result of twentieth-
century government policies and regulations that aim at the redistribu-
tion of wealth, is deregulation that has allowed bankers, insurers, fnancial 
intermediaries, and multinational corporations to proft from lack of gov-
ernmental oversight and boundaries (Piketty 2014, 260–261, 297). Other 
explanations for the decline of the middle class include globalization,
the transition to a service economy, and the dismantling of labor unions 
(Cohen 1998, 48). More than ever before is unskilled labor excluded from 
the benefts of economic growth, and that is in part because the demand 
for skilled labor and education is increasing rapidly (Cohen 1998, 52). At 
the same time, we must keep in mind that what we ‘feel’ and ‘perceive’ is 
relative when reviewed in long historical perspective. Pinker reminds us 
that narratives about inequality loom large, but that in the course of the 
history of humanity and civilization inequality has declined signifcantly.
That the lives of the poor across the globe in the past two hundred years 
have improved more rapidly than that of the rich. And, he notes that too 
often inequality is confused with unfairness, and we have seen in chapter 
3 that part of our instinctual make-up includes a strong aversion to unfair 
treatment and behavior (Pinker 2017, 101–2, 118). 
This is a crucial time for the—historically—rather recent experiment 
in large-scale democracy that began with the governmental revolution of 
the late eighteenth century. As mentioned in chapter 3, people accept some 
degree of inequality, for example, difference in income, but a democratic 
society can exist only when everyone believes they get a fair shake based 
on merit instead of being mainly dependent on kinship and friendship and 
subjected to rents only. In addition, people will accept social inequalities 
when all beneft to some degree from economic growth and when the most 
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disadvantaged groups are somehow protected. While inequality could be 
defned as the difference between those with landed property and the poor 
for most of history (Bauman 2000, 140), it is only in the past 250 years 
or so that inequality has become much more pronounced and viewed in 
the context of social citizenship. Michael Mann distinguishes between four 
elements of social citizenship: a relatively low level of inequality in mar-
ket income and wealth holdings, welfare transfers, progressive taxes, and 
universal education and health care (2012, 281). Each of these is under 
pressure. It is argued by some that in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, mercantilism (as the economic expression of political absolutism) 
made the economy serve politics (hence: political economy) (Cohen 1998,
10), but it might just as well have been the other way around. Determining 
what exactly was the case is diffcult because there was no clear distinc-
tion between what was considered public (i.e., government) or private (i.e.,
economy) (see chapter 2). However, in the late twentieth century and early 
twenty-frst century, entrepreneurial infuence seems to make politics serve 
the economy. Even a fairly conservative author such as Francis Fukuyama 
expresses concern about the possible repatrimonialization of the state and 
its government, the possibility that impersonal state and government insti-
tutions will be captured by the powerful economic elite (Fukuyama 2014,
28). Joseph Stiglitz called this “regulatory capture” (2013, 59). This may 
well be happening in the United States at the time these pages are written,
but we should watch out for this across all democracies simply because 
economic forces and companies have developed a global reach (see below).
The social costs of rising inequalities are signifcant, and most important 
among these is the erosion of a sense of identity in which fair play, equality 
of opportunity, and sense of community are important (Stiglitz 2013, 146).
I continue with this theme in the fnal chapter, but I touch upon this here 
simply because it illustrates how far removed we are from living in a truly 
global society where people care for one another and where the mighty 
do not and cannot prey upon the weak because of impersonal government 
oversight. 
While globalization clearly affects people as citizens in various ways, it 
is much less clear whether and in what ways it affects public offceholders 
(for an overview of various aspects of this see Raadschelders and Verheijen 
2019). With respect to career civil servants, there is some early empiri-
cal research about American federal civil servants (Hopkins 1976). Cur-
rent empirical research is limited to the infuence of Europeanization on 
European Union civil servants and on civil servants of the member states 
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civil servants is infuenced by institutionalized relations between interna-
tional fnancial institutions (IFIs) and states, by international economic 
trends, and by global challenges. With regard to the relations between IFIs 
and states, Galor notes that “in nonindustrial economies, . . . international 
trade has generated an incentive to specialize in the production of unskilled 
labor-intensive nonindustrial goods” (2011, 199), without mentioning that 
this is a consequence of what came to be known as the “Washington Con-
sensus” (see also chapter 7). While the economist who coined the term,
John Williamson, noted that his policy recommendations for Latin Ameri-
can countries included redistributive expenditures for education, health 
care, and infrastructure (1989, 2002), the Washington, DC–based IMF,
World Bank, and US Department of the Treasury mainly focused on fscal 
discipline, tax reform, trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization 
of state enterprises. In the eyes of Francis Fukuyama these are a “perfectly 
sensible list of economic policy measures” (2004, 15), but—again—they do 
not include the more balanced and redistributive policy recommendations 
of Williamson. 
As for international economic trends, the fnancial crisis of 2008 
resulted in states in various countries stepping in to bail out the fnancial 
industry (e.g., Franke 2014). With regard to global challenges, it would be 
interesting to learn how many national or federal civil servants, and from 
what departments and agencies, are involved, for instance, in making policy 
on issues that transcend domestic capacity and how many are assigned to 
track and comply with international law (Raustiala and Slaughter 2006; 
Slaughter and Burke-White 2009). 
As far as political offceholders are concerned, I am unsure what effects 
globalization has upon their functioning. It does seem, though, that there 
has been a global trend since the middle of the nineteenth century toward 
“the politics of personality,” as the British sociologist Richard Sennett 
called it. In his The Fall of Public Man he writes that personality politics is 
the uncivilized seduction of people away from thinking about what they 
might want to gain from or change in society (1977, 288). 
The leader himself  .  .  . can be warm, homey, and sweet; he can 
be sophisticated and debonair. But he will bind and blind people 
as surely as a demonic fgure if he can focus them upon his tastes,
what his wife is wearing in public, his love of dogs. He can dine 
with an ordinary family, and arouse enormous interest among the 
public, the day after he enacts a law that devastates the workers of 
his country—and this action will pass unnoticed in the excitement 







                
about his dinner. He will play golf with a popular comedian, and it 
will pass unnoticed that he has just cut the old-age allowance for 
millions of citizens. What has grown out of the politics of personal-
ity begun in the last century is charisma as a force for stabilizing 
ordinary political life. (1977, 270) 
Now, this was written in 1977, and many readers will recognize that person-
ality cults often occur in totalitarian or authoritarian systems and that these 
exist all around the globe. Personality politics is not a particularly novel 
phenomenon, though, since throughout history many heads of state were 
revered in some fashion or other (pharaohs, Roman emperors, European 
monarchs under the divine right to rule). Personality politics also emerges 
in democratic countries, where, in recent decades, substantial migrant 
populations give rise to the kind of populism advanced by some elective 
offceholders that trumps substantive policy choices and lures some of the 
people into emotional rather than considered and thoughtful responses to 
international (refugee) migration. Graham Wallas, mentioned in chapter 
two, was early to recognize the ease with which human prerational and 
emotional responses overtake more rational and intellectual intentions 
(1962 [1908]). We still do not pay suffcient attention in the study of public 
administration to the role and infuence of instinct an emotion. 
A global society can only become reality when people who are elected 
into political offce use the authority invested in them to beneft the people 
as a whole rather than serve to protect the interests of the few. George 
Washington and Nelson Mandela voluntarily stepped away from a posi-
tion of power, and that is exactly the kind of statement that befts a politi-
cal offceholder in a republic (see footnote 1 in the previous chapter). In a 
democracy, government, its elected offcials, and its career civil servants in 
bureaucracies serve the people. But there is another angle to this, and that 
is that the public also allows its attention to be reduced to curiosity about 
the private life of public fgures (Bauman 2000, 37). This has also repercus-
sions for how public authority is perceived, and I return to that theme in 
chapter 6. 
3. The Impact of Globalization on the Structure 
and Functioning of Government 
Moving from the individual to the organizational level, we should con-
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of government. Three clear examples of converging trends with regard to 
structuring were mentioned in chapters 1 and 4: the territorial state has 
become the dominant type of polity, all states are territorially defned in 
layers of jurisdictions from the local up to the national level, and all states 
operate with organizations that are structured as bureaucracies. These are 
globalizations that have been particularly manifest in the past millennium.
The last one, bureaucracy and bureaucratization, has pretty much become 
the standard way of organizing in the public, private, and nonproft sectors.
Collegial organization, where the members all hold the same offce, is still 
used, but only in the top of organizational pyramids. In the public sector,
these include all legislative assemblies and in various cases judicial benches.
In the private and nonproft sectors, all boards of directors, and so on, are 
collegial organizations. 
In terms of the functioning of government, there are two interrelated 
trends that have become prevalent in the past since the 1980s: new public 
management (NPM) and performance measurement. To varying degrees,
there is a belief that smaller government is better and that government 
reform should focus on reducing public sector size. In the words of Polish 
sociologist and philosopher Zygmunt Bauman, “The managerial equiva-
lent of liposuction has become the paramount stratagem of managerial art: 
slimming, downsizing, phasing out, closing down or selling out .  .  . etc.”
(2000, 122). In the public sector, efforts to reduce government size are 
known as reinventing government (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) and NPM 
(Hood 1991). NPM is a utopian ideology, rooted in deep faith that market-
type principles such as effciency and measurable performance indicators 
can work in the public sector. 
NPM emerged in the 1980s and became a full-blown trend in the pub-
lic sector from the 1990s on, supplanting the Weberian juridical orienta-
tion with a management orientation. In terms of the analytical framework 
of this book, NPM moves attention away from the constitutional and col-
lective levels of analysis to the operational level. NPM spread from the 
UK and New Zealand all over the world, but the execution of these ideas 
varied from country to country. Comparative research into NPM reforms 
is somewhat limited. Fitzpatrick et al. found that about 12 percent of arti-
cles in a variety of public administration journals concerned comparative 
analyses of NPM reforms (2011). Many NPM studies are single-country or 
single-policy studies. Comparative studies are limited mainly to Western 
Europe (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Van der Berg et al. 2015). Attention to 
NPM has been prompted by the desire to restrain government spending,
increasing distrust of government, cynicism about the responsiveness of 




















government bureaucracy, globalization, and the fact that an international 
market-oriented economy does not defer to domestic policies. However,
after 9/11, the 2008 economic crisis, and increasing (refugee) migration,
an increased role for the state is perceived as necessary. Van den Berg et al.
(2015, 16) describe three phases of NPM development: 
Phase 1, 1980s: output-oriented, performance measurement, focus 
on internal markets and private management methods, introduc-
tion of privatization, contracting out and deregulation, and sepa-
ration of policymaking from execution (see for strong critique of 
the latter, Du Gay 2000, 132). 
Phase 2: adds focus on external service delivery (1990s). 
Phase 3: adds notions of integrity of government and serving the 
public interest (since early 2000s). This would include efforts at 
increasing citizen participation (e.g., Citizen Charters in the UK,
1999). 
Phase 3 has also been labeled as post-NPM, where performance indica-
tors are balanced with responsiveness, integrity, and democratic legitimacy.
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) call this the new Weberian state framework,
which is one that reconciles the juridical perspective in the Weberian state 
framework, sometimes called classic public administration, with the NPM 
focus on public management. NPM was already considered passé in the 
mid-2000s (Dunleavy et al. 2006), and its effects and benefts were evalu-
ated as mixed (De Vries 2012). Whether government works better and 
costs less after 30 years of NPM reforms has mostly been answered with 
rhetoric and ideology. However, there are two recent empirical studies that 
shed new light on this question. 
First, British public administration and political science scholars Chris-
topher Hood and Ruth Dixon developed an elegantly simple matrix of 
nine outcomes of NPM reforms defned by running cost level and per-
formance level in terms of perceived consistency or fairness (2015, 182).
Hood and Dixon ridicule the spin around NPM. The UK has developed 
from a public bureaucracy state to a US-type mixed economy where, for 
instance, prisons and health care are provided by both public and private 
organizations, and where private oligopolies exist in a range of areas (IT,
security). They looked at multiple sources to get a sense of whether gov-
ernment works better and costs less, and concluded that it both costs more 
and works less well. Central government and tax collection cost more, and 
citizen satisfaction with government and taxes has declined. Overall assess-
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Second, Israeli scholar Mirit Kisner has completed an extensive com-
parative study of NPM reforms in 30 countries across the globe and 
assessed the extent of regressive effects of NPM (2016). She developed a 
regressiveness index and explains her fndings on the basis of dimensions 
of national culture as characterized by Hofstede et al. (2010). Focusing 
on regressive effects is not novel to the social sciences (e.g., Tocqueville; 
Merton), but it is to the study of public administration, and it involves 
investigating the unintended consequences of human action. The main 
unintended effect of NPM is decreased accountability of public service 
delivery and public servants because of agencyfcation (see, inter alia, Van 
der Meer and Raadschelders 1998, 30; Du Gay 2000, 130), contracting out,
performance management and measurement, privatization, and deregula-
tion. The regressive effect occurs when an objective is less attainable or 
even causes deterioration of the condition that NPM reforms were sup-
posed to eliminate. There can even be perverse effects, for instance when 
people deliberately game a system of performance measurement. 
Kisner concluded that NPM-type reforms can be found in all countries 
she examined, but that the overall movement is neutral. She formulated 
fve hypotheses using Hofstede’s dimensions: 
1. The higher power distance, the fewer regressive effects. 
2. The higher individualism, the fewer regressive effects. 
3. The higher masculinity, the higher regressive effects. 
4. The higher uncertainty avoidance, the higher regressive effects. 
5. The higher long-term orientation, the higher regressive effects. 
Of the 150 tests she did (fve hypotheses × 30 countries), she fnds that the 
hypotheses are supported in 57 cases, partially supported in 50 cases, and 
rejected in 47 cases. 
It is clear from her careful analysis that culture is not the only explana-
tion, since in some countries NPM worked despite negative expectations 
stemming from culture. For instance, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Den-
mark are countries similar in cultural dimensions, but Denmark pushed 
harder with NPM-type reforms, Sweden’s reverence for tradition and 
social equality was not helpful in pushing such reforms, and the Dutch were 
found to be high in uncertainty avoidance. Other examples of seemingly 
similar countries include Belgium, France, and Spain. They are consid-
ered Napoleonic countries but varied greatly in their application of NPM.
France has done better than Spain and Belgium, which both struggled with 
problems of the federal structure. In general on the European continent,
there was much variation in implementation (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; 









                     
 
 




Ongaro 2009; see Raadschelders and Vigoda-Gadot [with Kisner] 2015 for 
descriptive detail in NPM-style reforms on all continents). Finally, despite 
clear cultural differences, countries such as Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia,
Mexico, and Morocco scored high on progressive NPM reforms, but it 
could be that cultural compatibility with NPM-type reforms is not impor-
tant in countries with fewer democratic characteristics. 
Many NPM-style reforms have been motivated by the desire to defne 
and meet targets, to develop and measure performance indicators, and 
to increase accountability, especially encouraged for developing coun-
tries under the infuence of the Washington Consensus that emphasized 
deregulation and privatization. Management by numbers, performance 
indicators, and decision-making based on numbers and outputs appears 
to have reigned supreme in the public sector (see section 5). However, it 
appears that in the last 10 years, support for neoliberal economics has been 
dwindling, and that market liberalism is slowly but surely being replaced 
by market institutionalism. With the latter, governments are rediscovering 
their “marketcraft” (Vogel 2018). 
4. The Impact of Globalization on the Role and Position of Government 
Globalization and internationalization of government and governance 
are increasingly central concepts in the practitioner and academic worlds.
Surprisingly there is, as far as I know, no specifc research into the infu-
ence of globalization on the three branches of government, nor is there 
much, if any, evidence-based research into the impact of globalization on 
state institutions, models, and best practices (Farazmand 1999; for some 
exploratory literature on the exchange of models and best practices, see 
also several chapters in Van der Meer et al. 2015). More specifcally, most 
authors provide generalized arguments and thoughts about the impact of 
globalization, and thus implicitly suggest that its impact is the same every-
where. Examples of globalization with regard to structuring government 
are the territorialization and bureaucratization mentioned in the previ-
ous section, and we can add—at least in democracies—the triumph of the 
rule of law. Now, is the state losing its monopoly of coercion, as Weber 
and Elias wondered, and are we thus moving to a neotribal community,
as Bauman suggested (2000, 193)? Generalized opinions and perspectives 
on the impact of globalization on the state can be categorized into two 
main groups. Some argue that globalization diminishes state autonomy 
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age policy is constrained. Others argue that while globalization changes 
dynamics and interaction, it does not change the fact that the state is the 
only actor that can make international agreements on behalf of its popula-
tion. In this second line of thought, globalization may actually strengthen 
and enrich national governments, providing new opportunities for, rather 
than weakening, policymaking capabilities. 
In the frst line of argument, the erosion of national government auton-
omy and capacity is a consequence of three main factors. First, there is the
infuence that perceptions of globalization’s consequences have on the scope
and role of the state. With a strongly increased infuence of extraterritorial,
multinational enterprises and globalized fnancial markets, the state’s power
may be eroding and political control over the economy slipping (Bauman
2000, 186; Brenner 2004, 5). In addition, privatization and contracting out
may have hollowed out the domestic role and position of states (cf. Jessop
1993, 10; Milward and Provan 2000), and perhaps especially because these
economic phenomena have not been matched with increased oversight
(Freeman and Minow 2009). While some states may have been hollowed
out in terms of service delivery, their scope has not changed. Some collec-
tive services may be offered by private or nonproft contractors but are still
funded by taxpayers’ money, a situation characterized as one of a submerged
state (Mettler 2011) and a compensatory state (Durant 2020). Furthermore,
from a juridical point of view, the state is not hollowed out because it is still
the only actor that can make authoritative decisions on behalf of all people
in its jurisdiction. In Western and non-Western countries with a strong
state tradition, the position and role of the state has not been hollowed out
(Bohne et al. 2014a, 3–4; 2014b, 261; Burns 2015, 81). 
With regard to the role and position of the state in the international 
arena, it operates in a network of international forum and advocacy orga-
nizations that focus on various economic, cultural, political, military, and 
social issues and interests that have global proportions. The number of 
international organizations has ballooned since World War II. The Year-
book of International Organizations listed 4,600 governmental and nongov-
ernmental organizations in 1977 (as reported in Scott 1982, 5); the same 
yearbook reported a total of 18,689 such organizations for 2015 (Union 
of International Associations 2016, 25)! Establishing how many interna-
tional organizations there are is diffcult because it depends on how they 
are categorized (Kingsbury et al. 2005, 20). The Union of International 
Associations distinguishes between 15 types of international organizations.
Following Kim Moloney’s counting method, there were 906 intergovern-
mental organizations in 2015 (Moloney 2018, 25). 














The second factor in the erosion of national autonomy concerns the 
rise of shared sovereignty (most explicit in the case of the European Union) 
and the transfer of some competencies to the supranational level. Third is 
the growing importance of issues such as the global economic crisis and 
climate change that transcend the ability and power of territorial states and 
can only be addressed effectively at a supra- or intergovernmental level.
In this reasoning, globalization diminishes the autonomy and centrality of 
national governments. 
In the second line of argument on the impact of globalization on the 
state, the state continues to be at the center of the international politi-
cal system (again: as the only actor that has the authority to make bind-
ing decisions on behalf of the entire population in a sovereign country),
and interaction in the international arena enhances state capacity through 
exposure to different solutions for common policy issues. In this reason-
ing, national governments have an expanded role that requires new capaci-
ties and abilities. Governments now have to frame national contributions 
to help resolve policy challenges that transcend the nation-state. In and 
of themselves, domestic policies aimed at mitigating the effects of global 
trends and issues will increasingly prove insuffcient. 
The observations made above are very general; that is, they are not 
country specifc. But is the impact of globalization the same for every coun-
try? Intuitively, we can expect that the infuence of globalization will vary 
with structure and functioning of the political-administrative system. It 
also depends on the extent to which market parties (i.e., businesses, corpo-
rations, entrepreneurial activity) have the freedom to do as they see ft. By 
way of illustration, consider the United States. Contracting-out and priva-
tization are mentioned above as trends in the United States. These trends 
are much less important or play out differently in many other countries.
The United States is often characterized as a weak state, and one where 
the private sector has been quite successful in privatizing proft and social-
izing risk. However, American government has grown as signifcantly as 
those of many other Western states since the 1900s. Another example of an 
expanding role of the state, and already mentioned, concerns the aftermath 
of the 2008 worldwide economic recession, where states not only bailed 
out banks but also heightened their attention to regulating the economy. If 
anything, the state is perceived as the major guardian of the economy and 
is assumed to take responsibility for the stability of the fnancial system 
(Bohne et al. 2014b, 260). 



















   
Citizen and Government in a Global Society 169 
a weak state (Novak 2008) when assessing it in terms of functions exer-
cised and services delivered by the public sector directly or indirectly by 
private or nonproft partners through being fnanced by public agencies 
(Mettler 2011; Durant 2020). It is presently rather weak in the sense that 
it lacks effective and bipartisan political collaboration between members 
of different parties. This is, for instance, illustrated by the inability to 
introduce high-speed rail in Ohio. Why is it that Chinese, Japanese, and 
several Western European governments can build high-speed rail lines,
while this appears so more diffcult in this Midwestern state? The answer 
is partisanship. The Ohio Hub was a project aimed at linking Cincinnati,
Columbus, Dayton, Cleveland, and some cities in Ontario, Canada. It was 
proposed by Democratic governor Ted Strickland and would have received 
$400 million in federal support. This federal support was withdrawn when 
the newly elected governor, John Kasich, a Republican, made good on his 
campaign promise in 2010 to cancel the project. What makes sense eco-
nomically does not always appear to reign supreme in American politics.
In fact, improving connectivity between communities of people within and 
between cities via public transportation effciencies is known to facilitate 
the exchange of ideas and the possibility of innovation (Pentland 2014,
166; Serra 2011, 62–63, 119–21). 
To assess the impact of globalization on territorial states, it is important 
to untangle truly global phenomena, such as those mentioned at the begin-
ning of this chapter, from national trends as these unfold in a globalizing 
context and in an already existing political-administrative tradition. For 
example, domestic reforms in the Chinese economy have been substan-
tial since the early 1980s (Burns 2015, 80–82). Local governments receive 
larger management responsibilities over the economy, and state-owned 
enterprises have been privatized. The economic reforms have prompted 
judicial reforms (e.g., emphasizing the rule of law, the 1989 Administra-
tive Litigation Law), where the judiciary increasingly serves as mediator 
between citizens and government (Raadschelders and Vigoda-Gadot 2015,
254–259). And in the slipstream of reforms toward a socialist market econ-
omy, Chinese higher education has opened up to the people at large, and 
increasing numbers of Chinese students spend time studying abroad (Raad-
schelders and Vigoda-Gadot 2015, 372–376). To understand the extent to 
which domestic developments are prompted by globalizing trends, we do 
need comparative research, but the challenges of generating knowledge 
that is satisfying to academics and practitioners alike are substantial. 
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5. Understanding Globalization: The Deep Current of Rationalization 
and Its Manifestation(s) 
In contemporary public administration scholarship, it is unusual to explore 
extremely complex trends in human society that unfold over millen-
nia. One individual to do so is German legal scholar and sociologist Max 
Weber (1864–1920), who is widely known, and even more widely debated 
by supporters and critics, for his thoughts about the rationalization and 
bureaucratization of the world. He identifes rationalization as a process 
that evolves over thousands of years, at least in the Western world (Weber 
1946b, 139 [1919]). In this process, Weber observes, humankind shifts from 
a focus on value rationality to one that embraces instrumental rationality 
in the increasing belief that recourse to magic, religion, or the unquantif-
able is no longer necessary in the pursuit of stability in and predictability 
of social life. Thus, the rationalization of the world is accompanied by a 
disenchantment or demystifcation of the world. However, rationalization 
is not synonymous with “an increased and general knowledge of the condi-
tions” under which people live; it merely means “the knowledge or belief 
that if one but wished one could learn it at any time” (Weber 1946b, 139 
[1919]). In other words, while one can learn about the conditions of life on 
the basis of science, science does not by itself lead to better understanding 
of these conditions. Even so, under instrumental yet bounded rationality 
there is no place for value rationality, and it is science that provides the 
basis of knowledge and explains social events and phenomena, not Allah,
God, Shiva, or Wodan. Weber is not the frst to argue that rationalization 
and demystifcation are related; Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx sug-
gested the same (Bell 1961, 394; Goldstein 2005, 141–144). Weber was,
however, the frst to argue that value rationality and instrumental rational-
ity ought to be considered separately. 
Value rationality is concerned with an ethic of ultimate ends (Weber 
1946a, 120 [1919]) or, as Daniel Bell calls it, an ethic of conscience (1961,
279). An ethic of absolute ends and preferences can be discussed, but peo-
ple may never agree on what these ends and preferences should be. Instead,
so Weber argued, civil peace can only be maintained when an ethic of abso-
lute ends is complemented with an ethic of responsibility where people 
and groups agree to respect each other’s rights and opinions and continue 
living in the same community of people (Weber 1946a, 127 [1919]; Bell 
1961, 280). Instrumental rationality is at the forefront of Weber’s essays on 
politics and science as vocations (1946a and 1946b): 
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The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intel-
lectualization and, above all, by the “disenchantment of the world.”
Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from 
public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into 
the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations. (Weber 
1946b, 155 [1919]) 
To be sure, rationalization is not just an intellectual process that relegates 
religious experience to the private sphere of life; it is also a social practice 
in that it regards actions, processes, and beliefs in and of social life as goal-
oriented or instrumentally rational (Scaff 2000, 104). Indeed, rationaliza-
tion touches upon many aspects of human activity, including communi-
cation, fashion, entertainment, tourism, housing, athletics, science, family 
life, sexuality, architecture, health care, incarceration, education, religion,
music, science, politics, capitalism, organization, and so on. Does this 
mean that people have “done away” with seeking enchantment? Not at all.
They simply seek a different kind of enchantment, for instance, through 
the purchase or consumption of desirable goods; through the promise of 
enchanted living, at least every now and then by means of a visit to Disney 
World or taking a fairy-tale cruise in the Caribbean (Ritzer 1999; Scaff 
2014, 160); through riding a roller coaster and screaming one’s head off; 
through paintball in a simulated urban jungle; through violent video games,
and so forth. Perhaps enchantment has given way to the quick thrill, the 
immediate gratifcation of a desire. At any rate, rationalization as a process 
has given people a sense of control over their personal and material lives,
and is possibly best visible in the bureaucratization of organizational life,
personal life, and the world at large. 
Weber is probably best known for his analysis of bureaucracy, which 
he defned as both a type of organization and a type of personnel system 
(1980, 124–130). As organization it is hierarchical, with a clear line of com-
mand, with clear separation of duties between offcials, and he regards this 
as the most effcient of organizational types (not as the only effcient type).
As a personnel system, it is populated by offcials who exercise their offce 
without regard for personal bias in how they treat citizens, in his phrase sine 
ira et studio (i.e., without anger or passion: 1980, 129), and are characterized 
by professionalism. He also notes that the world witnesses an inexorable 
march forward of bureaucracy and bureaucratization, but bureaucracy has 
only become an instrument of the state and its government working for 
the people as citizens since the late eighteenth century. For most of history,


























bureaucracy was simply a patrimonial organization, where the son could 
inherit his father’s offce, and with its offcials conducting the business of 
the ruler and ruling elites. 
As with rationalization, Weber was not the frst to note that bureaucracy
develops into a new type of phenomenon with civil servants as the new
guardians of democracy. Almost a century earlier, Georg Hegel had charac-
terized various elements of the executive in a manner foreshadowing Weber
when describing civil servants as foregoing “the selfsh and capricious satis-
faction of their subjective ends” and serving with a “dispassionate, upright,
and polite demeanor” (1967, 191–193; see also Gale and Hummel 2003;
Jackson 1986; Shaw 1992; and Spicer 2004). Where Hegel was positive
about the service of bureaucracy to democracy, Weber was more concerned
about the possibility that the former could overshadow the latter, and in
his time he was not alone in that belief. He feared that bureaucracy and its
regulations could become an “iron cage” in which people as employees and
as citizens would be forever constrained. He deplored the possibility of civil
servants being viewed by others and perceiving themselves as mere cogs in
a machine, only interested in moving from one position to a better position
(Weber 1924, 414; see also Derman 2016, 51; Jennings et al. 2005). 
Weber’s focus on bureaucratization concerned organizational life.
However, not just organizations, but society and individual life bureaucra-
tize as well. William Whyte vividly described the life of organization man 
in suburbia, a life shining with conformity and repetitiveness (1956, 256ff.).
He described organization man as a personality type “who ha[s] left home,
spiritually as well as physically, to take the vows of organization life” (1956,
3). Ralph Hummel carried the idea of the bureaucrat as personality type to 
the extreme when writing that sexual relations for the bureaucratic type are 
a matter of technical performance and not an expression of love (1977, 51).
In this we can hear echoes of Weber’s remark that sex pretends to be the 
most humane devotion but is merely “a sophisticated enjoyment of oneself 
in the other” (Weber 1946 [1915], 348). 
Weber’s “iron cage” metaphor is as relevant today as it was in his time,
and possibly even more so. Bureaucracy has become the dominant type of 
organization, we live in a society that is heavily circumscribed by rules, and 
we may have spun ourselves into a “virtual cage” (Raadschelders 2019b).
Not only is the behavior of people pretty much constantly monitored by 
cameras on the streets, in shopping malls, on police uniforms, by smart 
TVs that track what people watch, by store membership cards, by registra-
tion of purchasing interests (Amazon), but people also increase the track-
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about their personal lives on Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, and 
dating websites, and by wearing a Fitbit wristband that informs one about,
for example, the number of steps walked per day. What is done with all 
this data and information is not on the radar screen of most people, and 
may well be only accessible to insiders (Pasquale 2015, 191; Pentland 2014; 
Galloway 2018), but citizens must become aware because they have no idea 
of what’s happening and how it could actually threaten democracy (O’Neill 
2017, 218). 
So bureaucratization is not just manifest in organizational life as stan-
dardized action in, for instance, the assembly line, it is also visible in the 
standardization of societal and individual lives. That this is possible is a 
function not only of the extent to which people in the past two centuries 
have reduced many expressions of life to the level of being a mere com-
modity, but also of, in the words of British sociologist and social theorist 
Nikolas Rose, the “age of the calculable person, the person whose indi-
viduality is no longer ineffable, unique and beyond knowledge, but can be 
known, mapped, calibrated, evaluated, quantifed, predicted, and managed”
(1996, 88). To be sure, commodifcation is not a feature of the modern age 
alone, but it has in the past two centuries become far more widespread 
and going far beyond the valuing of material goods only. Commodifcation 
touches pretty much every part of life to the point that one can really say 
that people’s minds are tuned into commodifying anything and everything. 
Commodifcation is a process that has been with humans since the 
moment they started living a sedentary life and developed a sense of 
property and ownership over material goods (animals, bags of grain, land,
gold, fabrics, etc.). As soon as something is recognized as a property, it can 
become a commodity that can be valued, measured, and exchanged (Ren-
frew 2011, 106, 114). People can exchange products among themselves (for 
instance: my cow for three of your sheep or fve sacks of grain), or they can 
establish a more formal arena for the exchange of multiple goods: a physi-
cal market. The most smoothly working markets are those where different 
products lose their unique features and simply come to be represented by a 
monetary value. The earliest records humans kept are those of trade, fnan-
cial transactions, and wage fuctuations, and they date back to the middle 
of the third millennium BCE in the ancient Near East. European societies 
were much slower to adopt record-keeping (Whittle 2001, 39, 42). 
For thousands of years, commodifcation concerned material goods,
but from the late nineteenth century on, it also included human activities,
ideas, and services. Labor or work is one of those human activities, and 
Karl Marx identifed it as a commodity that could be bought and sold in 












   
  
 
the marketplace. In the industrialized factory, the worker is no longer the 
one who shapes the raw material into an end product, as had been the case 
in the products of the trade guilds of old, but is only an employee respon-
sible for one link in a chain of production activities. Marx predicted that 
capitalist production would be self-destructive since more effcient means 
of production would result in lower wages that, in turn, would reduce the 
number of people able to buy the product (for a brief summary of Marx’s 
thought, see Wilson 1940, 317–18). We will never know whether Marx had 
it right, because industries discovered that production for durability is less 
proftable than planned obsolescence, the production of material goods 
with a fnite life-span (Bauman 2000, 85). What better illustration than my 
grandmother telling me decades ago that pantyhose in the pre–World War 
II years were thick and could be washed time and again but did not look 
very good on the leg, in comparison to the same product after the war that 
was much thinner and more shapely to the leg, but quick to get a “run” or 
“ladder” that could be salvaged with nail polish or—better—thrown away 
and purchased anew. 
As stated above, commodifcation has expanded well beyond material 
products. In the eyes of sociologist George Ritzer, the model of contem-
porary commodifcation is the fast-food restaurant. The McDonaldization 
of society is characterized by effciency, predictability, calculability, and 
control (Ritzer 1983, 2002): people get a burger fast; they know what it 
will contain whether in Beijing, Bogotá, Cape Town, New York, or Sydney.
They know it is cheaper than cooking one at home with fresh produce, and 
the entire production process is standardized. This is Frederick Winslow 
Taylor’s scientifc management to the extreme. But there is more. Many 
“things” can now be commodifed: children and childhood (Adatto 2003; 
Schor 2003), religion (Drane 2001; Ward 2003), and personal identity 
(Davis 2003). We can sell sperm and eggs. Robert K. Graham’s effort in 
1980 at starting a sperm bank with donations from Nobel Prize winners 
and other luminaries may have come to nothing (Plotz 2005a, 2005b), and 
the endeavor was satirized even before it began (Dahl 1979), but the idea 
was planted. A woman can rent her womb and carry someone else’s baby 
(Sandel 2003, 79). People can sell a body organ such as a kidney. The name 
of a famous architect will raise the price of an apartment even when it is 
similar to one constructed by an unknown designer (Ponzini 2014). One 
might even be able to sell the right to one’s name on a hotel or a golf 
course. And a well-known individual—in the United States often a former 
high-ranking public offceholder—can present her or his ideas before an 
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simply because it is an honor to be invited is passé. And this is not all.
Richard Sennett asks, “Has the merchandizing of political leaders come to 
resemble that of selling soap, as instantly recognizable brands which the 
political consumer chooses off the shelf?” (2006, 135). Did Karl Marx have 
a point when he described a world where commodities command human 
beings (Wilson 1940, 290)? 
Governments and entrepreneurs have discovered that public services 
can be commodities. This used to be off-limits; certain services were sim-
ply public by nature. In the 30 years after World War II, governments 
in various Western countries even expanded public services with an eye 
on rebuilding society and infrastructure. This helped raise general living 
standards signifcantly. During these glorious 30 years, income inequality 
decreased markedly (Fourastié 1979). In this welfare state, various services 
were decommodifed (Cerny 1997, 259). To varying degrees, this has been 
reversed; especially so in the United States, where many public services 
have been commodifed through direct privatization of such services (e.g.,
public utilities), contracting out (e.g., prisons), or substantial deregulation 
(e.g., health care, education, housing). 
Commodifcation beyond the production and exchange of mate-
rial goods can be understood in the larger context of rationalization and 
bureaucratization, but this does not mean that rationalization and bureau-
cratization must lead to the commodifcation of anything imaginable. In 
fact, it is not clear what deep societal process or processes, exactly, drive 
commodifcation to become something that includes far more than the 
production and exchange of material goods. Could it be that it is nothing 
more and nothing less than this increasing human inclination to superf-
cially calculate value, to express value in measurable terms? 
To facilitate trade many centuries ago, people developed the habit of 
making various commodities equivalent in terms of an agreed-upon value.
The easiest way to do so is to express value in terms of coin, but trade 
via barter did not disappear. It was not until the eighteenth century that 
people started thinking about calculating anything that concerns nature,
behavior, and feelings. The amazing discoveries in astronomy and physics 
since the ffteenth century left people with the impression that life and 
society could be just as easily expressed in universal laws and calculable 
terms. Consider the following thought by the widower Thomas Jefferson 
in a letter to Maria Cosway, a married woman with whom he had fallen in 
love. He writes about the battle between head and heart: “Everything in 
this world is a matter of calculation. Advance then with caution, the balance 
in your hand. Put into one scale the pleasures which any object may offer; 









   
 
 
but put fairly into the other the pains which are to follow, & see which pre-
ponderates” (as quoted in Haidt 2012, 35; emphasis added). From Goethe’s 
Faust, consider what Mephistopheles said to the Chancellor: 
What you can’t calculate, you believe cannot be true 
What you can’t weigh, has no weight for you 
What you can’t cost, has no value for you. 
(as quoted in translation by Samier 2005, 20; emphasis added) 
Weber connected the dots when writing: “The ‘objective’ discharge of 
business primarily means a discharge of business according to calculable 
rules and without regard for persons. . . . The peculiarity of modern cul-
ture, and specifcally of its technical and economic basis, demands this 
very ‘calculability’ of results” (Weber 1946, 215 [1921]). Like Jefferson,
Goethe, and Marx, Weber recognized that anything natural and human 
could be subjected to calculation and that this is especially possible in a dis-
enchanted world (Maley 2004, 71; Clegg 2005, 533). In a 1918 lecture, he 
noted that calculation is central to private and public endeavors alike: “The 
main inner foundation of the capitalist Betrieb is calculation. It requires for 
its existence a judiciary and an administration whose operation, at least in 
principle, can be rationally calculated according to stable, general norms, just 
as one calculates the predictable performance of a machine” (as quoted in 
Derman 2016, 105). Weber’s colleague, sociologist and philosopher Georg 
Simmel, noted that “the absolute and qualitative value of the individual 
voice is reduced to a unit of merely quantitative relevance” (as quoted in 
Schwarzkopf 2011, 114). Again Weber: “The more perfectly bureaucracy 
is developed, the more it is dehumanized, the more completely it succeeds 
in eliminating from offcial business love, hatred, and above all, purely per-
sonal, irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation” (Weber 
1980, 563; emphasis added; Mommsen 1980, 167). 
In John Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress, a man sits in an iron cage 
because he pursued “the lusts, pleasures, and profts of this world” (2009,
29–30 [1678]). Similarly, Marx noted how people increasingly focused on 
money and profts (Wilson 1940, 291). But that is no longer all there is.
Above, various examples of activities are noted that have been commodi-
fed, expressed in calculable quantities. Why do we do this? It is not just 
that it seems as if almost anything can be put up for sale, it is also that 
people have the illusion that almost any action can be accounted for when 
calculated, that we can prove we’ve done a good job when predefned tar-
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bers have gone up or down. Some illustrations will be useful. Evidence of 
successful policing is provided by decreasing crime rates, by the number of 
rapists and murderers caught and convicted, by the amount of confscated 
drugs. But is the real measure of success not how many crimes and drug 
deals have been prevented because of police presence? The problem is, of 
course, that we can never know that number. Evidence of overall educa-
tional success is measured in graduation rates, and successful completion 
of a degree is provided by showing that, for example, 80 percent or more 
of students have “mastered” one or more objectives in an assessment form 
of general education courses. But isn’t the real measure of success what an 
individual can say 20 years after leaving school about the extent to which 
her education has been a beneft? Scholarly success is measured in number 
of publications per year, citation scores, and impact scores of the journals 
published in. But is the real measure of success not whether a piece of 
research has made a difference in the real world? The evidence is increas-
ing that publication counts, citations, journal impact factors, and amount of 
research funding acquired have perverse effects upon individual research-
ers and their productivity (Edwards and Roy 2016, 52). 
Numerous are the comments since World War II about social science 
having reduced itself to calculable proportions. Take the sociologist C.
Wright Mills: “The conception of social science I hold has not been ascen-
dant. My conception stands opposed to social science as a set of bureau-
cratic techniques which inhibit social inquiry by ‘methodological’ preten-
sions, which congest such work by obscurantist conceptions, or which 
trivialize it by concern with minor problems unconnected with publicly 
relevant issues” (1959, 20). Or consider Friedrich von Hayek, who pointed 
out in his Nobel Prize lecture that in “economics and other disciplines 
that deal with essentially complex phenomena, the aspects of the events to 
be accounted for about which we can get quantitative data are necessarily 
limited and may not include the important ones” (1974, 2). Or take orga-
nizational theorist William Starbuck, who writes that the social scientists 
are “drowning in statistically signifcant but meaningless noise” (2006, 49).
Where does this being enamored with numbers come from? Is neurosci-
entist Joshua Green right when he observes that “to calculate at all is to 
distrust” (2013, 167; see also Stiglitz 2013, 152 on declining trust overall)? 
And do commodifcation and the enthrallment with calculation have per-
verse consequences for civic and public life? 
Commodifcation and calculation invite rent-seeking behavior, which 
is the effort to manipulate economic and political outcomes for personal 
gain. The concept of rent “refers to an excess beneft or return above what 















is normally expected in a competitive market, and it depends upon exclu-
sivity” (Scaff 2014, 33). Rent-seeking has become endemic in the United 
States (Stiglitz 2013, 47). With regard to economic policy, I mentioned 
above that the French demographer Fourastié called the immediate post-
war decades the glorious 30, and that the situation has since reversed 
because the economy is now run on the principle of maximizing profts 
for shareholders and making government accountable to the taxpayer by 
proving that performance indicators and targets have been met. This is 
especially a problem in the United States, where top executives’ income is 
more than 300 times that of the median income. People accept and under-
stand income inequality, but not to the point that the fruits of economic 
growth beneft mainly the upper income levels. 
As early as 1613, Italian scholar Antonio Serra outlined the secret of 
economic growth and social well-being: a combination of public spend-
ing for education, infrastructure, and technology, together with developing 
a diversifed economy (Reinert 2007, 95; Serra 2011). This is advocated 
by some contemporary economists such as Nobel Prize winner Joseph 
Stiglitz (2016), but it is not guiding policy in Washington, DC. French 
economist Thomas Piketty recently demonstrated that the upper centile’s 
share of national income increased less in Europe and Japan than it did in 
English-speaking countries since 1980. The consequence of this increasing 
inequality is virtual stagnation of purchasing power of the lower and mid-
dle classes. Since the 1908s we have seen a one-sided shift to market-based 
economics. Whatever happened with Karl Polanyi’s observation that the 
free market can exist only by the grace of governmental regulatory over-
sight (1944, 130, 141)? A market without oversight becomes an arena where 
some can stuff the profts of their companies into their own pockets rather 
than invest in their human capital and material assets. And in his often ref-
erenced but seldom read The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith warned about 
the dangers of monopolists seeking to control the market and infuence 
public policy so as to secure even more control of the economy. This is not 
a recent phenomenon. In three case studies (Iraq, sixth to thirteenth cen-
turies; northern Italy, eleventh to seventeenth centuries; Dutch Republic 
and Netherlands, twelfth to nineteenth centuries), Dutch historian Bas van 
Bavel showed how social revolts led to dominant markets and economic 
growth that benefted all because of a positive role played by public author-
ities (2016, 254). However, factor markets allow material inequalities to 
increase because market elites translate their wealth into political infuence 
and decision-making power that is used to shape the institutional arrange-
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triggers social polarization and reduces welfare for ordinary people (van 
Bavel 2016, 2). Thus, the position and role of the state is “hollowed out” by 
economic actors. Van Bavel describes a positive-negative economic cycle at 
the level of states; in our globalizing world, the question must be added: to 
what extent is the state further eroded by global, multinational powers with 
“weapons” of extraterritoriality and speed (Bauman 2000, 186)? 
In various countries, governments profess blind faith in the effciency 
of market-based services through privatization or contracting. Do we have 
evidence that privatization and contracting out result in cheaper and bet-
ter products? Does the citizen-taxpayer beneft from the commodifcation 
of prisons, of education, of public utilities, of housing, of health care, and 
so on? Or is it rather the owner of such services who has gained more? A 
market-based provision of services is generally advocated on the basis of 
short-term profts, but what longer-term objectives are served by priva-
tized or contracted collective services? Is it possible that contracting out 
and privatization actually undermine democracy (Aman 2009; Freeman 
and Minow 2009; Verkuil 2007, 2017)? 
Whether rent-seeking behavior undermines democracy leads to con-
cerns about the extent to which it is possible to manipulate political out-
comes, and this will be further addressed in the fnal chapter. However, a 
society where much is calculated in currency values, numbers, and rank-
ings, and where government falls prey to the “calculating behavior” of rent-
seeking private parties (i.e., businesses, interest groups, lobbyists) (Hacker 
and Pierson 2016, 92–93), is a society where politics is reduced to a pawn 
in an economic game rather than a guardian of democracy. 
Where citizens are the guardians in that garden of democracy (Liu and 
Hanauer 2011), they and those who are elected and appointed into public 
sector positions ensure that humanity’s vision for the future is not reduced 
to mere targets achieved at the end of the calendar, fscal, or academic year.
Citizens together with elected and appointed public servants are frst and 
foremost responsible for refreshing visions of a future that go beyond that 
which is measurable. Rationalization and bureaucratization are not just 
features of organizational life, and certainly not only of public life; they are 
deep—although not universal—undercurrents in our world (Jacoby 1976).
The present emphasis on performance management and measurement in 
the public sector has the risk of limiting or narrowing the attention of citi-
zens and their governments to measured accomplishments at the end of a 
year. That focus crowds out much-needed attention to a vision for a future 
society, and for the role government can play in helping to make that vision 
a reality. No doubt, given its authority to make binding decisions on behalf 




                   
 
of a population at large, government’s position among various social actors 
in achieving such a vision is pretty clear: it can guide, it can enable, it can 
ensure better than any other actor. But when we reduce government’s role 
to something that is measured, we actually run the risk of losing something 
that started more than two centuries ago: a government that works for the 
betterment of society. Now, that objective does not exclude performance 
management and measurement, but we should realize that such measures 
only scratch the surface of performance. Numbers are fne as long as 
they are embedded in and translated into a vision for a better future, and 
into a value-laden context. Modern societies and democracies need both 
value and instrumental rationality for government action to be considered 
authoritative. 
There is another side to this. Clearly, rationalization and bureaucra-
tization have benefts in that they establish some degree of predictability 
of public action, keep track of decisions made (i.e., a paper trail), and help 
making and keeping government accountable. Internally, these serve in 
organizations to establish clear lines of authority and a clear division of 
labor. But organizations are still made up of people, and when people real-
ize that what they do is assessed in terms of production targets and other 
measures, they may well be inclined to focus on those activities that will 
actually “pay off.” Have employees fulflled the responsibilities of offce 
when they have hit the targets? Like our primate cousins, human beings 
can be prone to calculating behaviors, to manipulate their activities, and 
manipulate how they are perceived so as to be perceived as having done a 
good job. Is Louis Gawthrop right when he observed that “far too often 
the appearance of a commitment to duty is suffcient to fulfll the demands of 
service, and as a consequence the individual who is successful in appear-
ing to be a dutiful public servant is most frequently viewed as the exem-
plary bureaucrat” (1998, 41; emphasis added)? On the same page, he recalls 
Oscar Wilde: the frst duty is to be artifcial, the second duty is yet to be 
discovered. 
6. How Can Citizens and Governments Deal with Globalization and 
the Perversions of Rationalization? 
As psychologist and economist Daniel Ariely reminds us, we really live in 
two worlds: one of social exchanges and one of market exchanges. The 
reader will appreciate that social exchanges have been the mark of human-
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interactions, material or gift exchanges have been equally common. In 
today’s world, many material exchanges have been “reduced” to market 
exchanges. He provides a very nice example of how market norms can 
invade social exchanges and thus violate social norms and hurt relations: 
How would your in-laws react if you give them $50 for the Thanksgiving,
Christmas, or Hanukkah dinner instead of bringing a bottle of wine (Ariely 
2008, 84)? 
In this day and age it is hard to remember that citizenship and govern-
ment in democracies have value beyond that which is measurable. Stan-
dardized, performance-based indicators and data do not tell us anything 
about government in a global or, at least, globalizing society. They can-
not tell us much beyond the superfcial about the extent to which citizens 
and governments in democratic political systems have come to rely upon 
one another. Citizens need government for a variety of services, tasks, and 
functions that can no longer be performed on the basis of collective, self-
governing effort, and governments need citizens to participate, to engage,
and to be civil to one another. The relationship between citizens and their 
governments is as reciprocal as that between two individuals in prehistoric 
bands, the only difference being that in prehistorical physical communities 
people knew that they needed each other for survival, while in modern,
massive, imagined communities citizens, elected and appointed offcehold-
ers, and government are thought of in terms of stereotypes rather than in 
terms of how each needs the other (for more on this, see chapter 7). 
We have seen in the previous two chapters that for millennia, gov-
ernments were the property of those with political and economic power.
Those elites used bureaucracy as their instrument. One might wonder why 
this situation could continue for thousands of years. The answer is really 
quite simple: people did not know any better. They were born in a particu-
lar station in life, and that’s how it was. By contrast, nowadays, even in very 
isolated countries with quite totalitarian political regimes such as Enver 
Hoxha’s Albania in the second half of the twentieth century and Kim Jong 
Un’s North Korea at present, people know that life, society, and politics 
are different and better in other places, and they will seek and get the same 
at some point. When I visited East Berlin in 1987, people living in a 12-
story apartment building near the Berlin Wall could actually see how their 
neighbors in West Berlin lived, and it came across as appealing. The Berlin 
Wall is no longer there. 
Especially in the second millennium of the Common Era, people 
started stirring in protest against extraordinary taxes. In fact, most revolts 
in the Middle Ages and the early modern period in Europe were tax revolts.












The American and French Revolutions were tax revolts, and the conse-
quences are still rippling throughout the world. These revolutions have 
shown that people can take power and establish a more equitable political-
administrative regime. 
Hence, society and government have fundamentally changed in the past 
250 years. If not always visible in practice, it is in terms of political theory 
that government and its offcials have come to serve the people. Citizens 
are still coming to terms with being sovereign, with being the owners of 
government, and thinking Government is Us (King and Stivers 1998; King 
2011), especially in a time of antigovernment sentiments and declining 
trust in public institutions. Governments seemed to have responded quite 
well to the challenges posed by the “triple whammy,” for it is at the request 
of citizens that governments have expanded the scope and range of their 
tasks, functions, and services beyond anything seen in history. Indeed, there 
is no historical precedent for the kind of government we have today, and 
this is mainly so in democratic political systems. 
That this position and role reversal took place in such a short period of 
time is nothing short of amazing. However, there is no inevitability about 
this. All of the empirical research and conceptual analyses into the long 
historical trends referenced in this book may show that the past 200-plus 
years are unusual in human history in terms of social and economic devel-
opment (see chapters 3 and 4), in terms of political development (chapter 
4 and this chapter), as well as in terms of institutionalized administrative 
arrangements, but it would be arrogant to claim that this is the outcome 
of some teleological necessity. There is no end of or to history; there is no 
ultimate end stage of political and economic development toward which 
humanity cannot but gravitate. Unsatisfying as it may be, one can only 
say that development happened. Why it happened is a question that can 
ultimately only be answered at the most fundamental level of some yet-to-
be-discovered “deep driver” in human history. Lacking knowledge of such,
scholars can only write that development happened, and they can point to 
possible explanations deeper than the superfcial performance indicators 
of economic and social development but certainly not as deep as the kind 
of universal driving force that has organized inquiries in the natural sci-
ences (e.g., gravity, magnetism, the weak and the strong forces, and natural 
selection). 
The idea that there is some kind of destiny or grand theory that helps 
us understand where we came from and why is inherited from the Enlight-
enment. Also originating in that time is the idea that governing should 
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1998), where people observe and discuss policy and politics and where they 
feel comfortable making policies on the basis of more than only factual, sci-
entifc knowledge sources. We may live in massive imagined communities 
of people, but we also live in societies where the abstract bonds of national 
belonging are interwoven with the tribal-like life in the various physical 
communities in which we also live, love, associate, recreate, and work. In 
light of an individual’s life expectancy, 250 years seems a long time, but in 
the light of the history of government, it is but a blip. No wonder we are 
still coming to terms with the new position and role of people and their 
governments in democratic society. That it is possible to come to grips 
with his has much to do with how in democracies (a) authority has come 
to be regarded and (b) the bases upon which people make decisions. Both 













Governing as Process 
Negotiable Authority and Multisource Decision-Making 
As long as government is the property of a political elite that also controls 
the economy, there is little opportunity for people at large to question—
let alone examine—how it conducts its business. For thousands of years,
those in power did not have to trouble themselves with being accountable 
to the people. They kept accounts of taxes on traded material goods and 
of taxes in kind and in labor (the latter also known as corvée). The old-
est records of writing are of trade, taxes, and wages. The power elite did 
not have to account for its behaviors. When people rose in protest, it was 
usually against high or extraordinary tax burdens. We do not know how 
frequently tax revolts occurred. Some say it was relatively rare (Webber 
and Wildavsky 1986, 33), while others claim it could well have been quite 
frequent but simply unknown since the lives of the lower classes leave lit-
tle record for most of history (Burg 2003, xvii). Records of tax rebellions 
increased from the European Middle Ages on, and there are quite a few in 
any country (for the Netherlands, see, e.g., Dekker 1982). 
Thus, what people protested against for most of history is oppressive 
or exploitive government, and the tax burden is the most visible and tan-
gible expression of discontent with how those in government (ab)use their 
role in society at large. And, of course, people cannot “look” much further 
than what infuences their daily lives, for they simply have little knowl-
edge about what happens elsewhere. For most of history, people had no 
means to communicate with one another beyond the locale where they 
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lived. Discussing approaches to tax behavior, Kircher distinguished a “cops 
and robbers” or “command and control” approach that breeds distrust and 
enforces compliance by any means, on the one hand, from a “service and 
client” approach that establishes trust and a cooperative tax climate, on the 
other (2007, xv). That distinction is useful to characterize governments’ 
role in societies at large. Up until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, the command-and-control approach to governing dominated,
and people were generally in no position to question the authority or legit-
imacy of those who governed. This approach to governing still dominates 
territorial states with limited or no democratic practices, and bureaucracy 
in such totalitarian systems serves those in power, not the people. In early 
democratic political systems, that approach was slowly replaced with some-
thing closer to the service-and-client approach, where bureaucracy actually 
serves the citizenry at large through the many tasks, functions, and services 
it provides. 
From the end of the eighteenth century on, people began recognizing 
that discontent with tax burdens was a manifestation of a deeper problem,
namely discontent with existing social and economic circumstances. Even 
when they expressed discontent with visible problems, these pointed to less 
visible trends. From the late eighteenth century on, governments began 
systematically collecting data about demographic, social, and economic 
circumstances with an eye on using that information as the basis for public 
policymaking (Boorstin 1985, 641–642, 670; Hacking 1990, 3, 118). Those 
in power found it expedient to inform themselves about these deeper prob-
lems, as, for instance, documented in the “royal essay contest” on social 
and economic pressures in Bavaria issued in 1848 by King Maximilian II 
(Shorter 1969). Such data formed not only the basis but also the justifca-
tion for public policy, and policies based on practical experience rather 
than science, scientifc research, and big data are increasingly considered 
uninformed (Murphy 1997, 153–156, 217). 
In chapter 4, I mentioned two governmental revolutions. The frst is 
the emergence of government in the increasingly sedentary communities 
of prehistory. In those communities political and economic power was con-
centrated in the hands of a social-economic-political-cultural elite, and this 
would be the normal situation for millennia. Under those circumstances,
it was unlikely that people would question those in power, and they only 
rebelled when life’s burdens became unbearable. Governmental author-
ity and decision-making were simply beyond questioning, let alone infu-
encing, even decisions by those who were not considered to be of divine 
descent (after all: one cannot question a divinity, e.g., Pharaoh, the Japa-
















                  
 
  
nese emperor until 1945) or appointed to such high offce by divine inter-
vention (droit divin, e.g., medieval and early modern monarchs in Europe; 
the election of a pope is allegedly inspired by the Holy Spirit). It is because 
of the second governmental revolution, prompted by two tax revolts—the 
American and the French Revolutions—that simply spiraled out of hand,
that people’s understanding of public authority and public decision-making 
changed signifcantly, and it became possible to look at governing as a pro-
cess for the frst time in history. 
This chapter is on governing as process and it focuses on the nature and 
processes of public authority and public decision-making in a democratic 
political system. The point of departure will be the position and role of the 
civil servant (section 1) since the bulk of people working in the public sec-
tor nowadays are administrative careerists. Following that will be a discus-
sion of the nature of public authority (section 2) with specifc attention to 
negotiable authority (section 3). It is that element of negotiation that is also 
characteristic of contemporary decision-making processes (section 4). In 
everyday practice, stakeholders in decision-making processes, that is, polit-
ical and administrative offceholders, lobbyists, representatives of interest 
groups, citizens, and so forth, not only rely on scientifc knowledge but 
also on other sources of knowledge (section 5). It is that nature and process 
of public authority and public decision-making in a democratic political 
regime that allows people to take most of what governments do for granted 
(section 6). Given that governments have existed for some 10,000 years,
and this is worthy of saying again, it is nothing short of amazing that public 
authority and public decision-making have changed in such a short span 
of time (section 7). Countries seeking democracy should know it involves 
as much day-to-day processes on the ground with, for instance, regard to 
decision-making as it does features of the institutional arrangement, such 
as negotiable authority. Thus, the historical perspective that dominated in 
chapters 2, 3, and 4 provides the background against which we can under-
stand the contemporary trends discussed in chapters 1 and 5. 
1. The Role and Position of Career Civil Servants 
in Democratic Political Systems 
For most of history, career civil servants or bureaucrats served those in 
power, effectively helping them to stay in power. They did so because they 
too benefted from some of the spoils of high offce; that is especially the 
case with bureaucrats in leadership positions. The ishakku (ruler) of the Ur-
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Nanshe dynasty in the city-state of Lagash (twenty-ffth and twenty-fourth 
centuries BCE) would receive fve shekels when a man divorced his wife; 
the vizier, the highest-ranked bureaucrat, would receive one shekel (Burg 
2004, 8–9). Historically, power was the property of the few, and bureaucracy 
was the instrument of those in power. The Atlantic Revolutions changed 
that dramatically. No longer was the ruler or the ruling elite sovereign, and 
bureaucracy began serving those who were elected to power. Since then,
sovereignty has resided in the citizenry as a whole, who elect from among 
themselves some to represent them in high public offce. Bureaucracy car-
ries out the programs and policies promised by those representatives. It is 
in this sense that bureaucracy serves the people. Ideally, in a democracy,
“Selfess public offcials are to the body politic as selfess friends are to 
individuals” (Fleishman 1981, 82). 
While in physical communities, people governed among themselves, it 
was in imagined communities that people recognized the need to govern 
through specifcally designed institutions in which power was concentrated 
to make the authoritative decisions necessary for the collective to survive.
That power was invested in offceholders, and it is in that sense that the 
primacy of politics doctrine has always been central to any political system’s 
functioning—from the most ruthlessly dictatorial to the most pluralist of 
democratic regimes. However, government’s position and role in society 
have changed fundamentally in the past 200-plus years and with it the 
meaning of the primacy of politics as well as the role and position of those 
elected to political offce and those appointed in administrative positions.
In a democratic political system, political offceholders are accountable 
through elections and, in some cases, term limits to ensure that they are 
subject to the will of the people. At the same time, those elected are not 
beholden to the people in that they act as trustees or guardians of democ-
racy, which requires that actions are sometimes taken that some people 
may not like but beneft society at large. 
In democratic political systems, the primacy-of-politics doctrine 
emphasizes that the administration is subordinate to politics, which means 
that those whose political party platform got them elected to high offce 
will be faithfully served by the bureaucracy in the pursuit of the program(s) 
promised when they were elected. Bureaucracy should serve a new admin-
istration coming into offce as faithfully as the previous administration,
provided, of course, that an administration’s program respects consti-
tutional principles and laws and that an administration is not overtly or 
covertly beholden to any special interests, such as to, in this day and age,
the interests of large businesses and multinational corporations. In the 
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previous chapter, I touched upon the possibility that the state’s governing 
authority could be eroded by global economic powers, and I will return 
to this theme in the fnal chapter. But, in this section, it is appropriate to 
more precisely pinpoint what exactly is under threat of being captured by 
big business. 
The part of the public sector that is most vulnerable to the infuence 
of private interests is politics, and specifcally those who aspire to and get 
elected into political offce. While historically, politics had a hold over the 
economy, it seems that today the economy, and especially big business,
increasingly has a hold over politics. This varies from country to country 
and is quite prominent in the United States. But, in general, trust in gov-
ernment has been dwindling since the late 1960s in all democratic systems,
and what keeps democracies actually operating are the career civil servants.
This was foreseen by Georg Hegel, who called career civil servants the new 
guardians of democracy. In the words of American professor of law and 
public policy Joel Fleishman: “Without selfess public offcials, the elec-
torate has no resources when confronted by the hard and painful choices 
that democracy must make from time to time—choices that require some 
to sacrifce and others to gain. . . . [But] how do we know that what claims 
to be the public interest really is? .  .  . Selfess offcials can be trusted to 
exercise judgement without suspicion that they have been swayed by those 
who will be beneftted by the rest of us.” A few sentences later he writes: 
“Our politics is impoverished, and the range of possible solutions to our 
problems diminished, by the tendency of many politicians to look to their 
own self-interest in re-election. That is not leading: it is following in the 
profoundest sense” (Fleishman 1981, 83). 
Can career civil servants be these selfess offcials, carrying out their 
duties on behalf of the interests of the citizenry at large? It is clear that the 
bulk of regulations that have the force of law are prepared by career civil 
servants who have relevant education and experience in the policy area in 
which they work (Page 2012). We should not expect legislators to have 
detailed knowledge of and make decisions about everything that is subject 
to regulation, and we certainly cannot expect them to effectively oversee all 
that is done in the name of government. Street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 
1980) and policy bureaucrats (Page and Jenkins 2005) are indispensable to 
government today. But whom or what do they serve? 
In one of his valedictory lectures, American public administration 
scholar Dwight Waldo lists 12 ethical obligations of career civil servants 
(1980, 103–106). The list shows how challenging the career civil servant’s 
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Constitution: oath of offce, especially to uphold the political sys-
tem/regime and its values; this is diffcult because what loyalty 
means is ambiguous (Rohr 1986; Rutgers 2010). For instance,
what does equality before the law mean, and how can it be real-
ized? Does an obligation to uphold the constitution also include 
obeying those elected to political offce? As important as the pri-
macy of politics is, we know from the Milgram and Zimbardo 
experiments that people may obey illegitimate decisions. That 
being the case, should career civil servants actively derail or 
even sabotage political desires? We know that they can (O’Leary 
2006), but should they? 
Law: civil servants need to obey the laws of the land, and this is dif-
fcult because the law is not always clear. What should one do 
when laws confict? What if they appear unconstitutional? What 
is the status of secondary versus primary law? In Continental 
European political-administrative systems, public action is 
almost automatically perceived in terms of Rechtsstaat (for lack of 
better translation, “constitutional state”), a concept that empha-
sizes both the “rule of law” and the “justness” of law. By way 
of contrast, in the United States, the public interest drives the 
“rule of law,” and people need to be reminded, time and again,
that constitutional and administrative law are as important to 
the vibrancy of democracy as public policy and management (cf.
Newbold and Rosenbloom 2017). 
Nation or country: civil servants are obligated to the people, not just 
to the regime or those in power; but who are the people? Is it the 
majority? To what extent should civil servants be mindful of the 
interests of the minority or minorities? 
Democracy: the will of the people, but how is that expressed in law 
or otherwise? Is the will of the people the same as the welfare 
of the people? And, in whose eyes: the people, the philosopher-
king, the new guardian? 
Organizational-bureaucratic norms: Waldo lists such generic norms 
as loyalty, duty, and order, as well as effciency, effectiveness, and 
economy. However, he also mentions more specifc norms, and 
these would include function, clientele, and technology. To what 
extent should these norms drive policy and decision-making by 
career civil servants? 
Profession and professionalism: policy bureaucrats feel they must 
uphold the values of their profession. Medical doctors have their 









Hippocratic oath. Many professional associations have a code of 
ethics and even behavioral standards linked to each of the codes.
But what about career civil servants with a higher-education 
background in government? Should they adhere to the profes-
sional and scientifc standards of their discipline and seek to pro-
vide evidence-based knowledge? And is that which is specifcally 
mentioned in a code of ethics that which should be obeyed, while 
what is not mentioned is not subject to it? How far can we go 
with legislating morality? 
Family and friends: should an obligation and loyalty to country and 
political regime override that to family and friends? 
Self: this concerns personal strength and integrity and at what point 
civil servants can say no to a directive. Can they do so when a 
decision they have to oversee or execute violates their individual 
values? Should they say no, even when a decision to not imple-
ment may result in harm to them and their families? One can 
imagine what it must have been like for civil servants in Nazi 
Germany and the occupied territories to swear an oath of loyalty 
to the regime or, when refusing, face the consequences for self 
as well as family. 
Middle-range collectivities: these include political party, race/eth-
nicity, religion, labor union, interest group. Many will argue that 
loyalty to these should not be a consideration, but in practice 
they play a role in day-to-day decision-making, as we shall see 
in section 5. 
Public interest / general welfare: this has much in common with the 
constitution, law, nation, and democracy, but Waldo views it as 
analytically separate from them. What exactly is the public inter-
est or general welfare? 
Humanity/world: those in government should operate out of fun-
damental respect for everyone’s humanity. As American politi-
cal scientist Louis Gawthrop reminded us, agape and caritas are,
respectively, the Greek and Latin concepts of love and respect 
for one another as central to democracies (Gawthrop 1998, 70). 
Religion or God: is there a higher authority than can be found and 
created by people on earth? In private life, anyone can appeal to 
and live by the principles of a religious faith, but to what extent 
can that attitude be exercised in public life? Can a public servant 
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is created by humankind? The separation of state from religion 
suggests not, but we know that religion plays a role in the public 
life of various countries to varying degrees. 
Waldo shows how complex ethical obligations in public life really are.
In combination, these ethical obligations may generate value conficts in 
a public servant on top of the value conficts and choices attached to the 
substantive issues that need attention. What can career civil servants do to 
resolve value conficts between issues and within themselves? Hodgkinson 
notes that there is a natural tendency for civil servants to resolve value 
conficts at the lowest possible level so that moral issues and choices can be 
avoided. In his words: “An aim of [government is] to rationalize and routin-
ize procedures for the resolution of value issues at the level of least organi-
zational cost. The administrative-managerial preference for the avoidance 
of ‘moral issues’ or contests of principle can also be explained by the fact 
that lower-level solutions may be amenable to compromise and persuasion,
whereas higher-level conficts may be irreconcilable, not only moral but 
also mortal” (Hodgkinson 1982, 117). 
Gawthrop expresses the same line of thought in forceful terms: “In 
attempting to maintain the artifcial appearance of duty, many public 
administrators have sought to link their commitment of service to the 
amoral pretense of detached objectivity, neutral competence, and dispassionate 
loyalty” (1998, 41; emphasis added). He writes that “the luster of our pre-
cious democratic concepts can . . . be corroded by an administrative service 
that has been intellectually, ethically and motivationally neutered by the can-
ons of objective impersonality in the name of effciency, economy, impartiality,
or procedural justice” (73; emphasis added). 
The reader is familiar with Max Weber’s insistence upon the public 
servant who administers and applies the law without anger or passion 
(sine ira et studio), and so without regard for who is being served. And the 
reader is familiar with Weber’s dictum that authority comes from knowl-
edge (Herrschaft kraft Wissen), and this includes substantive as well as 
organizational-procedural, societal, and personal knowledge. While for 
most of history, governments asserted their authority via force, donation 
(bribe, gift, graft), or divide and rule, it is only recently that authority has 
been established through conciliation and negotiation (Hodgkinson 1982,
167–168). 
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2. The Nature of Public Authority 
One might think that with government as the only actor in society with 
the authority to make binding decisions on behalf of the entire popula-
tion in a country, public authority would be an important area of study 
when trying to understand the role of government in society. Surprisingly,
it is not. In the study of public administration, much attention is devoted 
to evidence-based, empirical research on current problems, policies, orga-
nizations, management, and organizational behavior resulting in usable 
knowledge. This is understandable because every day, government meets 
challenges for which solutions need to be found. In this constant search for 
usable knowledge, conceptual studies are much less common but no less 
needed because they provide the context within which public action can be 
understood and legitimized. That is, public action is not only legitimized 
by its short-term outputs, which is what much performance measurement 
is focused on (see chapter 5), and longer-term outcomes, it is also justifed 
by ex ante considerations of why certain actions are desirable. In the case of 
this book, it is important to develop understanding of the nature of public 
authority in the past and today in the effort to answer our question of what 
government actually is. 
The literature on authority is substantial and especially so in philoso-
phy and political theory (Friedrich 1958, 1972; Flathman 1980; Raz 1990; 
Lincoln 1994). I limit the discussion in this section to Western political 
theory, but only for lack of knowledge of literatures on it in other parts of 
the world. However, as public authority is related to doing what is ethical 
for the people as a whole, there are sources outside the modern West that 
merit the attention of those interested in the position and role of govern-
ment, such as studies by Kautilya in ancient India, Shen-Buhai, Kung-Fu-
Tse, and Lao-Tse in ancient China, and Ibn Khaldûn in the Arab-speaking 
world of the fourteenth century (for a comparative study of ethical tradi-
tions in the world, see Jordan and Gray 2011). 
Authority has been conceptualized in terms of purpose and of pro-
cess. The former concerns substantive-purposive theories (S-P theories) that 
address authority as a type of power, and the latter involves formal-procedural 
theories (F-P theories) that are focused on rules and offces. Max Weber’s 
distinction between charismatic, traditional, and legal authority is an exam-
ple of an S-P theory since it defnes authority as accepted power exercised 
by identifable individuals. That type of theory tends to focus on an author-
ity or de facto authority and assumes that only people can be invested with 
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offcer, a professor, that is, anyone whose decision will affect someone else 
and is accepted when considered reasonable and legitimate: to form an 
international alliance, to sign off on an entitlement, to give a citation, to 
grade an exam or paper. Authority can also be seen as invested in rules and 
organizations with their offces, effectively separating the offce from the 
offceholder. An incumbent of high political offce may not be regarded 
as an authoritative individual, even though the offce is one of in author-
ity or de iure authority. As long as the tasks associated with the offce are 
fulflled according to the existing formal and informal rules, decisions and 
actions are considered authoritative. These two conceptions of authority 
are intricately twined in a democratic political system, since authority is 
“the accepted or legitimate use of power, formally invested in an individual 
offceholder (whether political or administrative) (the an authority or S-P
aspect), the use of which is constrained by explicit rules (the in authority
or F-P aspect)” (Raadschelders and Stillman 2007, 12). Characteristic of 
democratic political systems is that offceholders are subject to the law, and 
in that sense the F-P aspect supersedes the S-P aspect. It is obvious that 
in nondemocratic political regimes and governments, authority is simply 
concentrated in an individual or ruling coalition that is the source of law 
and thus above the law. 
In the early sedentary and imagined communities, the chief had little,
if any, offcial authority (see chapter 4). As settlements grew in population 
size, the ruler’s position acquired increasing authority that was buttressed 
by attributing some kind of divine element (descent, intervention, appoint-
ment). Pharaoh descended from the sun god Ra; Caesar claimed to have 
descended from Aeneas and his mother Venus; Roman emperors claimed 
their authority as divinely sanctioned, as did many European medieval and 
early modern monarchs; Chinese and Japanese emperors were regarded 
as divine. Since antiquity, authority has been identifed as a property that 
is exercised in a designated place. It emanated from those born into or 
appointed to an authoritative position. It is only since the seventeenth cen-
tury that authority has become something identifed with people as a body,
even though it took another three centuries for this to become tangible and 
manifest in the right to vote for all adult citizens. Finally, and as the most 
recent expression, authority can be regarded as a process. These four P’s of 
authority will be briefy discussed below. 
For much of history, public authority was regarded the property of 
an individual, and this is no better expressed than in Weber’s concepts 
of charismatic and traditional authority. His legal authority is invested in an 
offce, and it is rational when (a) not based on personal whim or motive 














    
and (b) exercised according to the rules and laws determined by those who 
represent the people. The purest type of legal authority is bureaucratic 
authority, which is executed on the basis of knowledge and professional 
competency without bias against individuals (Weber 1980, 129; Gadamer 
1975). Since authority is connected to offce, it is superior to individual 
will. As can be seen in Table 6.1, Weber’s types of authority may be analyti-
cally distinguishable, but in practice overlap. Some popes have charismatic 
and legal authority (e.g., John XXIII, John Paul II, Francis); several popes 
were scholars whose theological and diplomatic expertise is considered 
authoritative (e.g., Paul VI). Traditional and legal authority can be passed 
to a successor, such as a king; charismatic authority is by defnition per-
sonal and cannot be transferred (McIntosh 1969, 160, 163). But monarchs 
before the eighteenth century occupied offce as “in authority,” and starting 
with the Glorious Revolution in 1688 (perhaps even as early as with the 
Magna Carta in 1215, which was also the result of a tax dispute) a mon-
arch’s authority has been tied to the offce and circumscribed by law (cf. the 
English notion of king-in-Parliament). 
The authority of political offceholders in democratic systems is almost 
always exclusively legal authority. Most elected offceholders are members 
of a legislature, with the exception of various offces at state and local levels 
in American government (e.g., in local and county government: coroners,
sheriffs, judges, superintendents of education, school board members). 
Career civil servants have an important role in the democratic politi-
cal system since they “make binding decisions and take legitimate action,
within a specifed institutional arrangement, either upon explicit expres-
sion of or implicit delegation by the legislature or political executive or 
upon autonomous understanding of the common interest, provided that 
TABLE 6.1. Authority as property 
Property of . . . Source of authority One individual Multiple individuals 
Individual person or Tradition Tribal chief, monarch Aristocracy, ruling 
organization (an dynasty 
authority) 
Charisma Pope, Dalai Lama Red Cross, supreme 
court 
Expertise Master craftsman, Craft guild, think tank 
scholar 
Offceholder (in Law and reason President, king-in- Legislative assembly 
authority) Parliament 
Law/reason plus Civil servant Bureaucratic 
technical expertise organization 
Source: Expanded from Raadschelders and Stillman 2007, 19. 
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such action (i.e., making binding decisions) is taken on the basis of con-
stant interaction with stakeholders (representatives of interest groups,
citizens)” (Raadschelders and Stillman 2007, 14). They are accountable to 
those elected in offce but even more accountable to the people as sov-
ereign. In nondemocratic political systems, bureaucrats merely serve as 
instrument and at the pleasure of the one or those in power. There is no 
doubt that career civil servants today play an indispensable role in policy-
and decision-making (cf. Page and Jenkins 2005; Page 2012), and this was 
recognized by Hegel, who thought the professional civil servant to be the 
modern equivalent of Plato’s guardian (cf. philosopher-king) (Hegel 1991,
332–335; compare with Dewey’s expert-specialist king, 1927, 205; see also 
Gadamer 1989, 131). While Weber was concerned about the possibility of 
bureaucracy overshadowing and even constricting democracy, Hegel was 
much more optimistic, believing that bureaucracy was necessary for the 
protection of democracy (cf. Shaw 1992, 385–387). 
Also originating in antiquity is the idea that authority has to be exer-
cised in a specially designated place, such as a legislative assembly, a city 
council room, or a courtroom. If authority is exercised outside such a place,
it is usually made visible through some kind of symbol, such as a uniform 
with a badge or the fasces of Roman dictators. In antiquity and medieval 
times, people could only speak with authority in a designated space, such as 
the agora in ancient Greece, the forum in ancient Rome, and the Gulating
in ninth- to thirteenth-century Norway. In the past two centuries, authori-
tative actions and decisions have taken place in multiple and competing 
places and stages or arenas (Flathman 1980, 72). Nowadays, there are liter-
ally hundreds if not thousands of public bureaucracies, and each has a place,
stage, or arena for authoritative decisions and actions, and it is argued that 
this is a new manifestation of authority (Lincoln 1994, 143). Elected and 
high-level appointed offceholders operate in the political and administra-
tive arenas, but also in the societal arena. Middle- and lower-level career 
civil servants mainly work in the bureaucratic arena, but they do so usu-
ally in collaboration with colleagues from other bureaucratic arenas and in 
interaction with representatives of interest groups in the social arena that 
are relevant to the policy they’re working on. These places, stages, and 
arenas together create and maintain authority in society. With the growth 
of government since the late nineteenth century, authority can no longer 
be located in a single space, nor can it be attributed to a single individual or 
a small group. This fragmentation of authority across multiple places and 
arenas is also visible in the international arena. Territorial states may be 
the sovereign decision-makers, but it is undeniable that there are multiple 

















international nonproft and private actors, as well as multiple intergovern-
mental and supranational organizations, that are part of policymaking in 
the global arena (Ku 2018, 38). 
It was not until early modern times that authority became increas-
ingly identifed with the people. Thomas Hobbes defnes authority as the 
right to take action by an author who owns his words and actions or by 
an actor “whose words and actions [are owned] by those whom they rep-
resent” (1987, 218 [1651]). The ultimate or great authority is “indivisible,
and inseparably annexed to Soveraignty” (237). It is the people, or com-
monwealth, who create an offce or (e.g., legislative) body as an artifcial 
person. That is, sovereignty may be invested in an individual person, but as 
offceholder, this individual is an artifcial actor. This people or common-
wealth also creates artifcial chains or civil laws by and through which the 
commonwealth is governed (1987, 263 [1651]). However, being concerned 
about the stark choice between state and anarchy, in Hobbes’s view sover-
eignty and ultimate authority may rest with the people as a whole but has 
to be invested in and channeled through a sovereign “with Authority to 
represent in that employment, the Person of the Common-wealth” (289).
A similar emphasis on authority as a relational concept can be found with 
John Locke, although he emphasizes that the legislative authority is sub-
ject to “promulgated standing laws, and known authorised judges” (1986,
185–186). In his words, “Exceeding the bounds of authority is no more 
a right in a great than a petty offcer, no more justifable in a king than a 
constable” (220). With Hobbes and Locke, public authority is regarded 
as a human creation and no longer primarily associated with religious or 
secular truth-claims. 
In the course of the eighteenth century, authority came to be regarded 
as synonymous with tradition and blind obedience and thus an impedi-
ment on the road to reason, freedom, and progress. This rather static 
interpretation of authority did not hold up for long, and Gadamer points 
out why: “There is no such unconditional antithesis between tradition and 
reason . . . the fact is that tradition is constantly an element of freedom and 
of history itself. Even the most genuine and solid tradition does not persist 
by nature because of the inertia of what once existed. It needs to be affrmed,
embraced, cultivated” (1975, 250; emphasis added). The last part of this quo-
tation is important because it not only reminds us that authority has to be 
acknowledged time and again, but also indicates that authority can only 
be understood in relation to the authoritative, which can be defned as the 
widely shared values and beliefs that ground the legitimacy of authority 
(Flathman 1980, 26). And tradition and authority leave ample room for 
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What started with Hobbes and Locke comes to full fower in Jean-
Jacques Rousseau’s concept of authority as a social contract between indi-
viduals who are together sovereign and whose government is legitimate 
only when acting upon consent of the governed. Rousseau’s general will is 
not the aggregated individual consent of the governed but a general will 
grounded in reason. He contrasts this general will with the “Will of All”
that represents the private and aggregated interests of the majority (Rous-
seau 1986, 203 [1755]). Rousseau acknowledged the possibility of associa-
tions and partial societies, but hoped that there would be so many that no 
inequality could arise from the power of membership numbers. The ideas 
of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau prepare the ground for this fundamental 
reversal of the ruler-people relationship that was solidifed with subsequent 
changes in the institutional superstructure at the level of constitutional 
rules (chapter 2: separation of public and private, politics and administra-
tion, state and church; and constitutions) as well as at the level of collective 
rules (chapter 2: separation of offce and offceholder, but also expansion 
of voting rights). 
Authority as property, as place, and as people has something of a static 
ring. It is invested in people or in organizations. Individuals as offcehold-
ers can lose that authority because of term limits or resignation; organiza-
tions can lose authority following, for instance, a change in administration.
Thus viewed, authority can transfer from one actor to another, but its con-
tent is subject to change only when circumstances prompt such. However,
authority has taken on a new meaning in democratic political systems, for 
in such systems decisions and actions are considered authoritative only 
when they have been the outcome of negotiation. 
3. Negotiable Authority as Key to Understanding 
What Democratic Government Is Today 
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau understood authority as something created 
by humans and invested in an offce with an incumbent or in a body, that 
is, a collegial decision-making body such as a legislature, or a bureaucratic 
organization such as a police department. As beftting the time and context 
in which they wrote, they did not need to consider the process leading up 
to a decision or action as an element that contributes to its authoritative-
ness. In democratic political systems, though, authority as process becomes 
critically important. 
In the static view, authority is expressed and exercised as the legal 
manifestation of an invested property (i.e., legal authority, in authority) 














or as the property of an individual as offceholder (an authority). Public 
administration scholars tend to focus on this static element, as is clear from 
their attention to formal procedures and arrangements. Since the 1960s 
and 1970s, and especially in Western democracies, attention has turned 
toward a more dynamic aspect of authority, namely that what is considered 
as authoritative is viewed as resulting from the quality of the processes 
preceding and following a decision or action. In this perspective, authority 
is the refection of values shared throughout society as well as the product 
of interactions in a network of actors. Authority channels action, can be 
an outcome of action in multiple arenas, and is multilayered. At the most 
abstract level, authority provides the master narrative, the ultimate foun-
dation and legitimation of governmental decisions and actions. At the col-
lective level, authority is manifest in the rules of engagement according to 
which organizational and individual actors operate. At the more concrete 
and interactional level, authority is exercised in interaction between supe-
rior and subordinate. Traditionally, authority is conceptualized as a one-
way, top-down interaction, but it is becoming more and more common to 
perceive it as a two-way street. In fact, it is also reported as operating bot-
tom-up and is then called “invited authority” (Page and Jenkins 2005, 140). 
In democratic political systems, authority is the outcome of a process 
of negotiation. Several authors have drawn attention to the importance of 
negotiation in the public realm. Don Price mentions the unwritten consti-
tution as something that is adapted by political bargaining to new situa-
tions and circumstances (1983). Murphy notes that “a legality which has 
to negotiate the truths of the world emanating from elsewhere is a differ-
ent kind of legality,” meaning that laws are not fxed and can be reworked 
(1997, 33, 128). In a similar vein, Feeley and Rubin write that “regulation is 
an intimate, albeit not affectionate, process of negotiation, threat, bargain-
ing, compromise, and confrontation that cannot be subjected to fxed, pre-
established rules without becoming excessively lax or excessively harsh. It 
is dynamic, rather than mechanistic” (1998, 348). Focusing on the United 
States, Mansfeld notes that governing is a process of endless bargaining as 
provided for in the Constitution, a process of refection and choice rather 
than one of accident and force (1993, 130, 153). 
The practice of negotiating fts very well in a corporatist style of gov-
erning, where representatives of societal interests and government together 
develop a policy or rule. Corporatism can be defned as “a resolution to 
the problem of social order [where] the state, rather than superimposing a 
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functions with organized groups in civil society” (Hemerijck 1992, 77).
Corporatism provides an alternative to the spontaneous solidarity of com-
munity, to the competition of the market, and to the hierarchy of the state 
through the attempt “to make associative, self-interested collective action 
contribute to the achievements of public policy objectives” (Streeck and 
Schmitter 1985, 17). Corporatism is mostly a style that involves multiple 
rounds of policymaking that is institutionalized in a standing arrangement 
between societal parties (often representatives of employers and of labor 
unions) and a mediating government. It has been an important element of 
policymaking in northwestern European countries throughout the twen-
tieth century, and especially since World War II (Schuck and Kochevar 
2014, 418). 
The consensual nature of corporatist policymaking expands into a 
similar process for rulemaking. Negotiated rulemaking became standard 
in Germany after World War II and spread to other European countries 
(Löfstedt and Vogel 2001, 400, 402). In the United States it was frst applied 
in 1982, became law with the Negotiated Rulemaking Act in 1990, and was 
permanently reauthorized by the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act 
of 1996. Deep down, both corporatism and negotiated rulemaking refect 
how fundamental and important citizen participation is to governments 
in democracy (Tully 2008a, 145). Political association that operates under 
the rule of law (constitutionalism) and democracy (popular sovereignty) is 
the product of continuous negotiation and conciliation (Tully 2008b, 96).
Hoogenboom and Ossewaarde introduce the term “refexive authority”: 
“the belief in the ability of institutions and actors to negotiate, reconcile,
and represent arguments, interests, identities, and abilities” (2005, 614).
This concept refers to a decision or policymaking process that is authorita-
tive when it is characterized by open and participative interaction and an 
accessible decision-making arena. The term negotiable authority goes one 
step further and suggests that the outcome of a policy and decision-making 
process is also authoritative when the various stakeholders know that the 
outcome is not set in stone and can be reopened to negotiation and altered 
when circumstances change. In democracy, negotiable authority is often 
prescribed in rules; in the prehistoric sedentary, agricultural, and self-
governing communities, it was probably a fact of life. 
Negotiable authority establishes the legitimacy of collective or gov-
ernment action, and it does so because it combines “input” and “output”
legitimacy. German public administration scholar Fritz Scharpf distin-
guished these two types of legitimacy in a 2003 paper. Input legitimacy 














concerns public representation and participation and goes back to the 
Greek polis, and to Rousseauesque and French Revolution ideals of seek-
ing and advancing the common good. Output legitimacy concerns how 
these ideals are translated into action and is grounded in ideas expressed by 
Aristotle, Montesquieu, and the Federalist Papers. In Scharpf’s view, legiti-
macy of government action depends on protection of the public against 
the tyranny of the majority (which is the risk of input legitimacy) and on 
evading “the danger of being corrupted by self-interested governors” (with 
regard to output legitimacy) (Scharpf 2003, 3–4; see also Sell 2018, 81). We 
could add that democracy in general can be corrupted by self-interested,
rent-seeking behavior of both public offcials and private actors, a theme 
touched upon in the previous chapter and picked up again in the conclud-
ing chapter. 
Under negotiable authority, those who represent government are often 
career civil servants who operate not so much in a competitive market as 
in a negotiated network (Kettl 1993, 206–207). In that negotiated, net-
worked society, governance is more emphasized than government (Jessop 
2002, 255). In addition, career civil servants are not merely implementors 
of political desires and legislative actions, nor are they just policy experts; 
they also act as mediators between stakeholders and facilitate cooperative 
solutions to complex social problems (Catlaw 2006, 275–277). In democra-
cies, authority has become negotiated order (Colebatch 2010, 69). 
By way of summary, public authority is a complex phenomenon that 
has multiple components in democratic polities. It is still a property, but 
in its legal manifestation, it is especially linked to public offce and not 
to the incumbent of that offce; is manifest in multiple places, stages, and 
arenas; can be defned in terms of formal procedures (F-P theories) but 
is also the outcome of informal network interaction (S-P theories); and 
is in practice exercised and continuously negotiated through the involve-
ment of multiple publics. In this compound understanding of authority,
government is one actor among many actors striving to develop policies 
and rules that beneft society at large. It is still a vital actor given its unique 
authority to make binding decisions on behalf of the entire population.
However, whether decisions, policies, and rules are perceived as authorita-
tive depends on (a) the extent to which various interested parties have been 
included in the process leading up to the decision, policy, or rule, (b) the 
knowledge that the content of a decision, policy, or rule can be changed 
when circumstances so indicate, and (c) the awareness that multiple sources 
of knowledge are accessed. 
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4. The Nature of Public Decision-Making 
In democracies, enacting laws, rulemaking as element of administrative law,
and public policies are the product of negotiation, and the outcome can be
revisited and renegotiated when circumstances change. Given the involve-
ment of multiple actors, it follows that decisions are made on the basis
of a variety of inputs or knowledge sources. Presently, much emphasis is
placed on evidence-based policymaking, a process that uses facts established
through scientifc research as the legitimation for policy choices. In general,
scientifc knowledge has become important in the twentieth century as the
preferred basis for decision-making, while public opinion has been rele-
gated to the bottom of a hierarchy of knowledge (Yankelovich 1991, 50). In
light of the key role of career civil servants in decision- and policymaking,
and acknowledging the primacy of politics, it is clear why scientifc, factual
knowledge is preferred (see quotation above from Hodgkinson 1982, 117).
It is conceivable that career civil servants avoid explicating moral issues and
choices by retreating into managerialism. If that is the case, it would suggest
that they “need a technique for resolving value conficts which is superior to
the methods of avoidance, least resistance, or lowest principle” (Hodgkin-
son 1982, 146). As far as I know, there is little or no empirical research into
whether and to what extent civil servants “retreat into managerialism,” but
the process described above as negotiable authority actually provides a way
of dealing with the contentious problems governments are confronted with.
The process described below offers a basis for legitimacy that is broader
than that of evidence-based knowledge only. 
While scientifc, factual knowledge is considered important, a variety of 
authors have questioned whether complex public problems can be reduced 
to being administrative, managerial, and technical problems that require 
only the input of scientifc and administrative experts. In order of year of 
publication, they include Alfred Whitehead (1953, 200 [1925]), Bertrand 
Russell (1962, 260–261 [1931]), and Sheila Jasanoff (1990, 10). Should the 
public not be wary of policy being captured by a scientifc-technological 
elite, as President Eisenhower and C. P. Snow feared (Price 1967, 11)? The 
belief in rational decision-making by scientifc and administrative experts 
is challenged by the bounded rationality that Simon identifed (1946, 64–
65) and that includes the acknowledgment of cognitive and other biases 
in decision-making (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1130; Tetlock 2005; 
Jasanoff 2006, 34; Thaler 2017). It is also challenged by the emergence of 
preventive policy since the 1960s that shifts attention from the known and 
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knowable (the retrospective) to the unknown and unknowable (the pro-
spective) (Jasanoff 1987, 2010). Furthermore, science as the sole basis for 
policymaking is questioned by political offceholders, think tanks, and the 
media (Guston 2007; Jasanoff 1996, 400). 
Rational decision-making in Western countries is usually conceptu-
alized as a linear, sequential, and objective process, while in reality and 
practice it is nothing of the sort. It is a complex activity where several 
things may happen at once; problem defnition, possible solutions, ideas,
people, and outcomes are intertwined; decision-makers can enter and exit 
a decision-making arena (March 1991, 107). Driving home the complex-
ity of decision-making, American sociologist and organizational theorist 
James March pointed out that it is rule-based rather than choice-based; it is 
ambiguous and inconsistent, rather than guided by clarity and consistency; 
it is interpretive rather than instrumental; and it occurs in constant inter-
action with the organizational and societal environment rather than being 
under the control of an autonomous agent (2009, viii–ix). In view of the 
latter, it is not diffcult to see that decision-making involves technical and 
scientifc, organizational, societal, and personal elements and perspectives 
(Hodgkinson 1982, 73; Mitroff and Linstone 1993, 101). 
In the rationalist conception, decisions are primarily made on the basis 
of scientifc knowledge, which Nowotny et al. call Mode 1 knowledge pro-
duction. In contrast, Mode 2 knowledge production involves a diversity 
of knowledge sources accessed in dialogue between various stakeholders 
before and after the decision moment (Nowotny et al. 2003, 186–187).
These stakeholders include those who have a professional and/or organi-
zational involvement or responsibility and those who are the target group 
(citizens). Again, in the words of Dewey: “The shoemaker (expert) may 
know how to make and fx shoes, but the citizen knows where the shoe 
pinches” (1927, 207). Mode 1 and Mode 2 types of knowledge production 
generally occur simultaneously, both being important to the quality and 
authoritativeness of the decision. 
5. Multisource Decision-Making as Standard in Democratic Government 
As much as scientifc knowledge is an important source of knowledge, the 
consensus nowadays is that other knowledge sources are equally, if not 
more, important. These other knowledge sources include organizational 
knowledge of strategies, rules, techniques, procedures, and routines (Jones 
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society; and individual knowledge, often grounded in a mixture of religious,
historical, political, and philosophical views and life experiences. These 
four knowledge sources interact continuously with one another, sometimes 
in a collaborative manner, at other times in an adversarial manner. 
When considering potential solutions to a public problem, decision-
makers can and will turn to these four knowledge sources for information 
(see Figure 6.1). Scientifc or disciplinary knowledge will generate new 
knowledge; organizational knowledge will generate new rules, technolo-
gies, and procedures and even new organizations; social knowledge may 
well result in new laws, norms, and traditions; while individual knowledge 
may be expanded to include other beliefs and habits or even be amended to 
lead to new beliefs and habits. For many of the decisions all levels of gov-
ernment make every day, we can assume that they are made in collabora-
tive interaction between these four knowledge sources. But it happens that 
decisions are made based on social, organizational, and personal knowl-
edge sources while ignoring available scientifc knowledge. A clear example 
is the use of police lineups though scholarship has shown their limitations 
(Wagenaar and Loftus 1990). It is only recently that police agencies have 
moved away from the traditional lineup in favor of sequential photographic 
identifcation (as this author learned when teaching a class of law enforce-
ment offcers in April 2018). There is also ample evidence that decision-
makers deny or suppress scientifc knowledge, and this has been the case,
for instance, with the fact that lead in the atmosphere has negative effects,
that smoking is unhealthy, and that American football players have a much 
higher than normal risk of severe brain impairment and unexpected death 
(for discussion of examples of various types of interaction between knowl-
edge sources, see Raadschelders and Whetsell 2018). 
Governmental decision-making is always of key importance to any 
society, but for most of history it has been a one-way street, exercised in 
a top-down manner, and concerned with relatively short-term objectives.
In the service and knowledge economy of today, public sector decision-
making is even more important because 
(a) government is the only decision-maker with the authority to make 
binding decisions on behalf of all those living in the jurisdiction, 
(b) only governments can generate the resources to address society-
wide concerns, 
(c) only government can take care of problems that private and non-
proft collectives cannot address because the problems are not con-

































































































































































   
  
 
   
 
 




Governing as Process 205 
(d) only governments can play a mediating, midwifery role in an arena 
with multiple stakeholders and interests. 
Disciplinary or scientifc knowledge is important, but no single disci-
pline can provide all information necessary for understanding the nature 
and complexity of public problems, and thus scientifc knowledge in itself 
is not suffcient as a knowledge source (Shields 2008, 212). Decision-
making cannot but tap into different knowledge sources, if only because 
each of them is embodied in and by each of the participants in a policy-
and decision-making process. The position and role of governments in 
contemporary democracies are defned by the fact that decision-making 
is a two-way street, is iterative, and involves a constantly shifting network 
of interactions between individuals who tap into those knowledge sources 
believed to be most important for legitimizing a decision. 
6. The Governing We Can Take for Granted 
It has been said several times so far that, historically, government was the 
property of those in power and the multitude had little to no infuence over 
it. I have repeated this point because the historical experience of an over-
bearing, sometimes oppressive, and sometimes exploitive government is 
deeply embedded in people’s collective memories and still infuences how 
we think about government. 
However, in democratic political systems, the position and role of gov-
ernment are very different, perhaps not always in practice but certainly 
in terms of political theory and institutional arrangements. Government 
serves the sovereign people, who select from among themselves their rep-
resentatives, and the latter are supported for expert input by a vast bureau-
cracy that serves the people. That this bureaucracy is large is simply a func-
tion of the growth of government tasks, functions, and services that citizens 
ask for when dealing with the consequences of the triple whammy of the 
second half of the nineteenth century. 
There is no historical precedent for the contemporary position and role 
of government in the society of democratic political systems, but the over-
all size of government employment as a percentage of total employment 
varies signifcantly depending on whether services are provided directly 
by public sector employees or indirectly via contracting out and/or part-
nerships with the private sector. Overall, Scandinavian countries have the 
largest public sector: Norway (30 percent of the total workforce), Den-











   
mark (29.1 percent), Sweden (28.6 percent), and Finland (24.9 percent).
At the low end we fnd Colombia (3.7 percent), Japan (5.9 percent), and 
South Korea (7.6 percent). Canada (18.2 percent), the United Kingdom 
(16.4 percent), and the United States (15.3 percent) are in the middle of the 
pack (OECD 2017; the percentage for Colombia from McCarthy 2015). It 
is important to consider the extent to which governments rely on indirect 
service providers (i.e., contractors), but as far as I know comparative data 
are missing. We can get a sense of how important it is to determine the 
true size of government when considering data from the United States.
Paul Light has tracked America’s federal government’s blended workforce,
which includes federal civil servants, contractors, grantees, military, and 
postal service personnel. Between 1984 and 2015 the federal civil service 
fuctuated between a low of 1.75 million (2002) and a high of 2.17 million 
(1990) employees. Add in the military and the postal service, and it fuctu-
ated between 4.89 million (1985) and 3.85 million (2015). In 1985, almost 5 
million people worked as contract or grant employees; in 2015 this was 4.3 
million. Thus, the true size of the American federal government declined 
from 9.8 to 9.1 million employees in 2010 and further declined to a little 
more than 7 million by 2015 (Light 2017, 4; 2019). To my knowledge, reli-
able data for state and local government contracting and grantee employ-
ees are not available, but they might underline the importance of indirect 
service delivery. 
Mentioning state and local government in the United States brings me 
to one aspect in which government has not changed all that much over 
time: the most important level of government in many countries is still 
the local level. In December 2017, the American federal career civil service 
amounted to about 2.8 million employees, with another 1.3 million in the 
military; there were 5 million civil servants at state level, and 14.5 mil-
lion employees worked in local government. The most recent comparative 
data that I can fnd are those published by Polet (1998; also in Raadschel-
ders and Vigoda-Gadot 2015, 201), and these show that in northwestern 
Europe, local government is very important, while it is signifcantly less 
important than the regional and national levels of government in southern 
Europe. 
People often think about government in abstract terms and as some-
thing far removed from their day-to-day lives. Obviously, in the city-states 
of antiquity, government offcials (especially tax collectors) were known 
to the people, but as governments grew both territorially and in terms of 
personnel, they became less visible. However, in a variety of countries, it 

















Governing as Process 207 
police and fre departments, public schools, trash collection, maintenance 
of parks and playgrounds, and so forth. The oldest type of government is 
local government as an independent jurisdiction or city-state. Over time,
local governments have become embedded in larger units, nowadays in 
territorial states, but the local level still is the level of government that 
citizens experience directly and possibly identify with most. Throughout 
history, local government is that which generally survives when the upper-
level polity disintegrates. Since the nineteenth century, it has been recog-
nized that local government is also vital in developing and understanding 
citizenship. 
The frst to emphasize the importance of local government was Alexis 
de Tocqueville, writing in the 1830s: “The institutions of a township are to 
freedom what primary schools are to science; they put it within reach of 
the people; they make them taste its peaceful employ and habituate them 
to making use of it” (Tocqueville 2000, 57). A few decades later, John Stu-
art Mill called local government the school for democracy where citizens 
receive their frst experiences with political and civic education (Mill 1984,
378). American political theorist Vincent Ostrom quotes Nobel laureate 
George Stigler, who wrote in 1962: “An eminent and powerful structure 
of local government is a basic ingredient of society which seeks to give the 
individual the fullest possible freedom and responsibility” (Ostrom 1974,
120). 
It is a good thing that citizens can generally rely on all of the things 
that democratic governments nowadays do, but it is not so good that they 
are not aware of that reliance. It is only when things go wrong that citizens 
become aware of the extent to which they need government. Indeed, gov-
ernment today in democratic political systems is very, very different from 
its historical predecessors. 
7. Citizens and Government Have Come a Long Way in a Short Time 
We have seen that people established government in their communities as 
soon as the population became too large for everyone to know everyone 
else. Self-government emerged in human communities some 10,000 years 
ago and is possibly best expressed in its ability to organize collective action 
for irrigation (cf. Mithen 2012). Government as people understand it today 
emerged some 6,000 years ago, but it is only in the past 200-plus years 
that its position and role in society has fundamentally changed. From the 
historical point of view, this is really a very short time. The agricultural 
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Revolution can be credited with some pretty big changes, even when there 
is disagreement about whether it was a driver or a consequence of other 
changes, such as increasing population size, sedentarization, and emer-
gence of institutional arrangements for governing. It was in the decades 
preceding and following the Atlantic Revolutions that the position and role 
of government changed from being situated above the people and per-
ceived as far removed from the people as subjects, to serving the people as 
citizens and being—at least locally—directly experienced by the people. As 
discussed toward the conclusion of chapter 5, perhaps we are in the midst 
of redefning the relationship between citizen and government under the 
forces of globalization. It is certainly the case that citizen and government 
are still in the process of fnding their footing in their changed role and 
position vis-à-vis one another. It seems to me that we cannot yet know 
what exactly the longer-term impact has been of the Atlantic Revolutions.
In terms of political theory, we know that it was during that period that 
a new type of relationship was established between citizens and govern-
ment through a new set of institutional arrangements. But developing a 
new structure does not guarantee that how citizens and governments func-
tion mirrors and follows that new structure. An important step in the right 
direction was made with the developing practice of negotiable author-
ity and multisource decision-making. Both of these processes strengthen 
democracy, as they embody participative interaction. But, if anything,
democracy is a vulnerable political system, especially when private inter-
ests seek to capture public policy and regulation for their own beneft. To 
understand what government is today, we need to address the expectations,
dangers, and pressures government faces, especially from power- and rent-
seeking human beings. 
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Thriving by Self-Restraint, Vulnerable to Human Instinct,
Tribal Community, and Global Society 
The eternal principle through which all republics are born, ruled 
and preserved, . . . consists in the desire of the multitude to be 
governed with equality of justice and in conformity with the equality 
of their human nature. (Vico 2002, 107 [1725]; emphasis added) 
Tyrion: What is it you want exactly? 
Varys: Peace. Prosperity. A land where the powerful do not prey on 
the powerless. 
Tyrion: Where the castles are made of gingerbread and the moats 
are flled with blackberry wine. The powerful have always preyed 
on the powerless, that’s how they became powerful in the frst 
place. (Game of Thrones: season 5, episode 1) 
Mankind’s moral sense is not a strong beacon light. . . . It is, rather,
a small candle fame, casting vague and multiple shadows, fickering 
and sputtering in the strong winds of power and passion, greed and 
ideology. But brought close to the heart and cupped in one’s hands,
it dispels the darkness and warms the soul. (Wilson 1992, 9) 
The title of this book, The Three Ages of Government, may make people 
quickly “think” in terms of stereotypical characterizations. Government is 
bureaucracy, government hovers over us, it is populated by power-hungry 
political offce-seekers and lazy bureaucrats, it is slow, it is offcious, it 
is cumbersome and full of red tape. Those who seek political offce kiss 
babies and make promises but are only interested in getting into and hold-
ing onto public offce with all the trappings of power, prestige, and proft 













associated with it. Those who work in the career civil service come to work,
pretend to do their job, but are only interested in their next promotion and 
raise (cf. the narrative accompanying Erik Satie’s Sonatine Bureaucratique). 
The needs of the public are far from the mind of the public offceholder,
whether elected or appointed. If anything, government is something we 
really do not want. To varying degrees, these stereotypes are the reputation 
of government in many countries, even in Western democracies, and as 
such they are refective of the historical experience of exploitative govern-
ments and of the contemporary degree of distrust that people have devel-
oped about their governments since the 1970s. Government is bad. Private 
initiative and industry are good. 
People as citizens may not see it, but in the imagined communities of 
this world we need government more than ever. Would we really expect to 
survive in a world without government? A world without codifed norms 
and guardrails; without police offcers to protect us from those who seek 
to violate our freedoms; without judges and prosecutors who will sanc-
tion those who violated our celebrated freedoms; without social workers 
who protect the vulnerable, be they very young, very old, or handicapped; 
a world without garbage pickup; a world without school teachers; with-
out . . . take your pick. A society where people no longer know one another 
well enough to know whom to turn to in times of trouble or need is a soci-
ety where people—by necessity—create government. For millennia much 
of the exercise of governing was directed at serving the interests of the few,
of those with political power who, unrestrained, controlled the levers of 
power and the economy. It has only been in the past three, perhaps four 
centuries that people dreamed of the possibility that government could 
actually exist for the beneft of all. 
Vico’s dream at the opening of this chapter is one where we regard each 
other as human beings entitled to justice. It is an old dream, frst expressed 
by Zeno of Elea in the fourth century BCE, affrmed by St. Paul in his 
second letter to the Galatians urging that Jews and Gentiles should sit at 
the same table, pronounced in the American Declaration of Independence 
that all are created equal, reaffrmed in the French Bill of Rights of 1789,
its American version of 1791, and again captured in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights issued by the United Nations in 1948. Vico’s dream 
came close to reality in the three decades after World War II, the decades 
in which—for the frst time in history—a large middle class was born that 
included a population of citizens in blue and lower and middle white-collar 
jobs who had a shot at a good and decent life with a house, a car, and all 



















laboring classes among them, did not think much—if at all—about advanc-
ing their station in life. Survival was their daily task, not social advance-
ment. But since the late eighteenth century it became possible, slowly but 
surely, to consider the possibility of social mobility. 
Tyrion’s observation is one of cynicism in the second epigraph to this 
chapter. He has seen it all. Dream on, he says—it is never going to happen.
The multitude will always be subjected to the behavior of those who are 
able to cash in on their desires, be it political or monetary power. Vico’s 
dream came close; Tyrion’s cynicism refects the human experience with 
those who exploit the power of public offce and money. Are those who 
control political and economic power in the undemocratically governed 
parts of the world chuckling at the diffculties democracies face? Are they 
better aware of the extent to which human instincts of domination and sub-
mission drive public decision- and policymaking? Are they more inclined 
to recognize how much human society continues to operate as an amal-
gam of tribal communities where each works for the in-group and vilifes 
any out-group? Are they more in tune with the fact that global society is 
an unregulated free-for-all, if not a mess? Oh, yes, there are international 
agreements and treaties, but promises are but paper when not translated 
into meaningful action. 
When pondering Vico’s hope and Tyrion’s cynicism, we see that in 
some parts of the world, people have been able to balance the hopes that 
used to belong to the young with the cynicism of the old. Growing up, I 
had no clue about my good fortune in being born in, what French demog-
rapher Jean Fourastié would come to call the glorious 30. Those are the 
three decades following World War II when income inequalities in the 
democratic parts of the world were declining and people in general felt 
the possibility of economic and social advancement because of government 
circumscribing the conditions under which the “free” market could oper-
ate. Vico contemplated the possibility of the ideals that became embodied 
in and by the Atlantic Revolutions; Tyrion smirked at their improbabil-
ity. Vico’s belief is grounded in the conviction that humans can transcend 
their instinctual and tribal inclinations; Tyrion’s observation suggests that 
humans cannot. James Q. Wilson, in the third epigraph, is cautiously opti-
mistic and represents something of a middle ground. 
Vico is a historical person, Tyrion a fctional one, but both are social 
philosophers, considering what can be versus what always will be. The 
great challenge for citizens and government in imagined communities of 
people is, frst, to rise above the instinctual and tribal features that charac-
terize much of humanity’s journey through time, and, second, to rise above 






the existing manipulative political and economic power relations, to think 
in terms of separating politics from economics so that political offcehold-
ers cannot prostitute themselves for money and so that economic power 
houses are limited in their efforts to buy decisions and policies that favor 
their own interests. The infuence of money over politics is especially 
egregious in the United States. Has anyone taken notice of the fact that 
commentators on contemporary American politics in the media and the 
political class speak more frequently to how much candidates have raised 
and the size of their campaign “war chests” than they do about where the 
candidates stand on the issues and problems that confront that society? 
Money, not wisdom, experience, thoughtfulness, or policy, has become the 
measure of contemporary American politics. Where for most of history,
political power circumscribed economic power, which is the meaning of 
the term “political economy,” it seems that today the tables have turned so 
that economic power actually buys political power. Only when political and 
economic power are separated will it be possible to have the kind of society 
where anyone sees the possibility of a better life when government defnes 
the boundaries of the public and private arenas. Ungoverned economics is 
a form of social Darwinism that leaves much of humanity in the dust. In 
the words of American economist Robert Gilpin: “A market is not politi-
cally neutral; its existence creates economic power which one actor can use 
against another” (1987, 23). 
Humanity created government because the prosocial inclinations of the 
more or less egalitarian prehistoric humans living in physical communi-
ties needed to be shored up by artifcial arrangements in the stratifed and 
imagined communities of agricultural, industrial, and service and knowl-
edge societies. We know much about those prosocial desires and needs 
in the physical communities of old, but little about how these prosocial 
desires and needs can be maintained and advanced in the imagined and 
global communities of today. Human beings are prosocial creatures, but 
the more basic instincts of greed for wealth and lust for power can rear 
their antisocial heads because it is possible for the few with power to hide 
in the imagined communities of millions and billions of people and pursue 
base instincts at the expense of the many. Face it, in physical communities 
of 50 to 150 people, it is pretty much impossible to hide; in the imagined 
communities of the continuously urbanizing jungle, it is easy to go under-
ground. How many people with political or economic power can the aver-
age citizen actually name? More than half a century ago, Peter Drucker 
and John Kenneth Galbraith observed that the “new masters” and tycoons 
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bulk of the population and this in contrast to the extent to which nine-
teenth century tycoons faunted their wealth for all to see (Drucker 1957,
35–37; Galbraith 1958, 77). The preference for anonymity is the same 
today, but included now is not so much the extent to which political power 
has become intertwined with economic power, which has always been the 
case, but the extent to which the latter captures and dictates the former,
which is especially virulent in the United States. 
We have no clue how to maintain and advance our prosocial desires and 
needs in the imagined and global communities of today because there is 
no guide to where humanity in its social-economic-political evolution can 
go from where it is now. People may understand—somewhat—the trajec-
tory of their genetic evolution but have little understanding about how the 
speed of cultural evolution affects the species. And that is because we are 
in the midst of it. The 10,000 years of human (self-)governing discussed 
in this volume represent but a blip in the light of all species’ development 
on this earth. Humans are a young species and are still discovering who 
they are, what they can be, and why they exist in the frst place (although 
we may never know the answer to the last question). And they have to 
adapt to faster-paced and ever-increasing communication made possible 
by technologies of their own invention, the consequences of which they 
barely understand. 
The “glorious 30” represents the frst large-scale effort at realizing the 
ideals of the Atlantic Revolutions: liberty in political terms, equality in eco-
nomic terms, and fraternity in social terms. It has proven that all boats rise 
when political leadership rises above personal gain, above the lure of greed,
and when the governmental restraints Adam Smith called for are placed on 
the “free market.” 
In this concluding chapter, I review the analysis of the previous chap-
ters. First, I revisit the two defnitions of government provided in chapters 
1 and 4, respectively, with the latter one relevant only since the govern-
ment revolution that established democratic rule beyond the small city-
state (section 1). In sections 2 to 4, the observations on human instinct,
tribal community, and global society will be summarized and revisited.
Some of the concerns in chapter 5 about the impact of globalization will 
be discussed again in section 5 of this chapter, with particular attention to 
what makes democracy vulnerable: the possibility of rent-seeking behavior,
the sway of populist and xenophobic politics, and the pettiness of na-na-
na-na-boo-boo politics. While section 5 will have a somewhat dispirited 
tone, a more uplifting chord will be struck in section 6 when I argue that 
democratic government has a future in and through the intertwinement of 


















democracy and bureaucracy. That is, to be sure, a democracy where poli-
cies are developed and decisions made on the basis of negotiable authority 
and multisource decision-making that ensures citizen input next to plat-
forms upon which people are elected into political offce and in addition to 
the already well-developed expertise of bureaucracy. An optimistic belief in 
the strength of democracy is what drives the concluding section 7. 
1. The Position and Role of Government in Society 
Government is a social phenomenon that can be studied in specifc times 
and contexts as well as at a more abstract level. The position and role of 
governments varies over time within societies, and the comparative cross-
national perspective shows that governments’ roles and positions also vary 
from one country to the next (Raadschelders and Vigoda-Gadot 2015). At 
the more abstract level, we can defne government’s position and role in 
human societies irrespective of time and place. The defnition quoted in 
chapter 1 does exactly that: 
Government is an institutional arrangement that people develop 
once they start living under sedentary conditions and with growing 
populations, so that they can be assured that internal and external 
order and safety are maintained as best as possible despite the fact 
that they live in imagined communities. (Raadschelders and Still-
man 2017, 1) 
This defnition of government captures any institutional arrangement for 
governing, from the self-governing, agricultural communities of prehis-
tory, to the historical governments of the city-state, the territorial state, the 
empire, and it assumes that all governments throughout history exercise 
functions that secure order and safety, and taxation to pay for it. Indeed,
the emergence and development of government can be regarded as a great 
secular determinant of humanity, in addition to the four spiritual ones 
(Jewish law, Greek philosophy, Christianity, and democracy) that Manent 
distinguished as far as the Western world is concerned (2013, 295). Implicit 
to the defnition above is the fact that government, and government only,
should have the monopoly over the use of legitimate violence, which can 
range from issuing a speeding ticket, to incarceration and execution. Given 
the fact that all historical governments are treated as patrimony or prop-
erty by those with political (and economic) power, the defnition in chapter 


















Government is an institutional arrangement that some individuals
develop and others accept once people at large start living under sed-
entary and urban conditions and with growing populations, so that 
they, that is, those with political and economic power, can be assured that 
internal and external order and safety are maintained as best as pos-
sible despite the fact that people live in imagined communities. 
Explicit in the latter defnition is that the state is the prime actor to deal 
with challenges that transcend its jurisdiction, that is, the maintenance of 
external order and safety. Nowadays, that charge also includes the idea that 
territorial states are the prime actors to deal with global challenges. 
It has been assumed that individuals in the prepolitical world of the 
somewhat egalitarian hunter-gatherer society made a voluntary choice to 
establish a night-watchman state (Shapiro 1990, 6), but I am not so sure.
First, the true night-watchman state with a very limited government that 
only offers functions of assuring order and safety and enforcing contracts 
(Nozick 2013, 26 [1974]) merely existed for a few decades in the middle 
of the nineteenth century in Western Europe, while most governments 
before that time were also quite involved in regulating the economy at 
large, providing infrastructure, and even providing very basic welfare ser-
vices. Second, individual choice represents a rather Western conception 
of society as an aggregate of individual desires. In most parts of the world,
however, the individual is sooner defned by the whole and, as a conse-
quence, Western political theorists are often blind to the relational nature 
and structure of core concepts of politics (Shapiro 2005, 152, 172). The 
second defnition above provides a relational understanding of politics as 
one where some take the lead and many others simply follow or resign 
themselves to the existing power structure. 
We have seen in the previous chapters that this situation existed for 
most of history and that it was radically and fundamentally altered at the 
time of the Atlantic Revolutions, at least in some parts of the world. In 
chapter 2 these changes are described in terms of levels of analyses. The 
most important changes for society at large happened at the constitutional 
level. The separation of a public from a private sector helped in the dra-
matic shift of government as a property and instrument of the few to that 
of a container and mechanism that protects society and its people against 
violence, injustice, and oppression from without and within and enabled 
people as citizens to elevate themselves and their station in life. The sep-
aration of state and church illustrates what in the modern, democratic 
political-administrative system is regarded as public, what as private. That 
is, no organization or group of people in the private realm can authori-



















tatively and effectively act on behalf of the population as a whole. The 
separation of politics from administration ensures that those whom we 
wish to represent us are elected and, through that mechanism of sequential 
elections, held accountable for their actions. It also ensures that those who 
have professional education and experience are appointed in the career civil 
service irrespective of political infuence and affliation, and can thus keep 
an eye on larger community needs irrespective of the waxing and waning 
of political fortunes. The constitutions that have been adopted throughout 
the world since the late eighteenth century express an ancient sense of 
sociality, namely that we all need one another for survival. The assumed 
egalitarianism of the prehistoric hunter-gatherer societies is rekindled in 
that constitutional concept of people being equal under the law. Since the 
late eighteenth century, in various countries across the globe, the people as 
a whole became the sovereign, the source of law, and were served by those 
elected into political offce who, in turn, were supported by the bureau-
cracies of the emerging and growing administrative state. The changes at 
the collective and operational levels, separation of offce and offceholder,
departmentalization, and salary and pension in money, are equally impor-
tant but more internal to the public sector. They ensure that public offce 
cannot be inherited, bartered, or sold, that positions are clearly defned in 
relation to one another for reasons of coordination, and that those who 
work in the public sector are adequately compensated so as to preempt 
bribery, corruption, and taking on extra jobs to make a decent living. 
Clearly, this complex of political-administrative arrangements is novel 
to societies and has been effectively achieved only in those that are labeled 
as democratic. There are various countries in the world that have called 
themselves democratic but have been run as a property of a ruling elite,
such as in the past century the German Democratic Republic (1949–1990),
and presently the People’s Republic of China (since 1949) and the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of Korea (since 1948). For political-administrative 
systems that are truly democratic, that is, not controlled by one particular 
political elite and party, the time- and context-less defnition of govern-
ment as amended in chapter 4 can now be changed as follows: 
Government in a democratic political-administrative system is an 
institutional arrangement that citizens develop and maintain in and 
for the entire jurisdiction (i.e., urban and rural), so that they are 
assured that not only internal and external order and safety are guar-
anteed by means of police, justice, and military functions, but that 
also their well-being is advanced through the provision, production,





















This defnition refects the desires expressed in the eighteenth century 
for a government that actually conducts tasks, fulflls functions, and offers 
services that go beyond the so-called regalian, traditional functions of 
protecting public order and safety through police, justice, and defense.
Giambattista Vico was among the frst to call for this capacity, followed 
by scholars such as Christiaan von Wolff (mid-eighteenth century), Adam 
Smith (1776), and Nicolas de Condorcet (late eighteenth century). The 
development of the welfare state, which is an expression of that ancient,
partially genetic and instinctual, disposition to share resources and care 
for others, has been possible from the late nineteenth century on because 
of the innovative institutional foundation that emerged in the late eigh-
teenth century. It is under the condition of the welfare state that govern-
ments as containers decommodify various services (chapter 5), emphasiz-
ing that the human rights to accessible health care, affordable education,
a safe environment, and protection of those who are not in a position to 
care for themselves should not have a price set by the free market. It is,
indeed, unfortunate that the term “welfare state” has taken on such a pejo-
rative meaning in many Western democracies and particularly in America.
In some circles the term is equated with handouts, laziness, abuse of the 
others’ generosity, corruption, and a devaluation of human purpose, self-
awareness, and responsibility. At its base, however, and regardless of the 
particular programs and policies, the welfare state stands merely for the 
proposition that we have some basic obligations to one another and that 
democratic government is the best mechanism to express, share, and meet 
these obligations precisely because it is beholden to no one group or politi-
cal class but, rather, to everyone as equal members in an imagined commu-
nity. A properly functioning and properly oriented democratic government 
is, by defnition, a welfare state because it is focused on the needs of its 
members regardless of their social standing. 
This human inclination of sharing and caring for others can be linked 
to the four stages of economic development distinguished in chapter 4.
In the physical communities of the hunter-gatherer economy, survival of 
all was assured through sharing and caring for all. In the imagined com-
munity of the agricultural economy, sharing and caring became a charity,
something that people needed to be reminded of (cf. the admonitions in 
Leviticus and Deuteronomy to leave some of the harvest for the sojourner 
and the widow) and were even compelled to do (cf. tithing). In the urban-
izing environment of industrializing economies, it quickly became clear 
that sharing and caring could no longer rely on individual charity nor on 
the institutionalized services of church, mosque, and synagogue, but must 
be organized through government since that is the only societal institution 
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whose actions affect and encompass the entire citizenry and not just some 
segment of it. And what about sharing and caring in the service and knowl-
edge economy since World War II? In some countries, such as the United 
States, sharing and caring is considered a handout when provided through 
government and possibly better when organized as charity through non-
proft or even private organizations. In other parts of the world, such as the 
Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, sharing and caring are still 
considered a public responsibility and a basic human right. 
Throughout time, governments have structured their tasks, functions,
and services through territorial circumscription of jurisdictions, bureau-
cratic organization, and allowing for self-governance.Technically speaking,
government, whether in the early city-states or in contemporary territorial 
states, is an example of self-governance, an expression of the capacity of 
human beings to govern themselves when living in imagined communities.
After all, it is the effort of people to organize for that which hitherto, in the 
physical communities of hunter-gatherers, was simply done as collective 
effort. But government is quickly perceived as “above” the people when 
appropriated and controlled by the few, and then it is no longer regarded 
as an expression of self-governance. It is a function of the second governing 
revolution that people as a whole became sovereign, and where sharing and 
caring became—at least in part and to varying degrees—a public responsi-
bility. It is under that condition that bureaucracy was endowed with a new 
role, namely that of providing services, fulflling functions, and performing 
tasks that serve the population as a whole. Historically, bureaucracy has 
been the instrument of the happy few, enabling the happy few to stay in 
power, with bureaucrats knowing that they also can take some of the riches.
Presently, though not often recognized as such, bureaucracy is the instru-
ment through which the people at large acquire those “things” they cannot 
collective organize for among themselves. In the past, those with political 
and economic power, and through bureaucracy, frequently made impos-
sible demands upon society, and people would rise in revolt. It may be hard 
to understand or comprehend, but democracy, as generally understood in 
today’s world, is not possible without the expertise and professionalism of 
bureaucracy. 
The role and position of governments in their societies always changes 
with the fortunes of the political and economic institutional arrangements 
in place. But historically, governments’ role(s) had been fairly limited and 
their position one of being “above” society. It is only in the past 200 or 250 
years that the position and role of government in some parts of the world 
changed signifcantly. Of course, it is still infuenced by the political and 
 
 









economic atmosphere of the day, but people all over the world can see,
thanks to social media and other means of fast communication, that this 
experiment of a sharing and caring government for all under the protec-
tion and advancement of individual freedoms actually is possible. How-
ever, human beings are still learning how to deal with their contradictory 
instincts and discriminatory behaviors in an increasingly global society. 
2. The Influence of Human Instinct 
In the Western world of democracies, many ideas about society and the role 
of government in it originated in the eighteenth-century Age of Enlighten-
ment. Ideas about separating public and private realms, of state and church,
of politics from administration, of offce from offceholder, and dispositions 
regarding expanding the role of government to include welfare functions,
coalesced in the course of the eighteenth century. Underlying these ideas 
and desires was an increasingly strong belief in the power of human ratio-
nality, which people hoped would help them uncover universal social laws 
to engineer a better society. It is in the course of the eighteenth century 
that some scholars fully expected that the discovery of facts about social life 
would help map trends in society that, in turn, would inform the kind of 
public policymaking that could actually make the world better. Since then,
this belief in rationality and in scientifcally established facts and evidence 
has become so strong that people as citizens and as policymakers leave little 
room in their analyses for the extent to which instinct still plays a role in 
the process of determining courses of public action. Could it be that citi-
zens and policymakers do not care to admit to the infuence of instinctual 
and “tribal” (e.g., ethnic, racial, religious, cultural) responses to collective 
challenges? Would it embarrass people to admit it? Do people really think 
that insisting on the superiority of rationality, on scientifc knowledge,
and on the expertise and professionalism of those who do research and 
those who make policies on the basis of that research will overcome those 
instinctual and tribal inclinations? Do they really believe that policies are 
negotiated by experts and elected offcials only and then also only on the 
basis of scientifc sources of knowledge? These questions are taken up in 
this and the next three sections. Let us start with instinct. 
Human beings are a deeply conficted species, perhaps more so than 
our immediate primate ancestors and contemporary cousins. We are a bit 
chimpanzee, a bit bonobo, characterized by instinctual and behavioral fea-
tures the understanding of which is usually presented in terms of dichot-




   







omies, in an either-or rather than a holistic fashion. Chapter 3 outlined 
these instincts by looking at what we have learned from primatologists 
about human nature, and this was captured by emphasizing that humans 
balance instinct and intent. Instinct includes behavioral responses over 
which people have no control, as well as behavioral responses they have 
learned and have become so ingrained that they are pretty much instinc-
tual. The basic instinct of survival drives all behaviors, and we can under-
stand these behaviors not by regarding them as dichotomous but as ever 
emergent complements. 
Human beings are a social species, and this sociality is the more tan-
gible manifestation of their need to survive. Dependent on context and 
circumstance, humans select the behavior and attitude that best fts the cir-
cumstances. Under some circumstances, survival is served by cooperation,
some degree of egalitarianism, collectivism, conformity, and altruism or 
sharing. As we have seen, this is especially the case in the nomadic, prehis-
toric hunter-gatherer societies. We need not idealize the hunter-gatherer 
life imagined in Rousseau’s concept of the “happy barbarian.” It may be a 
good life unencumbered by the pressures of property and productivity, but 
it is also a challenging life where people mainly live by the day. 
Once people shifted to a sedentary lifestyle with an agricultural econ-
omy, their populations increased to the point that government became 
inevitable. Government became the manifestation of the collective inter-
ests and needs. In that economy, a stratifed, hierarchical society and an 
imagined community of people developed and with it a division of labor 
where many submit and few dominate, where individualism and displays of 
uniqueness, as well as competition and selfshness emerged. Keep in mind 
that these features and behaviors in sedentary, imagined communities did 
not replace the characteristics of nomadic, physical communities. Instead,
they are added. Carried from nomadic time into sedentary life was the con-
fict between groups, or rather between those who consider themselves an 
in-group versus those who are identifed as out-groups. Competition and 
confict between members of the, now imagined, in-group increased under 
sedentary life conditions. Of course, there was confict between individuals 
in physical communities, but we can imagine this to be constrained because 
individuals shared all resources and knew they needed one another for sur-
vival. However, confict beyond a quick fare-up and display of domina-
tion was generally unimaginable because it jeopardized the survival of the 
entire group. 
Under sedentary conditions, though, confict is unavoidable since 
resources are identifed as property of some and not of others. Given that 
people in imagined communities no longer know all members, the viola-
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tion of someone’s existence and/or goods through robbery, rape, or mur-
der by another becomes conceivable. Under that circumstance, the survival 
of the group is no longer assured through the social control mechanisms 
exercised by group members who all know each other but, instead, through 
institutional arrangements that have been endowed with the authority to (a) 
settle interpersonal confict in the in-group, (b) sanction those who disturb 
the order and safety within the group, and, given that all sedentary groups 
experience increasing population sizes, (c) to amass the defensive action 
and resources that protect the large in-group of hundreds, thousands, and 
even millions and billions of people against the aggression of equally large 
out-groups. Under sedentary conditions, life without government is, to 
use Hobbes’s phrase, “nasty, brutish, and short.” For sedentary life with 
government, we should consider the words of US Supreme Court justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes: “I like to pay taxes. With them I buy civilization.” 
Whatever the circumstances, nomadic or sedentary, people in all 
groups, physical or imagined, experience the tension between these com-
plementary “forces” of submission and domination, of egalitarianism and 
hierarchy, of collectiveness and individualism, and of altruism and selfsh-
ness (Edgerton 1992, 73). With regard to the latter, all primates, humans 
included, have the inclination to manipulate, deceive, and cheat, but it is 
mainly in imagined communities that those who do so may actually get 
away with it. In the words of American anthropologist and sociologist Rob-
ert Edgerton: 
As much as humans in various societies, whether urban or folk, are 
capable of empathy, kindness, even love and as much as they can 
sometimes achieve astounding mastery of challenges posed by their 
environments, they are also capable of maintaining beliefs, values,
and social institutions that result in senseless cruelty, needless suf-
fering, and monumental folly in their relations among themselves 
and with other societies and the physical environment in which they 
live. (1992, 15) 
For this reason, people in imagined communities need governing arrange-
ments for the sharing and caring that ensures the survival of all. 
3. The Influence of Tribal Community 
As far as we know, human beings have always lived in groups. It is easy 
to imagine a world, tens of thousands of years ago, where these groups 














were like dots on the earth’s vast landmasses. Since then, the human tribe 
has grown to be earth’s dominant species (although, in terms of numbers,
insects are far more dominant).That is, people of the small hunter-gatherer 
bands settled in hamlets, some of which became small towns, and some of 
these, in turn, became larger cities. Political organization changed also,
because the informal institutions of hunter-gatherer communities were 
replaced by more formal institutional arrangements that have a tendency 
to encompass larger territories. How this human tribe was governed can 
be described via a juridical and a sociological lens, and we shall see that 
both these perspectives are necessary to understand the position and role 
of government in society. 
From a legal point of view, humanity’s political arrangements are those 
of the territorially defned chiefdom, city-state, territorial state, and empire.
The institutional arrangement we call the territorial state becomes the 
dominant type. Even when some scholars claim that this territorial state 
is hollowing out (see next section), it is still the main instrument through 
which governments across the globe deal with domestic, international, and 
global challenges (Kennedy 2006, 238). In a legal or juridical sense, gov-
ernment is still the only actor that can make authoritative decisions that 
affect their society as a whole. This territorial state system was put in place 
by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, and it rests on the agreement that 
a state’s sovereignty or independence is acknowledged and respected by 
other states. In this Westphalian world, the state is the political arrange-
ment through which domestic concerns are addressed and protected from 
foreign interests (Scott 1982, 160–161). It is a system where states’ rela-
tions vis-à-vis one another are defned by formal borders, sanctions, and 
regulations. 
We know that it takes a while for people to identify with the territo-
rial state as the dominant political arrangement. No wonder, because for 
thousands of years, people identifed with a local and, at best, a regional 
community and political entity. If they were part of a larger political entity,
let’s call it an empire, that empire was vast and its leaders resided in a far-
away capital and, save some tribute or taxes, did not interfere with the 
governance of the various localities. For instance, the tribes whose terri-
tory were incorporated by the Romans did not call themselves Roman, not 
even when they were pronounced Roman citizens in 212 CE. Since the 
Treaty of Westphalia, though, state and nation increasingly have defned 
each other. Peoples in various regions still consider themselves in terms 
their older identities, such as Frisians in the Netherlands, but they also 


















regional groups in most countries, but when members of such a group 
meet in another country, they will sooner identify as citizens of their coun-
try rather than as people of a particular group or region in that country. To 
outsiders, all people in England are English and all people in the United 
States are American, but among themselves they know that people from 
Cornwall, Kent, and Northumbria and people from Mississippi, Vermont,
and Wyoming are very different. 
This takes us to the human tribe from a sociological perspective. Human 
beings have always thrived in groups, and they now live in a fssion-fusion 
society where people separate during the day for various reasons such as 
school or going to work but gather again toward the evening in order to 
spend the night together in the safety of the group. Especially in the West-
ern world, people live in very small groups, that is, nuclear families. In 
other societies people live in extended families and may even identify more 
with the tribal level than with the extended family. However, whatever the 
people that individuals identify with most, in imagined communities they 
are almost always members of multiple groups. Organized religion, sports 
groups, interest groups, political parties, and associations of various kind 
are all expressions of the human need to be part of a physical community 
of people. The physical community of the nomadic hunter-gatherer group 
was undifferentiated, and various groups might now and then meet (cf.
segmented society); the imagined communities of today are differentiated 
in multiple physical communities that each serve specifc needs. 
In this perspective, the territorial state is an artifcial supertribe that 
encompasses multiple more or less identifable “tribal” communities.
Sometimes these communities are truly physical communities where every-
one knows everyone else, but more often they are imagined communities 
where only a particular feature, affliation, or endeavor connects people.
This is especially the case with religious and political identities. People 
may identify as Catholic, Muslim, or Hindu, or as labor or conservative,
Republican or Democrat, they are as a whole an imagined community. 
When human beings moved from living in the physical hunter-gatherer 
communities, characterized by reverse dominance, and by kinship, egali-
tarian, and reciprocal relations, to sedentary and imagined communities 
where social relations were increasingly defned through hierarchy, gov-
ernment became an inescapable necessity. Following a transitional phase 
of local self-governance with somewhat formalized institutional arrange-
ments, in the urban supertribe of whatever territorial size, government 
became as much a property as cows and weapons, houses and spouses, and 
this would be the case for almost 6,000 years. Decisions that would be 
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considered despotic in a democratic political context were simply accepted 
by the multitude of people because they lacked the ability to consider the 
possibility that they could rise up and resist unilateral action by elites.
However, and as argued in chapter 4, both elites and criminals can take 
advantage of living in an imagined community by disappearing into the 
crowd and extracting disproportionate rewards from their work. In other 
words, the control of the territorial state over its citizens is not and never 
has been absolute, not even in totalitarian political systems. Nowadays, the 
territorial state’s ability to govern may be eroding as a function of global-
ization. How can we understand the position and role of government in an 
increasingly globalizing society? 
4. The Influence of Global Society 
The territorial state may be still the dominant political arrangement 
through which people govern themselves and entertain relations with other 
similar entities. It is also an arrangement questioned in its ability to address 
concerns and challenges that transcend national boundaries and are even 
in some cases truly global by nature. Indeed, in the eyes of some, the ter-
ritorial state is being hollowed out by “forces” from below and above, by 
problems local in effect but extraterritorial or global in origin. 
Forces from below include both private stakeholders and interest 
groups that directly interact with similar entities in the global arena, as well 
as subnational jurisdictions that directly engage with similarly subnational 
jurisdictions in other countries. The most important private stakeholders 
are the transnational corporations and enterprises that elude the long arm 
of the territorial state and have signifcant infuence on economic poli-
cies. In the public sector, subnational regional and local jurisdictions have 
emerged as players in their own right. At the regional level, at least two 
groups of actors can be discerned. On the one hand, there are the tribe-like 
entities (e.g., Kurds, Basques, Québécois) that seek independence from an 
existing territorial state and can be found all over the globe. On the other 
hand, there are the formal political subnational jurisdictions that have 
become players, and this is nowhere more visible than in the European 
Union, a regional player in the global environment, but also a player with 
various internal regions, that is, counties, provinces, Länder, départements, 
and so on, organized in the Committee of Regions. In each member state,
these regional jurisdictions have sought to defne their role in a globalizing 
















ever, more important at the subnational level are cities, especially the larger 
ones, and certainly metropolitan regions. 
The city has been called the most enduring and stable mode of social 
organization (Khanna 2016, 49) and a variety of scholars point to the city’s 
role as hub of social, cultural, economic, and technological activity as the 
reason why the territorial state has become permeable (Brenner 2004, 78).
In fact, the territorial state merely copied social and political institutions 
and practices from city-states, especially expanding its reach and posses-
sion through territorial expansion (Halperin 2015, 75). Sociologist and 
urban scholar Neil Brenner suggests three global trends infuencing the 
interaction between urban areas and their states: 
(a) global economic integration as evidenced by national, territorial 
economies being permeable to supranational, continental, and 
global fows of capital, 
(b) resurgence of subnational superclusters of producers, and 
(c) consolidation of new supranational and cross-border institutions 
operating upon multistate regulatory arrangements such as the 
European Union, the G-7 (the G-8 until 2014 when Russia’s 
participation was suspended), the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, the United Nations, the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, and so on. (Brenner 2004, 5–6) 
With that in mind, international relations scholar Pareg Khanna argues 
that we are shifting from a world dominated by political and territorial 
demarcations to one where cross-border and global economic relations 
lead to supply-chain integration (2016, 149). He stresses that this does not 
signify the end of the territorial state, but reconfgures it as a cogovernor 
responsible for the regulation of the market (2016, 22). He also notes that 
the increased call for self-determination is not necessarily a sign of divi-
sive tribalism, but rather evidence of humanity maturing into the “natural 
unit” of living, that is, the more local or upper-local institutional arrange-
ment (2016, 68). That “natural unit” is the pragmatic solution to maintain-
ing multiethnic harmony and it would ensure solidarity between people 
(2016, 65, 120). The same line of argument is used by archaeologist Rob-
ert Kelly, who notes that fragmentation and division will be a step toward 
transnational stability (Kelly 2016, 116). He also writes that the territorial 
state may not be a necessity anymore in a world where the cost of war has 
become much higher than the possible benefts because the use of nuclear 
force destroys material property as well as human life (Kelly 2016, 112). 











Is there still a role for the territorial state in a globalizing world? What 
role can the territorial state play in a world where various actors within and 
around its borders are just as important and instrumental in dealing with 
supra-domestic and global concerns and challenges? From a sociologi-
cal perspective, one can argue that the role of the state has been reduced 
to that of being one among many actors making decisions that affect the 
public realm. Perhaps it has always been like that, and merely not so per-
ceived, recognized or experienced because of this dominance of the legal 
or juridical, that is Westphalian, perspective upon the state. In that sense,
globalization has augmented the Westphalian, juridical perspective with a 
sociological lens. And, indeed, it is through that sociological lens that we 
can recognize that the state is no longer that set of institutional arrange-
ments which directs and provides public services. However, one should 
not assume that the prominence of the territorial state as dominant politi-
cal arrangement of domestic and international relations has had its day.
If anything, the state still defnes the public arena and the civil rights and 
duties of its citizens, administers justice, circumscribes the “free market,”
and has more capability to protect its citizens from harm than any other,
private, social arrangement. In fact, we do not have another institutional 
arrangement that can take care of our collective needs as well as the ter-
ritorial state can. Combining these juridical and sociological lenses in the 
effort to assess the contemporary position and role of the state helps us see 
that it has become more of an enabling actor that defnes the boundaries of 
acceptable interactions between people and their groups. 
So, has living in a global society changed humans and their govern-
ments? Are we witnessing a new chapter in the history of human govern-
ing? Are people becoming global citizens who recognize that they live in 
a global society? Globalization, of course, is especially tangible in the fact 
that people learn about what happens elsewhere in a matter of minutes,
seconds even. Globalization is just as tangible in the intertwined world 
economy, where problems in one economy or region can easily have world-
wide reverberations, if not lead to global depression. In people’s daily lives,
that intertwinement of economies is visible in supermarket shelves where 
food products from all over the world can be purchased. All of this was not 
the case 50 years ago, except perhaps for the kind of economic downturn 
that ripples from one country to the next. That has been happening since 
the nineteenth century (Roberts 2012). 
But, again, is this globalization the driver in a trend toward a new kind 
of human being and society? This would be, indeed, the ultimate evidence 
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evolution. However, I think we are not there yet. In fact, we are not even 
close. In comparison to the life cycle of an individual human being, Homo 
sapiens has existed a long time, but it is in the context of the evolution 
of life but a blip. Cultural evolution, which basically concerns increasing 
“mastery” over the natural and social worlds, has slowly gained momentum 
since the time the earliest Homo made tools, but it has exponentially accel-
erated in the past 10,000 years with regard to institutional arrangements 
for governing, and in the past 200 to 300 years in terms of industrial and 
technological capabilities. Amid the forces of cultural evolution, which we 
now defne as globalization, the human being as a social creature is still 
catching up. In the words of political scientist James Q. Wilson, “Modern 
society is . . . a recent development that still must cope with a human ani-
mal that evolved under very different circumstances” (1993, 98; emphasis 
added). “Human animal” is emphasized because human beings are as much 
infuenced by their instincts as they are by their reason and intent. Despite 
the fact that biologically we are one species, what people stress are still the 
visible superfcial differences of, for instance, skin color and body weight,
and the less visible divides of political, religious, and sexual identity. In 
other words, humans culturally still categorize one another in tribes. We 
are far from living in a global society where people recognize and respect 
each other’s fundamental humanity and citizenship, the only two features 
all human beings share. Global citizenship in a (so far utopian) global soci-
ety will only be possible once people have overcome the more basic sur-
vival instincts that have been channeled and honed in those 10,000 years 
of sedentary, proprietary life. And global citizenship is only possible once 
all of humanity recognizes that economic development and prosperity, as 
well as educational opportunity, should not be limited to the elites in the 
developed parts of the world, but shared with everyone in the developed 
and less-developed parts of the world. 
5. Democracy as Ideal and as Vulnerable: 
Challenges from Human Behavior 
To understand the contemporary collective challenges that people face in 
the regional, national, interregional, and global communities, and to gauge 
the position and role of government in tackling these challenges, it is nec-
essary to consider the very ancient instinctual and behavioral predisposi-
tions of human beings in relation to the institutional arrangements for the 
distribution of power and wealth that people establish and accept when liv-










ing democratic, sedentary conditions. In this section, I frst touch upon the 
nature of democracy as it emerged in the past two centuries or so, and then 
discuss why it is so vulnerable to the kind of manipulation that is inspired 
by survival instinct parading as greed for possession and lust for power, the 
deep but persistent whispers beneath the veneer of civilization. 
Democracy as Ideal Political System 
In many societies around the globe, the state is still treated as the property 
and instrument of the elites, and bureaucracy is the instrument that helps 
keep top political and economic leaders in power by ensuring that those 
working in bureaucracy can cream off part of the pie. That was the type of 
political-administrative and economic system that dominated all societies,
right up to the time of the Atlantic revolutions. It is then, only 240 years 
ago, when the ancient idea of equality of people became enshrined in an 
equality before the law that is to be protected by the state’s government.
It is then, and only then, that the equally ancient idea of democracy was 
elevated from including only part of the population in a small territorial 
unit, the adult males in the city state of ancient Athens, to the large unit 
of the territorial state that includes all who live within its boundaries even 
when only those who are defned as citizens have voting rights. 
Democracy has been spreading across the globe, but it has one big 
hurdle to overcome: the almost instinctual inclination of the individual 
to survive by acquiring material goods without regard for others and, if 
necessary, manipulate societies’ rules to do so “legally.” The individual in 
primate societies can cheat and deceive, as primatologists have shown and 
as touched upon in chapter 3. The human individual is just as capable of 
cheating and deceiving but probably less so in physical than in imagined 
communities. Furthermore, keeping in mind Clive Gamble’s contrast 
between Western and Melanesian conceptions of individualism (see chap-
ter 4), one can imagine that manipulation is “easier” and more “understand-
able” in Western democracies, with their emphasis upon the individual as 
the building block of society. This Western worldview of the individual 
as the center of the universe infuences Westerners’ outlook on politics 
and economics. Perhaps it is idealistic or naive to believe in, but human-
ity now has the ability to recognize the great advantages of democracy as the best 
of institutional arrangements for constraining individual instinctual and tribal 
behaviors as well as for understanding them. Churchill’s mention of someone’s 
remark that democracy is the best of all bad governing arrangements is 
tongue-in-cheek because throughout his career he understood perfectly 










If I had to sum up the immediate future of democratic politics in a 
single word I should say “insurance.” That is the future—insurance 
against dangers from abroad, insurance against dangers scarcely less 
grave and much more near and constant which threaten us here at 
home in our own island. (Free Trade Hall, Manchester, May 23,
1909) (Churchill 2008, 384) 
Thirty-fve years later he said it thus: 
How is that word “democracy” to be interpreted? My idea of it is 
that the plain, humble, common man, just the ordinary man who 
keeps a wife and family, who goes off to fght for his country when 
it is in trouble, goes to the poll at the appropriate time, and puts 
his cross on the ballot paper showing the candidate he wishes to be 
elected to Parliament—that he is the foundation of democracy. And 
it is also essential to this foundation that this man or woman should 
do this without fear, and without any form of intimidation or victim-
ization. He marks his ballot paper in strict secrecy, and then elected 
representatives and together decide what government, or even in 
times of stress, what form of government they wish to have in their 
country. If that is democracy, I salute it. I espouse it. I would work 
for it. (House of Commons, December 8, 1944) (Churchill 2008, 64) 
Of course, Churchill was a member of the aristocracy and thus of a privi-
leged class, but he described the secret of democracy very well: it provides 
insurance against dangers at home and abroad through the popular elec-
tion of representatives on the basis of a secret ballot. In terms of political 
theory democracy is so far the best political system humans have developed because 
it assumes the state and government to be abstractions that are not the property 
of a political and economic elite whose machinations cannot be controlled by the 
populace, but a vessel steered by elected representatives who regard themselves as 
trustees or guardians of the people and who do not seek power for the sake of power 
and enrichment. Ideally, democracy is the political system where those in 
political power serve politics and are not beholden to those with economic 
power, and, at least, where the possibility of an economic hold over politi-
cal power is constrained by the rule of law. Also, and again ideally, that is,
under the best of circumstances, democracy is the system where those in 
power see it as a temporary honor from which they cannot but voluntarily 
step away. In the modern age, George Washington and Nelson Mandela 
are among the few to have done so. In fact, George Washington was very 
modern in his understanding that the democratic institutions of the state 













are vulnerable to manipulations by people. In his Farewell Address on Sep-
tember 17, 1796, he warned people of political parties: 
However political parties may now and then answer popular ends,
they are likely in the course of time and things, to become potent 
engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will 
be enabled to subvert the power of the people and to usurp for 
themselves the reins of government, destroying afterwards the very 
engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion. 
Washington pointed out that the democratic republic and state as a set 
of institutional arrangements that belongs to the citizenry, could still be 
perverted by an individual’s or by a group of individuals’ interest in power 
and wealth. It seems that Washington no longer regarded the state as a 
property in which all governing power should be concentrated, as Thomas 
Hobbes suggested, nor as a property in the hands of absolute rulers against 
which the people have to be protected, as John Locke advised. And, obvi-
ously, Hobbes and Locke only experienced, and thus thought about, the 
state as someone’s property. 
Declining Trust in Government 
The reader will recognize how utopian it sounds to say that democracy is 
a system of politics where those in power regard their position as a tem-
porary honor. The reader will thus note how far removed this is from real-
ity. It may be the case that “no regime type in the history of mankind has 
held such universal and global appeal as democracy does today” (Foa and 
Mounk 2016, 16) but in the real world, legal and moral safeguards have 
been established to protect democracy from humanity’s more instinctual 
inclinations. There are electoral cycles so that the citizenry at large has the 
opportunity to express desire for a change of direction without having to 
resort to violent revolution. In some democracies, it has proven necessary 
to set term limits so as to ensure that political offceholders cannot stay in 
power for an unlimited amount of time. Just focusing on political power 
alone, it is clear how much true democracy is still a dream that can be per-
verted by rent-seeking individuals. Only by contrasting democracy as ideal 
with democracy as it operates in reality can people see how much is still to 
be done. And yet, at the same time, that contrast allows us to see that equal-
ity of opportunity, if not equality of condition, has been achieved to some 

















decades were glorious, indeed, with public policies aimed at improving citi-
zens’ standard of living in general and providing safety nets for those who 
could not provide for themselves. In those decades, trust in government was 
high in most Western countries. Whatever happened since the mid-1970s 
is not the object of this book to describe, but trust in public institutions 
has declined almost everywhere. Any analysis of this decline in trust should 
include the fact that the declining trust of the citizenry in government is 
related to various elements, of which I pick three: the apparent triumph of 
rent-seeking behavior by private actors, the rise of personality politics and 
populism, and the emergence of a politics of intolerance between political 
offceholders of different, even opposing, affliation. 
Rent-Seeking Behavior by Private Actors:  
Business Principles in the Public Realm 
To understand the vulnerability of democracy and democratic politics,
we frst need to consider the extent to which economic thought has not 
only become intertwined with political thought and perspective, but has 
actually come to dominate politics. The contemporary study of economics 
emerged out of Europe’s Enlightenment as the study of rent-seeking indi-
viduals who maximize their preferences, that is, the study of microeconom-
ics, and where government policies allegedly seek to advance the greatest 
good for the greatest number of individuals. In that utilitarian approach to 
economics, scholars quickly forgot the study’s early modern roots as the 
study of political economy (Reinert 2007). This is the study of how and 
why politics controls the economy, that is, the study of macroeconomics.
Scholars such as the Italian economist avant la lettre Antonio Serra in the 
early seventeenth century, and the Prussian statesman and scholar of public 
administration Veit Ludwig von Seckendorff in the middle of the seven-
teenth century, observe that social development is best achieved through 
(a) diversifying the economy, not focusing on the production of raw mate-
rials only, through (b)  .  .  . government-initiated (and likely government-
fnanced) development of connective and energy infrastructure (in the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries: paved roads, canals; in the second half 
of the nineteenth century: railroads, water, gas, and electricity lines, sewers; 
in the late twentieth, the World Wide Web), as well as through (c) educa-
tion accessible for the population at large, and doing (a)–(c) by (d) linking 
the economically thriving urban with the more traditional rural, agricul-
tural communities (Reinert 2007, 92, 95, 225), which nowadays includes 
linking the developed to the lesser developed parts within countries and of 
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the world. So we can and should be able to probe what governing as a social 
phenomenon and institutional arrangement is, and then seek understand-
ing of its three main manifestations: 
(1) self-government among people, which lasted some 4,000 years, 
(2) government above a society with subjects, which lasted almost 
6,000 years, and 
(3) government in a society with citizens, which represents a posi-
tion and role that emerged at the time of the Atlantic revolutions 
and to which citizens and governments are still adjusting. 
And in some parts of the world we should add since the twentieth century 
the importance of (e) providing accessible health care to the population at 
large. 
This recipe for economic and social development seems to be standard 
operating procedure in northwestern European countries since World War 
II and has been suggested for the United States by, among others,American 
legal scholar and political offceholder Robert Reich (2015), Nobel Prize–
winning economist Joseph Stiglitz (2013, 2016), and economic adviser Jef-
frey Sachs (2011). Recent empirical research in developing and developed 
countries confrms that increases in economic complexity help decrease 
income inequality (Hartmann et al. 2017, 85). It is also advanced as the 
recipe for improving the plight of developing countries by, for instance,
economist John Williamson in his proposal of the Washington Consen-
sus. To be sure, he never intended for his ideas to be interpreted in the 
narrow confnes of monetarism, supply-side economics, and minimal state 
(Williamson 1989, 2002). The voices of Williamson, Sachs, Reich, Stiglitz,
Williamson, Hartmann, and many others, however, are drowned out by 
that ancient drive for physical survival and for dominance (including rec-
ognition, prestige, etc.) that seems to lead to a get-what-you-want attitude 
among human beings living in sedentary and imagined communities, and 
perhaps even most so among those who live in the Western world. More 
specifcally, to think of the public sector as “government” and of the private 
sector as the “market” is Western in origin. 
How do people today perceive the relation between the public arena, as 
“embodied” in an abstract government, and the private arena, usually iden-
tifed in the concept of “market”? For most of history, the market was liter-
ally a place, a square, where producers came to sell and city-folk as con-
sumers gathered to buy. That market was a physical place for the exchange 













in the developing world, the casbahs in the Middle East and Northern 
Africa, the weekly markets in Europe, and the farmer’s markets in the 
United States. Government belongs to the public world and government’s 
primacy over private interests is nicely captured in Roman jurist Aemilius 
Papinianus’s (142–212 CE) dictum, “A public right cannot be changed by 
the agreements of private parties” (ius publicum privatorum pactis mutari non 
potest), which is the basis of the Western understanding of the rule of law 
(Hamza 2017, 192; Novak 2009, 25). One can argue whether this idea pro-
vides a glimpse into what happened in the eighteenth century, namely that 
people came to think of a market as an abstraction, as something where the 
business interests of the private realm were somehow, magically, propelled 
by an invisible hand. The concept of the market’s invisible hand was coined 
by the Scottish political economist Adam Smith, who wrote that the busi-
nessman is interested 
only [in] his own security; and by directing .  .  . industry in such a 
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only 
his own gain; and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an 
invisible hand to promote an end that was no part of his intention.
Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By 
pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of the society 
more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. (2010,
230; emphasis added) 
In chapter 2 of Book IV, though, he also warns that private entrepreneurs 
and business interests can become “tribes of monopoly” whose sole func-
tion is to secure wealth by frst working for it and next, by securing prop-
erty, such as land or buildings, that others are wanting to rent. Hence the 
concept of rent-seeking, which refers to accumulating wealth without hav-
ing to work for it. It is appropriate to quote Adam Smith at length on this 
issue, since he is so often mistaken as the prime advocate for the unshack-
led freedom of the market and a trickle-down economy. At the end of Book 
I, chapter 11, in his Wealth of Nations he writes: 
The interest of the dealers [referring to stock owners, manufactur-
ers, and merchants], however, in any particular branch of trade or 
manufacture, is always in some respects different from, and even 
opposite to, that of the public. To widen the market and to narrow the 
competition, is always the interest of the dealers. To widen the market 
may frequently be agreeable enough to the interest of the public; 








   
 
 
but to narrow the competition must always be against it, and can 
serve only to enable the dealers, by raising their profts above what 
they naturally would be, to levy, for their own beneft, an absurd tax 
upon the rest of their fellow-citizens. (Smith 2010, 132; emphasis 
added) 
At the end of chapter 2, Book IV, he addresses the risk of monopolists using 
their wealth to infuence those in political offce to make decisions that will 
secure their proft margins. In fact, Smith warns that some of these tribes 
may even intimidate legislators. 
This monopoly has so much increased the number of some particu-
lar tribes of [manufacturers], that, like an overgrown standing army,
they have become formidable to the government, and upon many 
occasions intimidate the legislature. The member of parliament who 
supports every proposal for strengthening this monopoly, is sure to 
acquire not only the reputation of understanding trade, but great 
popularity and infuence with an order of men whose numbers and 
wealth render them of great importance.  If he opposes them, on 
the contrary, and still more if he has authority enough to be able to 
thwart them, neither the most acknowledged probity, nor the high-
est rank, nor the greatest public services, can protect him from the 
most infamous abuse and destruction, from personal insults, nor 
sometimes from real danger, arising from the insolent outrage of 
furious and disappointed monopolists. (2010, 239; emphasis added) 
Given the global reach of large corporations, there is every reason for gov-
ernments to pay careful attention to protecting democracy. I do not know 
whether comparative research has been done into the extent that private 
business in various countries try to bend public policy and regulation to 
ft their interests, but it is clear that this has been happening since the 
1970s. It is certainly the case in the United States, where public policy- and 
decision-making have been increasingly captured by private corporations 
through, inter alia, supporting reelection campaigns of business-friendly 
candidates and offceholders. This is not just regulatory capture (Stiglitz 
2013, 59), it is corrosive capture (Hacker and Pierson 2016, 93) since it 
hacks away at the fedgling shoots of a democracy where the differences 
between haves and have-nots are ameliorated by some degree of redis-
tributive policy. 




















ket would be akin to the anarchy that Hobbes feared. In fact, the free 
market in a democracy can only be one that is regulated by government 
(Polanyi 1944, 71, 141) so as to avoid excesses of price gauging, of rent-
seeking, and of unsavory competitive practices. A true free market with 
unbridled capitalism emasculates political democracy (Mann 2013, 132) 
because it violates the rights of the little man whom Churchill spoke of. In 
the concluding volume of his study on origins of social power, sociologist 
Michael Mann observes that the golden age of capitalism, the 1930s to the 
early 1970s, was a regulated one (2013, 136). Indeed, democratic polities 
cannot afford an unregulated market (Reich 2015, 4), and the superorgan-
ism that multinational corporations have become can be contained only by 
government (Haidt 2012, 346). The market is a social institution, and like 
any social institution, it has to be circumscribed by rules and norms set by 
a government that is of the people, acts in name of the people, and is with 
the people. As a social institution, the market actually refects the fact that 
human beings are instinctual creatures characterized by sociality (Asvar 
2019). 
Politics in a democracy should advance the interests of the people as a 
whole. That is not the same as saying that everything should be commu-
nally shared, as we presume to be the case in prehistory. People living in 
sedentary, imagined communities recognize and accept inequality but only 
when they feel that they get a fair shake and beneft from economic growth.
Distrust in government is fueled by questions about what motivates deci-
sions of political offceholders. When politicians fall to the rent-seeking,
calculating behavior according to their own private interests or those in the 
corporate world, they can no longer serve as guardians of democracy. And,
indeed, it appears that since the early twenty-frst century, a democratic 
recession can be seen throughout the globe (Diamond 2015) as a function,
at least in part, of the repatrimonialism mentioned in chapters 1 and 5. 
Income inequality has always existed, but it declined signifcantly in 
those 30 glorious years when, for the frst time in history, a large middle 
class emerged that has proven to be the backbone of any government in 
a democracy because it is the large, taxpaying portion of the population.
Since the 1970s, that middle class has been gutted by those who believe,
blindly and uninformed by Adam Smith, in the free market. Politicians 
have been duped by those with economic power. And if not duped, they 
have prostituted themselves for personal gain. Those with economic 
power have found a way since the early 1970s to advance their agenda of 
a deregulated market through which they can feed their own greed. They 
seek to exploit the weaknesses of politics in a democracy. Is it not ironical 







    




    




that democracy not only frees the people but also liberates business from 
the grip of absolutist politics? In premodern government, political power 
almost always controlled economic power, hence the term “political econ-
omy” (also known as mercantilism). Under democracy, economic power is 
much less constrained by political power, and the risk is that the former 
will seek the latter and vice versa so that both can hold on to that power 
and wealth, unless mechanisms are in place that, on the one hand, prohibit 
egregious abuse of power and that, on the other hand, are enforced by 
decision-makers not partial to one particular set of interests. 
Rent-seeking behavior is a major challenge in any democracy when 
calculable short-term outputs are more appreciated than longer-term 
outcomes. Systems scientist Safa Motesharrei and coauthors warn that in 
the case of what they call “economic stratifcation,” that is, serious social-
economic inequalities, “collapse is very diffcult to avoid and requires major 
policy changes, including major reductions in inequality and population 
growth rates” (2014, 101). Management scholar and coauthor of the well-
known 1972 Limits to Growth report of the Club of Rome, Jørgen Randers,
observed that the capitalist economy and liberal democracy seem unwilling 
to invest in long-term advantages for society and suffer from short-termism 
(2012). Whether it is true that liberal democracies are weaker governments 
than, say, that of China remains to be seen. Meanwhile, applying business 
principles of “good management” to the public sector since the 1980s, best 
known as new public management (NPM), undermines the legitimacy 
of public decisions on the basis of both democratic and economic values,
that is, on judgments about fairness, due process, and equity, as well as 
cost-beneft and means-ends considerations. This is not a simple matter 
to achieve in a culture that not only commodifes material goods but also 
seeks to make more immaterial benefts calculable. The welfare state of the 
30 glorious years has given way to the competition state. In the words of 
British political scientist Philip Cerny: 
Rather than attempt to take certain economic activities out of the 
market, to “decommodify” them as the welfare state was organized 
to do, the competition state has pursued increased marketization in 
order to make economic activities located within the national terri-
tory, or which otherwise contribute to national wealth, more com-
petitive in international and transnational terms. (1997, 259) 
In the competition state (see also Jessop 2002, 96), the state has reduced 
















the state is expected to bail businesses out yet acquiesce when top manag-
ers receive exorbitant compensation packages. What a disgrace it is that 
it has been possible, at least in the United States, for private businesses to 
privatize proft and socialize risk. Given that median salaries of the labor-
ing and middle classes have stagnated in the past 30 years, it is no wonder 
that people have come to distrust those with economic power. The social 
capitalism of the 30 glorious years has been challenged, to put it mildly, by 
the shift from managerial to shareholder power, from focusing on short-
term gains rather than on long-term results (the latter was the secret of the 
Protestant ethic), and from declining informal trust as a function of declin-
ing face-to-face communication (Sennett 2006, 37, 39, 42). 
Personality Politics and Populism:
The Enduring Power of Emotions 
Another big challenge to democracy is the political populism made pos-
sible through leadership by personality, followership by the herd, and for-
eign nondemocratic governments that seek to fame that populism in the 
hope of destabilizing democracy. In the words of Wrangham and Peterson, 
Whenever political power is personalized, so is the physical power 
on which it ultimately depends; and whenever the physical power is 
personalized [not parsed and regulated through institutions, laws,
and rules] the violence of demonic males from which it ultimately 
derives will be unrestrained. (1996, 244) 
I touched on personality politics in chapter 5, but it needs be mentioned 
in the context of this chapter since it is making democracy vulnerable to 
the intentions, desires, values, beliefs, and tastes of those who seek politi-
cal offce. Political offceholders recognize the importance of playing on 
people’s emotions and their ethnic, racial, and religious biases and thus, as 
Sennett observes, divorcing the way that they behave themselves in offce 
from their actual performance (2006, 165). Sennett suggests that a politi-
cian or a political party can be treated as a brand, a marketing tool (2006,
135). And political consultants have learned from brain scientists that ideas 
and programs do not count as much as emotions (Krastev 2012). It is easier 
to play upon people’s intuitive reactions than call upon their rationality. 
No one can blame political offceholders, political party members,
and political consultants when the apathetic, cynical, education-adverse
members of the citizenry simply allow emotions to rule. Being a citizen in
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a democracy is hard work because it involves not only rights and follow-
ing orders and leadership, but also duties, such as trying to be informed,
and taking responsibility for what happens in the public realm. This is,
however, diffcult in a time when the solidarity of social capitalism has
given way to a politics of new individualism and indifference (Sennett
2006, 164). Why would one care about someone else’s fate and fortune
when it is hard enough to look after one’s own? Is Bulgarian political
scientist Ivan Krastev right when somewhat cynically observing that
“transparency is not about restoring trust in institutions. Transparency
is politics’ management of mistrust” (2012)? More specifcally, transpar-
ency is the politicians’ answer to the people at large who observe those
in politics. 
The experiment in democracy is also under pressure from political
regimes that fear the potential of democracy and thus seek to destabilize
democratic regimes through playing upon the ancient human inclina-
tion to distinguish between in-group and out-group. I am not familiar
with any empirical evidence that nondemocratic regimes do this, but it
has been suggested in various media outlets that, for instance, Russia
seeks to destabilize Western European countries. First, as mentioned in
a New York Times article of May 29, 2017, through fnancing right-wing
populist parties such as the Five Star Movement in Italy, the National
Front in France, the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany, and the
Party of Freedom in the Netherlands. These parties thrive because,
second, Russia allegedly also directs migrants from Asian and Middle
Eastern countries to Western Europe, thus feeding a nationalist frenzy
against increasing multiethnicity in society. Third, in late 2017 it was
suggested that Russia may have fnanced Brexit campaigns in the UK.
Who still believes there really is a new human being on the horizon,
a true global citizen who no longer craves war (as Kelly 2016, 6, and
Henrich 2016, 318, suggest)? It is, though, important to keep in mind
that political populism is successful in some countries and not in others
(Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008). 
Whether humanity is on the verge of becoming a new type of global 
human species is also important in this context. Jonathan Haidt argues that 
intuition always seems to come frst and reasoning second (2012, xx and 
220). Canadian-American cognitive psychologist Steven Pinker under-
scored this when he listed the features that make it unlikely that human 










        




The primacy of family ties in all human societies and the consequent 
appeal of nepotism and inheritance. 
The limited scope of communal sharing in groups, the more com-
mon ethos of reciprocity, and the resulting phenomenon of 
social loafng and collapse of contributions to public goods when 
reciprocity cannot be implemented. 
The universality of dominance and violence across societies and 
existence of genetic and neurological mechanisms that underlie 
it. 
The universality of ethnocentrism and other forms of group-
against-group hostility across societies, and the ease with which 
such hostility can be aroused. 
The partial heritability of intelligence, conscientiousness, and anti-
social tendencies, implying that some degree of inequality will 
arise even in perfectly fair economic systems, and so we face an 
inherent tradeoff between equality and freedom. 
The prevalence of defense mechanisms, self-serving biases, and cog-
nitive dissonance reduction, by which people deceive themselves 
about their autonomy, wisdom, and integrity. 
The biases of human moral sense, including preference for kin and 
friends, a susceptibility to a taboo mentality, and a tendency to 
confuse morality with conformity, rank, cleanliness, and beauty.
(2002, 294) 
This is quite a list, and in this day and age of rent-seeking behavior and 
populism, it does seem almost impossible to believe that governments can 
rise above the instincts of human beings. However, I think we have seen 
its possibility in those glorious 30 years, but humanity under democratic 
conditions has suffered some setback since then because of increased polar-
ization and partisanship in the political and societal arenas. 
Na-Na-Na-Na-Boo-Boo Politics:
The Price of Polarization and Partisanship 
Living and working in the United States, one can easily think of it as the 
prime example of a country where politics has become polarized and par-
tisan. In class I have used the phrase “na-na-na-na-boo-boo politics” when 
referring to the pettiness of political offceholders once they are in power,
to the lack of civility between legislators of different parties, and to the 














lengths to which both Democrats and Republicans in American politics 
are prepared to go in manipulating the democratic process to hold on to 
power. Redistricting is just one example of the instruments American poli-
ticians have used (Tokaji 2018), and there have been and are other tools to 
skew power (Levitski and Ziblatt 2018, 209–211). However, polarization 
and partisanship are found in most democratic systems, although in some 
more (e.g., Southern and Eastern Europe) than in others (northwestern 
Europe). Polarization and partisanship are not only features of and gener-
ated by political offceholders and those who aspire to political offce, but 
are also found among various categories of citizens. In fact, polarization 
and partisanship may well be a function of interaction between portions of 
the population and (aspiring) political offceholders. They feed upon each 
other’s emotions and prejudices. They focus on selected slices of informa-
tion rather than scanning the spectrum of news media. People are moti-
vated by loss of identity in an increasingly multiethnic and multicultural 
world, are tired of promissory politics, and are disappointed by the degree 
of economic prosperity and opportunity for social mobility. 
This is not the place to discuss at length the literature on political polar-
ization and partisanship, but some attention to their causes is useful for 
understanding the context within which government operates and, thus,
infuences perceptions of its position and role in society. First, and focusing 
on political power only, elite theorists of democracy argue that the prin-
cipal cause of polarization is leadership style and lack of consensus among 
the political elite (Körösényi 2013, 16, 18). Related to that is that politics 
is less often seen as a calling, and more often seen as a way to move up the 
food chain of power and wealth. Another aspect of political discourse is 
that pundits, talking heads, consultants, and so on, add to the polarization 
already existent between political offceholders and their publics. 
Second, one can also focus on economic circumstances, and thus fnd 
that when promises of welfare policy development do not materialize, the 
result is a rise of economic populism, as was the case, for instance, in Hun-
gary in the 1990s (Körösényi 2013, 14). More generally, and across West-
ern democracies, there is increasing discontent about the rising levels of 
income inequality, and that appears to be quite a robust determinant of 
polarization (Grechyna 2016). 
A third possible set of causes may have to do with civil rights. The 
greater the extent to which freedom of expression (e.g., a free press) and 
freedom of association (e.g., labor unions) are allowed, the lesser the degree 
of political polarization (Patkós 2016). The structure of the political ele-
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represents a fourth category of causes. It is found that in a majoritarian,
two-party systems, levels of political polarization and partisanship are gen-
erally higher. Politics and policymaking in multiparty, consensus democ-
racies are not just “kinder and gentler,” as Dutch political scientist Arend 
Lijphart observed (1999, 306–307), but simply less polarizing. 
A ffth reason for political polarization and partisanship may be genera-
tional since it is highest among those who are least likely to use the internet 
and communicate via social media, that is, the elderly (Boxell et al. 2017,
5). Finally, a sixth possible cause may actually underlie all others and that 
has to do with levels of trust between people as human beings in general 
and, with regard to the subject matter of this book, between people in their 
respective roles as citizens, career civil servants, and political offcehold-
ers. At the very least, lack of trust among people also appears as a robust 
determinant of polarization (Grechyna 2016). It does not help that people 
increasingly distrust sources of information as well. How profoundly sad 
is it that children and teenagers need to be taught how to distinguish fake 
news from “real” news, training, for example, fnanced by Microsoft for 
secondary school education in Italy. The price paid for political polariza-
tion and partisanship is declining belief in the possibility of democracy. 
Indeed, democracy may have more universal appeal than any other 
regime type, but the fact that support for authoritarian alternatives is rising 
even in democracies (Foa and Mounk 2016, 12; Levistki and Ziblatt 2018) 
should warn us not to be complacent about the future of democracy. Let 
us not forget that democracy is not just a set of institutional arrangements,
but also a behavioral habit of self-restraint. In the words of President Ben-
jamin Harrison: “God has never endowed any statement or philosopher, or 
any body of them, with wisdom enough to frame a system of government 
that everybody could go off and leave” (1895, 4). 
A more visible and tangible illustration of the price of political polar-
ization and partisanship is that citizens, career civil servants, and political 
offceholders perceive each other more quickly on the basis of stereotypes 
than on an effort to discern what the reality actually might be like. Talk-
ing in the course of my career to lower-, middle-, and upper-level career 
civil servants, elected offceholders at local, regional, and national levels,
students at all levels in secondary and higher education, and people in gen-
eral, it is clear that people perceive reality in terms of stereotypes (in their 
respective public roles as citizen, civil servant, and political offceholder) 
more often than is desirable (Raadschelders 2003b, 220–222). Take a look 
at Tables 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3. 
Political polarization and partisanship may well result in citizen apathy.
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TABLE 7.1. Stereotypes and reality about citizens 
Abstract view of the citizenry Concrete view of citizens 
Stereotypes Voting cattle, public policy too Uninformed, entitlement mentality,
diffcult to understand for lay uninterested, lack of civic duty and 
people emphasis on rights 
Reality Limited knowledge about Active in interest groups, involved in 
government public affairs relevant to personal 
life, emphasis on rights and duties 
TABLE 7.2. Stereotypes and reality about politics and elected officials 
Abstract view of politics as “actor” Concrete view of politicians 
Stereotypes Short-term vision, “promissory 
politics,” sound bites without 
substance, talking without saying 
much, manipulative 
Reality Represents the common interest,
politics as calling 
Lust for power, corruptible,
manipulative, political offce as 
means to power and wealth 
Representatives of specifc electoral 
interests, visionaries for change 
TABLE 7.3. Stereotypes and reality about career civil servants and government 
Abstract view of government  Concrete view of government as 
as a whole subunits (including individuals) 
Stereotypes Inaccessible, ineffcient, red tape,
corruptible; bureaucracy is too big. 
Reality Balancing myriad and conficting 
demands, largest single employer,
largest possible clientele,
huge degree of organizational 
differentiation 
Self-seeking, formalistic, distant,
corruptible, power hungry, slavishly 
following the lead of elected 
offceholders 
proactive policymakers, citizen 
oriented, concerned, professional,
indispensable to politics 
Apathy is where citizens simply give up the belief that their voices and 
votes matter. However, it is important for citizens to remember that politi-
cian- and bureaucrat-bashing on their part is short-sighted since those who 
do not recognize their duty as citizens are just as guilty of perpetuating 
the existing stereotypical misunderstandings. This cannot be emphasized 
enough: in the long stretch of history, it is most unusual to have the oppor-
tunity to be a citizen rather than a subject. And that comes with duties, not 
just rights. One of those duties is to be as informed as one can be. We know 
that citizens are not dumb; they are simply uninformed (Shenkman 2016,
17). Policymakers, whether elected or appointed, should go through the 















to take the time to absorb and weigh information. True citizenship requires 
system 2 thinking. 
Elected offceholders (and those aspiring to political offce) have taken 
up bureaucrat-bashing since the late 1970s and have been successful, judged 
by the extent to which citizens distrust bureaucracy. However, let us not 
forget that political offceholders can just as easily be stereotyped (Table 
7.2). I did so on purpose in my TEDx talk on reconceptualizing govern-
ment (cf. “politicians have learned to kiss babies, civil servants daily change 
the diapers”) (Raadschelders 2018b). To be sure, I do not believe that all 
politicians are self-serving, rent-seeking individuals, but it is necessary to 
provide some counterweight to bureaucrat-bashing. And it is important to 
remember that politics should be about substance, not just about personal-
ity, intuition, and gut reactions. 
The stereotypes we are most familiar with are those of career civil ser-
vants (a term I prefer by far over the much more pejorative “bureaucrats”),
and the reader can fnd them in Table 7.3. Some of the items mentioned in 
the bottom row of each of these three tables will come across as idealistic,
but I cannot help thinking that democracy is possible and should not be 
left to the political leadership only (cf. Mackie 2009 on Schumpeter’s elitist 
views on democracy). Democracy and its government are the responsibility 
of all people in their respective public roles. 
The Need for Continuous Civics Education 
The blame game for political polarization and partisanship is not produc-
tive because it operates on stereotypes. More importantly, there is no point 
in determining who is most to blame, citizen, politician, or career civil 
servant. Everyone is doing exactly what is allowed. Citizens do not care too 
much to hear about duties, but do expect government and its offcials to do 
their duty. Business executives can only be expected to widen their market 
interest by seeking to infuence public regulations until they are told not 
to. Political offceholders can only be expected to seek private donations 
when there are no regulations that prohibit them. Civil servants will not 
express reservations about intended policies when they fnd that the politi-
cal leadership does not wish to hear them. The only thing that can make a 
difference for all types of public actors is education. 
The people as the citizenry not only have rights that are enforced on 
their behalf, but have duties they must fulfll as individual citizens and as 
a collective. The question of the day in many Western democracies is this: 
have we elevated the notion of “right” to the realm of absolutes while rel-











    
 
 
egating the countervailing notion of “responsibility” to the realm of rela-
tivisms, which means they are easily fungible? Citizens are not subjects of 
rule, they are makers and allies of rule through their representatives in the 
indirect representative democracies of today. Nikolas Rose says it thus: 
To rule citizens democratically means ruling them through their 
freedom, their choices, and their solidarities rather than despite 
these. It means turning subjects, their motivations and interrela-
tions, from potential sites of resistance to rule into allies of rule.
(1996, 117) 
This is not easy to ensure, though, when there appears to be less and less 
civics education in secondary schools, and more emphasis on citizen rights 
than on citizen duties. In fact, it would be useful for citizens in general to 
develop a more nuanced understanding of the role and position of govern-
ment in society: government in democratic societies is not “over us” as if 
people are subjects, but part of the people in their role as citizens. Govern-
ment and its bureaucracy are indispensable to the survival of democracy 
(Suleiman 2003, 35), but what citizens “see” is a politics and democracy 
that is “for sale.” They see a public sector where elected offceholders 
appear beholden to business interests or to interest groups. That trust in 
government is declining is clear, and one reason is that in some political 
systems politics seems to have succumbed to the private sector, especially 
when public laws are enacted to serve private parties and interests. Mind 
you, private parties are not only businesses and those hired to lobby on 
their behalf, they also include political parties (indeed, political parties are 
not part of the public sector) and any single-issue interest group or multi-
issue charter organization. 
Education in civics should go beyond the 1950s–1970s civics class, Gov-
ernment 101, that introduces 12- to 18-year-olds to the structure of gov-
ernment (the three branches) and how a bill becomes a law, that is, to the 
“stamps, fags, and coins” of government. It should also include attention 
to challenges and choices citizens and their governments have to make.
The iCivics initiative of the associate justice of the US Supreme Court 
Sandra Day O’Connor is an excellent example of how this can be done 
(www.icivics.org). Civics education should also focus, no modesty here, on 
the cross-time perspective discussed in this book. It is upon that kind of 
foundation that young people can opt for a career in the public sector that 





        










nately, I have met plenty of students who have that kind of calling despite 
the negativity, polarization, and cynicism that surrounds them. We need to 
give them the knowledge about government and the instruments to help 
them navigate it, as well as a deeper understanding of government as a 
key and indispensable function in any democratic system. Teachers, profes-
sors, lecturers, instructors—they all need to display genuine enthusiasm,
insatiable curiosity, and frm idealism in the midst of growing mistrust and 
cynicism. It is through education early on that complacency about citizen-
ship in democratic government can be avoided. 
6. Democracy and Bureaucracy: 
The Delicate Interplay of Fairness and Efficiency 
In physical communities, people deal with each other directly and in such a 
way that the baser behaviors are constrained by the group, because without 
such constraints the group would not survive. In imagined communities,
this is far more diffcult because people no longer know each other well 
enough to know whom they can trust. And so there is a government to 
help constrain the instincts and inclinations of individual human beings.
Social psychologist Donald T. Campbell observes that society can survive 
when people develop the means to curb greed, pride, dishonesty, coward-
ice, lust, wrath, gluttony, envy, thievery, promiscuity, stubbornness, dis-
obedience, and blasphemy. That is quite a list, and evolutionary biologist 
Robert Trivers added gossip, backbiting, and scolding (both referenced in 
Edgerton 1992, 70). Sociologist and anthropologist Robert Edgerton notes 
that people tend to accept correlated events as causally linked, that they 
are predisposed to suspect the worst of others, and that they project their 
hostility to others. He concluded that efforts to fnd ways to master those 
base instincts have never been more than partial because people are vessels 
of quite contradictory characteristics: they can be altruistic but also self-
ish, cooperative but also competitive, inquisitive about the unknown and 
yet fearful of it, self-assertive and yet submissive (Edgerton 1992, 72–73).
Human beings are a cauldron of contradictions. 
People are also pattern-seekers and simplifers who tend to think in 
terms of dichotomies rather than complementarities. They contrast a 
normative and communal stand with a more rationalistic, individualistic 
outlook (Wilson 1993). They contrast mechanistic societies and organiza-
tions with those that are perceived as more organic (cf. Ferdinand Tön-













   





nies). They discuss democracy as something that is threatened by bureau-
cracy (cf. Max Weber). They also think that democracy is threatened by 
effciency and that, in turn, effciency is jeopardized by democracy. They 
contrast overbearing government regulation with the liberating deregula-
tion that allows for a free market. In light of the stereotypes people hold of 
each other’s public roles, it must be clear that people also tend to diminish 
a complex organizational and social reality by stereotyping. In reality, we 
will not only fnd a balancing mix of those contrasts, but must understand 
we actually need it and recognize that sometimes the balance may tilt a bit 
to one side, other times to another, but should never decisively tilt toward 
one end only. With an unquestioned belief in performance management 
and NPM, we have teetered dangerously on one side of that balancing act. 
The challenge for democracy is that in large-scale imagined communi-
ties it is possible for those in power to hide their true intentions, where 
those elected to public offce and those with lots of money can together 
manipulate the common folk and subvert what a true democracy embod-
ies: talking under the condition of respect for differences, listening, hear-
ing, weighing, and coming to some sort of agreement. In a democracy,
people negotiate decisions and policies knowing that they can change them 
when circumstances so require. In a democracy, people can consult dif-
ferent sources of knowledge, not preferring one source over all others. In 
a democracy, an educated citizenry, whether garbage collector and street 
maintenance worker, elementary school teacher or professor, high-level 
CEO or low-level worker, can talk policy, especially policies that affect 
their own lives and that of their children. People as citizens should know 
that they can also be informed by the power-scrutinizing organizations that 
have emerged in the so-called monitory democracy (Keane 2009, xxii–xxix,
688). These include human rights organizations, focus groups, advisory 
boards, citizen juries, bioregional assemblies, consumer testing agencies,
and global watchdog organizations, among many others (Keane 2009, 692–
693). South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1995–1998),
chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, is perhaps the best-known example 
of this monitoring democracy. 
When people can “talk policy,” democracy is the scariest of political 
systems that humanity has devised. It is scary to those in power because it 
challenges the historical pattern in which power always fowed to the cen-
ter and the few. It is scary to those in power because their ability to manip-
ulate the multitude is constrained and monitored. Democracy is scary to 


















take ownership of government and recognize that basic human rights come 
with duties of participative, engaged, and—when and where possible—
informed citizenship. It is scary because it has never really existed except 
to some degree and only in some countries during those glorious 30 years. 
What experience can we fall back upon? Those who ignited the Ameri-
can and French Revolutions had no clue of the ripples they would send 
through the world. They were as blind as we are today, but we now know 
that some degree of balance between hope and cynicism has been possible.
Lust for political and economic power and wealth will always be. People 
will always hoard power when they are allowed to get away with it. My 
call is not for a bloody revolution or for political regime change, but for a 
persistent evolution toward informed democracy. 
7. Democracy, Self-Restraint, and True Guardians 
What government is can be explained by three metaphors used by politi-
cal scientist and economist Scott Page (2017, 138–143). We can think of 
government as an iceberg, of which we see only the top and the rest is 
invisible to the population at large. Perhaps this is how a lot of people 
think about government. Or we can see government as a structure of insti-
tutional arrangements that deal with collective challenges that are beyond 
the interest and capacity of private and nonproft actors. This is how civics 
used to be taught in most Western countries. For a while at least, citizens 
were told that contemporary policymaking is too technical for them and 
should be left to elected and appointed professionals. Finally, we can think 
of government as a cloud within which operate actors from all three major 
groups in society: public, private, and nonproft. This metaphor is probably 
the one that fts best the content of this book. Government is constantly 
shape-shifting in response to developments in the social, natural, geo-
graphical, cultural, political, and economic environments. Teaching civics 
should really be teaching about government’s position and role in society,
and then about its position and role over time. 
The answer to our question—what is government?—lies in knowing 
about what it has been and could be. What it has been is, obviously, subject 
to interpretation, and what it is and can be is even more subject to interpre-
tation. An answer for the moment, and certainly not an ultimate answer, to 
such an ontological question must be drawn from a wide range of authors,
and thus a wide range of ideas, suggestions, analyses, insights, emerging 


















yet unclear thoughts, and expectations. In my effort to understand human-
ity’s creation of, engagement with, and desire for governance as expressed 
through that formal, institutional arrangement we call government, I con-
clude that how we govern ourselves is determined, on the one hand, by our 
instinctual need for survival and sociality, and on the other, by our modern 
belief in rationality and intentionality. 
We are pattern seekers in a world that actually defes our desires for algo-
rithmic regularities. If anything, randomness is more common to human 
life than people care to admit: “When you’re talking about individual out-
comes, there’s a lot of randomness [and] people don’t like that answer, and 
so they keep wanting a different answer. They say nature abhors a vacuum.
Humans abhor randomness. We like deterministic stories” (Duncan Watts 
as interviewed by Wong 2018; see also Salganik et al. 2006). 
In light of all that randomness, it will be diffcult to claim the ability of 
seeing where humanity is heading, let alone to tell you why. A scholar can 
only surmise trends on the basis of what has been, and then suggest what 
avenues might be ahead. That said, there are patterns discernable at an 
abstract and general level. Where humans feel, and can act on, the need,
they will structure government territorially and organizationally. Human 
decision-making and policymaking is as much infuenced by instinctual,
emotional, and learned behaviors as it is by intent and evidence-based 
information. Democracy is the only political regime type that allows for 
negotiable authority and multisource decision-making. Democracy thrives 
when human beings substitute the temptation of short-term, individual 
gains with the promise of long-term, collective benefts. 
Large-scale democracy is an unusual institutional arrangement since 
for most of history it did not exist. Democracy establishes some degree 
of participation by the people. The iron law of oligarchy, which not only 
pertains to political parties but also to the confuence of political and eco-
nomic power, cannot be escaped, but it can be contained. However, it can 
be contained only when law and regulation are not controlled by private 
interests, when political offceholders do not prostitute their vote for 
money, when businesspeople are limited in their rent-seeking capabilities 
and operations and are willing to forgo satisfying short-term desires and 
individual rents for longer-term welfare and collective rents, and when citi-
zens not only recognize but accept the duties that come with being a citi-
zen. In other words, large-scale democracy can only exist when all actors,
institutional and individual, restrain their own freedom so that the other 
can be free. This is ultimately the message of the Sermon on the Mount 




alleged remark that “my freedom to punch you stops at your nose,” and of 
Nina Simone’s observation that freedom is to have no fear. In that kind of 
democracy, all people, whatever their station and occupation in life, serve 
as true guardians of the government they need to survive and thrive. We 
cannot do without democracy and government in our imagined commu-
nities, so we might as well share the burden of democracy and tend the 










   
Notes 
Introduction 
1. I know that Simon wrote somewhere that he was a simplifer, not a complexi-
fer, but I have been unable to fnd the reference. 
Chapter 1 
1. On a side note: let us hope that this does not include the recently introduced 
“evidence-based sentencing” in the United States, where “evidence” refers to sta-
tistics about the risk of recidivism for a member of the group to which the accused 
belongs and not to the particularities of the case itself (Elster 2015, 19 n. 22). 
Chapter 2 
1. On a side note: Klaes and Sent note that it is plausible that the notion of 
limited rationality does not date from before the seventeenth century (2005, 33),
but their analysis of the history of the concept only spans the decades between 1840 
and 1995. 
2. That is, I pick up knowledge whenever I read something that prompts me 
to check a reference. If anything, my research is driven by curiosity, by following a 
trail of references, and is thus likely more determined by chance than by rationality 
and objectivity. 
3. Nota bene: this type of approach has been proposed by Gottlieb (1991) for 
psychology and has been quite systematically used by Vaughn et al. (2014) in and 
for the study of social work. 
4. Nota bene: In the Roman distinction between res publica (public thing) and 
res privata (private property), the latter refers to the private sphere of the family 













252 Notes to Pages 114–47 
Chapter 4 
1. Throughout the book, I use “democracy” as the term for a government where 
those in political offce are elected by the people, and where citizens’ rights such 
as freedom of speech, of religion, and of assembly are protected by government.
For the American reader, it is important to point out that the Founding Fathers 
used the term “republic” rather than “democracy.” They viewed democracy as the 
perverted type of rule by the many, frst identifed thus by Aristotle. They were in 
favor of a government run by elites and ensured that through, e.g., the creation of 
an Electoral College. America’s Founding Fathers would fnd the contemporary 
meaning of democracy quite different. 
2. Rittell and Webber (1973) explicitly used the word “resolution” instead of 
“solution” to get across that in their view problems, and certainly “wicked prob-
lems,” could never be solved, only resolved temporarily. 
3. While the point is somewhat tangential, the reader may recall the brief discus-
sion of levels of intentionality in chapter 3 and recognize that this contrast between 
so-called Western and Melanesian conceptions of personhood is too dichotomous 
and that in reality elements of both conceptions are relevant to how personhood 
is defned. In the West and elsewhere, people are defned to varying degrees as 
individuals but also to varying degrees in relation to one another and, perhaps even 
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